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   Forms,	   v.	   2:	   Mythical	   Thought	  [1928]	  WCT	   What	  Is	  Called	  Thinking?	  [1951-­‐1952]	  WDR	   Wilhelm	   Dilthey’s	   Research	   and	   the	   Current	   Struggle	   for	   a	   Historical	   Worldview	  [1925]	  WM	   What	  Is	  Metaphysics?	  [1927]	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Note	  on	  Translations	  	  In	   the	  case	  of	  Kant,	   I	  have	   followed	   the	  generally	   first-­‐rate	   translations	  of	   the	  Cambridge	  
Edition	  of	  the	  Works	  of	  Immanuel	  Kant,	  and	  I	  have	  noted	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  I	  deviate	  from	  it.	  In	  a	  few	  cases	  I	  have	  benefited	  from	  consulting	  alternative	  translations,	  which	  I	  will	  list	  in	  the	  References.	  Because	  the	  available	  English	  translations	  of	  Heidegger	  vary	  wildly	  in	  both	  terminology	   and	   overall	   quality,	   I	   have	   modified	   extant	   translations	   in	   almost	   every	  instance,	  and	  accordingly	  I	  will	  not	  mark	  my	  deviations	  from	  extant	  translations.	  Even	  here,	  however,	   I	   have	   typically	  benefited	   from	   the	   available	   translations,	   and	   I	  will	   list	   those	   I	  have	  consulted	  in	  the	  References.	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And	   so	   that	   which	   has	   at	   last,	   to	   my	   own	  astonishment,	   emerged	   from	   my	   hands	   is	   a	  thing	   I	   feel	   I	   wish	   to	   call,	   proudly—despite	  the	   misery	   and	   disgust	   of	   these	   years—a	  
German	  philosophy.	  	   Spengler,	  1922	  	  	  	  	  
Introduction	  In	  the	  late	  spring	  of	  1929	  Heidegger	  came	  back	  down	  from	  Davos	  and	  immediately	  set	  to	  work	  on	  the	  manuscript	  that	  would	  become	  Kant	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics,	  which	  he	  published	  later	  that	  year.	  It	  is	  probably	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  philosophers	  have	  never	  been	  quite	  sure	  what	  to	  make	  of	  this	  work	  since.	  The	  “Kantbook,”	  as	  Heidegger	  casually	  referred	  to	  it,	  wielded	  more	  than	  its	  fair	  share	  of	  influence	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  questions	  it	  raises,	  including	  the	  precise	  structure	  of	  Kant’s	  discursive	  view	  of	  human	   cognition,	   remain	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Critique	   of	   Pure	  
Reason.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   the	  questions	  Heidegger	  presses	  and	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  he	  presses	   them	   are,	   as	   Cassirer	   argued	   at	   the	   time,	   not	   really	   Kant’s.	   Since	   Heidegger’s	  approach	  has	  nevertheless	  spawned	  its	  very	  own	  cottage	  industry	  of	  secondary	  literature	  on	   Kant,	   much	   of	   which	   remains	   heavily	   influenced	   by	   both	   his	   methodology	   and	   his	  substantive	  conclusions,1	  one	  may	  well	  question	  whether	  Heidegger’s	  intervention	  in	  Kant	  scholarship,	  a	  province	  in	  which	  he	  was,	  after	  all,	  not	  nearly	  as	  comprehensively	  versed	  as	  
                                                1	  See,	  for	  instance,	  the	  approach	  outlined	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  Sallis	  (1980).	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his	   Neokantian	   contemporaries,	   has	   on	   the	   whole	   been	   salutary	   for	   the	   contemporary	  understanding	  of	  Kant.	  In	   any	   case,	   Heidegger’s	   book	   itself	   has	   slowly	   faded	   away	   from	   its	   former	  preeminence	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  Kant.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  this	  is	  for	  good	  reason:	  whatever	  intrinsic	   interest	   Heidegger’s	   reading	   of	   Kant	  might	   retain,	   none	   of	   its	   chief	   interpretive	  claims	   remain	   tenable	   today.2	  But	   it	   is	   also	   true	   that	  Heidegger’s	   book	  has	   fallen	   into	   an	  uncomfortable	   kind	   of	   academic	   limbo:	   it	   is	   neither	   a	   straightforward	   piece	   of	   Kant	  scholarship—thus	   its	   inherently	   limited	   utility	   for	   Kantians—nor	   is	   it	   a	   straightforward	  expression	   of	   Heidegger’s	   own	   philosophical	   views—thus	   its	   limited	   interest	   for	  Heideggerians.	  The	  prevailing	  view	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  it	  is	  something	  of	  a	  mishmash	  of	  both	  which	  is	  therefore	  helpful	  in	  clarifying	  neither.	  Such	   mixed	   methodologies	   are	   hardly	   unfamiliar	   to	   those	   conversant	   in	   the	  literature	  on	  Kant.	  P.F.	   Strawson’s	  The	  Bounds	  of	  Sense,	  which	  may	  have	  done	  more	   than	  any	  other	  work	  to	  put	  the	  study	  of	  Kant	  back	  on	  the	  grand	  map	  of	  Anglophone	  philosophy,	  was	   unabashedly	   revisionist	   in	   its	   intentions.3	  Indeed,	   it	   could	   never	   have	   succeeded	   in	  rehabilitating	   Kant	   any	   other	   way.	   Whereas	   Strawson’s	   methodology	   is	   clear	   enough,	  however,	  Heidegger’s	  remains	  something	  of	  a	  mystery.	   In	  no	  small	  part	   this	   is	  due	  to	  the	  fact,	   often	   recognized,	   that	  Heidegger’s	   approach	   in	  Kant	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics	  can	   hardly	   be	   separated	   from	   his	   own	   legendarily	   obscure	   philosophical	   project.	   But	   to	  observe	  this	  is	  to	  risk	  immediately	  consigning	  the	  Kantbook,	  once	  again,	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  
                                                2	  Among	  these	  claims	  I	  would	  reckon:	  (1)	  that	  the	  transcendental	  power	  of	  imagination	  is	  really	  the	  unknown	  common	  root	  of	  understanding	  and	  sensibility;	  (2)	  that	  the	  section	  on	  the	  Schematism	  is	  really	  the	  heart	  of	  Kant’s	  problematic	   in	   the	   first	  Critique;	   and	  (3)	   that	  Kant’s	   late	  addition	  of	   the	  question	  What	  is	  the	  human	  
being?	  to	  his	  canonical	  list	  of	  three	  indicates	  a	  prior	  grounding	  role	  for	  a	  philosophical	  anthropology	  (really:	  an	  analytic	  of	  existence)	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  critical	  project	  as	  a	  whole.	  3	  See	  Strawson	  (1966),	  11.	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Heidegger	  scholars,	  scholars	  who,	  for	  their	  own	  part,	  may	  no	  longer	  have	  much	  use	  for	  it.	  The	  end	  result	  is	  that	  no	  one	  really	  knows	  what	  to	  do	  with	  the	  Kantbook.	  It	  might	  be	  used	  to	  illustrate	  mistakes	  into	  which	  a	  reader	  of	  Kant	  could	  easily,	  but	  ought	  not	  to,	  fall,	  or,	  on	  the	   other	   side,	   it	   might	   be	   used	   to	   illustrate	   a	   way	   of	   doing	   philosophy	   into	   which	  Heidegger	   himself	   almost	   fell.	   But	   few	   have	   attempted	   to	   systematically	   evaluate	   the	  Kantbook	  according	  to	  criteria	  for	  success	  that	  Heidegger	  himself	  would	  have	  recognized.	  Heidegger	  himself	  is	  actually	  an	  exception	  here,	  and	  the	  verdict	  he	  later	  returned	  on	  his	  efforts	   in	  the	  Kantbook	  was	  not	  kind.	  Many	  of	  his	  readers	  have	  shared	  this	  sentiment	  and	  have	  tended	  to	  see	  the	  Kantbook—and	  sometimes	  even	  the	  entire	  period	  of	  his	  thought	  in	  which	  he	  was	  most	  influenced	  by	  Kant	  (roughly:	  1926-­‐1929)—as	  an	  aberration	  from	  the	  true	  path	  of	  his	  thinking.4	  Kant,	  so	  the	  suggestion	  goes,	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  among	  Heidegger’s	  least	  fruitful	  interlocutors—at	  least	  if	  we	  measure	  fruitfulness	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  sheer	  output,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  depth	  of	  insight	  the	  encounter	  afforded	  him.	  The	  decision	  rendered	  here—initially,	  we	  must	  remember,	  by	  Heidegger	  himself—about	   Heidegger’s	   relationship	   to	   the	   tradition	   of	   philosophy	   has	   had	   ramifications	  well	  beyond	   the	   relatively	   small	   circle	  of	   scholars	   interested	   in	  understanding	  Heidegger.	  The	  decision	  against	  Kant,	  and	   in	   favor,	  say,	  of	  Kierkegaard	  and	  Nietzsche,	  has	  had	   important	  and	   in	   some	   cases	   probably	   irreversible	   consequences	   for	   the	   curriculum	   and	   self-­‐conception	   of	   an	   entire	   philosophical	   movement	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   The	   paradigmatic	  figures	  of	  this	  tradition,	  at	  least	  until	  we	  get	  to	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  tend	  to	  be	  those	  who	  are	   “outsiders”	  with	   respect	   to	  mainstream	  academic	  philosophy—consider,	   for	  example,	  
                                                4	  See	  Kisiel	  (1993)	  and	  van	  Buren	  (1994).	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the	  cases	  of	  Kierkegaard,	  Marx,	  Nietzsche,	  and	  Freud.5	  Kant,	  modern	  philosophy’s	  ultimate	  insider—in	   part,	   of	   course,	   since	   he	   himself	   did	   more	   than	   anyone	   else	   to	   shape	   the	  narrative	  by	  which	  we	  nowadays	  come	  to	   learn	  what	  modern	  philosophy	   is—is	  a	  part	  of	  this	  tradition	  only	  problematically,	  and	  more	  often	  than	  not	  by	  way	  of	  a	  negative	  influence.	  Of	  course,	  Kant	  has	  always	  had	  his	  admirers	  within	  this	  tradition,	  but	  it	  has	  generally	  been	  thought	  best	  to	  keep	  one’s	  distance	  when	  the	  day	  is	  done.	  This	  current	  situation	  was	  not	  inevitable,	  or	  at	  least	  it	  would	  not	  have	  appeared	  that	  way	  in	  1929.	  By	  the	  time	  of	  his	  participation	  in	  the	  Davos	  Hochschulekurse	  with	  Cassirer,	  Kant	  had	  played	  as	  substantive	  a	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  Heidegger’s	  thinking	  as	  anyone	  else.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  influences	  of	  Dilthey,	  Kierkegaard,	  Aristotle,	  and	  early	  Christianity	  on	  his	  thought	  in	  the	  early	  1920s	  cannot	  be	  denied.	  But	  by	  1929	  Kant	  had	  eclipsed	  them	  all,	  and	  at	  Davos	  Heidegger	  wanted	   to	   show,	  by	  means	  of	   an	   ingenious	   interpretation	  of	   the	  
Critique	   of	   Pure	   Reason,	   that	   he,	   not	   Cassirer,	   was	   the	   real	   heir	   of	   Kant	   and	   the	  Enlightenment.	  The	  moment	  did	  not	   last	   long.	   Just	   four	  years	   later,	  Heidegger	  would	   join	  the	  Nazi	  party	  and	  be	  installed	  as	  the	  rector	  at	  Freiburg	  with	  a	  mandate	  to	  reform	  the	  university.	  By	  the	   end	   of	   the	   turbulent	   decade,	   Heidegger	   would	   have	   immersed	   himself	   deeply	   in	  Nietzsche’s	  thought,	  and	  the	  path	  of	  his	  thinking	  would	  only	  take	  him	  further	  and	  further	  away	   from	   any	   recognizable	   academic	   tradition	   in	   philosophy.	   After	   the	   war	   it	   became	  difficult	  to	  see	  what	  Heidegger’s	  interest	  in	  the	  first	  Critique	  had	  ever	  really	  amounted	  to	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  In	  this	  context	  the	  Kantbook	  acquired	  the	  status	  of	  a	  historical	  artifact,	  one	  
                                                5	  Of	  course,	  Hegel	  stands	  as	  a	  glaring	  exception	  here,	  even	  if	  the	  American	  phenomenological	  movement	  has	  maintained	  an	  at	  best	  ambivalent	  attitude	  towards	  him.	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which	  perhaps	  warns	  us,	  above	  all,	  of	  the	  dangers	  of	  trying	  to	  insinuate	  one’s	  own	  thought	  into	  a	  tradition	  which	  is	  not	  really	  one’s	  own.	  In	   the	   face	   of	   such	   historical	   facts	   it	  would	   be	   absurd	   to	   suggest	   that	  Heidegger’s	  reading	  of	  Kant	  was	  anything	  but	  the	  failure	  which	  he	  himself	  judged	  it	  to	  be.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  I	  am	  not	  about	  to	  suggest	  otherwise.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  Kantbook	  can	  now	   be	   closed	   for	   good.	   We	   are	   the	   inheritors	   of	   Heidegger’s	   failure	   on	   this	   score,	  something	  which	   contemporary	   phenomenology	  must	   come	   to	   grips	  with	   if	   it	  wishes	   to	  clarify	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  obviously	  uneasy	  relationship	  it	  continues	  to	  bear	  to	  Kant.	  Such	  a	  clarification,	  I	  am	  convinced,	  can	  only	  begin	  with	  a	  return	  to	  those	  days	  in	  1929	  when	  this	  failure	  had	  not	  yet	  assumed	  the	  character	  of	  an	  unconquerable	  historical	  fact.	  And	  yet	  the	  questions	  of	  the	  Davos	  debate	  have	  receded	  so	  far	  from	  our	  philosophical	  memory	  that	  it	  takes	  as	  much	  effort	  as	  we	  can	  muster	  even	  to	  recover	  its	  stakes.	  Why	   did	   Heidegger	   have	   to	   read	   Kant?	   Why	   did	   he	   have	   to	   interpret	   him	   so	  “violently,”	  as	  he	  would	  later	  acknowledge?	  Could	  Heidegger	  have	  approached	  any	  nearer	  to	  Kant’s	   thought	  while	   remaining	  himself?	  And	  what	  was	   the	   inner	  movement	  of	  Kant’s	  thought	  that	  Heidegger	  could	  not	  quite	  grab	  a	  hold	  of?	  Each	   of	   these	   questions,	   considered	   on	   its	   own,	   could	   well	   be	   the	   subject	   of	   a	  substantial	  volume.	  My	  goal	  here	  is	  to	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  which	  must	  be	  laid	  if	  we	  are	  to	  make	   the	   stakes	   of	   Davos	   intelligible,	   and	   thus	   to	   take	   the	   first	   tentative	   steps	   towards	  returning	  to	  Heidegger’s	  reading	  of	  Kant	  its	  power	  to	  provoke.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  I	  call	  this	  essay	  a	  “genesis.”	  I	  do	  so	  not	  because	  I	  aim	  to	  trace	  completely	  the	  historical	  story	  that	  would	   chronologically	   display	   Heidegger’s	   Kant	   interpretation	   over	   the	   course	   of	   its	  development.	   In	   fact	   I	   am	   not	   going	   to	   pursue	   the	   various	   fine	   distinctions	   between	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Heidegger’s	  Kant	  interpretation	  as	  it	  first	  appeared	  in	  1926	  and	  as	  it	  would	  finally	  appear	  in	  the	  Kantbook.	  Instead,	  what	  I	  am	  offering	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  conceptual	  genesis	  of	  Heidegger’s	  interpretation.	  I	  will	  do	  so	  by	  beginning	  with	  Kant	  himself.	   In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  my	  essay,	   I	  examine	  the	  place	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  in	  Kant’s	  philosophy,	  which,	  I	  will	  argue,	  ends	  up	   playing	   foundational,	   and	   connected,	   roles	   both	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   Kant’s	   critical	  system—in	  the	  first	  Critique—and	  at	  its	  end—in	  the	  third.	  In	  the	  second	  part	  I	  will	  train	  my	  attention	   on	  Heidegger,	   examining	   the	   development	   of	   his	   philosophical	  methodology	   in	  the	   early	   1920s	   up	   through	  Being	  and	  Time,	   an	   aspect	   of	   his	   thought	   that	   is	   of	   decisive	  importance	   if	  we	  want	  to	  understand	  his	   interpretation	  of	  Kant.	  Finally,	   I	  will	   turn	  to	  the	  Kantbook	   itself.	   Although	   it	   failed	   in	   its	   primary	   task,	   an	   appreciation	   of	   its	   goals	   and	  methodology	   sheds	   new	   light,	   I	   hope,	   on	   the	   questions	   that	   animated	   the	   discussion	   at	  Davos,	   and	  with	  which	   phenomenology	  will	   once	   again	   have	   to	   reckon	   if	   it	  will	   come	   to	  grips	  with	  its	  place	  in	  the	  tradition.	  In	  Chapter	  I	  I	  will	  trace	  the	  role	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  plays	  in	  the	  first	  Critique	  in	  grounding	   the	   objective	   validity	   of	   the	   pure	   concepts	   of	   the	   understanding.	   The	   unity	  characteristic	  of	  concepts	   in	  general,	   I	  will	  argue,	   is	  essentially	  dependent	  on	  the	  unity	  of	  action	  for	  which	  the	  employment	  of	  our	  power	  of	  judgment	  is	  first	  responsible	  for	  bringing	  into	  the	  field	  of	  cognition.	  Since	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  cannot,	  as	  Kant	  insists,	  be	  governed	  by	  the	  application	  of	  rules,	   this	  means	  that	   the	  objective	  validity	  of	  our	  rational	  norms	   is	  possible	  only	  on	   the	  condition	   that	  we	  have	  already	  assumed	  the	  responsibility	   for	  some	  judgment	   that	   rests	   on	   the	   nonconceptual	   subsumption	   of	   an	   intuition	   under	   a	   concept.	  Neither	  the	  clarity	  and	  distinctness	  of	  our	  concepts	  nor	  the	  mere	  deliverances	  of	  our	  faculty	  of	  feeling	  could	  compel	  us	  to	  judge	  (as	  the	  rationalists	  and	  empiricists	  had	  supposed),	  and	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yet	  we	  must	  do	   so	  nonetheless	   if	  we	  are	   to	  be	  able	   to	   relate	  ourselves	   cognitively	   to	   the	  world	  of	  objects	  at	  all.	  In	   Chapter	   II	   I	   will	   investigate	   the	   (essentially	   limited)	   unity	   of	   theoretical	   and	  practical	  philosophy	  that	  Kant	  seeks	   to	  attain	   in	   the	   third	  Critique.	   I	  will	  argue	   that	  Kant,	  pressed	  by	  Herder	   to	  acknowledge	  a	  deeper	  unity	  between	  the	  two,	  defends	  his	  dualistic	  view	   by	   critiquing	   the	   role	   our	   power	   of	   judgment	   plays	   with	   respect	   to	   our	   faculty	   of	  feeling.	  This	  critique	  is	  by	  no	  means	  only	  negative,	  however,	  for	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  the	  faculty	  of	   feeling	   actually	   makes	   possible	   a	   kind	   of	   transition	   between	   the	   standpoints	   of	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  philosophy.	  Precisely	  because	  it	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  faculty	  of	  feeling,	  however,	   this	   transition	   is	   nothing	   like	   Herder’s	   natural-­‐historical	   teleology.	   In	   fact,	  Herder’s	  vitalism	  is	  something	  like	  a	  cognitive	  image	  of	  the	  true	  transition.	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  Herder	  has	  simply	  attempted	  to	  make	  an	  objective	  use	  of	  a	  (properly)	  subjective	  principle	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judgment.	  It	  is	  in	  its	  subjective	  use	  alone	  that	  such	  a	  principle	  could	  provide	  the	  means	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  unity	  towards	  which	  Herder	  was	  pressing	  Kant.	  Understanding	  what	  this	  unity	   is	  supposed	  to	  consist	   in	   for	  Kant	   is	  crucial	   for	  understanding	  the	  overall	  shape	   of	   his	   critical	   system.	   Above	   all,	   it	   is	   not	   by	   accident,	   but	   for	   essential	   structural	  reasons,	  that	  the	  power	  of	  judgment,	  which	  played	  the	  foundational	  role	  in	  the	  critique	  of	  cognition,	  now	  plays	  the	  final	  role	  in	  uniting	  Kant’s	  critical	  philosophy	  as	  a	  whole.	  In	  Chapter	  III	   I	  will	   follow	  out	  the	  development	  of	  Heidegger’s	  early	  reflections	  on	  philosophical	  methodology,	  especially	  as	  they	  are	  manifest	   in	  his	  Freiburg	  seminars	   from	  1919	  to	  1922.	  Heidegger’s	  development	  of	  the	  method	  of	  “formal	  indication,”	  which	  will	  be	  decisive	   for	   his	  work	   for	   years	   to	   come,	   can	   best	   be	   seen,	   I	   argue,	   as	   a	   response	   to	   the	  demands	   of	   life	   philosophy,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   the	   worries	   about	   the	   “givenness”	   of	   the	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phenomenon	  brought	  forward	  by	  the	  Neokantians.	  In	  this	  regard,	  Natorp’s	  critical	  review	  of	   Husserl’s	   Ideas	   and	   Heidegger’s	   (not	   yet	   adequate)	   response	   to	   it	   are	   crucial	   for	  understanding	  the	  shape	  his	  thought	  would	  take	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  begin	  laying	  out	  the	  connection	  between	  Heidegger’s	  conceptions	  of	  philosophical	  methodology	  and	   the	   history	   of	   philosophy,	   a	   connection	   that	   will	   prove	   decisive	   for	   the	   projected	  structure	  of	  Being	  and	  Time.	  In	   Chapter	   IV,	   then,	   I	   turn	   to	   Being	   and	   Time,	   where	   we	   find	   Heidegger’s	  methodology	   deployed	   to	   its	   fullest	   potential,	   even	   if	   the	   historical	   part	   of	   the	   work	   to	  which	  that	  methodology	  pointed	  never	  actually	  came	  to	  fruition.	  My	  interpretive	  focus	  will	  fall	  on	  Heidegger’s	  methodological	   introductory	  sections,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  role	  which	  the	  second	  division	   of	   the	  work	  was	   supposed	   to	   play.	   I	  will	   try	   to	   explain	   how	  Heidegger’s	  term	  “Dasein”	  functions	  for	  him	  as	  a	  formal	  indicator	  and	  why	  the	  results	  of	  the	  inquiry	  it	  opens	   (i.e.,	   the	   preliminary	   analytic	   of	   existence)	   must	   necessarily	   be	   exhausted	   by	   the	  directive	  they	  were	  supposed	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  for	  the	  historical	  inquiry	  into	  which	  Being	  
and	  Time	  was	  originally	  designed	   to	  be	  resolved.	  With	  respect	   to	   this	  historical	   research,	  which	   Heidegger	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   Destruktion	   of	   the	   history	   of	   philosophy,	   Kant	   was	  assigned	   a	   privileged	   role:	   Heidegger	   had	   come,	   by	   1927,	   to	   consider	   Kant	   to	   be	   his	  proximate	  historical	  forebearer,	  and	  for	  Heidegger,	  this	  meant	  that	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  his	  own	  phenomenological	  project	  would	  only	  become	  available	  to	  him	  if	  he	  first	  went	  all	  out	  after	  an	  understanding	  of	  Kant.	  The	  final	  goal,	  to	  be	  sure,	  was	  to	  recover	  the	  stakes	  of	  the	  Greek	  inquiry	  into	  being,	  but	  an	  encounter	  with	  Kant	  would	  serve,	  or	  so	  he	  thought	  at	  the	   time,	   as	   the	   unavoidable	   first	   step	   on	   that	   journey	   which	   would	   link	   the	   existential	  analytic	  to	  the	  grand	  tradition	  of	  Western	  metaphysics.	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In	  Chapter	  V,	  finally,	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  encounter	  with	  Kant	  to	  which	  Heidegger	  was	  thus	  led.	  At	  Davos,	  I	  will	  stress,	  the	  stakes	  were	  high	  for	  Heidegger	  indeed.	  Only	  by	  showing	  that	  it	  was	  he	  who	  stood	  in	  the	  Kantian	  tradition	  could	  he	  succeed	  in	  connecting	  the	  published	  torso	   of	   Being	   and	   Time,	   which	   had	   already	   garnered	   him	   considerable	   international	  recognition,	  with	   the	  ancient	  question	  of	  being	   to	  which	   that	  project	  was,	   from	   the	  start,	  supposed	  to	  be	  oriented.	  As	   I	  have	  already	   indicated,	  Heidegger	  did	  not	  really	  succeed	   in	  his	  attempt	  to	  locate	  the	  Kantian	  origin	  of	  his	  own	  thought,	  and	  perhaps	  he	  could	  not	  have.	  I	  will	  suggest,	  however,	  that	  Heidegger	   left	  some	  important	  resources	  on	  the	  table	  at	  and	  after	  Davos,	  depriving	  him	  of	  the	  best	  chance	  he	  would	  ever	  have	  to	  connect	  his	  thought	  up	  to	  the	  Enlightenment	  tradition.	  In	  fact,	  I	  will	  suggest,	  it	  may	  well	  be	  that	  it	  was	  Heidegger	  himself	  who	  “shrank	  back”	  from	  the	  encounter	  with	  Kant	  which	  he	  had	  almost	  concluded,	  a	  shrinking	  back	  which	  has	  continued	  to	  haunt	  the	  phenomenological	  tradition	  to	  this	  day.	  








Part	  One	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   precisely	   this	   section	   is	  especially	   charming	   in	   that	   we	   see	   Kant	  immediately	  at	  work,	  oblivious	  of	  any	  regard	  for	  the	  reader.	   	  Heidegger,	  1928	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The	  Social	  Contract	  opens	  with	  a	  simple	  observation	  which	  concisely	  expressed	  the	  deepest	  preoccupation	   of	   the	   eighteenth	   century.	   “Man	   is	   born	   free,”	   Rousseau	   observes,	   “and	  everywhere	  he	  is	  in	  chains.”6	  And	  yet	  the	  century	  never	  lost	  its	  confidence	  that	  it	  must	  be	  possible	  to	  preserve	  the	  inner	  freedom	  of	  mankind	  despite	  the	  external	  conditions	  that	  had	  distorted	  it	  beyond	  recognition.	  Kant	  would	  soon	  emerge	  as	  the	  leading	  voice	  in	  defense	  of	  the	  centrality	  of	  freedom	  to	  a	  proper	  conception	  of	  the	  human	  being,	  and	  the	  coherence	  of	  his	   critical	   system	   was	   seen	   by	   many—both	   in	   his	   own	   time	   and	   in	   the	   years	   that	  followed—as	  the	  articulation	  and	  defense	  the	  Enlightenment	  had	  been	  waiting	  for.	  And	  yet	  the	   basic	   tension	   noted	   by	  Rousseau	   is	   not	   so	  much	   overcome	   in	   Kant’s	   thought	   as	   it	   is	  more	  or	  less	  peacefully	  accepted	  by	  it.	  Even	  Kant’s	  grandest	  architectonic	  ambitions	  never	  led	  him	  completely	  away	  from	  Rousseau’s	  insight;	  in	  fact,	  those	  very	  ambitions	  turned	  out	  to	  depend	  upon	  it,	  requiring	  a	  sharp	  distinction	  between	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is	  and	  the	  world	  as	  we	  ought	  to	  make	  it.	  In	  the	  one	  man’s	  chains	  are	  given	  their	  due,	  in	  the	  other	  his	  freedom.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  latter—and	  only	  there—where	  the	  satisfaction	  reason	  has	  vainly	  sought	  in	   its	   cognition	   of	   the	   natural	   world	   can	   finally	   be	   met	   with.	   Until	   now	   reason	   has	  entertained	  only	  a	  confused	  presentiment	  of	   its	  own	  freedom	  in	  its	  theoretical	  endeavors	  (CPR	  A796/B824;	  see	  also	  CPrR	  5:107),	  but	  Kant	  has	  finally	  collected	  the	  critical	  resources	  necessary	  to	  turn	  its	  attention,	  forcibly	  if	  need	  be,	  to	  its	  final	  end.	  In	  this	  regard	  Kant	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  grant	  that	  the	  “greatest	  and	  perhaps	  only	  utility	  of	  all	  philosophy	  of	  pure	  reason	  is	  .	  .	  .	  only	  negative”	  (CPR	  A795/B823).	  In	  this	  way	  the	  entire	  edifice	  of	  critique	  finally	  leads	  to	   the	   unobscured	   contemplation	   of	   freedom,	   which	   is	   accordingly	   the	   keystone	   of	   its	  
                                                6	  Rousseau	  (1762b),	  141.	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system	  (CPrR	  5:3).7	  Freedom	  is	  “the	  capacity	  which	  confers	  unlimited	  usefulness	  on	  all	  the	  others”	  and	  represents	  our	  highest	  and	  final	  vocation	  as	  human	  beings	  (MoC	  27:344).	  Now,	  Kant	  was	  well	  aware	  that	  the	  Enlightenment	  attempt	  to	  install	  freedom	  as	  the	  highest	   principle	   of	   natural	   philosophy8	  had	   led	   the	   latter	   into	   a	   series	   of	   seemingly	  intractable	   difficulties.	   Releasing	   human	   reason	   from	   its	   servitude	   to	   the	   once-­‐eternal	  species	  forms	  of	  the	  Scholastics—and	  compelling	  it	  instead	  to	  seek	  its	  ultimate	  principles	  in	  the	  form	  of	  its	  own	  operations	  (whether	  we	  take	  the	  latter	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  Descartes	  or	  Locke)—had	  reanimated	   long-­‐dormant	  questions	  about	   the	  ability	  of	   the	  human	  mind	   to	  grasp	   the	   basic	   principles	   of	   nature.	   Where	   it	   did	   not	   invite	   skepticism,	   however,	   the	  permission	  granted	  to	  human	  reason	  to	  take	  its	  instruction	  in	  the	  first	  and	  final	  instances	  from	  itself	  proved	  to	  open	  the	  door	  to	  an	  ambitious	  metaphysics	  whose	  connection	  to	  the	  real	  world	   remained	   unconvincing	   to	   so	  many.	  When	  Kant	  warned	   in	   the	  Dreams	   of	   the	  “fantastical	  visionaries”	  residing	  in	  a	  paradise	  of	  shadows	  without	  frontiers	  (DSS	  2:317),	  he	  was	  merely	  warming	   up	   for	   the	   sustained	   assault	   on	   rational	  metaphysics	  which	  would	  earn	  him	  the	  epithet	  “alles	  zermalmend”	  (“all-­‐crushing”)	  from	  Mendelssohn.9	  Kant’s	  worry	  reflected	  the	  lesson	  he	  had	  absorbed	  through	  the	  experience	  of	  reading	  Rousseau:	  reason’s	  unconvincing	  conquest	  of	  the	  kingdom	  of	  nature	  threatened	  to	  tarnish	  its	  good	  name	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  practical	  action.	  The	  lasting	  achievement	  of	  the	  first	  Critique,	  Kant	  hoped,	  rested	  on	   the	   security	   it	   would	   be	   able	   to	   provide	   for	   an	   inquiry	   into	   reason’s	   practical	   use	   in	  which	  the	  deep	  connection	  between	  reason	  and	  freedom	  could	  be	  irrevocably	  established.	  
                                                7	  This	   is	  not	   to	   say	   that	   the	   “natural	  dialectic”	  of	  practical	   reason	  can	  be	  overcome	  by	  practical	  philosophy	  alone;	  at	  best,	  through	  science	  we	  can	  escape	  the	  “ambiguity”	  into	  which	  practical	  reason	  falls	  and	  clear	  the	  way	  for	  wisdom	  to	  prevail	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  sensible	  incentives	  which	  never	  cease	  to	  assert	  themselves.	  See	  G	  4:404-­‐405.	  8	  For	  a	  particularly	  vivid	  illustration	  of	  this,	  see	  Malebranche	  (1674-­‐1675),	  in	  particular,	  Bk.	  I,	  Chs.	  1-­‐2.	  9	  Mendelssohn	  (1785),	  3.	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Kant’s	   critical	   thought	   is	   often	   identified	   straightaway	   with	   the	   image	   of	   the	  “tribunal	  of	   reason”	   so	  characteristic	  of	   the	  Enlightenment	   (see,	   e.g.,	  CPR	  Axii,	  Bxiii).	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  venerable	  traditions	  bequeathed	  to	  modernity,	  whether	  they	  be	  religious	  or	  political	   institutions,	   or	   even	   idols	   of	   the	  mind,	  must	  be	   subjected	   to	   a	  question	   so	  basic	  that	  no	  external	  authority	  could	  claim	  a	  special	  privilege	  in	  answering	  it,	  namely,	  Are	  they	  
reasonable?	  Far	   from	  originating	  with	  Kant,	  however,	   the	   image	  of	   the	   tribunal	  of	   reason	  had	   been	   in	   circulation	   for	   some	   time,10	  although	   it	   did,	   to	   be	   sure,	   take	   on	   a	   somewhat	  different	  inflection	  in	  Kant’s	  work.	  For	  Kant,	  reason	  is	  no	  longer	  merely	  assigned	  the	  task	  of	  criticizing	  the	  institutions	  and	  doctrines	  handed	  down	  by	  tradition	  and	  experience.	  Instead,	  reason	  is	  asked	  to	  sit	  in	  judgment	  first	  and	  foremost	  over	  its	  own	  pretensions;11	  if	  the	  tacit	  emphasis	  of	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  was	  on	  the	  tribunal	  of	  reason,	  Kant	  subtly	  shifts	  the	  discussion	   to	   the	   very	   idea	   of	   a	   tribunal	   and	   the	   attendant	   task	   of	   judgment	   with	  which	  reason	  finds	  itself	  burdened.	  Witness,	  for	  example,	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Kant	  in	  1781	  publicly	  introduces	  the	  task	  of	  a	  “critique	  of	  pure	  reason”	  and	  proclaims	  it	  as	  the	  manifestation	  of	  the	  genuine	  spirit	  of	  his	  age.	  On	  the	  surface,	  he	  concedes,	  it	  may	  appear	  as	  though	  the	  enthusiasm	  for	  reason,	  so	  palpable	  among	  the	  men	  of	   letters	   in	   the	  previous	  century,	  had	  run	   its	  course,	  dissolving	  into	   the	   democratic	   but	   shallow	   program	   of	   the	   philosophes	   and	   Popularphilosophen,	   a	  
                                                10	  Locke	  had	  already	  referred	  to	  reason’s	  judgeship	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  seventeenth	  century;	  see	  Locke	  (1689),	  693	  (IV.xviii.6)	  and	  704	  (IV.xix.14).	   In	   the	  Encyclopedia	  article	  on	  Liberté	  de	  penser,	  Abbé	  Mallet	  refers,	   in	  a	  similar	  context,	  to	  the	  “tribunal	  de	  la	  fiere	  raison,”	  albeit	  it	  in	  a	  negative	  manner,	  defending	  the	  prerogative	  of	  religious	   faith	   in	  matters	   of	   revelation	   (Mallet	   [1751],	   IX.472b-­‐473a,	   quoted	   at	   IX.473a).	   The	  more	   liberal	  attitude	  towards	  freedom	  of	  thought	  shared	  by	  most	  of	  the	  encyclopedists,	  including	  Diderot	  and	  d’Alembert,	  was,	   however,	   scattered	   throughout	   the	   volumes	  of	   the	  Encyclopedia	   and	  occasioned	   a	   good	  deal	   of	   public	  controversy.	  See	  Lough	  (1971),	  137-­‐140.	  11	  Cassirer	  makes	  a	  similar	  point.	  For	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  reason	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  tool	  for	  criticism,	  but	  rather	  something	  the	  deepest	  mystery	  of	  which	  lies	  in	  itself.	  “The	  age	  of	  d’Alembert	  feels	  itself	  impelled	  by	  a	  mighty	  movement,	  but	  it	  refuses	  to	  abandon	  itself	  to	  this	  force.	  It	  wants	  to	  know	  the	  whence	  and	  whither,	  the	  origin	  and	  the	  goal,	  of	  its	  impulsion”	  (Cassirer	  [1932],	  4).	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program	  marked	   by	   indifference,	   if	   not	   outright	   hostility,	   to	   the	   traditional	   problems	   of	  philosophy	   and	   metaphysics.	   Kant	   is	   convinced	   that	   beneath	   the	   surface,	   however,	   lies	  something	   deeper:	   the	   feigned	   indifference	   towards	   metaphysical	   questions	   so	  characteristic	  of	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century	  should	  not	  be	  mistaken	  for	  shallowness,	  for	  it	  is	  evidently	  the	  effect	  not	  of	  the	  thoughtlessness	  [Leichtsinns]	  of	  our	  age,	  but	  of	   its	   ripened	   power	   of	   judgment	   [gereiften	  Urteilskraft],	   which	   will	   no	  longer	  be	  put	  off	  with	   illusory	  knowledge,	   and	  which	  demands	   that	   reason	  should	   take	   on	   anew	   the	  most	   difficult	   of	   all	   its	   tasks,	   namely,	   that	   of	   self-­‐knowledge,	  and	  to	  institute	  a	  court	  of	  justice,	  by	  which	  reason	  may	  secure	  its	  rightful	   claims	  while	  dismissing	  all	   its	   groundless	  pretensions,	   and	   this	  not	  by	  mere	   decrees	   but	   according	   to	   its	   own	   eternal	   and	   unchangeable	   laws;	  and	   this	   court	   is	   none	  other	   than	   the	  critique	   of	   pure	   reason	   itself.	   (CPR	  Axi-­‐xii)	  	  According	  to	  Kant,	   then,	   the	  rise	  of	   indifferentism,12	  properly	  understood,	  reflects	  not	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  ambitions	  of	  reason	  in	  the	  Enlightenment,	  but	  rather	  the	  maturation	  of	  the	  intellectual	  public	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  the	  century	  which	  for	  this	  very	  reason	   has	   at	   last	  made	   itself	  worthy	   of	   the	   title	   of	   the	   “age	   of	   criticism”	   (CPR	  Axin;	   JL	  9:33).	  	   Kant’s	   reference	   in	   this	   passage	   to	   the	   age’s	   “ripened”	   power	   of	   judgment	   is	   no	  accidental	  or	  rhetorical	  flourish.	  The	  proper	  name	  for	  the	  growth	  of	  judgment,	  Kant	  tells	  us	  in	  the	  Anthropology,	   is	  “maturity	  [Reife],”	  the	  growth	  of	  which	  “comes	  only	  with	  years”	  (A	  7:199;	  cf.	  G	  4:407).	  This	  corresponds	  precisely,	   it	  should	  be	  noted,	  to	  Kant’s	  most	  famous	  characterization	   of	   his	   age	   as	   the	   “age	   of	   enlightenment”	   (WE	   8:40),	   for	   “enlightenment	  [Aufklärung]	   is	   the	   human	   being’s	   emergence	   from	   his	   self-­‐incurred	   minority	  [Unmündigkeit]”	   (WE	   8:35),	   his	   coming	   of	   age,	   we	  might	   say.	   In	   the	  Anthropology,	   Kant	  connects	  the	  power	  of	  judgment,	  just	  as	  he	  had	  in	  the	  first	  Critique,	  to	  the	  political	  climate	  
                                                12	  Kant	   remarks	   ruefully	   that	   nowadays	   “it	   seems	   to	   be	   taken	   as	   an	   honor	   to	   speak	   of	   metaphysical	  investigations	  contemptuously	  as	  mere	  caviling	  [Grübeleien]”	  (JL	  9:32).	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of	  his	  age:	  “[Judgment]	  is	  based	  on	  one’s	  long	  experience,	  and	  it	  is	  the	  understanding	  whose	  judgment	   [Urteil]	   even	   a	   French	   Republic	   searches	   for	   in	   the	   assembly	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	  Elders”	  (A	  7:199).13	  Kant	  emphasizes	  that	  the	  faculty	  of	  judgment,	  in	  comparison	  with	  that	  of	  reason,	  is	  a	  humble	  faculty:	  it	  is	  “aimed	  only	  at	  that	  which	  is	  feasible,	  what	  is	  fitting,	  and	  what	   is	  proper”	  and	  “is	  not	  as	   lustrous	  as	   the	   faculty	   that	  extends	  knowledge”	  (A	  7:199).	  Nevertheless,	   the	   rootedness	   of	   the	   eighteenth	   century	   in	   the	   faculty	   of	   judgment	  constitutes	  its	  essential	  step	  forward	  in	  stabilizing	  the	  ground	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  freedom.	  If	  freedom	  is	  the	  keystone	  of	  reason’s	  systematicity	  and	  corresponds	  to	  the	  highest	  point	  to	  which	  we	  can	  aspire,	  judgment,	  we	  might	  say,	  constitutes	  the	  fundament	  which	  secures	  it	  against	   its	   inevitable	   lapses	   into	  enthusiasm,	  as	  well	   as	   its	   inherent	  proclivity	   to	  mistake	  the	  nature	  of	  its	  vocation.	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  offer	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  in	  Kant’s	  first	  and	  third	  Critiques	   insofar	  as	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	  establish	   two	  points,	   the	  goals	  of	   the	   first	   two	  chapters,	  respectively.	  First,	  it	  is	  through	  the	  mere	  act	  of	  exercising	  our	  power	  of	  judgment	  that	   we	   first	   ground	   the	   objective	   validity	   of	   the	   pure	   concepts	   of	   the	   understanding.	  Judging	  that	  something	  is	  the	  case	  requires	  the	  nonconceptual	  recognition	  that	  an	  intuition	  is	   subsumable	  under	  a	   concept,	   and	  only	   the	  primacy	  of	   such	  a	   subsumption,	  which	  was	  reduced	   or	   eliminated	   by	   Kant’s	   early	   modern	   predecessors,	   explains	   the	   possibility	   of	  objective	  cognition.	  Second,	   the	  power	  of	   judgment	   is	  called	  upon	   in	   the	   third	  Critique	  as	  
                                                13	  Here	  I	  follow	  the	  Handschrift	  edition,	  which	  adds	  “even”	  to	  the	  sentence,	  an	  addition	  which	  surely	  indicates	  the	  force	  of	  Kant’s	  point	  more	  clearly.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  even	  the	  Republic,	  which	  initially	  announced	  itself	  as	  nothing	   less	   than	   the	   rejection	  of	   all	   traditional	  wisdom,	  has	   learned	  by	  way	  of	   the	  hard	  experience	  of	   the	  Reign	  of	  Terror	   that	   an	   irreducible	  political	   role	   remains	   for	  mature	   judgment.	   The	  Haus	  der	  so	  genannten	  
Ältesten	   is	   the	  upper	  house	  of	   the	  Directory	   (established	   in	  1795),	   the	  Counseil	  des	  Anciens,	  which	  wielded	  veto	  power	  over	  the	   legislation	  of	   the	  Counseil	  des	  Cinq-­‐Cents.	  Thus	  Kant’s	  association	  of	   judgment	  with	  the	  promising	  new	  spirit	  of	   the	  age	  was	  not	   just	  a	  naïve	  hope	   that	   carried	  him	  away	   in	  1781;	   it	   survived	  even	  through	  the	  waxing	  and	  waning	  of	  Kant’s	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  political	  developments	  in	  France.	  For	  a	  thorough	  account	  of	  the	  latter,	  see	  Beiser	  (1992),	  Ch.	  2.	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the	  faculty	  which	  is	  to	  provide	  an	  a	  priori	  principle	  for	  the	  faculty	  of	  the	  feeling	  of	  pleasure	  and	  displeasure.	   In	  doing	   so,	  Kant	   says,	   it	  provides	   for	  a	  necessary	  moment	  of	   transition	  between	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  philosophy.	  Thus	  it	  is	  the	  faculty	  which	  is	  called	  upon	  at	  the	   decisive	   points	   both	   at	   the	   beginning	   (in	   establishing	   the	   basic	   thesis	   of	   the	   first	  
Critique)	   and	   at	   the	   end	   (in	   circumscribing	   the	   possibility	   and	   limits	   of	   scientific	  philosophy)	   of	   the	   critical	   philosophy.	   This,	   I	  will	   argue,	   is	   no	   accident,	   for	   only	   because	  judgment	  is	  characterized	  in	  the	  first	  Critique	  as	  a	  power	  of	  subsumption	  that	  is	  not	  rule-­‐governed	   can	   it	   legislate	  a	  priori	   for	   the	   faculty	   of	   feeling.	   Furthermore,	   this	   connection	  between	  the	  first	  and	  third	  Critiques	  is	  crucial	  for	  understanding	  the	  significance	  of	  Kant’s	  critical	   project	   in	   its	   historical	   context.	   For	   the	   double	   task	   assumed	   by	   the	   faculty	   of	  judgment	   in	   Kant’s	   theory	   reflects	   the	   two	   fundamental	   pressures	   brought	   upon	   the	  Enlightenment	  by	  eighteenth-­‐century	   thought,	  although	   it	   is	  only	   the	  galvanization	  of	   the	  second	  of	  these	  problems	  by	  the	  events	  of	  1785	  that	  provided	  the	  occasion	  for	  Kant	  to	  offer	  his	  decisive	  solution	  to	  it.	  
Historical	  Precedents	  Whatever	   else	   it	   may	   have	   been,	   the	   Enlightenment	   was	   a	   movement	   focused	   on	  understanding	  the	  world	  through	  a	  rational	  lens	  and,	  in	  turn,	  reshaping	  the	  world	  where	  it	  was	  found	  wanting	  according	  to	  rational	  principles.	  Even	  from	  such	  a	  schematic	  definition,	  however,	  certain	  tensions	  in	  its	  self-­‐conception	  can	  already	  be	  discerned.	  First,	  the	  tasks	  of	  recognizing	   reason	   in	   the	  world	  and	  refashioning	   it	   in	  on	   this	  basis	   require	   that	   in	   some	  sense	  the	  world	  both	  is	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  rational,	  assumptions	  which	  drew	  fire	  from	  various	  quarters	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  beginning	  already	  with	  the	  first	  appearance	  of	  Bayle’s	  
Dictionary	  in	  1697	  and	  extending	  through	  Hamann	  and	  the	  Sturm	  und	  Drang.	  The	  defense	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of	  the	  Enlightenment	  project	  in	  the	  face	  of	  such	  criticisms	  was	  an	  undertaking	  with	  which	  Kant	  shared	  broad	  sympathies,	  but	  an	  eighteenth-­‐century	  observer	  could	  easily	  be	  forgiven	  for	   regarding	   its	   defense—until	   Kant,	   at	   least—as	   incoherent,	   if	   not	   schizophrenic.	  Empiricist	   and	   rationalist	   strategies	   for	   defending	   Enlightenment	   principles—associated,	  for	   Kant,	   with	   the	   work	   of	   Locke	   and	   Leibniz,	   respectively—set	   out	   in	   diametrically	  opposed	  directions	  to	  accomplish	  their	  goal.	  Kant	  would	  sum	  up	  the	  situation	  succinctly	  in	  the	  Amphiboly	  chapter	  of	  the	  first	  Critique:	  “Leibniz	  intellectualized	  the	  appearances,	  just	  as	   Locke	   totally	   sensitivized	   the	   concepts	   of	   understanding”	   (CPR	   A271/B327).	   Both	  paths,	  unfortunately,	  led	  to	  what	  in	  Kant’s	  mind	  proved	  to	  be	  insuperable	  difficulties.	  Secondly,	   supposing	   that	  we	  grant	   that	   the	  world	   is	   and	  ought	   to	  be	   rational,	   it	   is	  still	  not	  altogether	  clear	  that	  the	  task	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  does	  not	  contradict	  itself:	  if	  we	  succeed,	  after	  all,	  in	  recognizing	  the	  world	  as	  rational,	  what	  task	  could	  possibly	  remain	  for	  us	  to	  remake	  it	   in	  reason’s	  image?	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  rationality	  of	  nature	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  our	  cognition	  of	  it,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  and	  for	  the	  same	  reason,	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  impossibility	  of	  action,	  or	  at	  least	  of	  the	  rational	  motivation	  to	  act,	   within	   it.	   It	   was	   this	   question	   which,	   a	   generation	   later,	   would	   lead	   Hegel	   to	   the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  role	  of	  philosophy	  can	  only	  be	  to	  recognize,	  as	  he	  puts	  it,	  the	  rose	  in	  the	  cross	  of	  the	  present:	  the	  actual	  is	  rational,	  and	  the	  rational	  is	  actual.14	  But	  Hegel’s	  solution	  reflects	  a	  concern	  that	  had	  festered	  for	  half	  a	  century.	  In	  different,	  yet	  subtly	  related	  ways,	  Rousseau	   and	   Voltaire	   had	   waged	   a	   half-­‐philosophical,	   half-­‐popular	   battle	   against	   the	  encroachment	  of	  principles	  proper	  to	  cognition	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  practice.	  In	  their	  view,	  the	  
                                                14	  Hegel	  (1821),	  22.	  
 18	  
ascendancy	  of	  reason	  threatened	  to	  obscure	  the	  authentic	  principles	  of	  action	  rooted,	  but	  increasingly	  concealed,	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  human	  beings.	  
Reason	  against	   the	  Senses.	   To	   say	   that	   Leibniz	   “intellectualized”	   appearances	   is	   to	  say	  that	  Descartes’s	  focus	  on	  ideas	  as	  forms	  (distinguished	  from	  corporeal	  images)15	  as	  the	  bearers	  of	  cognitive	  content	  available	  for	  rational	  purposes16	  becomes	  completely	  decisive	  for	   Leibniz’s	   account	   of	   cognition.	   For	   Leibniz,	   sensible	   and	   intellectual	   representations	  differ	  not	  in	  species,	  but	  in	  degree,	  with	  the	  consequence	  that	  the	  former	  are	  only	  confused	  versions	   of	   the	   latter.	   Even	   in	   its	   confused	   perception	   of	   the	  world,	   then,	   each	   soul	   can	  nevertheless	  be	  said	  to	  cognize,	  however	  imperfectly,	  the	  infinite.17	  For	  Leibniz,	  the	  totality	  of	   our	   sensible	   perceptions	   can	   be	   analyzed	   as	   an	   intelligible	   order	   that	   manifests	   the	  
                                                15	  See,	  e.g.,	  the	  geometrical	  presentation	  of	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  Meditations	  in	  his	  reply	  to	  Mersenne:	  “Idea.	  I	  understand	  this	  term	  to	  mean	  the	  form	  of	  any	  given	  thought	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Indeed,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  these	  images	  are	  in	  the	  corporeal	   imagination,	   that	   is,	   are	  depicted	   in	  some	  part	  of	   the	  brain,	   I	  do	  not	  call	   them	   ‘ideas’	  at	  all;	   I	   call	  them	  ‘ideas’	  only	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  give	  form	  to	  the	  mind	  itself”	  (Descartes	  [1641],	  113	  [VII:160-­‐161]).	  See	  also	  his	  reply	  to	  Hobbes	  (Descartes	  [1641],	  127	  [VII:181])	  and	  his	   later	  clarification	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  his	   innatism	  (Descartes	  [1647a],	  303	  [VIIIB:357-­‐358]).	  Descartes	  is,	  of	  course,	  expanding	  upon	  his	  remarks	  on	  imagination	  and	  understanding	  at	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  Sixth	  Meditation	  (Descartes	  [1641],	  50-­‐51	  [VII:71-­‐73]).	  Later	  in	  the	  seventeenth	   century,	   the	   authors	   of	   the	  Port-­‐Royal	  Logic	  would	   follow	  Descartes	   closely	   on	   this	   point	   (see	  Arnauld	  &	  Nicole	  [1662],	  25-­‐26).	  16	  This	   is	  not	   to	   imply	   that	   the	   “intellectualization”	  of	   appearances	   is	   already	   complete	   in	  Descartes.	   In	   the	  
Discourse	  on	  Method	   Descartes	   imagines	   long	   chains	   of	   reasoning,	   along	  which	   all	   truths	   falling	  within	   the	  scope	  of	  human	  cognition	  can	  be	   located.	  At	   the	   top	  of	   these	  chains	  stand	   the	  most	  general	   laws	  of	  nature,	  which	  can	  be	  discovered	  a	  priori	  so	  long	  as	  we	  keep	  to	  the	  proper	  method	  in	  natural	  philosophy	  (Descartes	  [1637],	   132,	   143-­‐144	   [VI:42-­‐43,	   64]).	   Descartes	   nevertheless	   acknowledges	   that	   observations	   become	  increasingly	  necessary	  as	  we	  “advance	  in	  our	  knowledge,”	  i.e.,	  move	  down	  the	  chain	  from	  the	  general	  to	  the	  particular	  (Descartes	  [1637],	  143	  [VI:63]).	  Because,	  for	  Descartes,	  general	  and	  particular	  are	  related	  as	  cause	  to	  effect,	  and	  because	  there	  are	  often	  several	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  less	  general	  law	  can	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  more	  general	  one,	   the	  specific	  way	   in	  which	   the	  particular	  depends	  upon	   the	  general	   can	  be	  ascertained	  only	  by	  utilizing	   the	   hypothetical,	   experimental	   method—“seeking	   further	   observations	   whose	   outcomes	   vary	  according	  to	  which	  of	  these	  ways	  provides	  the	  correct	  explanation”	  (Descartes	  [1637],	  144	  [VI:65]).	  Thus	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  a	  priori	  rationalist	   framework	  to	  the	  specifically	  observable	  regularities	  of	  nature	  relies	  on	  envisioning	  a	  single	  logical	  chain	  along	  which	  both	  rational	  and	  empirical	  cognitions	  of	  nature	  are	  located.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  for	  Descartes	  himself	  the	  potential	  for	  the	  strictly	  rational	  cognition	  of	  nature	  to	  overstep	  its	   bounds	  must	   have	   seemed	   a	   remote	   one	   at	   best.	   It	  may	  well	   be	   true	   that	   if	   the	   cognitive	   content	   of	   an	  empirical	   observation	  depends	  on	   the	  possibility	  of	   relating	   it	   logically	   to	   a	   chain	  of	   principles	  descending	  from	  clear	  and	  distinct	  perceptions,	  then	  a	  principled	  boundary	  for	  the	  a	  priori	  philosophical	  task	  cannot	  be	  demarcated.	  Given	  Descartes’s	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  natural	  philosopher,	  however,	  this	   is	   of	   little	   practical	   consequence,	   for	  we	  would	   expect	   her	   observations	   of	   the	   natural	  world	   to	   press	  against	   the	   chains	   of	   her	   a	   priori	   reasoning	   with	   an	   independent	   force	   of	   their	   own.	   And	   yet	   for	   later	  rationalists	  the	  relation	  between	  reason	  and	  experience	  would	  understandably	  remain	  unclarified.	  17	  See,	  e.g.,	  Leibniz	  (1714),	  211	  (§13).	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wisdom	   of	   God,	   and	   thus	   the	   task	   of	   understanding	   this	   totality	   is	   inseparable	   from	   the	  construction	  of	  a	  theodicy	  of	  the	  natural	  world.	  This	  is	  accomplished,	  however,	  at	  the	  cost	  of	   a	   distinctive,	   irreducible	   role	   for	   empirical	   observations,	   at	   least	   when	   the	   latter	   are	  taken	  in	  their	  character	  as	  sensible	  representations.18	  Among	   empiricists,	   by	   contrast,	   there	   emerged	   an	   insistence	   that	   representations	  carry	   cognitive	   significance	   precisely	   insofar	   as	   they	   are	   sensible	   images.	   This	   strategy,	  which	  was	  of	  course	  intended	  to	  insure	  empiricism	  against	  the	  possibility	  of	  flying	  off	  into	  the	  extravagances	  of	  the	  rationalists,	  nevertheless	  only	  led	  the	  empiricists	  to	  the	  opposite	  extreme,	   as	   evidenced	   in	   particular	   by	   the	   attacks	   of	   Berkeley	   and	   Hume	   on	   Locke’s	  abstractionism—attacks	   carried	   out	   in	   the	   name	   of	   a	   consistent	   application	   of	   the	  empiricist	  methods	  espoused	  by	  Locke	  himself.19	  Locke’s	  guiding	  idea	  was	  to	  trace	  all	  the	  content	  of	  our	  ideas	  back	  to	  experience,	  showing	  along	  the	  way	  that	  the	  doctrine	  of	  innate	  ideas—whatever	   internal	   difficulties	   might	   attend	   it—is	   in	   any	   event	   superfluous	   as	   an	  explanation	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   cognition.20	  In	   the	  wake	   of	  Hume’s	  Treatise,	   however,	  certain	   radical	   implications	   of	   the	   empiricist	   strategy	   began	   to	   emerge	   more	   clearly,	  throwing	   its	   utility	   as	   a	   defense	   of	   Enlightenment	   ideals	   into	   doubt.	   The	   enthusiastic	  
                                                18	  It	   is	   for	   the	  most	   part	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	  my	  work	   here	   to	   ask	   about	   the	   fidelity	   of	   Kant’s	   reading	   of	  Leibniz	  to	  the	  latter’s	  actual	  views.	  I	  will	  simply	  point	  out	  that	  Leibniz’s	  work	  in	  the	  New	  Essays,	  which	  was	  published	  in	  1769	  and	  which	  Kant	  read	  in	  1773,	  and	  which	  had	  argued	  clearly	  and	  forcefully	  (in	  its	  preface)	  for	   a	   continuity	   underlying	   sensible	   and	   intelligible	   representations,	   was	   paradigmatic	   for	   Kant’s	  interpretation.	  See	  Wilson	  (2012).	  19	  It	   is	  worth	   emphasizing	   that	   for	   neither	   Berkeley	   nor	   Hume	  was	   the	   overcoming	   of	   Locke’s	   doctrine	   of	  abstraction	   a	  mere	   scholastic	  matter.	   According	   to	  Berkeley,	   Locke’s	   view	   “occasioned	   innumerable	   errors	  and	  difficulties	   in	  almost	  all	  parts	  of	  knowledge”	   (Berkeley	   [1710],	  76	   [Int	  §6]).	  Hume,	   for	  his	  part,	   credits	  Berkeley	  with	   “one	   of	   the	   greatest	   and	  most	   valuable	   discoveries	   that	   has	   been	  made	  of	   later	   years	   in	   the	  republic	  of	  letters”	  (Hume	  [1739-­‐1740],	  17	  [1.1.7]).	  20	  Thus,	  at	  any	  rate,	  goes	  the	  program	  laid	  out	  at	  the	  very	  beginning	  of	  Book	  II	  of	  the	  Essay	  (Locke	  [1689],	  104	  [II.i.1-­‐2]).	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reception	  of	  Hume	  by	  Hamann	  (and	  later	  Jacobi)	  was	  just	  one	  outward	  sign	  of	  this.21	  If	  the	  rational	  content	  of	  our	  cognition	  is	  nothing	  above	  and	  beyond	  its	  origin	  in	  experience,	  an	  origin	   for	   which	   we	   can	   hold	   ourselves	   responsible	   no	   further	   than	   for	   the	   mere	  undergoing	   of	   it,	   then	   the	   rational	   normative	   commitments	   which	   Descartes	   sought	   to	  secure—and	  which	  appear	  to	  be	  necessary	  to	  ground	  any	  strict	  science—are	  threatened.	  Thus	   if	   the	  effect	  of	  Leibniz’s	   intellectualization	  of	  appearances	   is	   to	   (implausibly)	  subject	   the	   observation	   of	   the	   natural	   world	   to	   the	   abstract	   and	   (for	   us,	   at	   least)	  insufficiently	   determinate	   deliverances	   of	   reason,	   then	   the	   effect	   of	   Locke’s	   empiricist	  method	  is	  to	  reduce	  reason	  to	  the	  natural	  rhythms	  of	  our	  receptive	  faculty.	  In	  either	  case,	  the	   Enlightenment	   project	   of	   recognizing	   and	   cultivating	   reason—and	   recognizing	   and	  cultivating	   it,	   moreover,	   in	   the	   world—increasingly	   found	   itself	   threatened	   by	   the	   very	  forces	  which	  were	  seeking	  to	  defend	  it.	  It	  will	  come	  as	  no	  surprise,	  then,	  that	  the	  attempts	  of	   theoretical	   reason	   to	   defend	   the	   Enlightenment	  would	   themselves	   begin	   to	   fall	   under	  suspicion.	  
Reason	  against	  Action.	  Given	  the	  climate,	   it	  was	  perhaps	  inevitable	  that	  philosophy	  in	  general	  would	  come	  under	  attack	  for	  harboring	  a	  destructive	  cognitive	  bias.	  Hume	  is	  an	  important	   forerunner	   of	   this	   concern,	   too,22	  although	   given	   the	   relatively	   modest	   early	  impact	  of	  the	  Treatise,	  it	  is	  probably	  inadvisable	  to	  separate	  this	  charge	  from	  the	  explosive	  appearance	  of	  Rousseau’s	  first	  Discourse	  onto	  the	  popular	  scene	  in	  1750.	  
                                                21	  It	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  Hamann’s	  letter	  to	  Kant	  of	  July	  27,	  1759	  is	  the	  earliest	  document	  linking	  Kant	  to	  Hume.	  See	  Beiser	  (1987),	  22-­‐24	  for	  an	  account	  of	  the	  peculiar	  circumstances	  surrounding	  Hamann’s	  letter.	  22	  See,	  in	  particular,	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  first	  book	  of	  the	  Treatise:	  “Where	  reason	  is	  lively,	  and	  mixes	  itself	  with	   some	  propensity,	   it	   ought	   to	  be	  assented	   to.	  Where	   it	  does	  not,	   it	  never	   can	  have	  any	   title	   to	  operate	  upon	  us”	  (Hume	  [1739-­‐1740],	  270	  [1.4.7]).	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For	  Rousseau,	  the	  question—at	  least	  as	  the	  Academy	  of	  Dijon	  intended	  to	  pose	  it—is	  not	   whether	   modern	   thought	   can	   account	   for	   practice	   as	   well	   as	   theory;	   it	   is	   whether	  advances	   in	   the	   arts	   and	   sciences	   have,	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   led	   to	   an	   improvement	   or	  degradation	   of	   morals.	   That	   said,	   Rousseau’s	   emphatic	   negative	   answer	   to	   the	   latter	  question	   conveys	   an	   unmistakable	   internal	   criticism	   of	   modern	   philosophy,	   as	   well:	   if	  philosophy	  has	   in	   fact	   led	  our	  hearts	  astray,	   it	  cannot	  have	  been	  the	  “true	  philosophy”	   in	  the	  first	  place.	  True	  philosophy	  Rousseau	  instead	  identifies	  with	  virtue	  alone,	  the	  “sublime	  science	  of	  simple	  souls”	  the	  principles	  of	  which	  are	  “engraved	  in	  all	  hearts.”	  It	  is	  a	  science,	  however,	  which	   is	   accessible	   not	   to	   keen	   and	   refined	   intellectual	   insight,	   but	   only	   to	   the	  sound	   and	   humble	   understanding	   that	   has	   reconciled	   itself	   to	   its	   very	   commonness.	  Reason,	  whatever	  the	  subtlety	  of	  its	  constructions,	  must	  fit	  itself	  to	  the	  simplicity	  of	  virtue,	  not	   the	   other	   way	   around.	   Rousseau	   leaves	   us	   with	   two	   alternatives,	   speaking	   well,	   i.e.,	  letting	   theoretical	   reason	   be	   our	   highest	   guide,	   and	   acting	   well.23	  It	   is	   clear	   in	   which	  direction	  virtue	  inclines,	  and	  if	  reason	  cannot	  reconcile	  itself	  to	  it,	  well,	  then,	  so	  much	  the	  worse	  for	  its	  own	  pretensions.	  It	  is	  this	  standpoint,	  too,	  which,	  a	  decade	  later,	  would	  inform	  the	  satirical	  standpoint	  of	  Voltaire’s	  Candide.	  In	  1756	  Voltaire	  had	  sent	  Rousseau	  his	  poem	  on	  the	  Lisbon	  disaster,24	  
                                                23	  Rousseau	  (1750),	  21.	  24	  The	  historical	  events	  that	  horrified	  and	  fascinated	  Voltaire	  proved	  inescapable	  and	  formative	  for	  the	  young	  Kant,	  as	  well.	  Already	  in	  1753,	  two	  years	  before	  the	  Lisbon	  earthquake	  and	  before	  Kant	  had	  even	  secured	  the	  qualifications	  to	  lecture	  as	  a	  Privatdozent,	  the	  Prussian	  Royal	  Academy	  had	  made	  Pope’s	  system	  the	  subject	  of	  its	   prize	   essay	   competition.	   Although	   Kant	   apparently	  mulled	   over	   the	   idea	   of	   submitting	   an	   essay	   to	   the	  academy	  (see	  R	  3703-­‐3705	  [1753-­‐1754]	  17:229-­‐239),	  he	  ultimately	  decided	  against	   it,	  steering	  clear	  of	  the	  subsequent	  battles	  between	  Lessing	  and	  Mendelssohn,	  on	  the	  one	  side,	  and	  Reinhard,	  a	  follower	  of	  Crusius,	  on	   the	   other.	   After	   the	   earthquake	   itself,	   however,	   he	   did	   address	   the	   issue,	   albeit	   somewhat	   obliquely:	  arguing	   that	  natural	   causes	  alone	  suffice	   to	  explain	   the	  earthquake,	  Kant	  did	  at	   least	  hope	   to	  quell	  popular	  fears	   rooted	   in	   superstition	   and	   enthusiasm.	  When,	   in	  1759,	  Kant	   finally	  did	  publish	   a	   short	   piece	  directly	  addressing	  the	  question	  of	  optimism,	  he	  shortly	  came	  to	  regret	  it.	  Yet	  another	  follower	  of	  Crusius	  mistook	  it	  for	  a	  personal	   insult	  and	  retaliated	  by	  heaping	  public	  abuse	  on	  Kant,	  abuse	   to	  which	  Kant	  wisely	  refrained	  from	   responding.	   In	   fact,	   Kant’s	   biographer	   Borowski	   reported	   that	   Kant	   asked	   him	   quite	   seriously	   to	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and	   indeed	   the	   final	   sentence	   of	  Rousseau’s	   first	  Discourse25	  could	  well	   have	   served	   as	   a	  motto	  for	  Voltaire’s	  book.	  It	  is	  clearly	  echoed,	  above	  all,	  in	  the	  famous	  final	  sentence	  of	  the	  latter:	  Il	  faut	  cultivar	  notre	  jardin.26	  While	  much	  of	  the	  attention	  lavished	  on	  Voltaire’s	  book	  has	  understandably	  centered	  on	  its	  boisterous	  send-­‐up	  of	  Leibnizian	  theodicy,	   it	   is	  in	  fact	  the	   distinct,	   though	   related,	   problem	   of	   action	   to	   which	  we	   are	   supposed	   to	   be	   led	   and	  which	   represents,	   for	  Voltaire,	   the	   crux	  of	  his	   attack	  on	   traditional	  philosophy,	   an	   attack	  intended	  to	  be	  no	  less	  radical	  than	  Rousseau’s.	  What	  Voltaire	  takes	  to	  be	  pernicious	  is	  not	  so	  much	  Leibniz’s	  blind	  allegiance	  to	  the	  doctrine	  that	  this	   is,	  and	  must	  be,	  the	  best	  of	  all	  possible	  worlds,	  but	  rather	   the	  presumed	  necessity	  of	  working	  out	   this	  doctrine	   in	  detail	  and	  applying	  it	  discursively	  to	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  actual	  world.	  To	  do	  so	  is	  to	  negate	  the	  very	  condition	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  human	  action,	  the	  wellspring	  of	  which	  can	  only	  be	  the	  felt	  division	  between	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is	  and	  the	  world	  as	  it	  ought	  to	  have	  been	  made.27	  For	  Voltaire,	   as	   for	   Rousseau,	   the	   proper	   life	   is	   the	   one	   oriented	   towards	   simple	   work,	  
                                                                                                                                                       immediately	   withdraw	   this	   pamphlet	   from	   circulation	   if	   he	   ever	   happened	   upon	   an	   old	   copy	   of	   it	   in	   a	  bookshop.	  For	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  this	  affair,	  see	  Walford	  (1992),	  liv-­‐lvii.	  25	  “And	  without	  envying	  the	  glory	  of	  those	  famous	  men	  who	  are	  immortalized	  in	  the	  republic	  of	  letters,	  let	  us	  try	   to	   place	   between	   them	   and	   ourselves	   that	   glorious	   distinction	   observed	   long	   ago	   between	   two	   great	  peoples:	  that	  the	  one	  knew	  how	  to	  speak	  well,	  the	  other	  how	  to	  act	  well”	  (Rousseau	  [1750],	  21).	  26	  “‘That’s	  well	  said,’	   replied	  Candide	  [to	  Pangloss],	   ‘but	  we	  must	  work	  our	   land’”	  (Voltaire	  [1759],	  79).	  The	  proper	  English	   translation	  of	  Voltaire’s	   final	   sentence	   is	  much	  debated,	   and	  Wootton’s	   choice	  obscures	   the	  important	  reference	  to	  Genesis.	  But	  in	  any	  event,	  Voltaire’s	  meaning	  is	  that	  paradise,	  at	  least	  such	  as	  we	  are	  entitled	   to	   it,	   consists	   in	   keeping	   our	   business	   to	   ourselves	   and	   cultivating	   our	   fields.	   The	   juxtaposition	   of	  discourse,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   action,	   on	   the	   other,	   appears	   serially	   throughout	   Candide.	   See,	   most	  memorably,	   the	   death	   of	   the	   Anabaptist	   in	   Ch.	   5.	   See	   also	   Voltaire	   (1757),	   135	   and	  Voltaire	   (1756a),	   95n,	  where,	  after	  quoting	  Shaftesbury	  at	  length,	  Voltaire	  himself	  finally	  breaks	  in:	  “This	  is	  admirably	  said,	  but	  .	  .	  .	  .”	  27	  In	  his	  Preface	  to	  his	  poem	  on	  the	  Lisbon	  earthquake,	  Voltaire	  is	  explicit	  that	  neither	  Leibniz	  nor	  Pope	  is	  his	  ultimate	   target,	   but	   rather	   the	   misuse	   that	   is	   made	   of	   their	   theories	   (see	   esp.	   Voltaire	   [1756a],	   97-­‐99).	  Although	  this	  remains	  implicit	  in	  Candide,	  it	  cannot	  be	  doubted	  that	  his	  intention	  there	  remains	  the	  same.	  The	  problem	  in	  Candide	   is	  not	  so	  much	  philosophy;	   it	   is,	   rather,	   to	  use	   the	  phrase	   that	  comes	  up	  so	  often	   in	   the	  latter	  work,	  philosophizing.	  Again,	  see	  esp.	  Ch.	  30:	  “‘Let	  us	  work	  without	  philosophizing,’	  said	  Martin,	  ‘it	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  make	  life	  bearable’”	  (Voltaire	  [1759],	  79;	  cf.	  Ch.	  21	  [49]).	  Voltaire’s	  point	  is	  that,	  however	  correct	  the	  doctrine	   of	   the	  philosophers	  may	  be,	   the	  attempt	   to	  work	   the	  doctrine	  out	   in	  detail	  distracts	  humanity	  from—and	  undermines	  its	  motivation	  for—its	  true	  vocation:	  the	  task	  of	  making	  the	  world	  a	  better	  place.	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transforming	   the	   world	   without	   succumbing	   to	   the	   temptation	   to	   try	   exhaustively	   to	  understand	  it.28	  Faced	   with	   these	   two	   groups	   of	   difficulties,	   Kant	   worked	   out	   a	   response	   that	  delimited	  the	  scope	  and	  role	  of	   inquiry	  guided	  by	  reason.	  His	  goal	  was	  to	  secure	  through	  philosophy	  a	  metaphysically	  grounded	  role	  for	  mathematical	  natural	  science	  while	  staking	  out	  with	  principled	  precision	  the	  limits	  of	  reason’s	  authority	  in	  theoretical	  matters.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   reason	   is	   restrained	   in	   the	   realm	  of	   cognition	   from	  establishing	   the	  principles,	  most	  notably	  the	  Principle	  of	  Sufficient	  Reason,	  that	  would	  ultimately	  align	  natural	  science	  with	   theodicy,	   while,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   by	   distinguishing	   reason’s	   practical	   from	   its	  theoretical	  interests,	  Kant	  shows	  how	  action	  in	  the	  world	  can	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  constraints	  of	  reason	  while	  nevertheless	  being	  independent	  of	  the	  results	  of	  the	  pure	  natural	  science	  the	  possibility	  of	  which	  he	  had	  grounded	  in	  the	  first	  Critique.	  In	  each	  case	  what	  is	  crucial	  is	  Kant’s	  careful	  separation	  of	  the	  faculties	  of	  reason	  and	  understanding	  and	  insistence	  on	  the	  discursive	  character	  of	  human	  cognition.	  Reason,	  Kant	  says,	  demands	  of	  objects	  much	  more	  than	  we	  can	  theoretically	  cognize	  with	  respect	  to	  them.29	  Theoretical	  cognition,	  in	  order	  to	  remain	  objectively	  valid,	  must	  maintain	  an	  essential	  reference	  to	  our	  receptive	  capacities,	  the	   forms	   of	   our	   human	   sensibility.	   Reason,	   for	   its	   part,	   constitutes	   its	   object	   in	   a	   self-­‐sufficient	  manner,	  but	  it	  is	  an	  object	  for	  our	  desiderative,	  not	  our	  cognitive,	  faculty.	  
                                                28	  For	   his	   own	   part,	   Rousseau’s	   response	   to	   Voltaire	   was	  measured.	   He	   did	   not	   see	   how	   a	   self-­‐consistent	  Christian	  could	  avoid	  commitment	  to	  the	  “optimistic”	  theses	  of	  Leibniz	  and	  Pope	  (Rousseau	  [1756],	  118-­‐119),	  and	  he	  complained	  that	  Voltaire’s	  poem	  on	  Lisbon	  was	  downright	  cruel,	  depriving	  those	  who	  were	  suffering	  of	   the	   genuine	   consolation	   offered	   by	   religion	   (Rousseau	   [1756],	   109).	   For	   Rousseau,	   at	   least,	   Pope’s	  optimism	   is	   not	   so	  much	   an	   impediment	   to	   action	   as	   it	   is	   the	   necessary	   complement	   to	   it.	   Here	  Rousseau	  already	  stands	  in	  some	  proximity	  to	  the	  views	  Kant	  would	  subsequently	  elaborate	  in	  the	  second	  Critique.	  29	  “What	  makes	  it	  so	  difficult	  for	  our	  understanding	  with	  its	  concepts	  to	  be	  the	  equal	  of	  reason	  is	  simply	  that	  the	   former,	   as	   human	   understanding,	   that	   is	   excessive	   (i.e.,	   impossible	   for	   the	   subjective	   conditions	   of	   its	  cognition)	  which	  reason	  nevertheless	  makes	  into	  a	  principle	  belonging	  to	  the	  object”	  (CPJ	  5:403).	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The	   power	   of	   judgment	   plays	   the	   crucial	   role	   in	   both	   aspects	   of	   Kant’s	   response,	  even	  if	  this	  did	  not	  become	  clear	  to	  him	  immediately.	  In	  the	  first	  Critique,	  Kant	  defends	  the	  claim	   that	   the	   power	   of	   judgment	   is	   the	   principle	   behind	   all	   acts	   of	   the	   understanding.	  Because	  it	  is	  not	  rule-­‐governed	  in	  its	  task	  of	  subsumption,	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  requires	  an	  act	  of	  the	  subject	  going	  well	  beyond	  what	  empiricist	  and	  rationalist	  analyses	  require	  of	  this	  faculty.	  All	  acts	  of	  the	  understanding	  have	  a	  constitutive	  reference	  back	  to	  such	  an	  act,	  and	   that	   is	   why	   the	   norms	   immanent	   in	   the	   act	   of	   judgment	   (expressed	   in	   the	   table	   in	  which	  its	  forms	  are	  ordered)	  govern	  the	  use	  of	  our	  cognitive	  faculty	  in	  general.	  For	   some	   time	   this	   result,	   combined	   with	   his	   thoroughgoing	   defense	   of	   reason’s	  legislation	   in	   practical	  matters,	   appeared	   to	   Kant	   to	   be	   adequate	   to	   keep	   the	   theoretical	  ambitions	  of	  modern	  rationalism	  at	  bay.	  But	  the	  eruption	  of	  the	  pantheism	  controversy	  in	  1785,	   combined	   with	   the	   pressure	   applied	   to	   Kant	   by	   the	   camp	   of	   Herder	   and	   Forster,	  forced	   him	   to	   reconsider	   whether	   he	   had,	   in	   fact,	   defused	   the	   tendency	   at	   the	   heart	   of	  rationalist	  theodicy.	  Herder’s	  novel,	  if	  not	  necessarily	  rigorous,	  employment	  of	  teleological	  explanation	   shed	   light,	   for	  Kant,	   on	   the	   connection	   of	   teleology	   to	   aesthetics,	   an	   issue	   in	  which	   he	   had	   maintained	   an	   interest	   for	   quite	   some	   time.	   He	   finally	   came	   to	   see	   the	  possibility	   and	   necessity	   of	   a	   third	   entry	   in	   the	   critical	   corpus	  which	  would	   explain	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	  transition	  between	  nature	  and	  morality	  by	  means	  of	  establishing	  an	  a	  priori	  principle	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  for	  the	  faculty	  of	  feeling.	  
	  





	  Even	  before	  1769,	   the	  year	  which	   “brought	   great	   light”	   for	  him,30	  Kant	  was	  developing	  a	  distinctive	   kind	   of	   response	   to	   opponents	   of	   the	   privilege	   granted	   to	   reason	   by	   the	  Enlightenment.	  While	  he	  would,	  of	  course,	  soon	  enough	  come	  to	  appreciate	  the	  gravity	  of	  Hume’s	  attack	  on	  causal	  concepts,	  it	  was	  the	  controversies	  surrounding	  Wolffian	  doctrine,	  in	   particular,	   the	   difficulties	   inherent	   in	   space	   and	   time	   as	   continuous	  magnitudes,	   that	  provided	   Kant	   with	   the	   clearest	   instances	   of	   the	   apparent	   misfit	   between	   reason	   and	  phenomena.31	  In	  his	  brief	  1768	  essay	  on	  the	  directions	  in	  space,	  Kant	  concludes	  by	  urging	  his	  reader	  not	  to	  dismiss	  the	  concept	  of	  space	  solely	  on	  account	  of	  the	  rational	  difficulties	  it	  engenders.	  The	  plain	  reality	  of	  space	  is,	  he	  insists,	  intuitively	  sufficient	  for	  inner	  sense	  and	  therefore	   must	   constitute,	   whatever	   difficulties	   the	   clarification	   of	   its	   concept	   might	  engender,	  one	  of	  the	  ultimate	  data	  of	  our	  cognition	  (GDS	  2:383).	  This	  immediately	  casts	  the	  difficulties	   which	   have	   attended	   all	   attempts	   to	   understand	   space	   through	   rational	  concepts	   in	   a	   new	   light:	   from	   now	   on	   they	   are	   to	   be	   taken	   not	   as	   indictments	   of	   this	  ultimate	  datum,	  but	  instead	  as	  symptoms	  of	  the	  misapplication	  of	  rational	  norms.	  In	   his	   Inaugural	   Dissertation	   of	   1770,	   Kant	   develops	   the	   implications	   of	   this	  suggestive	   conclusion	   as	   part	   of	   a	   systematic	   philosophy.	   Here	   he	   maintains	   that	   the	  
                                                30	  R	  5037	  (1776-­‐1778)	  18:68.	  31	  See	  Jauernig	  (2011),	  297.	  The	  paradoxes	  themselves,	  of	  course,	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  the	  Eleatics,	  but	  it	  was	  Leibniz’s	   fascination	  with	   them,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  practical	   success	  of	  his	   infinitesimal	   calculus,	   that	  had	  given	  them	   a	   renewed	   currency	   in	   the	   eighteenth	   century,	   where	   they	   served	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   many	   of	   the	  controversies	   surrounding	   Wolff.	   Leibniz’s	   own	   journey	   through	   the	   paradoxes	   of	   the	   continuum	   is	  chronicled	  in	  Arthur	  (2001).	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conditions	   under	  which	   sensible	   representations	   can	   be	   given	   to	   us	   are	   entirely	   distinct	  from	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	   intellectual	  representations	  can	  be	  given	  to	  us,	  and	   it	   is	  precisely	   the	   conflation	   of	   these	   two	   sorts	   of	   conditions	   that	   has	   led	   so	   many	   prior	  philosophers	   into	   apparently	   inextricable	   tangles.	   The	   only	   solution	   is	   to	   cut	   the	   knot	  entirely	  by	  dividing	  cognition	   into	  two	  separate	  species,	   the	  sensitive	  and	  the	   intellectual	  (ID	   2:392).32	  In	   accordance	   with	   this	   distinction,	   the	   objects	   of	   cognition,	   too,	   must	   be	  subject	  to	  a	  fundamental	  classification	  according	  to	  the	  specific	  mode	  of	  cognition	  to	  which	  they	  correspond.	  While	  objects	  are	  given	  to	  our	  senses	  as	  they	  appear,	  they	  are	  given	  to	  our	  intellect,	  or	  understanding	  (intellectus),33	  as	  they	  really	  are.	  Although	  it	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  that	  Kant	  rigorously	  maintains	  it,34	  in	  §3	  he	  already	  refers	  to	  the	  association	  of	  sensibility	  with	  receptivity	  (receptivitas),	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  intelligence	  with	  a	  form	  of	  spontaneity	  (facultas),	  on	   the	  other.35	  While	  objects	  give	   themselves	   to	  us	   in	  appearance	   through	  our	  receptive,	  sensible	  faculty,	  the	  intellect,	  for	  its	  part,	  gives	  itself	  its	  own	  object,	  namely,	  when	  the	   concept	   of	   the	   object	   is	   not	   abstracted	   from	   sensible	   forms,	   but	   originates	   in	   the	  intellect’s	  real,	  not	  merely	  logical,	  use.	  
                                                32	  As	  Lorne	  Falkenstein	  has	  emphasized,	  such	  a	  move—away	  from	  modern	  rationalist	  and	  empiricist	  trends	  and	  back	  towards	  Königsberg	  Aristotelianism—may	  make	  Kant	  more	  of	  a	  reactionary	  than	  a	  revolutionary.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   move	   is	   made	   in	   response	   to	   a	   set	   of	   distinctively	   modern	   problems.	   See	   Falkenstein	  (1995),	  29-­‐31.	  33	  If	  we	  are	  concerned	  merely	  with	  the	  Inaugural	  Dissertation,	  it	  is	  probably	  a	  matter	  of	  indifference	  whether	  we	   translate	   “intellectus”	   as	   “intellect”	   or	   “understanding,”	   although	   the	   former,	   to	   be	   sure,	   captures	   its	  philosophical	  heritage	  more	  transparently.	  “Verstand,”	  Kant’s	  German	  equivalent	  for	  “intellectus,”	  has	  a	  strong	  
prima	   facie	   claim	   to	   be	   translated	   as	   “intellect,”	   as	   well,	   although	   given	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   critical	  distinction	   between	   Verstand	   and	   Vernunft,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   ordinary	   German	   meaning	   of	   “Verstand,”	   I	   will	  follow	  the	  Cambridge	  edition	  in	  rendering	  it	  “understanding”	  throughout.	  34	  Falkenstein,	   in	   particular,	   has	   denied	   this,	   holding	   that	   in	   the	   Inaugural	  Dissertation	   Kant	   reverts	   to	   the	  (traditional)	   view	   that	   sensibility	   is	   itself	   a	   discursive	   faculty	   in	   that	   it	   combines	   the	   basic	  materials	   from	  which	  sensations	  are	  composed.	  See	  Falkenstein	  (1995),	  46ff.	  35	  Kant’s	  complete	  formulation	  runs	  as	  follows:	  “Intelligence	  (rationality)	  is	  the	  faculty	  of	  a	  subject	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  it	  has	  the	  power	  to	  represent	  things	  which	  cannot	  by	  their	  own	  quality	  come	  before	  the	  senses	  of	  that	  subject”	  (ID	  2:392).	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This	  contrast	  between	  the	  real	  and	  logical	  use	  of	  the	  intellect	  will	  continue	  to	  play	  a	  major	  role	  in	  Kant’s	  critical	  thought.	  In	  the	  Inaugural	  Dissertation,	  the	  distinction	  is	  drawn	  in	  the	  following	  manner:	  By	  the	  first	  of	  these	  uses,	  the	  concepts	  themselves	  .	   .	   .	  are	  given,	  and	  this	  is	  the	   real	   use.	   By	   the	   second	   use,	   the	   concepts,	   no	  matter	  whence	   they	   are	  given,	   are	   merely	   subordinated	   to	   each	   other,	   the	   lower,	   namely,	   to	   the	  higher	   (common	   characteristic	  marks),	   and	   compared	  with	   one	   another	   in	  accordance	   with	   the	   principle	   of	   contradiction,	   and	   this	   use	   is	   called	   the	  
logical	  use.	  (ID	  2:393;	  cf.	  2:411)	  	  Notice	  that	  the	  logical	  use	  of	  the	  intellect	  is	  characterized	  by	  subordination	  and	  comparison.	  Although	  it	  is	  not	  immediately	  clear	  from	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Dissertation,	  subordination	  and	  comparison	   refer	   to	   the	   two	   different	   directions	   in	   which	   the	   intellect	   can	   move	   with	  respect	   to	   concepts:	   it	   moves	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   lower	   species	   by	   “determining”	   higher	  concepts	   and	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   higher	   species	   by	   “abstracting”	   from	   lower	   concepts	   (JL	  9:99).	  Together,	  these	  constitute	  the	  logical	  use	  of	  the	  intellect.	  By	  its	  real	  use,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	   Kant	   refers,	   here,	   at	   least,	   to	   the	   intellect’s	   ability	   to	   give	   itself	   concepts	  independently	  of	  sensibility.	  This	  contrast	  between	  the	  logical	  and	  the	  real	  use	  of	  the	  intellect	  now	  allows	  Kant	  to	  account	  more	   fully	   for	   the	   “difficulties”	   to	   which	   he	   had	   alluded	   at	   the	   end	   of	   his	   1768	  essay.	  So	  long	  as	  we	  rigorously	  distinguish	  between	  two	  modes	  of	  givenness,	  sensitive	  and	  intellectual,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  questions	  regarding	  the	  intrinsic	  character	  of	  representations	  originally	   given	   through	   sensibility	   (even	   if	   they	   have	   been	   taken	   up	   “logically”	   by	   the	  understanding)	   are	   not	   ultimately	   answerable	   to	   the	   demands	   of	   reason,	   for	   they	   will	  retain	   a	   permanent	   reference	   to	   their	   distinct	   sensible	   origin.	   To	   suppose	   they	  would	   be	  answerable	   to	   such	   demands	   would	   be	   to	   conflate	   the	   intellect’s	   two	   distinct	   uses.	  According	  to	  its	  real	  use,	  the	  content	  of	  intellectual	  cognition	  arises	  from	  its	  rational	  form	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alone,	   while	   in	   its	   logical	   use	   the	   intellect	   applies	   a	   rational	   form	   to	   appearances	   the	  content	   of	   which	   already	   bears	   the	   indelible	   stamp	   of	   sensible	   cognition.	   And	  when	  we	  consider	   the	  modes	  by	  which	   sensibility	   forms	   the	   contents	   of	   our	   cognition,	   that	   is,	   the	  forms	  of	  space	  and	  time,	  there	  is	  just	  no	  reason	  to	  expect	  or	  require	  them	  to	  have	  intrinsic	  
logical	   forms	   of	   their	   own.	   Conversely,	   questions	   regarding	   the	   intuitive	   content	   (i.e.,	  worries	  about	  the	  emptiness)	  of	  originally	  intellectual	  representations	  are	  altogether	  out	  of	  place,	   presupposing	   a	   sensible	   standard	   to	   which	   nonsensible	   things	   could	   rightfully	   be	  held	   (see	   ID	   2:396).	   In	   this	   way	   the	   difficulties	   in	   reconciling	   the	   “intuitively	   sufficient”	  representation	  of	  space	  with	  the	  logical	  requirement	  of	  complete	  conceptual	  clarity	  are—or	  at	  least	  Kant	  thought	  at	  the	  time—entirely	  resolved.	  At	   the	   time	   this	   result	  must	   have	   appeared	   to	   Kant	   as	   though	   it	  would	   blunt	   the	  force	  of	  the	  weapons	  the	  empiricists	  and	  rationalists	  had	  been	  wielding	  against	  each	  other	  for	  the	  better	  part	  of	  a	  century.	  But	  during	  the	  decade	  that	  separated	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  
Inaugural	  Dissertation	   from	   the	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason,	   Kant	   found	  himself	   struggling	   to	  give	   a	   positive	   sense	   to	   the	   doctrine	   to	   which	   he	   now	   found	   himself	   committed.	   In	  particular,	  he	  realized	  that	  he	  was	  unable	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  understanding	  can	  give	  itself	  its	  own	  object,	  that	  is,	  establish	  a	  relation	  to	  an	  object	  through	  its	  own	  power.	  In	   the	  case	  of	   sensible	   representations,	   such	  a	  question	  never	  arises:	  because	   they	  result	  from	   the	   affection	   of	   the	   subject	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   object	   (ID	   2:392),	   their	   objective	  reference	   is	   built	   into	   them	   from	   the	   start	   (even	   if	   the	   forms	   of	   such	   representations	  inescapably	   depend	   upon	   subjective	   conditions).	   But	   through	   what	   means,	   if	   any,	   could	  intellectual	   representations,	   which	   originate	   not	   affectively,	   but	   from	   the	   activity,	   or	  faculty,	   of	   the	   subject,	   attain	   to	   such	   objectivity?	   In	   the	   Inaugural	  Dissertation	   Kant	   had	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been	  content	  to	  state	  that	  “whatever	  cognition	   is	  exempt	  from	  such	  subjective	  conditions	  [i.e.,	  the	  forms	  of	  our	  sensibility]	  relates	  only	  to	  the	  object”	  (ID	  2:392),	  but	  by	  1772	  he	  saw	  that	  such	  a	  position	   failed	   to	  explain	  how	  objective	  reference	  could	  “get	   into,”	  as	   it	  were,	  the	  representation	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  As	  he	  wrote	  in	  his	  letter	  to	  Herz	  of	  February	  21,	  1772,	  such	   a	   merely	   negative	   explanation	   is	   insufficient:	   “I	   silently	   passed	   over	   the	   further	  question	  of	  how	  a	  representation	  that	  refers	  to	  an	  object	  without	  being	  in	  any	  way	  affected	  by	  it	  can	  be	  possible”	  (C	  10:130-­‐131).	  This	  worry	  immediately	  precipitated	  an	  even	  deeper	  crisis	  in	  Kant’s	  thought,	  since	  among	  this	  class	  of	  representations	  were	  to	  be	  found	  all	  the	  basic	   concepts	   of	   general	   metaphysics.	   If	   the	   understanding	   is	   incapable	   of	   establishing	  straightaway	  a	  relation	  to	  the	  objects	  of	  cognition	  by	  means	  of	  its	  own	  resources,	  then	  what	  could	  possibly	  be	  the	  source	  of	  the	  validity	  of	  these	  concepts?	  
Preliminaries:	  Cognition	  and	  Objectivity	  For	  Kant,	  the	  first	  step	  in	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  resides	  in	  combining	  once	  again	  what	  he	   had	   so	   carefully	   separated	   in	   the	   Inaugural	   Dissertation.	   Instead	   of	   maintaining	   that	  there	  is	  a	  cognitive	  way	  of	  representing	  objects	  purely	  intellectually,	  and	  through	  which	  we	  might	  be	  able	   to	  avoid	  any	  essential	   reference	   to	   the	   form	  of	  our	  sensible	   intuition,	  Kant	  now	  takes	  discursivity,	  which	  for	  him	  requires	  the	  coordination	  of	  sensible	  and	  intellectual	  representations,	  to	  be	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  the	  cognition	  of	  a	  determinate	  object	  in	  the	  first	   place.	   According	   to	   the	   traditional	   conception	   of	   discursivity,	   to	   insist	   that	   human	  cognition	   is	   “discursive”	   is,	   at	   bottom,	   to	   say	   that	   it	   is	   not	   a	   case	   of	   immediate	   intuition.	  Discursion	   requires	   discourse;	   thus	   it	   takes	   time.36	  Kant’s	   appropriation	   of	   the	   term,	  however,	  adds	  a	  further	  dimension	  to	  it:	  human	  cognition	  is	  discursive	  because	  immediate	  
                                                36	  Falkenstein	  (1995),	  42.	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intuition,	   as	   such,	   does	   not	   suffice	   to	   constitute	   a	   cognition.	   This	   at	   once	   stands	   the	  traditional	   distinction	   between	   intuitive	   and	   discursive	   cognition	   on	   its	   head:	   instead	   of	  discursive	  cognition	  being	  a	  mere	  waystation	  with	  intuition	  as	  its	  goal,	  intuition	  becomes	  a	  mere	   step	   on	   the	   way	   to	   that	   which,	   in	   order	   to	   constitute	   cognition,	   must	   ultimately	  acquire	  a	  discursive	  form.	  As	   Kant	   now	   sees	   it,	   for	   our	   faculty	   of	   cognition	   to	   determinately	   represent	   an	  object,	   both	   understanding	   and	   sensibility—hence	   both	   concepts	   and	   intuitions—are	  required	  (CPR	  A258/B314,	  B146).	  Kant	  is	  thus	  not	  abandoning	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  worlds	   of	   sense	   and	   intellect	   in	   the	   Inaugural	   Dissertation,	   but	   rather	   identifying	   the	  distinction	   with	   components	   of	   cognition,	   rather	   than	   with	   self-­‐sufficient	   modes	   of	  cognition.	   As	   a	   corollary,	   however,	   the	   notion	   of	   two	   classes	   of	   objects	   (sensible	   and	  intelligible)	  must	  also	  be	  revised,	  a	  revision	  which	  is	  not,	  however,	  as	  straightforward	  as	  it	  might	   seem.	  On	   the	   one	  hand,	  Kant	   still	   holds	   the	   view—already	   familiar	   to	   us	   from	   the	  1772	   letter	   to	   Herz—that	   the	   relation	   of	   a	   representation	   to	   an	   object	   is	   not	   at	   all	  mysterious	   when	   we	   intuit	   a	   present	   object	   through	   our	   sensible	   faculty.	   On	   the	   other	  hand,	   Kant	   now	   thinks	   that	   cognition	   of	   an	   object,	   at	   least	   in	   the	   full-­‐fledged	   sense	   of	  
cognition,	  requires	  more	  than	  such	  receptivity.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  Kant	  expresses	  this	  by	  saying	  that	   a	   (merely)	   intuitive	   representation	   of	   an	   object	   does	   not	   suffice	   for	   a	   determinate	  cognition	  of	  that	  object;	  by	  this	  he	  means	  that	  a	  merely	  intuitive	  relation	  to	  the	  object	  fails	  to	  pick	  it	  out	  as	  an	  object	  which	  could	  be	  related	  to	  or	  distinguished	  from	  other	  objects	  at	  all.	  We	  must	  distinguish,	  then,	  the	  initial	  mode	  by	  which	  objects	  are	  given	  to	  our	  sensibility	  from	  the	  establishment,	  through	  thought,	  of	  a	  determinate	  relation	  to	  that	  object.	  To	  relate	  
 31	  
to	  an	  object	  that	  is	  genuinely	  given,	  but	  nevertheless	  determinate,	  will	  accordingly	  require	  the	  employment	  of	  both	  cognitive	  faculties.	  This	   has	   led	   to	   some	   disagreement	   over	   the	   basic	   sense	   of	   the	   word	   “object”	   in	  Kant’s	   thought,37	  with	   some,	   following	   Strawson	   and	   what	   is	   probably	   rightly	   called	   a	  “traditional”	   reading	   of	   Kant,	   holding	   that	   appearances	   and	   things	   in	   themselves	   are	  different	   classes	   of	   objects	   altogether,	   and	   others,	   following	   Henry	   Allison,	   holding	   that	  appearances	  and	  things	  in	  themselves	  are	  merely	  different	  aspects,	  or	  ways	  of	  considering,	  just	  one	  class	  of	  objects,	  that	  is,	  the	  objects	  as	  they	  appear	  to	  us	  and	  the	  objects	  as	  they	  are	  “in	   themselves,”	   abstracted	   from	   the	  peculiar	   conditions	   of	   human	   cognition.	   I	   am	  by	  no	  means	  trying	  to	  adjudicate	  this	  dispute	  here,	  but	  it	  may	  be	  helpful	  to	  say	  a	  few	  words	  about	  it	  to	  help	  clarify	  the	  precise	  sense	  of	  my	  interpretation.	  At	   any	   rate,	   I’m	  basically	   sympathetic	   to	  Allison’s	   view.	   I	   certainly	   do	   not	   think	   it	  succumbs	   to	   the	   well-­‐known	   conceptual	   criticisms	   of	   Paul	   Guyer	   or	   Rae	   Langton,38	  although	   I	   do	   not	   think	   there	   is	   a	   slam-­‐dunk	   textual	   case	   to	   be	   made	   for	   it	   (or	   the	  traditional	   view),	   either.39	  I’m	   not	   sure	   that	   I’m	   in	   complete	   agreement	   with	   Allison,	  though.	  In	  particular,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  Kant’s	  proclivity	  to	  speak	  of	  things	  in	  themselves	  as	  if	  he	  were	   speaking	  of	  an	  entirely	  distinct	  class	  of	  objects,	   I	  am	  not	  convinced	  that	   this	   is	  simply	   a	   regrettable	  mistake	   on	   Kant’s	   part.	   Cognition,	   after	   all,	   is	   not	   the	   only	  way	  we	  comport	  ourselves	  to	  objects;	  we	  do	  this	  through	  the	  faculty	  of	  desire,	  as	  well.40	  To	  be	  sure,	  if	  we	  stick	  to	  the	  cognitive	  standpoint,	  the	  “thing	  in	  itself”	  is	  indeed	  only	  comprehended	  by	  
                                                37	  I	   leave	   entirely	   aside	   here	   the	   question	   of	   the	   systematic	   distinction,	   if	   any,	   between	   “Objekt”	   and	  “Gegenstand,”	   a	   distinction	   defended,	   for	   example,	   in	   Allison	   (1983)	   but	   no	   longer	   in	   Allison	   (2004).	   The	  explanation	  of	  the	  shift	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Allison	  (2012),	  43-­‐44.	  38	  See,	  e.g.,	  Guyer	  (1987),	  336-­‐344;	  Guyer	  (2006),	  68-­‐69;	  and	  Langton	  (1998),	  10-­‐12.	  39	  Here	  I	  am	  basically	  in	  agreement	  with	  Gardner	  (2005).	  40	  See,	  e.g.,	  MoV	  27:479,	  where	  Kant	  distinguishes	  the	  objects	  of	  material	  philosophy	  into	  nature,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  freedom,	  on	  the	  other.	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way	  of	  abstraction	  from	  the	  thing	  as	  it	  appears	  to	  us,	  but	  from	  the	  desiderative	  standpoint,	  the	  “thing	  in	  itself”	  comes	  first,	   for	  reason	  itself	   is	   legislative	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  object	  of	  our	  desiderative	  faculty. In	  displacing	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  supersensible	  from	  the	  cognitive	  to	   the	   desiderative	   sphere,	   Kant	   is	   reaffirming	   the	   reality	   of	   ordinary	   objects	   like	   tables,	  chairs,	   and	   post	   offices	   in	   one	   sense	   while	   undermining	   it	   in	   another.	   Their	   reality	   is	  impugned	  not	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  rational	  norms	  of	  divine	  cognition,	  but	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  rational	  norms	  of	  the	  human	  faculty	  of	  desire.	  To	  get	  a	   sense	  of	  my	  worries	  about	  Allison’s	  position	  here,	   consider	   the	   following	  description	  of	  what	  Allison	  regards	  as	  an	  “erroneous,	  albeit	  widely	  held,	  transcendentally	  realistic	  picture	  of	  Kant’s	  idealism”:	  Things	  as	  they	  are	  in	  themselves	  are	  equated	  with	  things	  as	  they	  “really	  are,”	  whereas	   things	   as	   they	   appear	   are	   things	   as	   they	   are	   for	   us,	   subject	   to	   the	  limits	  imposed	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  sensibility.	  And,	  given	  this	  picture,	  Kant’s	  claim	   that	   space	   and	   time	   are	   merely	   empirically	   rather	   than	  transcendentally	  real	  is	  taken	  as	  implying	  that	  they	  are	  not	  “fully”	  or	  “really	  real.”	  .	  .	  .	  According	  to	  this	  picture,	  transcendental	  idealism	  seems	  to	  require	  us	  to	  sacrifice	  the	  reality	  of	  either	  our	  cognition	  or	  its	  object.41	  	  Although	  Allison	  concedes	  that	  Kant’s	  terminology	  often	  suggests	  just	  such	  an	  (erroneous)	  interpretation,	   it	  nevertheless	  distorts	  Kant’s	  own	  view	  “inasmuch	  as	   it	  measures	  human	  knowledge	  in	  light	  of	  the	  ideal	  of	  a	  ‘God’s	  eye’	  view.”42	  But	  Kant’s	  view,	  as	  I	  understand	  it,	  is	  that	  we	  cannot	  really	  help	  measuring	  our	  cognition	  against	  such	  a	  standard	  after	  all,	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  we	  do	  have	  such	  a	  standard—not,	  however,	  in	  God’s	  faculty	  of	  cognition,	  but	  in	  our	  very	  own	  faculty	  of	  desire.	  
                                                41	  Allison	  (2006),	  12.	  42	  Allison	  (2006),	  12.	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This,	  at	  any	  rate,	  is	  the	  way	  I	  will	  understand	  objectivity.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  much	  of	  what	  I	  have	  to	  say	  really	  hangs	  on	  it,	  but	  hopefully	  this	  brief	  digression	  at	  least	  makes	  my	  own	  interpretive	  standpoint	  clearer	  in	  what	  follows.	  Cognition,	  as	  Kant	  understands	  it,	  is	  one	  of	  three	  fundamental	  faculties	  (Vermögen)	  of	  the	  human	  mind.43	  The	  general	  concept	  of	  a	  mental	  faculty,	  Kant	  tells	  us,	  is	  something	  in	  virtue	   of	   which	   the	   mind	   is	   active	   (A	   7:140),44	  and	   a	   fundamental	   faculty	   is	   one	   which	  cannot	   be	   derived	   from	   any	   further	   ground	   that	   it	  would	   have	   in	   common	  with	   another	  faculty	  (CPJ	  5:177).45	  Generally	  considered,	  then,	  human	  cognition	  is	  one	  of	  the	  three	  most	  basic	  ways	  the	  human	  mind	  is	  active.46	  It	   is	  distinctive	   in	  that	   it	  seeks	  solely	  to	  represent	  objects,	   in	  one	  or	  more	  of	   their	  determinate	  aspects,	  as	   the	  very	  objects	   they	  are.	  Now,	  a	  
                                                43	  Kant	  does	  not	  consistently	  distinguish	  between	  a	  Kraft	  and	  a	  Vermögen.	  Occasionally	  he	  appears	  to	  conflate	  them	  (e.g.,	  at	  CPR	  A262/B318)	  or	  even	  to	  explicitly	  identify	  them	  (e.g.,	  at	  CPJ	  5:287).	  Béatrice	  Longuenesse,	  at	  least,	  has	  maintained	  that	  there	  is—in	  certain	  contexts—an	  important	  distinction	  to	  be	  drawn,	  at	  least	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  Vermögen	  zu	  urteilen	  and	  Urteilskraft	  (where	  the	  latter	  is	  the	  actualization	  of	  the	  former	  with	  respect	   to	   sensory	   perceptions).	   As	   she	   acknowledges,	   Kant’s	   texts	   themselves	   are	   likely	   too	   equivocal	   to	  support	   the	   distinction	   in	   any	   sharp	   form;	   nevertheless,	   she	   thinks	   it	   is	   a	   crucial	   conceptual	   distinction	   to	  draw	   in	  understanding	  Kant’s	   argument	   (Longuenesse	   [1998],	   8).	  As	  will	   be	   clear	   from	  what	   follows,	   I	   am	  unconvinced	  of	  this.	  But	  I	  will	  point	  out	  right	  away	  that	  I	  agree	  with	  Longuenesse	  that	  the	  question	  cannot	  be	  adequately	   settled	  by	  an	  appeal	   to	  Kant’s	   terminology,	  but	  must	  be	  addressed	  primarily	  on	   the	   conceptual	  level.	  44	  In	   metaphysics	   lectures	   from	   the	   early	   1780s	   Kant	   defines	   a	   faculty	   (facultas)	   somewhat	   differently,	  namely,	  as	  the	  “possibility	  of	  acting”	  (MMr	  29:772,	  823).	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  link	  with	  activity	  is	  decisive.	  Note	  also	  that	  facultas	  is	  opposed	  to	  receptivitas	  in	  the	  Inaugural	  Dissertation	  (2:392;	  see	  p.	  26	  above).	  As	  Cassirer	  emphasizes,	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   faculty	   as	   a	  mere	   capacity	   is	   altogether	   antithetical	   to	   the	   Leibnizian-­‐Wolffian	  tradition.	  In	  accordance	  with	  monadic	  independence	  and	  self-­‐sufficiency,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  facultas	  is	  opposed	  in	  the	   first	   instance	  to	   the	   influxus	  physicus	  of	  empirical	  psychology	  (Cassirer	   [1932],	  120-­‐121).	   It	   is	   the	   latter	  concept	  which	  reduces	  a	  “faculty”	  to	  a	  mere	  capacity	  and	  paves	  the	  way	  for	  its	  elimination	  after	  the	  manner	  of	  the	   seventeenth	   century’s	   elimination	   of	   occult	   qualities.	   Contrast	   this	   Leibnizian-­‐Wolffian	   tendency,	  however,	  with	  that	  of	  Descartes,	  for	  whom	  “the	  term	  ‘faculty’	  denotes	  nothing	  but	  a	  mere	  potentiality	  [ipsum	  
nomen	  facultatis	  nihil	  aliud	  quam	  potentiam	  designat]”	  (Descartes	  [1647a],	  305	  [VIIIB:361]).	  45	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  in	  the	  second	  Critique	  Kant	  remarks	  that	  “all	  human	  insight	  is	  at	  an	  end	  as	  soon	  as	  we	  have	  arrived	  at	  basic	   faculties”	  (CPrR	  5:46-­‐47;	  trans.	  modified).	  Wolff	  held	  that	  the	  soul	  must	  have	  only	  
one	  basic	  power,	  a	  mistake	  Kant	  diagnoses	  in	  some	  detail	  in	  the	  first	  Critique	  (CPR	  A648-­‐650/B676-­‐678;	  see	  Wolff	  [1720],	  48-­‐49	  [§745]).	  46	  The	  other	  two	  faculties	  are	  the	  faculty	  of	  desire	  and	  the	  faculty	  of	  the	  feeling	  of	  pleasure	  and	  displeasure.	  Each	  Critique	  deals	  with	  one	  fundamental	  faculty,	  showing	  in	  each	  case	  how	  one	  of	  the	  three	  higher	  cognitive	  faculties	   is	   legislative	  (or,	   in	  the	  case	  of	   the	  power	  of	   judgment	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  faculty	  of	   feeling,	  quasi-­‐legislative)	   for	   it.	   See	  CPJ	  5:198	  and	  FI	  20:245-­‐246	   for	  Kant’s	   schematic	   representations	  of	   these	   relations.	  And	  see	  my	  discussion	  of	  the	  Introduction	  to	  the	  third	  Critique	  in	  Ch.	  II.	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cognition,	   i.e.,	   an	  act	   through	  which	   the	   capacity	   to	   cognize	   is	   actualized,	   consists	   in	   “the	  determinate	  relation	  of	  given	  representations	  to	  an	  object”	  (CPR	  B137).	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Kant	  holds	  that	  the	  establishment	  of	  such	  a	  determinate	  relation	  is	  not	  something	  the	  mind	  can	  bring	  about	  entirely	  through	  its	  own	  power,	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  even	  the	  fundamentally	  active	  faculty	  of	  cognition	  must	  be	  further	  subdivided	  into	  active	  and	  passive	  subfaculties.47	  Although	   this	   division	   between	   the	   spontaneous	   and	   the	   receptive	   coincides	   with	   that	  between	  the	  “higher”	  and	  the	  “lower”	  species	  of	  cognition,	  Kant	  insists	  that	  the	  reason	  for	  attaching	   the	   epithet	   “ober”	   to	   the	   former	   group	   is	   on	   account	   of	   the	   universality	   of	   the	  representations	  with	  which	  it	  deals	  (A	  7:196;	  JL	  9:36).	  Now,	  Kant	  sometimes	  refers	  to	  the	  collection	  of	  higher	   cognitive	   faculties	  as	   the	  understanding	   (e.g.,	  CPR	  A65/B89,	  B137),48	  sometimes	  as	  reason	  (e.g.,	  CPR	  A11/B24-­‐25,	  A835/B863;	  also	  presumably	  at	  Axiii),	  but	  in	  any	  case	  it	  is	  characterized	  by	  its	  use	  of	  concepts,49	  while	  the	  collection	  of	  lower	  cognitive	  faculties	  is	  generally	  referred	  to	  as	  sensibility,	  which	  is	  characterized,	  for	  us,	  at	  least,	  by	  the	  distinctive	  forms	  by	  means	  of	  which	  we	  intuit	  objects.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  let	  us	  examine	  each	  side	  of	  cognition	  in	  turn.	  First,	  to	  say	  that	  the	  object	   is	   sensibly	   given	   to	   us	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   the	   object	   is	   itself	   present	   in	   intuition;	  instead,	   Kant	   says,	   intuition	   is	   “that	   through	   which	   [cognition]	   relates	   immediately	   to	  [objects]”	  (CPR	  A19/B33).	  To	  say	  that	  the	  relation	  is	  “immediate”	  is	  to	  make	  a	  point	  about	  the	  logical	  primacy	  of	  this	  relation,	  corresponding,	  more	  than	  likely,	  to	  the	  unproblematic	  
                                                47	  Thus	  the	  receptivity	  of	  our	  cognitive	  faculty	  depends	  upon	  its	  activity,	  or	  at	   least	  upon	  its	  capacity	  to	  act.	  Again,	   Kant’s	   metaphysics	   proceeds	   along	   these	   same	   lines:	   “We	   can	   never	   be	  merely	   passive,	   but	   rather	  every	   passion	   is	   at	   the	   same	   time	   action.	   The	   possibility	   of	   acting	   is	   a	   faculty	   <facultas>,	   and	   of	   suffering	  receptivity	  <receptivitas>.	  The	  latter	  always	  presupposes	  the	  former”	  (MMr	  29:823).	  This	  is	  connected	  with	  the	  point	  in	  n.	  44	  above.	  48	  Kant	   acknowledges	   this	   freely	   at	   A	   7:197,	  where	   he	   distinguishes	   between	   broad	   and	   narrow	   senses	   of	  “understanding.”	  49	  I	  include	  under	  this	  heading	  the	  ideas	  of	  reason,	  consistently	  defined	  by	  Kant	  as	  species	  of	  concepts	  (CPR	  A311/B367,	  A320/B377;	  A	  7:199-­‐200;	  see	  also	  CPJ	  5:351).	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case	  of	   relating	   to	  an	  object	   identified	   in	   the	  1772	   letter	   to	  Herz:	   there	   is	  nothing,	   as	  we	  might	  say,	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  intuition	  relates	  to	  objects.	  But	  caution	  is	  in	  order	  here,	  for	  our	  intuition	   is	  not	  “original,	   i.e.,	  one	  through	  which	  the	  existence	  of	   the	  object	  of	   intuition	   is	  itself	  given”	  (CPR	  B72).50	  Rather,	  the	  converse	  is	  the	  case:	  our	  intuition	  of	  an	  object	  is	  only	  possible	   through	   the	   prior	   existence	   of	   that	   object.	   This	   is	   the	   positive	   content	   of	   Kant’s	  claim	   that	   our	   intuition	   is	   sensible.	   Accordingly,	   sensibility	   is	   “the	   capacity	   [Fähigkeit]	  (receptivity)	   to	   acquire	   representations	   through	   the	   way	   in	   which	   we	   are	   affected	   by	  objects”	   (CPR	   A19/B33;	   cf.	   A51/B75).51	  Sensibility	   in	   our	   cognition	   is	   thus	   a	   species	   of	  intuitive	  capacity,	  a	  capacity	  to	  relate	  ourselves	  cognitively	  to	  objects	  in	  an	  immediate	  way	  by	  means	  of	  receiving	  representations.	  Corresponding	   to	   this	   immediacy	   is	   the	   singularity	   characteristic	   of	   intuitive	  representations	  (see,	  e.g.,	  CPR	  A32/B47,	  A320/B377;	  JL	  9:91),	  although	  the	  precise	  nature	  of	   this	   correspondence	   is,	   perhaps,	   not	   entirely	   straightforward.	   Lorne	   Falkenstein,	   for	  instance,	   has	   argued	   that	   only	   the	   immediacy	   of	   intuitions	   can	   be	   their	   definitive	  characteristic;	   their	   singularity	   must	   be	   a	   consequence,	   not	   a	   presupposition,	   of	   Kant’s	  argument.52	  The	  situation	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  considerably	  less	  (interpretatively)	  dire	  than	  Falkenstein	   suggests,	   for	   to	   say	   that	   intuitions	   are	   singular	   is	   not	   quite,	   as	   Falkenstein	  glosses	   it,	   to	  say	   that	   they	  are	  representations	   “arising	   from	  sensation	  of,	  or	   referring	   to,	  
                                                50	  This	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  to	  say	  that	  we	  possess	  the	  positive	  concept	  of,	  or	  even	  an	  insight	  into	  the	  possibility	  of,	  any	  nonsensible,	  intellectual	  intuition.	  In	  fact	  Kant	  goes	  out	  of	  his	  way	  to	  deny	  this	  (CPR	  B307).	  51	  A	  certain	  amount	  of	  ambiguity	  attaches	  to	  Kant’s	  use	  of	  the	  term	  “sensation.”	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  merely	  a	  sensation,	  the	  representation	  refers	  not	  back	  to	  the	  affecting	  object,	  but	  merely	  to	  a	  modification	  of	   the	  state	  of	   the	  subject	   (CPR	  A320/B376-­‐377).	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  as	  Kant	  clarifies	   in	   the	  Critique	  of	  the	  
Power	   of	   Judgment,	   sensation	   has	   an	   objective	   sense	   precisely	  when	   it	   is	   considered	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  faculty	  of	  cognition	  (CPJ	  5:205-­‐206).	  52	  Falkenstein	  (1995),	  66-­‐67.	  Notice,	  however,	  that	  if	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  the	  distinction	  between	  higher	  and	  lower	  faculties	  of	  cognition	  must	  also	  be	  a	  result,	  not	  a	  presupposition,	  of	  Kant’s	  argument.	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just	   a	   single	   object.”53	  This	   is	   because	   intuitions	   are,	   initially,	   at	   least,	   of	   indeterminate	  reference.54	  An	   intuition	   can	   refer	   to	   a	   determinate	   object	   only	   when	   that	   object	   can	   be	  individuated	   as	   one	   object	   among	   others,	   but	   this,	   in	   turn,	   is	   possible	   only	   when	   it	   is	  brought	  under	  a	  rule	  provided	  by	  the	  understanding.55	  To	  see,	  by	  contrast,	  what	  notion	  of	  singularity	  may	  be	  relevant	  here,	  consider	  Kant’s	  discussion	  of	  animals	  in	  the	  Anthropology.	  Even	   animals,	  which	   lack	   the	   higher	   cognitive	   faculties,	   can	   “manage	   provisionally”	  with	  singular	   representations,	   but	   in	   doing	   so	   they	   lack	   a	   rule	   under	   which	   such	   singular	  intuitions	  may	  be	  subordinated	  (A	  7:196).	  Now,	  Kant’s	  point,	  I	  think,	  is	  not	  that	  animals,	  in	  contrast	   to	   us,	   successively	   relate	   to	   a	   series	   of	   individuated	   objects,	   objects	   which,	  however,	   lack	   a	   general	   rule	   under	   which	   the	   successive	   representations	   can	   be	  subsequently	   subordinated.	   His	   point,	   rather,	   is	   that	   in	   no	   case	   can	   animals’	   successive	  relation	  to	  a	  series	  of	   individuated	  objects	  be	  established	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  We	  might	  say	  that	  animals	   relate	   to	  objects,	  but	   there	   is	  no	  point	  at	  which	  a	  distinction	  between	   these	  objects	   could	   arise	   for	   them.	   They	   thus	   relate	   to	   the	   world	   as	   to	   something	   essentially	  singular	  and	  indeterminate	  despite	  the	  variety	  of	  their	  intuitive	  representations.	  
                                                53	  Falkenstein	  (1995),	  67.	   If	  we	  do,	  however,	  understand	  singularity	  this	  way,	  then	  I	  agree	  with	  Falkenstein	  that	  the	  singularity	  of	  intuitions	  can	  only	  be	  a	  result	  of	  Kant’s	  argument.	  54	  Falkenstein	   hesitates	   here,	   I	   suspect,	   because	   it	  may	   seem	   to	   follow	   from	   the	   indeterminacy	   of	   intuitive	  reference	   that	   the	   spatiotemporal	   locations	   of	   intuitions	   must	   be	   imposed	   on	   them	   by	   actions	   of	   the	  understanding.	  But	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  an	  intuition	  must	  be	  (and,	  I	  think,	  for	  Kant,	  is)	  both	  indeterminate	  and	  (preconceptually)	   spatiotemporally	   located,	   for	   being	   spatiotemporally	   located	   does	   not	   entail	   carrying	   a	  determinate	  reference	  to	  an	  object.	  55	  Allison,	   following	   W.H.	   Walsh,	   claims	   that	   an	   intuition	   is	   only	   “proleptically”	   the	   representation	   of	   a	  particular:	  “To	  fulfill	  their	  representational	  function,	  intuitions	  must	  actually	  be	  brought	  under	  concepts,	  but	  their	   capacity	   to	   function	   in	   this	   way	   is	   sufficient	   to	   justify	   their	   logical	   classification.”	   Nevertheless,	   for	  Allison	  only	  a	  conceptualized	   intuition	   is	  a	  genuinely	  singular	  representation	  (Allison	   [2004],	  82).	  Although	  (by	   Kant’s	   hypothesis)	   we	   cannot	   conceive	   of	   a	   singular	   representation	   (since	   it	   fails	   to	   be	   a	   full-­‐fledged	  cognition),	   I	   see	   no	   reason	   to	   suppose	   such	   a	   representation	  must	   be	   determinate,	   unless	   picking	   out	   one	  object	  among	  others	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  referring	  to	  an	  object	  at	  all	  (even	  when	  this	  will	  not	  be	  a	  case	  of	  cognizing	  an	  object).	  All	  Kant	  needs	  is	  a	  distinction	  between	  singular	  (and	  indeterminate)	  and	  individual,	  or	  particular	   (and	  determinate),	   representations.	  But	   this	   seems	   to	  be	   just	  what	  Kant	   is	   implicitly	  drawing	  upon	  in	  his	  insistence	  that	  intuitions	  are	  objective	  but	  indeterminate	  representations.	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The	   immediacy	  with	  which	   intuition	  relates	   to	  objects	   is	  connected	  not	  only	   to	   its	  singularity,	  but	  also	  to	  its	  priority	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  thought.	  Intuition,	  Kant	  tells	  us,	  can	  precede	  any	  act	  of	   thinking	  something	  (CPR	  B67;	  also	  B132),	  and	  “all	   thought	  as	  a	  means	   is	  directed”	  back	   to	   intuition	   as	   its	   goal	   (CPR	   A19/B33).	   Thus	   determining	   thought	   acts	   upon	  intrinsically	  indeterminate,	  but	  (for	  us,	  at	  least)	  determinable	  intuitions.	  This	  immediately	  links	   Kant’s	   notion	   of	   intuition	   to	   that	   of	   appearance,	   which	   he	   introduces	   as	   “the	  undetermined	   object	   of	   an	   empirical	   intuition.”56 Kant	   uses	   the	   term	   “appearance”	   in	  several	  senses,	  as	  even	  a	  cursory	  glance	  at	  a	  chief	  thesis	  of	  transcendental	  idealism—that	  we	   cognize	   objects	   only	   as	   they	   appear,	   not	   as	   they	   are	   in	   themselves—suggests.	   Since	  cognition	   requires	   determinacy	   (CPR	   B137),	   appearances	   cannot	   here	   be	   undetermined	  objects	  (as	  at	  CPR	  A20/B34).	  Instead,	  Kant	  means	  to	  say	  that	  appearances,	  though	  initially	  (given	   the	   priority	   of	   intuition)	   undetermined	   objects,	   admit	   of	   determination	   without	  thereby	  losing	  their	  character	  as	  appearances.57	  Now,	   Kant	   immediately	   adds,	   “That	   in	   the	   appearance	   which	   corresponds	   to	  sensation”	  is	  its	  matter,	  while	  “that	  which	  allows	  the	  manifold	  of	  appearance	  to	  be	  intuited	  
                                                56	  In	   fact,	   Kant	   seems	   to	   conflate	   intuition	   and	   appearance	   in	   several	   places,	   including	   (a	   passage	   to	   be	  discussed	  below)	  A69/B93.	  57	  This	  view,	  moreover,	   is	  not	  a	  new	  one,	  and	  in	  this	  context	  it	   is	  instructive	  to	  consider	  §5	  of	  the	  Inaugural	  
Dissertation.	   “But	   it	   is	  of	  greatest	   importance	  here,”	  Kant	  emphasizes,	  “to	  have	  noticed	  that	  cognitions	  must	  always	  be	  treated	  as	  sensitive	  cognitions,	  no	  matter	  how	  extensive	  the	  logical	  use	  of	  the	  understanding	  may	  have	  been	  in	  relation	  to	  them.	  For	  they	  are	  called	  sensitive	  on	  account	  of	  their	  genesis	  and	  not	  on	  account	  of	  their	  comparison	   in	  respect	  of	  identity	  or	  opposition”	  (ID	  2:393).	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  remark,	  “But	  in	  the	  case	  of	  sensible	   things	   and	   phenomena,	   that	   which	   precedes	   the	   logical	   use	   of	   the	   understanding	   is	   called	  
appearance,	   while	   the	   reflective	   cognition,	   which	   arises	   when	   several	   appearances	   are	   compared	   by	   the	  understanding,	  is	  called	  experience”	  (ID	  2:394).	  Here	  “apparentia”	  is	  used	  specifically	  to	  indicate	  that	  which	  precedes	  the	  application	  of	  concepts,	  but	  in	  the	  Critique	  he	  will	  apply	  the	  logic	  he	  here	  applies	  to	  the	  class	  of	  sensitive	   cognitions	   to	   the	   class	   of	   appearances.	   Though	   he	   continues	   to	   use	   “appearance”	   in	   the	   specific	  sense,	   this	   opens	   up	   a	   broader	   sense	   of	   the	   term,	   as	   well,	   a	   sense	   that	   is,	   in	   fact,	   the	   relevant	   one	   when	  distinguishing	  appearances	  from	  things	  in	  themselves.	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as	  ordered	  in	  certain	  relations”	  is	  its	  form	  (CPR	  A20/B34).58	  This	  already	  suggests	  that	  the	  work	   of	   determination	   cannot	   be	   located,	   as	   some	   of	   Kant’s	   basic	   formulations	   might	  suggest,	  entirely	  on	  the	  side	  of	  thought:	  the	  presence	  in	  us	  of	  determining	  forms	  of	  intuition	  already	   entails	   that	   spatiotemporal	   determinations	   are	   in	   some	   manner	   attached	   to	  (though	  not	  necessarily	   intrinsic	   representational	  properties	  of)	   indeterminate	   intuitions	  prior	   to	   the	   work	   of	   the	   understanding.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   species	   of	   determination	   that	  correspond	  to	  our	  forms	  of	   intuition	  remain	  insufficient	  for	  determining	  an	  object	  for	  the	  purposes	   of	   cognition.	   For	   this,	   another	   cognitive	   faculty	   altogether	   is	   required.	   As	   Kant	  puts	  the	  point	  in	  the	  Analytic	  of	  Principles,	  With	   us	   understanding	   and	   sensibility	   can	   determine	   an	   object	   only	   in	  
combination.	  If	  we	  separate	  them,	  then	  we	  have	  intuitions	  without	  concepts,	  or	   concepts	   without	   intuitions,	   but	   in	   either	   case	   representations	   that	   we	  cannot	  relate	  to	  any	  determinate	  object.	  (CPR	  A258/B314;	  cf.	  A51/B75)	  	  Thus	   for	   purposes	   of	   determination,	   and	   hence	   as	   a	   condition	   of	   objective	   cognition	   in	  general,	   given	   appearances	  must	   in	   turn	  be	   thought.	  Appearances	   given	   initially	   through	  sensibility	  provide	  the	  connection	  with	  the	  given	  that	  cannot	  be	  sundered	  if	  our	  cognition	  is	   to	   link	  up	  with	   its	  object,	  and	  no	  act	  of	   thinking	  appearances,	  however	  exhaustive,	  can	  possibly	   purge	   the	   appearances	   of	   their	   character	  as	   appearances.	   Thus	   the	   determinate	  relation	   to	   an	   object,	   a	   necessary	   condition	   of	   objective	   cognition,	   is	   possible	   in	   the	   first	  
Critique	   only	   by	   bringing	   into	   play	   both	   of	   our	   basic	   cognitive	   faculties—sensibility	   and	  understanding.	  Now,	   the	   thesis	   that	  much	  of	  human	  cognition	   is	  discursive	   is	  not	   at	   all	   new	  with	  Kant;	  his	  innovation,	  rather,	  is	  twofold:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  insists	  that	  all	  human	  cognition	  
                                                58	  Indeed,	   Kant	   later	   clarifies	   that	   by	   “matter”	   he	   generally	  means	   “the	   determinable	   in	   general,”	  while	   by	  “form”	  he	  means	  “its	  determination”	  (CPR	  A266/B322).	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is	  discursive,	  so	  that	  discursivity	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  detour	  along	  the	  road	  to	  something	  higher,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  he	  identifies	  the	  discursive	  moment	  of	  cognition	  with	  the	  bringing	  together	   of	   two	  distinct	   (higher	   and	   lower)	   faculties	   of	   cognition.	  As	  Allison	  has	   pointed	  out,	   there	   is	   a	   close	   conceptual	   connection	   between	   Kant’s	   “discursivity	   thesis,”	   i.e.,	   the	  view	   that	   human	   cognition	   is	   discursive,	   and	   the	   overall	   intelligibility	   of	   transcendental	  idealism:	  only	  because	  the	  sensible	  conditions	  of	  cognition	  are	  distinct	  from	  its	  intellectual	  conditions	  is	  it	  even	  possible	  to	  represent	  things	  cognitively	  as	  they	  are	  in	  themselves,	  for	  considering	   them	   under	   the	   latter	   aspect	   depends	   on	   there	   being	   some	   mode	   of	  representation	  that	  is	  proper	  to	  the	  understanding	  alone.59	  Despite	  its	  importance,	  and	  despite	  the	  pride	  of	  place	  it	  occupies	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  both	   the	   Transcendental	   Aesthetic	   and	   the	   Transcendental	   Analytic,	   it	   is	   not	   altogether	  obvious	  that	  the	  discursivity	  thesis	  is	  a	  position	  for	  which	  Kant	  explicitly	  argues	  in	  the	  text	  of	   the	   first	  Critique,60	  a	  situation	   that	  makes	   it	   tempting	   to	  explain	  Kant’s	  commitment	   to	  the	  view	  merely	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  broader	  sweep	  of	  his	  thought	  and	  thereby	  treat	  it	  as	  a	  mere	  presupposition	  of	  the	  critical	  system.	  Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  distinguish	  between	  Kant’s	   (historical)	   motivations	   for	   the	   view—which	   are	   perhaps	   clearer	   when	   we	   look	  beyond	   the	   confines	   of	   the	   first	   Critique—and	   the	   arguments	   which	   he	   ultimately	   took	  himself	   to	   be	   able	   to	   produce	   for	   it	   within	   the	   framework	   of	   the	   argument	   of	   the	   latter	  work.	  My	   own	   view,	  which	   I	   will	   not	   try	   to	   establish	   here,	   is	   that	   the	   thesis	   is	   (at	   least	  supposed	  to	  be)	  established	  simultaneously	  with	  Kant’s	  major	  claim	  of	  the	  Transcendental	  
                                                59	  See	  Allison	  (2004),	  16-­‐17.	  60	  Allison	  himself	   took	   this	   to	   be	   an	  unargued	  presupposition	   of	   the	   first	  Critique	   in	   the	   first	   edition	   of	   his	  book.	  He	  now	  holds	   that	  Kant	  at	   least	  gives	  us	   the	   resources	   to	   reconstruct	  an	  argument	   for	   it.	   See	  Allison	  (2004),	  452n37.	  Falkenstein,	  too,	  has	  remarked	  upon	  the	  apparent	  lack	  of	  argument	  for,	  or	  even	  a	  complete	  explanation	  of,	  the	  thesis	  (Falkenstein	  [1995],	  29).	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Deduction:	   that	   the	   pure	   concepts	   of	   the	   understanding	   have	   validity	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  objects	  we	  originally	   intuit	   through	  our	   sensible	   faculty.	   In	  what	   follows,	   I	  would	   like	   to	  show,	   not	   that	   Kant’s	   deduction	   of	   the	   categories	   succeeds	   or	   fails,	   but	  why	   he	   came	   to	  associate	   the	   task	   of	   the	   deduction	   so	   closely	  with	   the	   task	   of	   the	   power	   of	   judgment,	   a	  faculty	  that	  is	  necessary	  if	  our	  concepts	  are	  to	  be	  linked	  back	  to	  intuition	  and	  thus	  capable	  of	  producing	  objective	  cognition.	  
Judgment	  as	  the	  Clue	  to	  All	  Acts	  of	  the	  Understanding	  Given	  that	  he	  considered	  it	  “the	  most	  difficult	  thing	  that	  could	  ever	  be	  undertaken	  on	  behalf	  of	  metaphysics”	   (P	   4:260),	   it	   should	   come	   as	   no	   surprise	   that	   the	   basic	   principle	   of	   the	  Transcendental	  Deduction	  became	   transparent	   to	  Kant	  only	   through	  a	   series	  of	   attempts	  and	  over	  a	  number	  of	  years.	  In	  a	  lengthy	  footnote	  to	  the	  1786	  Metaphysical	  Foundations	  of	  
Natural	   Science,	   Kant	   makes	   the	   bold	   claim	   that,	   as	   he	   has	   now	   come	   to	   realize,	   the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  categories	  make	  experience	  possible	  can	  be	  “accomplished	  through	  a	  single	   inference	   from	   the	   precisely	   determined	   definition	   of	   a	   judgment	   in	   general	   (an	  action	  through	  which	  given	  representations	   first	  become	  cognitions	  of	  an	  object)”	  (MFNS	  4:475n).	  And	  indeed	  Kant	  takes	  advantage	  of	  this	  definition	  of	  judgment	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  1787	  edition	  of	  the	  deduction.61	  Why	  would	  the	  definition	  of	   judgment	  be	  so	  important	  for	  understanding	  the	  basic	  strategy	  of	  the	  deduction?	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  story	  actually	  begins	  quite	  early	  in	  the	  first	  Critique.	  From	  its	  opening	  pages	  Kant	  expresses	  supreme	  confidence	  in	  his	  ability	   to	   render	   his	   investigation	   into	   pure	   reason	   systematic	   and	   exhaustive.	   This	   is	  
                                                61	  Note	  that	  the	  important	  §19	  of	  the	  deduction	  alludes	  several	  times	  to	  this	  definition	  (see	  CPR	  B141,	  B142).	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because	   pure	   reason	   is	   “a	   perfect	   unity”	   (CPR	   Axiii)62 	  with	   which	   I	   can	   easily	   gain	  “exhaustive	   acquaintance.”	   And	   this	   is	   simply	   because	   I	   encounter	   it	   nowhere	   but	   “in	  myself”	  (CPR	  Axiv).	  Apparently	  as	  an	  afterthought,	  Kant	  adds,	  “Common	  logic	  already	  also	  gives	   me	   an	   example	   of	   how	   the	   simple	   acts	   of	   reason	   may	   be	   fully	   and	   systematically	  enumerated”	   (CPR	   Axiv).	   Taking	   these	   remarks	   together,	   Kant’s	   view	   seems	   to	   be	   the	  following:	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  simply	  by	  inspecting	  my	  own	  acts	  of	  reasoning	  I	  can	  come	  up	  with	  a	  systematic	  schema	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  this	  activity.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  production	  of	  just	  this	  schema	  is	  the	  task	  traditionally	  assigned	  to	  logic,	  so	  it	  stand	  to	  reason	  that	  the	  logicians’	  efforts	  (“though	  not	  yet	  wholly	  free	  of	  defects”;	  P	  4:323;	  cf.	  JL	  9:20-­‐21)	  will	  serve	  as	  a	  helpful	  guide.63	  Although	  he	  does	  not	  develop	  his	  point	  any	  further	  in	  the	  Preface,	  Kant	  returns	  to	  it	  at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  Transcendental	  Analytic:	   after	   emphasizing	   that	   his	   is	   a	   scientific	  undertaking	  which	  therefore	  requires	  systematic	  completeness	  determined	  through	  an	  idea	  of	  the	  whole	  (CPR	  A64-­‐65/B89),64	  he	  points	  out	  that	  the	  pure	  understanding,65	  because	  it	  is	  separate	  from	  all	  sensibility,	  is	  a	  unity	  that	  subsists	  on	  its	  own,	  which	  is	  sufficient	  by	  itself,	  and	  which	  is	  not	  to	   be	   supplemented	   by	   external	   additions.	   Hence	   the	   sum	   total	   of	   its	  
                                                62	  Kant	  elaborates	   in	   the	  Prolegomena:	   “Pure	  reason	   is	   such	  an	   isolated	  domain,	  within	   itself	   so	   thoroughly	  connected,	   that	  no	  part	   of	   it	   can	  be	   encroached	  upon	  without	  disturbing	   all	   the	   rest,	   nor	   adjusted	  without	  having	  previously	  determined	  for	  each	  part	  its	  place	  and	  its	  influence	  on	  the	  others;	  for,	  since	  there	  is	  nothing	  outside	   of	   it	   that	   could	   correct	   our	   judgment	   within	   it,	   the	   validity	   and	   use	   of	   each	   part	   depends	   on	   the	  relation	  in	  which	  it	  stands	  to	  the	  others	  within	  reason	  itself,	  and,	  as	  with	  the	  structure	  of	  an	  organized	  body,	  the	  purpose	  of	  any	  member	  can	  be	  derived	  only	  from	  the	  complete	  concept	  of	  the	  whole”	  (P	  4:263).	  63	  Thus	  whatever	   deficiencies	  may	   be	   present	   in	   Kant’s	   table	   of	   categories,	   Hegel’s	   charge	   (see,	   e.g.,	   Hegel	  [1830],	  84	  [§42R])	  that	  Kant	  simply	  collected	  them	  empirically	  from	  the	  history	  of	  logic,	  instead	  of	  (as	  Fichte	  did)	   deducing	   them	   from	   a	   common	   principle,	   is	   not	   entirely	   fair.	   Kant	   did	   not	   just	   follow	   the	   traditional	  logicians	  out	  of	  inertia;	  rightly	  or	  wrongly,	  he	  thought	  they	  had	  done	  a	  pretty	  good	  job.	  64	  This	  scientific	  nature	  is,	  for	  Kant,	  definitive	  of	  philosophy	  as	  such.	  In	  fact,	  “not	  only	  does	  philosophy	  allow	  such	   strictly	   systematic	   connection,	   it	   is	   even	   the	   only	   science	   that	   has	   systematic	   connection	   in	   the	  most	  proper	  sense,	  and	  it	  gives	  systematic	  unity	  to	  all	  other	  sciences”	  (JL	  9:24).	  65	  Here	  “pure	  understanding”	  should	  surely	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  broad	  sense,	  so	  that	  Kant’s	  point	  is	  identical	  to	  the	  one	  he	  has	  already	  made	  at	  CPR	  Axiii-­‐xiv.	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cognition	  will	  constitute	  a	  system	  that	  is	  to	  be	  grasped	  and	  determined	  under	  one	  idea,	  the	  completeness	  and	  articulation	  of	  which	  system	  can	  at	  the	  same	  time	  yield	  a	  touchstone	  of	  the	  correctness	  and	  genuineness	  of	  all	  the	  pieces	  of	  cognition	  fitting	  into	  it.	  (CPR	  A65/B89-­‐90)	  	  To	   merely	   catalog	   the	   concepts	   of	   the	   understanding	   as	   they	   are	   stumbled	   upon	   in	  experience	  might	  well	  yield	  a	  series	  of	  true	  observations,66	  but	  it	  would	  have	  nothing	  at	  all	  to	  do	  with	  the	  business	  of	  scientific	  philosophy	  (cf.	  CPR	  A832/B860;	  MFNS	  4:467;	  JL	  9:72).	  To	  conduct	  philosophy	  scientifically	  depends	  entirely	  upon	  recognizing	  and	  analyzing	  the	  unity	  of	  our	  higher	  faculty	  of	  cognition.67	  In	  fact,	  this	  is	  the	  point	  of	  calling	  this	  part	  of	  the	  
Critique	  a	  transcendental	  “analytic,”	  for	  in	  logic	  “analytic	  discovers	  through	  analysis	  all	  the	  actions	  of	  reason	  that	  we	  perform	  in	  thinking”	  (JL	  9:16).	  An	  external	  clue	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  these	  actions	  can	  be	  gleaned	  from	  the	  basic	  classifications	  present	  in	  the	  more	  or	  less	  adequate	  logic	  textbooks,	  but	  even	  if	  we	  pay	  no	  heed	  to	  the	  latter	  it	  is	  a	  principle	  the	  moments	   of	   which	   should	   in	   any	   event	   be	   easily	   reproducible	   if	   we	   systematically	   and	  exhaustively	  examine	  the	  basic	  acts	  of	  our	  own	  mind.	  	   In	   the	   1783	   Prolegomena	   Kant	   gives	   a	   somewhat	   different	   rendition	   of	   his	  investigations	   into	  the	  Table	  of	  Categories.	  Aristotle,	  of	  course,	  had	  compiled	  a	   list	  of	   ten,	  but	   among	   these	   not	   one	   could	   serve	   as	   a	   principle	   by	   which	   the	   functions	   of	   the	  understanding	  could	  be	  derived.	  
                                                66	  It	  is	  not	  out	  of	  the	  question,	  of	  course,	  that	  we	  might	  stumble	  upon	  a	  fruitful	  topic,	  just	  as	  philosophers	  had	  prepared	  the	  way	  for	  the	  second	  analogy	  by	  way	  of	  their	  investigations	  into	  the	  Principle	  of	  Sufficient	  Reason.	  But	  even	  had	  they	  somehow	  attached	  this	  question	  to	   the	  transcendental	  unity	  of	  apperception,	   this	  would	  not	   have	   given	   them	   insight	   into	   the	   philosophical	   significance	   of	   the	   second	   analogy.	   No	   one	   had	   even	  dreamt	  of	  the	  other	  two	  analogies,	  Kant	  tells	  us,	  “since	  the	  clue	  of	  the	  categories	  was	  missing,	  which	  alone	  can	  uncover	  and	  make	  noticeable	  every	  gap	  of	  the	  understanding,	  in	  concepts	  as	  well	  as	  in	  principles”	  (CPR	  A217-­‐218/B265).	  67	  In	   the	   1772	   letter	   to	   Herz,	   Kant	   refers	   to	   such	   a	   principle	   as	   “the	   way	   they	   [i.e.,	   the	   categories]	   divide	  themselves	   into	  classes	  on	  their	  own	  [von	  selbst]	   through	  a	   few	  fundamental	   laws	  of	   the	  understanding”	  (C	  10:132;	  trans.	  modified).	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In	   order	   however	   to	   find	   such	   a	   principle,	   I	   cast	   about	   for	   an	   act	   of	   the	  understanding	  [sah	  ich	  mich	  nach	  einer	  Verstandeshandlung]	  that	  contains	  all	  of	  the	  others	  and	  that	  only	  differentiates	  itself	  through	  various	  modifications	  or	  moments	   in	   order	   to	   bring	   the	  multiplicity	   of	   representation	   under	   the	  unity	   of	   thinking	   in	   general,	   and	   there	   I	   found	   that	   this	   act	   of	   the	  understanding	  consists	  in	  judging.	  (P	  4:323)	  	  This	  passage	  casts	  Kant’s	  remarks	  from	  1781	  in	  something	  of	  a	  different	  light.	  According	  to	  his	  earlier	  remarks,	   referring	   to	   logic	   in	  order	   to	   find	  a	  more	  or	   less	  ready	  catalog	  of	   the	  acts	   of	   the	  understanding	   is	   a	   straightforward	   (even	   if	   ultimately	  dispensible)	  move,	   but	  according	   to	   the	   1783	   story	   Kant	   had	   to	   “cast	   about”	   for	   a	   principle,	   even	   after	   (as	   the	  previous	  paragraph	  in	  the	  Prolegomena	  makes	  clear)	  it	  was	  clear	  to	  him	  that	  the	  principle	  he	  needed	  must	  exhaustively	  determine	  the	  concepts	  of	  the	  understanding.	  Thus	  the	  Prolegomena	  suggests	  that	  there	  were	  two	  steps	  to	  Kant’s	  procedure:	  first,	  adverting	   to	   logic;	   second,	   locating	  within	   logic	   the	   principle—judgment,	   Kant	   now	   tells	  us—by	  means	  of	  which	  the	  acts	  of	   the	  understanding	  may	  be	  systematically	  enumerated.	  And	  if	  we	  glance	  at	  the	  logic	  textbooks	  of	  Kant’s	  time,	  we	  see	  immediately	  that	  the	  second	  step	   by	   no	   means	   trivially	   follows	   upon	   the	   first.	   The	   Port-­‐Royal	   Logic	   had	   divided	   the	  “principal	   operations	   of	   the	   mind”	   into	   four	   types:	   conceiving,	   judging,	   reasoning,	   and	  ordering.68	  Acts	  of	  judgment	  presuppose	  the	  conception	  of	  their	  elements,	  i.e.,	  ideas,	  and	  in	  turn	  are	  presupposed	  by	  syllogistic	  reasoning	  and,	  finally,	  the	  method	  of	  ordering	  suitable	  to	   science.	   As	   Reinhard	   Brandt	   has	   shown,69 	  the	   Port-­‐Royal	   classificatory	   system	   is	  basically	   repeated	   (although	   the	   status	   of	   the	   fourth	   heading—method—is	   sometimes	  problematic	   or	   even	   omitted	   altogether)	   by	   Bayle,	   Wolff,	   Reimarus,	   and	   others.	   On	   this	  basis,	   not	   only	   is	   a	   classification	   of	   the	   forms	   of	   judgment	   an	   unlikely	   candidate	   for	   the	  
                                                68	  Arnauld	  &	  Nicole	  (1662),	  23.	  69	  Brandt	  (1995),	  54-­‐55.	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principle	  underlying	  all	  “operations	  of	  the	  mind,”	  but	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  actually	  precluded	  by	  its	   localization	   within	   one	   species	   of	   the	   latter.	   A	   table	   of	   syllogistic	   forms	   (cf.	   Kant’s	  procedure	  at	  CPR	  A321/B378)	  could,	  with	  at	  least	  equal,	  and	  probably	  much	  better,	  right,	  be	  invoked	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  principle	  behind	  such	  a	  unity.	  For	   the	   moment,	   I	   just	   want	   to	   emphasize	   that	   this	   presents	   a	   real	   puzzle:	   why	  would	  Kant	  have	  gravitated	  to	  judgment	  (and	  its	  forms)	  as	  harboring	  the	  clue	  to	  the	  unity	  of	  human	  understanding	  in	  general?	  Certainly	  Kant	  would	  have	  expected	  this	  to	  be	  puzzling	  to	   his	   reader,	   given	   the	   novelty	   of	   his	   move.	   So	   we	   would	   expect	   Kant	   to	   explain	   his	  rationale	  to	  the	  reader—and	  to	  so	  do	  in	  short	  order.	  My	   own	   view	   is	   that	   this	   is	   exactly	  what	   he	   does.	   Unfortunately,	   however,	   Kant’s	  argument	  that	  the	  forms	  of	  judgment	  express	  the	  unity	  of	  reason	  is	  condensed	  into	  roughly	  two	  pages	  of	  the	  Critique,	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  argument	  is	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  flurry	  of	  definitions	  and	  classifications	  with	  which	  it	  is	  peppered.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  it	  all,	  Kant	  arrives,	  as	  we	  would	   expect,	   back	   at	   the	   conclusion	   at	   which	   he	   had	   gestured	   so	   casually	   in	   the	   A	  Preface:	  “The	  functions	  of	  the	  understanding	  can	  therefore	  all	  be	  found	  together	  if	  one	  can	  exhaustively	  exhibit	  the	  functions	  of	  unity	  in	  judgments”	  (CPR	  A69/B94).70	  An	  examination	  of	   these	   two	   pages	   shows	   just	   how	   inseparable	   Kant’s	   identification	   of	   judgment	   as	   the	  principle	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  understanding	  is	  from	  the	  discursive	  standpoint	  of	  the	  Critique	  as	  a	  whole.71	  
                                                70 	  Hegel,	   who	   of	   course	   relentlessly	   criticizes	   Kant’s	   table	   of	   judgments	   (see	   n.	   63	   above),	   actually	  congratulates	   Kant	   for	   having	   determined,	   intentionally	   or	   not,	   the	   species	   of	   judgment	   by	   “the	   universal	  forms	  of	  the	  logical	  idea	  itself”	  (Hegel	  [1830],	  248	  [§171A]).	  Perhaps	  Hegel	  is	  right,	  but	  Kant’s	  intention	  is	  just	  the	  opposite.	  71	  As	   a	   historical	  matter,	   Brandt	   has	   conjectured	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   connecting	   the	   doctrines	   of	   concepts	   and	  inferences	  by	  means	  of	   judgment	   first	   appears	   in	  R	  4638,	   dated	  by	  Adickes	   to	   shortly	   after	  1772,	   a	  dating	  which	  would,	  of	  course,	  correspond	  to	  Kant’s	  attempt	  to	  work	  out	  the	  problem	  he	  had	  explained	  to	  Herz	  in	  February	  of	  that	  year.	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A68/B93:	  Kant’s	  “no	  other	  use”	  Claim	  One	   of	   the	   first	   challenges	   confronting	   the	   interpretation	   of	   this	   tortuous	   passage	   is	   to	  distinguish	   Kant’s	   stipulative	   definitions	   from	   his	   substantive	   claims.	   To	   do	   so,	   it	   is	  important	   to	   always	   keep	   in	   mind	   what	   he	   ultimately	   wants	   to	   show:	   that	   the	   table	   of	  judgments	  expresses	  the	  unity	  of	  our	  understanding.72	  Accordingly,	  the	  substantive	  claims	  are	   all	   directed	   towards	   this	   end:	   they	   show	   that	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   understanding	   is	   best	  brought	   out	   when	   the	   latter	   is	   conceived	   as	   a	   faculty	   for	   judging.	   This	   passage	   is	   often	  referred	   to	   for	   the	   clarifications	   it	   offers	   of	   Kant’s	   distinctions	   between	   intuitions	   and	  concepts	  (initially	  drawn	  at	  CPR	  A19/B33	  and	  A50/B74).	  But	  it	  should	  be	  emphasized	  that	  Kant	  is	  not	  undertaking	  this	  exercise	  for	  its	  own	  sake,	  or	  because	  he	  is	  afraid	  he	  has	  been	  unclear;	  he	  is	  trying	  to	  bring	  out	  precisely	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  intuition-­‐concept	  distinction	  that	  are	  important	  if	  we	  want	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  understanding	  can	  be	  represented	  as	  a	  faculty	  for	  judging.	  Kant	  begins	  by	  pointing	  out	  what	  should	  already	  be	  familiar	  to	  his	  reader,	  namely,	  his	  view	  that	  “besides	  intuition	  there	  is	  no	  other	  kind	  of	  cognition	  than	  through	  concepts”	  (CPR	  A68/B92-­‐93),	   cognition	  which	   is	   “not	   intuitive	  but	  discursive.”	  Now,	  however,	  Kant	  seeks	  to	  elaborate	  his	  idea	  further:	  “All	  intuitions,	  as	  sensible,	  rest	  on	  affections,	  concepts	  therefore	  on	  functions”	  (CPR	  A68/B93).	  Let	  us	  proceed	  with	  care	  here:	  whereas	  intuitions,	  because	  they	  are	  sensible,	  rest	  on	  “affections,”	  concepts	  rest	  on	  “functions”—in	  fact,	  Kant	  says,	   “also	  auf	  Funktionen”	   (my	  emphasis).	  Kant’s	   “also”	  directs	  our	  attention	  back	   to	   the	  “sensible”	   occurring	   earlier	   in	   the	   sentence:	   the	   idea	   seems	   to	   be	   that	   concepts,	  because	  
                                                72	  More	  precisely,	  he	  wants	  to	  show	  that	  a	  table	  of	  judgments	  expresses	  the	  unity	  of	  our	  understanding.	  That	  Kant’s	  own	  version	  of	  such	  a	  table	  is	  the	  correct	  one	  is	  defended,	  albeit	  (as	  Kant	  freely	  admits)	  too	  briefly,	  at	  A71-­‐76/B96-­‐101.	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they	  are	  nonsensible,	  can	  only	  be	  based	  on	  functions.	  At	  first	  glance	  this	  may	  seem	  like	  an	  odd	  inference	  to	  be	  asked	  to	  draw.73	  What	  is	  the	  logical	  connection	  supposed	  to	  be	  between	  functions	  and	  nonsensible	  representations?	  If	  anything,	  we	  would	  expect	  Kant	  to	  conclude	  that	  concepts,	  as	  nonsensible,	  rest	  on	  some	  species	  of	  spontaneous	  activity.	  One	  might	  well	  wonder,	  in	  addition,	  whether	  the	  mathematical	  term	  “function”74	  is	  even	  appropriate	  here.	  Kant	   immediately	   goes	   on,	   however,	   to	   clarify	   both	   puzzles:	   “By	   a	   function,	   however,	   I	  understand	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   action	   [Einheit	   der	   Handlung]	   of	   ordering	   different	  representations	  under	  a	  common	  one.”	  Thus	  Kant	   is	  alerting	  us	   that	  he	   is	  using	   the	   term	  
function	   in	  a	  specific,	  perhaps	  surprising	  way,	  namely,	   to	   indicate	  a	  specific	  kind	  of	  unity,	  that	   is,	   the	   unity	   that	   characterizes	   the	  action	   of	   ordering	   a	  manifold	   of	   representations	  under	  a	  common	  one.	  Thus	  the	  characteristic	  we	  would	  have	  expected	  Kant	  to	  emphasize	  straightaway	  is	  in	  fact	  already	  being	  thought	  under	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  function.	  We	   are	   still	   left	   in	   the	   dark,	   of	   course,	   as	   to	   why	   Kant	   takes	   his	   remarks	   on	   the	  terminological	  detour	   through	  “Funktion”	   in	   the	   first	  place. In	  mathematics,	   to	  consider	  a	  quantity	   as	   a	   function	   is	   to	   consider	   it	   as	   expressing	   a	   relation	   of	   arbitrary	   complexity	  holding	   among	   other	   quantities. 75 	  By	   attaching	   to	   this	   mathematical	   notion	   the	  
                                                73	  Adickes,	   for	  one,	  certainly	  thought	  so,	  enough	  to	  amend	  the	  text	  by	  substituting	  “aber”	   for	  “also.”	  Neither	  Erdmann	  nor	  Schmidt	  accepted	  the	  amendment	  into	  their	  editions.	  74	  The	   terminology	   of	   functiones	   underwent	   rapid	   development	   from	   its	   introduction	   (at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  seventeenth	  century)	  by	  Leibniz	  and	  the	  Bernoullis	  throughout	  the	  whole	  of	  Kant’s	  lifetime.	  The	  key	  figure	  in	  this	  development,	  however,	  is	  Euler,	  who	  by	  the	  mid	  1750s	  had	  developed	  an	  extremely	  general	  definition	  of	  a	   function	   to	  which	  he	  ascribed	   foundational	  significance.	  After	  explaining	   the	  distinction	  between	  variable	  and	   constant	   quantities,	   Euler	   describes	   how	   the	   distance	   and	   trajectory	   of	   a	   shot	   fired	   from	   a	   cannon	  depends	   upon	   the	   quantity	   of	   gunpowder	   and	   the	   elevation	   of	   the	   barrel.	   “In	   this	   business	   the	   thing	   that	  requires	  the	  most	  attention	  is	  how	  the	  variable	  quantities	  depend	  on	  each	  other,”	  and	  “those	  quantities	  that	  depend	  on	  others	  in	  this	  way,	  namely,	  those	  that	  undergo	  a	  change	  when	  others	  change,	  are	  called	  functions	  of	  these	  quantities”	  (Euler	  [1755],	  vi).	  Thus	  a	  function	  allows	  a	  quantity	  to	  be	  indicated	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  its	  dependence	  on	  certain	  other	  quantities	  is	  brought	  to	  the	  fore.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  development	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  function,	  see	  Youschkevitch	  (1976).	  75	  Leibniz	   had	   already	   remarked	   upon	   the	   significance	   of	   this	   fundamental	   notion	   as	   early	   as	   1686:	   the	  possibility	  of	  taking	  as	  given	  a	  scattered	  series	  of	  points	  and	  fitting	  to	  them	  a	  single	  geometrical	  line	  “whose	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aforementioned	   notion	   of	   the	   unity	   of	   an	   action,	   Kant	   sets	   up	   an	   important	   contrast	  between	   his	   two	   most	   basic	   species	   of	   representations.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   unity	  characteristic	  of	  sensible	  intuitions	  consists	  in	  their	  singularity.	  This	  singularity	  must	  not,	  to	  be	  sure,	  be	  conflated	  with	  simplicity—“every	  intuition	  contains	  a	  manifold	  in	  itself”	  (CPR	  A99)—but	  the	  manifoldness	  of	  an	  intuition	  consists	  in	  its	  divisible,	  not	  divided,	  parts,	  parts	  which	  do	  not	  precede	  the	  givenness	  of	  the	  intuition	  as	  a	  whole	  (CPR	  A25/B39,	  A32/B47-­‐48;	  cf.	  MFNS	  4:508).	  The	  intuited	  object	  has	  its	  unity	  not	  by	  virtue	  of	  any	  action	  on	  our	  own	  part,	  but	  simply	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  immediate	  presence	  of	  a	  whole	  that	  does	  not	  depend	  upon	  our	   piecemeal	   construction	   of	   it.	   Thus	  when	   Kant	   inserts	   an	   “aber”	   into	   the	   sentence	   in	  which	   he	   defines	   function	   (“By	   a	   function,	   however	   .	   .	   .”),	   what	   is	   surprising	   in	   this	  definition,	   and	  which	   Kant	   thinks	   deserves	   emphasis,	   is	   that	   a	   function	   does	   not	  merely	  (and	  as	  its	  mathematical	  heritage	  might	  suggest)	  indicate	  unity,	  or	  unity-­‐in-­‐multiplicity,	  in	  general,	   but	   rather	   a	   unity	   of	   a	   very	   specific	   type:	   the	  unity	   of	   an	  action.	   The	   singularity	  constitutive	  of	  an	  intuition	  is,	  in	  a	  manner	  of	  speaking,	  a	  unity	  given	  to	  us	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  fait	  
accompli,	  and	  this	  is	  emphatically	  not	  the	  unity	  of	  an	  action.	  This	  contrast	  nicely	  illustrates	  the	  discursivity	  of	   the	  human	  understanding:	  although	  we	   intuit	  objects	   in	  an	   immediate	  and	   singular	   way,	   we	   come	   to	   cognize	   these	   objects	   only	   by	   distinguishing	   and	   then	  gradually	   reconstructing,	   through	   a	   series	   of	   determining	   acts,	   the	   object	  which	  we	   had	  originally	  intuited	  in	  a	  merely	  indeterminate	  manner.	  
                                                                                                                                                       notion	   is	   constant	   and	  uniform,	   following	  a	   certain	   rule”	   (Leibniz	   [1686],	   39	   [§6]).	  The	   crucial	  point	   is	   the	  possibility	  of	  representing	  an	  arbitrarily	  complex	  multiplicity	  by	  means	  of	  a	  single	  expression.	  It	  is	  important	  to	   see	   that	   this	   remains	   the	   operative	   principle	   of	   Euler’s	   arithmetical	   definition	   (see	   n.	   74),	   as	   well:	   to	  manipulate	  an	  equation	  so	  that	  it	  is	  a	  function	  of	  one	  variable	  in	  particular	  is	  to	  give	  a	  set	  of	  relations	  a	  point	  around	  which	  they	  can	  be	  organized	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  single	  quantity.	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   Like	   many	   of	   his	   predecessors,	   Kant	   struggles	   against	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   general	  representation	   as	   just	   an	   image-­‐copy	   of	   something	   particular.76	  A	   concept	   is	   not	   simply	  given	   in	   the	  manner	   of	   a	   static	   picture;	   rather,	   a	   concept	   depends,	   at	   least	   as	   far	   as	   its	  possibility	  of	  being	  related	  to	  an	  object	  is	  concerned,	  on	  the	  unity	  of	  an	  action.	  Thus	  when	  Kant	  goes	  on	  to	  say,	  “Now	  the	  understanding	  can	  make	  no	  other	  use	  of	  these	  concepts	  than	  that	  of	   judging	  by	  means	  of	   them”	   (CPR	  A68/B93;	   I	  will	   refer	   to	   this	   as	  Kant’s	   “no	  other	  use”	  claim),	  he	  is	  not	  jumping	  to	  an	  altogether	  distinct	  train	  of	  thought,	  as	  it	  might	  at	  first	  appear,	  for	  the	  “judging”	  in	  this	  sentence	  is	  meant	  to	  correspond	  to	  the	  action	  the	  unity	  of	  which	  he	  has	   just	   emphasized.	  This	   at	  once	  demarcates	  Kant’s	   view	  sharply	   from	   that	  of	  Spinoza:	  unlike	  Spinoza,	  for	  whom	  ideas	  are	  intrinsically	  active	  and	  self-­‐unfolding—in	  fact,	  they	   are	   just	   “understanding	   itself	   [ipsum	   intelligere]”—for	  Kant	   the	   activity	   upon	  which	  concepts	   depend	   must	   ultimately	   be	   located	   in	   a	   distinct	   faculty,	   namely,	   the	   faculty	   of	  judgment.	  When	  Kant	  says	  concepts	  lack	  any	  other	  “use”	  than	  they	  have	  in	  judging,	  we	  are	  therefore	   entitled	   to	   take	   him	   quite	   seriously,	   for	   the	   unity	   characteristic	   of	   concepts	  always	  retains	  a	  reference	  to	  acts	  of	  judging.	  
The	  Act	  of	  Judging	  and	  the	  Vermögen	  zu	  urteilen	  What	  does	   it	  mean,	  however,	   for	   concepts	   to	  have	   “reference”	   to	   judgments	   in	   this	  way?	  Béatrice	  Longuenesse,	  who	  has	  taken	  the	  argument	  at	  A68-­‐69/B93-­‐94	  very	  seriously,	  takes	  this	  to	  mean	  that	  concept	  formation	  is	  oriented	  towards	  the	  use	  we	  will	  ultimately	  make	  of	  those	  concepts.	  Since,	  however,	  concepts	  have	  “no	  other	  use”	  than	  they	  have	  in	  judgments,	  the	  forms	  of	  concepts	  must	  be	  isomorphic	  with	  the	  forms	  of	  judgments,	  and	  this	  is	  why	  the	  table	   of	   judgments	   can	   function	   as	   a	   clue	   to	   the	   table	   of	   categories.	   Accordingly,	  
                                                76	  Spinoza,	   in	  particular,	   complains	  about	   the	  conception	  of	  an	   idea	  as	   “something	  mute,	   like	  a	  picture	  on	  a	  tablet”	  (Spinoza	  [1677],	  479	  [EIIP43S]).	  
 49	  
Longuenesse	  sharply	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  mere	  capacity	   to	   judge	  (the	  Vermögen	  zu	  
urteilen),	  which	  gives	  a	  unified	  form	  to	  all	  acts	  of	  the	  understanding,	  and	  the	  actualization	  of	   that	  capacity	  (the	  Urteilskraft).77	  On	  her	  reading	  of	   the	  passage,	   then,	  Kant’s	  claim	  that	  the	   understanding	   can	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   Vermögen	   zu	   urteilen	   rests	   on	   a	   teleological	  principle:	   the	   forms	   of	   concepts	  depend	  on	   the	  use	  which	   is	   subsequently	   to	   be	  made	  of	  them	   in	   acts	   of	   judgment.	   Crucially,	   then,	   the	   “judging”	   referred	   to	   in	   the	   “no	   other	   use”	  claim	  is	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  Urteilskraft,	  not	  the	  Vermögen	  zu	  urteilen.	  Conversely,	  however,	  it	  is	  because	  all	  acts	  of	  the	  understanding	  are	  directed	  to	  the	  employment	  of	  the	  Urteilskraft	  that	  the	  understanding	  itself	  must	  be	  understood,	  most	  basically,	  as	  a	  Vermögen	  zu	  urteilen.	  If	  Longuenesse	  is	  right,	  then	  the	  table	  of	  judgments,	  which	  for	  most	  of	  the	  history	  of	  Kant	  interpretation	  has	  been	  considered	  a	  monumental	  embarrassment,	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	   the	  Transcendental	  Analytic	  of	   the	   first	  Critique:	  because	   it	  deals	  with	   the	  understanding,	   and	   because	   the	   understanding	   is	   essentially	   a	   capacity	   to	   judge,	   all	   its	  arguments	  must	  be	   “related,	  down	   to	   the	  minutest	  details	  of	   [its]	  proofs,	   to	   the	   role	   that	  Kant	  assigns	  to	  the	  logical	  forms	  of	  our	  judgments.”78	  The	  immense	  value	  of	  Longuenesse’s	  book	  is	  the	  thoroughness	  and	  convincingness	  with	  which	  she	  caries	  out	  this	  task.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   however,	   if	   my	   reading	   of	   A68/B93	   is,	   thus	   far,	   correct,	  Longuenesse’s	  reading	  of	  Kant’s	  “no	  other	  use”	  claim	  should	  strike	  us	  as	  more	  than	  a	  little	  odd:	  if	  Kant’s	  emphasis	  on	  the	  unity	  of	  action	  is	  the	  overriding	  feature	  of	  this	  passage,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  strange	  indeed	  for	  him	  to	  locate	  the	  principle	  of	  all	  acts	  of	  the	  understanding	  not	   in	   this	   action,	   but	   in	   a	  mere	   capacity	   to	   act.	   In	   fact,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   realize	   that	  on	  Longuenesse’s	  view,	  the	  Vermögen	  zu	  urteilen	  is	  a	  capacity	  twice	  removed	  from	  action:	  our	  
                                                77	  See	  n.	  43	  above.	  78	  Longuenesse	  (1998),	  5.	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power	  to	  actually	  make	  judgments	  (our	  Urteilskraft)	  depends	  on	  our	  having	  reflected	  our	  concepts	   in	   such	   a	   way	   (through	   our	  Vermögen	   zu	  urteilen)	   that	   such	   a	   capacity	   can	   be	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  them.	  Granted,	  even	  this	  bare	  capacity	  would	  be	  guided	  by	  an	  eventual	  action,	  but	  Kant	  himself	  never	  distinguishes	   capacity	   from	  activity	   in	   this	  passage,	  which	  we	  would	  expect	  him	  to	  do	  if	  he	  were	  driving	  at	  a	  point	   like	  this.79	  This	   is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  Longuenesse’s	  reading	  cannot	  be	  right,	  only	  that	  it	  depends	  on	  reading	  the	  passage	  almost	  directly	  against	  its	  (apparent)	  grain:	  by	  separating	  the	  capacity	  to	  judge	  from	  the	  activity	  of	  judging,	  and	  by	  claiming	  that	  it	  is	  the	  capacity,	  not	  the	  activity,	  which	  provides	  the	  principle	  for	   all	   acts	   of	   the	  understanding,	   Longuenesse	   construes	  Kant’s	   reference	   to	   the	  unity	   of	  action	  characteristic	  of	  concepts	  in	  a	  roundabout	  way.	  To	  be	  sure,	  it	  is	  true	  on	  her	  view	  that	  the	  unity	  of	  action	  characteristic	  of	  concepts	  refers	  to	  acts	  of	  judging,	  but	  this	  is	  a	  reference	  
forward	  to	  the	  judgments	  which	  they	  subsequently	  make	  possible.	  My	   suggestion,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   that	   we	   read	   the	   reference	   of	   the	   unity	   of	  concepts	  to	  acts	  of	  judging	  in	  the	  other	  direction:	  backward	  to	  the	  acts	  of	  judgment	  through	  which	  concepts	  first	  attain	  their	  original	  unity.	  This	  has	  the	  virtue	  of	  rendering	  Kant’s	  claim	  (at	   A69/B94)	   that	   the	   understanding	   can	   be	   represented	   as	   a	   faculty	   for	   judging	  considerably	   more	   straightforwardly:	   concepts	   depend	   on	   unities	   of	   action,	   so	   concepts	  cannot	  precede	  acts	  of	  the	  Vermögen	  zu	  urteilen.	  Now,	  it	  is	  true,	  of	  course,	  that	  Kant	  refers	  to	   the	  use	  which	   is	  to	  be	  made	   of	   concepts,	   and	   I	  do	  not	  at	   all	  dispute	   that,	  once	   formed,	  concepts	   do	   have	   (and	   only	   have)	   such	   a	   use.	   But	   Kant	   does	   not	   draw	   attention	   to	   this	  possible	  use	  to	  contrast	  it	  with	  the	  mere	  capacity	  for	  the	  understanding	  to	  use	  concepts	  this	  
                                                79	  That	   is,	   unless	   one	   takes	   Kant’s	   introduction	   of	   the	   Vermögen	   zu	   urteilen	   at	   A69/B94	   to	   be	   that	   very	  moment.	  But	  the	  very	  question	  is	  whether	  there	  are	  grounds	  for	  distinguishing	  the	  Vermögen	  zu	  urteilen	  from	  the	  Urteilskraft	  in	  this	  passage.	  More	  generally,	  on	  the	  complicated	  relationship	  between	  capacity	  and	  activity	  in	  Kant’s	  thought,	  see	  nn.	  44	  and	  47	  above.	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way,	  but	  rather	  to	  refer	  directly	  to	  the	  use	  which	  must—in	  a	  sense	  to	  be	  elaborated	  later—have	   “already”	   been	  made	   of	   concepts,	   at	   least	   from	   a	   transcendental	   point	   of	   view.80	  In	  short,	   it	   seems	   to	  me	   that	  Longuenesse’s	   reading	  places	   considerably	  more	   stress	  on	   the	  word	   “Vermögen”	   than	   it	   is	   really	   able	   to	   bear.	   Rather	   than	   taking	   Kant’s	   reference	   to	   a	  
Vermögen	  as	  the	  introduction	  of	  an	  important	  contrast	  with	  the	  faculty	  for	  actually	  judging,	  I	  think	  we	  should	  simply	  identify	  them.	  It	  could	  be	  objected,	  and,	  I	  think,	  fairly,	  that	  the	  real	  strength	  of	  Longuenesse’s	  view	  (as	   she	   would	   surely	   acknowledge)	   rests	   not	   on	   the	   interpretation	   of	   a	   short,	   obscure	  passage,	  but	  rather	  on	  the	  power	  of	  her	  distinction	  between	  the	  Vermögen	  zu	  urteilen	  and	  the	  Urteilskraft	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  wide	  swaths	  of	  Kant’s	  text.	  Even	  granting	  the	  points	  I	  have	  just	  made,	   it	   is	   surely	  miscalculating	   the	  burden	  of	  proof	   to	  suppose	   that	  much	  hangs	  on	  them.	  If	  the	  price	  to	  be	  paid	  for	  the	  power	  of	  Longuenesse’s	  analysis	  is	  a	  strained	  reading	  of	  an	  in	  any	  event	  obscure	  section	  of	  text,	  so	  be	  it.	  Although	   I	   certainly	   do	   not	   propose	   to	   settle	   the	   matter	   here,	   it	   is	   worth	  emphasizing	  that	  my	  reading	  of	  the	  passage,	  like	  Longuenesse’s,	  explains	  why	  there	  should	  be	   such	   a	   close	   link	  between	   the	   logical	   forms	  of	   judgment	   and	   the	   “minutest	  details”	   of	  Kant’s	   proofs.	   In	   fact,	   it	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   my	   reading	   does	   so	   in	   an	   even	   more	   direct	  manner	   than	   hers.81	  For	   on	   her	   picture,	   the	   “use”	   of	   	   concepts	   is	   consequent	   upon	   their	  
                                                80	  In	  other	  words,	  Longuenesse’s	  reading	  depends	  on	  diminishing	   the	  activity	  associated	  with	  the	  Vermögen	  
zu	  urteilen	   introduced	   at	   A69/B94,	  while	  mine	   depends	   on	   emphasizing	   this	   very	   activity	   and	   linking	   it	   to	  Kant’s	   discussion	   of	   concepts.	   While	   he	   does	   not	   really	   press	   the	   point,	   Allison	   registers	   his	   “continued	  puzzlement	   about	   how	   a	   capacity	   (as	   contrasted	   with	   its	   exercise)	   can	   do	   anything,	   including	   determine	  sensibility”	  (Allison	  [2012],	  44).	  Although,	  as	  I	  have	  pointed	  out	  (n.	  44	  above),	  a	  facultas	  is	  basically	  a	  species	  of	  activity,	  Allison	  certainly	  has	  a	  point:	  Longuenesse	  has	  divorced	   the	  capacity	   for	  actually	   judging	   from	  a	  capacity	  for	  even	  being	  able	  to	  do	  so	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  why	  the	  latter,	  not	  the	  former,	  should	  be	  taken	  by	  Kant	  to	  be	  definitive	  of	  the	  understanding.	  My	  interpretation	  avoids	  this	  difficulty.	  81	  Allison,	  for	  one,	  thinks	  that	  Longuenesse	  “still	  owes	  us	  an	  account	  of	  how	  the	  subjection	  of	  the	  manifold	  of	  sensible	  intuition	  in	  general	  to	  the	  categories	  is	  supposed	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	  appeal	  to	  the	  logical	  functions	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formation,	   while	   on	   mine	   their	   forms	   always	   reflect	   an	   original	   “use,”	   i.e.,	   an	   act	   of	  judgment	   (in	   Longuenesse’s	   terms:	   an	   act	   of	   the	   Urteilskraft).	   On	   my	   reading,	   there	   is	  nothing	   teleological	   about	   Kant’s	   basic	   move	   here:	   the	   reason	   why	   the	   categories	   are	  isomorphic	  with	   the	   logical	   forms	   of	   judgment	   is	   that	   concepts	   can	   only	   be	   concepts	   by	  referring	   back	   to	   acts	   of	   judgment,	   and	   the	   unity	   characteristic	   of	   concepts	   necessarily	  inherits	  the	  unity	  characteristic	  of	  this	  activity.	  One	  final	  word	  is	  in	  order.	  Despite	  everything	  I	  have	  just	  said,	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  reject	  the	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   conceptual	   distinction	  between	   the	  Vermögen	  zu	  urteilen	   and	   the	  
Urteilskraft	   as	   Longuenesse	   draws	   it	   or	   claim	   that	   such	   a	   distinction	   is	   foreign	   to	   Kant’s	  thought	  altogether.	  My	  claim	  is	  just	  that	  Kant	  is	  neither	  alluding	  to	  nor	  implicitly	  relying	  on	  it	  at	  A68-­‐69/B93-­‐94	  in	  the	  first	  Critique.	  In	  fact,	  I	  do	  think	  we	  can	  and	  should	  distinguish,	  with	  Kant,	  between	  the	  logical	  formation	  of	  concepts	  and	  the	  application	  of	  these	  concepts,	  a	   topic	   Kant	   will	   discuss	   most	   prominently	   in	   the	   third	   Critique	   by	   distinguishing	   the	  reflecting	   from	   the	  determining	  power	   of	   judgment.	   And	   concept	   formation	   in	   general—and	   this	   includes	   the	   pure	   concepts	   of	   the	   understanding	   (the	   forms	   of	   which,	   like	  empirical	  concepts,	  are	  “made,”	  not	  given;	  JL	  9:93)—depends	  on	  the	  reflecting	  activity	  that	  precedes	   determining	   judgment.	   For	   now,	   I	   will	   simply	   note	   that	   much	   of	   the	   payoff	   of	  
                                                                                                                                                       of	  judgment	  in	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  [B]	  Deduction”	  (Allison	  [2012],	  46).	  Presumably,	  of	  course,	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  the	  teleological	  aspect	  of	  Longuenesse’s	  view	  is	  supposed	  to	  address:	  the	  categories	  are	  reflections	  (in	  Kant’s	  technical	  sense)	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  judgment	  that	  are	  already	  the	  necessary	  conditions	  of	  the	  synthesis	  of	  the	   sensible	   manifold.	   But	   Allison’s	   real	   concern,	   as	   I	   understand	   it,	   is	   whether	   such	   an	   account	   leaves	  something	  to	  be	  explained.	  For	  my	  part,	  I	  suspect	  that	  it	  does:	  why	  should	  the	  forms	  of	  judgment	  determine	  the	  forms	  of	  concepts	  just	  because	  these	  concepts	  have	  “no	  other	  use”	  than	  their	  use	  in	  possible	  judgments?	  As	  I	  see	  it,	  that	  would	  certainly	  answer	  the	  quid	  facti	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  pure	  concepts	  of	  the	  understanding,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  immediately	  answer	  the	  quid	  juris.	  Now,	  Allison’s	  own	  view,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  categories	  are	  “embedded	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  judgment	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  judging	  under	  a	  certain	  form	  necessarily	  involves	  a	   certain	   mode	   of	   unification	   of	   the	   manifold,	   which	   corresponds	   to	   (without	   being	   identical	   with)	   the	  unification	  thought	  in	  the	  category”	  (Allison	  [2012],	  45-­‐46),	  is	  very	  close	  to	  my	  own:	  the	  unification	  thought	  in	   the	   category	   corresponds	   to	   the	   unification	   of	   the	   manifold	   in	   judging	   because	   the	   specific	   unity	  characteristic	  of	  concepts	  in	  general	  is	  parasitic	  upon	  the	  unity	  enacted	  in	  acts	  of	  judging.	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Longuenesse’s	   interpretation,	   i.e.,	   her	   convincing	   demonstration	   that	   much	   of	   the	   first	  
Critique	  must,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  understood,	  be	  related,	  “down	  to	  the	  minutest	  details	  of	  [its]	  proofs,”	  to	  the	  logical	  forms	  of	  judgment,	  can	  be	  retained,	  even	  if	  we	  reject,	  as	  I	  believe	  we	  should,	   her	   controversial	   thesis	   that	   the	   understanding	   should	   be	   understood	   first	   and	  foremost	  as	  a	  capacity	  to	  judge.	  
A68/B93:	  “All	  bodies	  are	  divisible”	  As	  it	  turns	  out,	  our	  difficulties	  are	  only	  beginning,	  for	  Kant’s	  subsequent	  elaboration	  of	  the	  notion	   of	   judgment	   (CPR	  A68-­‐69/B93-­‐94)	   is	   beset	   by	   a	   host	   of	   interpretive	   problems.	   It	  will	  take	  some	  work	  to	  sort	  these	  out.	  	  “Judgment,”	  he	  continues,	  is	  therefore	  the	  mediate	  cognition	  of	  an	  object,	  hence	  the	  representation	  of	  a	  representation	  of	  it.	  In	  every	  judgment	  there	  is	  a	  concept	  that	  holds	  of	  many,	  and	   that	   among	   this	   many	   also	   comprehends	   [begreift]	   a	   given	  representation,	   which	   is	   then	   related	   immediately	   to	   the	   object.	   (CPR	  A68/B93)	  	  At	   first	   glance,	  Kant’s	   point	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   straightforward	   reflection	  of	   his	   discursivity	  thesis:	  every	   judgment	  requires,	  at	  minimum,	  the	  presence	  of	  both	  a	  concept	  (which,	  qua	  concept,	  “holds	  of	  many”)	  and	  a	  (singular)	  intuition,	  judged	  to	  fall	  under	  it	  (and	  which,	  qua	  intuition,	  is	  “related	  immediately	  to	  the	  object”).	  What	  is	  more,	  the	  example	  he	  offers	  might	  appear	   to	   instantiate	   the	   principle	   he	   has	   just	   enunciated	   in	   a	   rather	   straightforward	  manner:	  So	   in	   the	   judgment,	   e.g.,	   “All	   bodies	   are	   divisible,”	   the	   concept	   of	   the	  divisible	   is	   related	   to	   various	   other	   concepts;	   among	   these,	   however,	   it	   is	  here	  particularly	  related	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  body,	  and	  this	  in	  turn	  is	  related	  to	  certain	  appearances	  that	  come	  before	  us.	  (CPR	  A68-­‐69/B93)	  	  A	  casual	  comparison	  of	  these	  two	  quotations	  will	  quickly	  suggest	  the	  following	  parallelism:	  in	  All	  bodies	  are	  divisible,	  the	  “concept	  that	  holds	  of	  many”	  is	  indubitably	  “the	  concept	  of	  the	  divisible”;	   “among	   this	  many,”	   that	   is,	   “among	   these,”	   i.e.,	   the	   “various	  other	   concepts”	   to	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which	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  divisible	  is	  related,	  “a	  given	  representation”	  is	  comprehended	  (in	  the	  example,	  “the	  concept	  of	  body”)	  “which	  is	  then	  related	  immediately	  to	  the	  object,”	  that	  is,	  to	  “certain	  appearances	  that	  come	  before	  us.”	  If	  this	  were	  the	  parallelism	  Kant	  intended,	  then	  All	   bodies	   are	   divisible	   would	   illustrate	   the	   discursivity	   thesis	   by	   illustrating	   how	   a	  concept	  (divisibility)	  is	  said	  to	  hold	  of	  many	  (the	  bodies),	  a	  necessary	  condition,	  as	  Kant	  has	  just	  stated,	  for	  any	  judgment	  whatsoever.	  Immediately,	  however,	  we	  see	  that	  this	  cannot	  be	  quite	  what	  Kant	  intends.	  For	  the	  
concept	  of	  body,	  qua	  concept,	  cannot	  be	   immediately	  related	   to	  an	  object.	  Only	   intuitions	  relate	  to	  objects	   immediately,	  as	  Kant	  has	   just	  reminded	  us	  (CPR	  A68/B93).	   Instead,	   that	  “which	  is	  then	  related	  immediately	  to	  the	  object”	  must	  be	  the	  “certain	  appearances	  which	  come	  before	  us”—certain	   intuitions,	   one	  wants	   to	  say	   (and	   in	   fact	   in	  his	  own	  copy	  of	   the	  first	   Critique,	   Kant	   changed	   “appearances”	   to	   “intuitions”	   in	   the	   example,	   although	   the	  change	  was	   never	   incorporated	   into	   the	   second	   edition;	   see	   ACPR	   23:45).	   But	   this	   only	  brings	   the	   difficulty	   in	   Kant’s	   example	   into	   sharper	   relief.	   For	   it	   appears	   that	   in	   the	  judgment	  All	  bodies	  are	  divisible	  both	  the	  concept	  of	  body	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  divisible	  are	  such	  that	  they	  “hold	  of	  many,”	  although	  they	  do	  so	  in	  different	  senses.	  The	  concept	  of	  body	  holds	  of	  many	  in	  that	  it	  is	  “related	  to	  certain	  appearances	  [i.e.,	   intuitions]	  that	  come	  before	   us,”	   while	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   divisible	   holds	   of	   many	   by	   being	   related	   to	   the	  (general)	  concept	  of	  body.	  Now,	  for	  a	  judgment	  to	  be	  a	  “mediate	  cognition	  of	  an	  object,”	  it	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  former	  relation	  that	  is	  of	  primary	  significance,	  for	  the	  cognition	  can	  only	   be	   of	   an	   object	   if	   an	   intuition	   which	   relates	   immediately	   to	   that	   object	   plays	   a	  constitutive	   role	   in	   it.	  And	   I	  do	   think	   the	  primary	  purpose	  of	   the	   example	   is	   to	   illustrate	  precisely	  this	  point.	  But	  then	  why,	  one	  wonders,	  has	  Kant	  made	  reference	  to	  the	  fact	  that	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the	   concept	   of	   the	  divisible	   “holds	   of	  many,”	   if	   that	  was	   the	  point	   he	   intended	   to	   clarify?	  Moreover—and	  more	  mysteriously	  still—what	  are	  the	  “various	  other	  concepts”	  supposed	  to	  be	  to	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  divisibility	  is	  purportedly	  related	  through	  this	  judgment?	  Typically,	  the	  answer	  that	  is	  given	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  “various	  other	  concepts”	  is	  the	   following:	   bodies	   are	   related	   to	   all	   the	   other	   objects	   that	   are	   thought	   (or,	   perhaps,	  thinkable)	   under	   the	   concept	   of	   divisibility.82	  In	   this	  way,	   the	   thought	   seems	   to	   run,	   the	  concept	   of	   the	   divisible,	   too,	   is	   related	   to	   these	   “various	   other	   concepts.”	   Certainly,	   such	  claims	  helpfully	  relate	  Kant’s	  point	  here	  to	  one	  of	  the	  alternative	  ways	  in	  which	  he	  is	  apt	  to	  define	  judgment,	  namely,	  as	  “the	  representation	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  consciousness	  of	  various	  representations”	  (JL	  9:101;	  cf.	  P	  4:300).	  The	  idea	   is	  that	  Kant	  refers	  to	  the	  “various	  other	  concepts”	   to	   illustrate	   the	   unity	   relevant	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   divisibility	   in	   the	   example,	   a	  unity	   which	   consists	   not	   in	   its	   relation	   to	   intuitions,	   but	   just	   to	   the	   concepts	   which	   are	  themselves	  thought	  under	  it.	  Now,	   all	   of	   this	   is	   true	   about	   Kant’s	   view	   of	   judgment,	   generally	   speaking.	   The	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  what	  Kant	  actually	  says	  in	  the	  passage	  in	  question.	  Kant	  says	  that	  “in	  the	  judgment	   .	   .	   .	   the	  concept	  of	   the	  divisible	   is	  related	  to	  various	  other	  concepts”	  (my	  emphasis).	  The	   concept	  of	   the	  divisible	  does	  not,	   however,	   depend	   for	   its	   relation	   to	   the	  concepts	  of	  other	  divisible	  things	  upon	  its	  relation	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  body.	  If	  it	  has	  any	  such	  relations,	  it	  has	  them	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  judgment	  that	  all	  bodies	  are	  divisible.	  What	  it	  does	  
                                                82	  See,	   e.g.,	   Allison	   (2004),	   85.	   J.	   Michael	   Young	   is	   more	   explicit	   in	   construing	   Kant’s	   claim	   as	   involving	   a	  relation	  of	  bodies	   (or,	   the	  concept	  of	  body)	   to	   the	  various	  other	  concepts	   that	   fall	  under	   the	  concept	  of	   the	  divisible.	   Young’s	   gloss	   on	   the	   section	   as	   a	   whole	   runs	   as	   follows:	   “To	   give	   unity	   to	   representations	   in	   a	  judgment	   is	   to	   bring	   them	  under	   a	   higher	   concept,	   thereby	   relating	   them	   to	   other	   things	   that	   likewise	   fall	  under	  that	  higher	  concept”	  (Young	  [1995],	  586-­‐587,	  quoted	  at	  587).	  Although	  I	  can	  agree	  with	  this	  in	  part,	  my	  own	   view,	   as	   specified	   below,	   is	   that	   the	   “various	   other	   concepts”	   to	  which	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   divisible	   is	  related	   are	   not—proximately,	   at	   least	   (hence	   my	   partial	   agreement)—the	   species	   under	   the	   genus	   of	   the	  divisible,	   but	   rather	   the	   subspecies	   (and	   subspecies	   of	   subspecies,	   etc.)	   under	   the	   genus	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  body.	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not,	  however,	  have	  in	  advance	  (except,	  perhaps,	  accidentally)	  is	  a	  relation	  to	  the	  concepts	  which	  are	  thought	  under	  the	  concept	  of	  body.	  To	  these	  the	  concept	  of	  divisibility	  is	  indeed	  related	   in	   the	   first	   time	  “in	   the	   judgment”;	  accordingly,	   these	  must	  be	   identified	  with	   the	  “various	  other	  concepts”	  to	  which	  Kant	  refers.83	  If	  my	  proposed	  reading	   is	  correct,	   the	  second	  clause	  of	   the	  sentence	  has	  a	  slightly	  different	  sense	  than	  it	   is	  usually	  accepted	  as	  having.	  “Among	  these”—that	   is,	  now,	  among	  the	  species	  and	  subspecies	  of	  concepts	  to	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  divisibility	  is	  related	  in	  the	  judgment—“it	   is	   here	   particularly	   related	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   body”—that	   is,	   there	   is	  something	  distinctive	  about	  the	  way	  it	  is	  related	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  body,	  a	  way	  in	  which	  it	  is	  not	  related	  to	  these	  “various	  other	  concepts”—and	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  lies	  in	  the	  use	  that	  is	  made	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  body	  in	  this	  particular	  judgment:	  “this	  [i.e.,	  the	  concept	  of	  body]	  in	  turn	   is	   related	   to	   certain	   appearances	   that	   come	   before	   us.”	   Thus	   the	   concept	   of	   body	  actually	   fulfills	   two	   distinct	   functions	   in	   this	   judgment:	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   relates	   the	  concept	   of	   divisibility	   indefinitely	   downwards,	   i.e.,	   to	   the	   species	   and	   subspecies	   of	  concepts	  thought	  under	  the	  generic	  concept	  of	  body,	  while,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  relates	  the	  concept	   of	   divisibility	   to	   the	   appearances,	   or	   the	   intuitions,	   that	   “come	   before	   us”	   and	  which,	  in	  accordance	  with	  our	  earlier	  discussion	  of	  intuition,	  first	  make	  the	  cognition	  of	  an	  object	  possible.	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  former	  use	  as	  its	  “logical”	  use,	  the	  latter	  its	  “transcendental	  use.”84	  
                                                83	  In	  Kant’s	  technical	  terminology,	  my	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  divisibility	  is	  related	  to	  its	  subordinate,	  not	  its	  coordinate,	  marks	  through	  the	  concept	  of	  body.	  See	  JL	  9:59.	  84	  These	  uses	   correspond	   to	   the	   logical	  distinction	  Kant	  draws	  between	  analytic	  and	  synthetic	  distinctness.	  “The	   kind	   of	   distinctness	   that	   arises	   not	   through	   analysis	   but	   through	   synthesis	   of	   marks	   is	   synthetic	  distinctness.	   And	   thus	   there	   is	   an	   essential	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   propositions:	   to	   make	   a	   distinct	  
concept	  and	  to	  make	  a	  concept	  distinct”	  (JL	  9:63).	  In	  our	  example,	  we	  would	  say	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  body,	  according	  to	  its	  logical	  use,	  analytically	  makes	  a	  distinct	  concept	  of	  the	  divisible	  by	  relating	  it	  (“intensively”—see	   JL	   9:59)	   downwards	   to	   subspecific	   concepts,	   while	   it	   synthetically	  makes	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   divisible	  
 57	  
Distinguishing	  these	  two	  uses	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  body	  makes	  Kant’s	  distinctive	  view	  of	   judgment,	   as	   compared	   to	   Leibniz’s,	   stand	   out	   in	   particularly	   sharp	   but	   subtle	   relief.	  Lurking	   in	   the	   background	   here	   is	   the	   Leibnizian	   view	   of	   concepts	   and	   conceptual	  containment.85	  For	   Leibniz,	   concepts	   are	   nested	   within	   one	   another	   in	   a	   hierarchy	   of	  relations	   of	   containment	   and	   subordination.	   Thus	   when	   a	   concept	   is	   related	   to	   another	  concept,	   it	   is	   trivially	   related	   to	   “various	   other	   concepts”	   (in	   just	   the	  way	   to	  which	  Kant	  alludes	  at	  A68-­‐69/B93);	  to	  say	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  body,	  e.g.,	  that	  it	  is	  subsumable	  under	  the	  concept	  of	   the	  divisible,	   is	   ipso	  facto	   to	   subsume	   the	   concepts	  already	   thought	  under	   the	  concept	   of	   body	   under	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   divisible,	   as	   well.	   Now,	   as	   long	   as	   all	   we	   are	  interested	  in	  is	  the	  relation	  that	  concepts	  bear	  to	  one	  another,	  Kant	  has	  no	  objection	  to	  any	  of	  this.	  To	  say	  that	  all	  bodies	  are	  divisible,	  Kant	  will	  grant,	  is	  indeed	  to	  relate	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  divisible	  to	  the	  “various	  other	  concepts”	  already	  thought	  under	  the	  concept	  of	  body.	  By	  contrast,	  if	  we	  return	  to	  the	  text	  of	  the	  example,	  we	  now	  find	  that	  Kant’s	  next	  remark	  (again	  indicated	   by	   an	   “aber”)	   must	   be	   intended	   to	   illustrate	   the	   distinctiveness	   of	   his	   own	  position	  (against,	  e.g.,	  Leibniz’s)	  and	  bring	  him	  back	  to	  the	  point	  about	  judgment	  that	  he	  is	  attempting	  to	  clarify:	  “Among	  these,	  however,	  it	  is	  here	  particularly	  related	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  body.”	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  in	  the	  judgment	  the	  concept	  of	  body	  is	  singled	  out	  for	  a	  special,	  and	  highly	  significant,	  role:	  it	  has	  not	  just	  a	  logical	  use,	  but	  a	  transcendental	  one,	  as	  well.	  Consider	  our	  example	  once	  again.	  Whereas,	  for	  Leibniz,	  the	  concept	  of	  body	  merely	  serves	  as	  a	  way	  by	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  divisible	  is	  related	  indefinitely	  “downwards,”	  
                                                                                                                                                       
distinct	   by	   relating	   it	   to	   the	   appearances	   that	   come	   before	   us.	   As	   Kant	   goes	   on	   to	   explain,	   “To	   synthesis	  pertains	  the	  making	  distinct	  of	  objects,	  to	  analysis	  the	  making	  distinct	  of	  concepts”	  (JL	  9:64).	  85	  The	  classical	  statement	  of	  Leibniz’s	  view	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Discourse	  on	  Metaphysics:	   “The	  subject	  term	  must	   always	   contain	   the	   predicate	   term,	   so	   that	   one	  who	   understands	   perfectly	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   subject	  would	  also	  know	  that	  the	  predicate	  belongs	  to	  it”	  (Leibniz	  [1686],	  41	  [§8]).	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as	   it	  were,	   in	  the	  direction	  of	  concepts	  of	  greater	  and	  greater	  specificity,	   in	  Kant’s	  view	  it	  does	  all	  that	  and	  more,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  “more”	  that	  is	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  Kant’s	  position:	  instead	  of	  merely	  functioning	  as	  a	  node	  in	  an	  organized	  network	  of	  concepts,	  the	  concept	  of	  body	   is	   here	   employed	   to	   get	   at	   intuitions	   themselves,	   intuitions	   which,	   in	   turn,	   relate	  immediately	   to	   an	   object.	   This	   is	   indeed	   a	   subsumption,	   but	   it	   is	   a	   subsumption	   in	  something	  exceeding	  a	  purely	  conceptual	  sense:	  it	  is	  not	  a	  concept	  but	  an	  intuition	  that	  is	  ultimately	   subsumed	   under	   a	   concept.86	  General	   logic,	   of	   course,	   knows	   and	   need	   know	  nothing	   of	   all	   this,	   since	   it	   abstracts	   from	   the	   content	   of	   cognition	   altogether	   (CPR	  A54/B78).	  But	  for	  transcendental	  logic,	  which	  concerns	  the	  pure	  thought	  of	  the	  object	  (CPR	  A55/B80),	  precisely	  this	  is	  the	  key	  point:	  in	  every	  judgment	  there	  must	  be	  a	  concept	  that	  is	  employed	  to	  subsume	  an	  intuition	  under	  a	  concept,	  for	  only	  in	  this	  way	  does	  a	  relation	  to	  an	   object	   enter	   into	   the	   judgment;	  what	  makes	   it	   a	   judgment—and	   thus	   something	  with	  cognitive	  value—is	  that	  it	  is	  about	  an	  object.	  	   At	   this	   point	   Kant	   is	   finally	   ready	   to	   confirm	   the	   “clue”	   which	   he	   has	   already	  identified:	  “We	  can	  .	  .	  .	  trace	  all	  actions	  of	  the	  understanding	  back	  to	  judgments	  [auf	  Urteile	  
züruckführen],	   so	   that	   the	  understanding	   in	  general	  can	  be	  represented	  as	  a	   faculty	   for	  
judging”	  (CPR	  A69/B94).	  For	  reasons	  I	  have	  already	  given,	  I	  think	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  read	  Kant’s	  reference	  to	  the	  Vermögen	  zu	  urteilen	  here	  as	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  act	  of	  judging,	  the	  act	  which	  expresses	  the	  unity	  of	  all	  acts	  of	  the	  understanding.	  And	  this	  is	  just	  because	  it	  is	  the	  act	  of	  judging	  to	  which	  the	  unity	  of	  action	  characteristic	  of	  concepts	  must	  be	  traced	  back	   in	   order	   to	   be	   understood.	   Kant	   now	   goes	   on	   to	   briefly	   retrace	   the	   grounds	   of	   his	  argument	  from	  the	  top:	  
                                                86	  Again,	  there	  is	  always	  a	  conceptual	  subsumption;	  Kant’s	  point	  is	  just	  that	  in	  every	  judgment	  there	  must	  be	  an	  intuitive	  one,	  as	  well.	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For	  according	   to	  what	  has	  been	  said	  above	   [the	  understanding]	   is	  a	   faculty	  for	   thinking.	  Thinking	   is	   cognition	   through	  concepts.	  Concepts,	  however,	   as	  predicates	  of	  possible	  judgments,	  are	  related	  to	  some	  representation	  of	  a	  still	  undetermined	   object.	   The	   concept	   of	   body	   thus	   signifies	   something,	   e.g.,	  metal,	  which	  can	  be	  cognized	  through	  that	  concept.	  It	  is	  therefore	  a	  concept	  only	   because	   other	   representations	   are	   contained	   under	   it	   which	   can	   be	  related	  to	  objects.	   It	   is	   therefore	   the	  predicate	   for	  a	  possible	   judgment,	  e.g.,	  “Every	  metal	  is	  a	  body.”	  (CPR	  A69/B94)	  	  Kant	  describes	  concepts	  as	  “predicates	  of	  possible	  judgments”;	  he	  is	  here	  surely	  not	  talking	  about	   one	   possible	   use	   of	   concepts	   among	   others,	   but	   rather	   referring	   back	   to	   the	   only	  possible	  use	  of	  concepts	  described	  at	  A68/B93	  (in	  the	  “no	  other	  use”	  claim).	  Thus	  concepts	  not	  only	  incidentally,	  but	  essentially	  relate	  to	  an	  object,	  even	  though	  this	  relation	  is,	  strictly	  speaking,	  external	  to	  those	  concepts	  themselves.	  Abstracted	  from	  the	  determining	  activity	  of	   the	   concept,	   the	   object	   remains	   “noch	  unbestimmt,”	   an	   indeterminacy	   reflected	   in	   the	  “etwas”	  of	   the	  next	   sentence:	   “The	   concept	  of	   the	  body	   thus	   signifies	   something	   .	   .	   .”	   (my	  emphasis).87 	  That	   is,	   the	   concept	   has	   cognitive	   value	   only	   insofar	   as	   it	   can	   actively	  determine	  a	  range	  of	   representations	  which	  considered	   in	   themselves	  remain	  objectively	  indeterminate.	  The	   crucial	   sentence	   here	   is	   the	   penultimate	   one:	   “It	   is	   therefore	   a	   concept	   only	  because	   other	   representations	   are	   contained	   under	   it	   which	   can	   be	   related	   to	   objects.”	  Normally,	  this	  is	  taken	  to	  mean	  that	  a	  concept	  is	  only	  a	  concept	  because	  it	  contains	  under	  it	  
intuitions	  which	  “can	  be	  related	  to	  objects.”	  But	  this	   is	  not	  actually	  Kant’s	  meaning,	  as	  his	  locution	  “can	  be	  related	  .	  .	  .”	  indicates:	  it	  is	  not	  that	  intuitions	  “can	  be”	  related	  to	  objects,	  as	  if	   this	  were	  one	  possible	  use	  of	   them,	   for	   intuitions	  relate	   immediately	   to	  objects.	  Rather,	  
                                                87	  Kant	  often	  refers	  to	  the	  etwas	  by	  means	  of	  an	  “x”	  in	  his	  notes.	  “If	  anything	  x,	  which	  is	  cognized	  by	  means	  of	  a	  representation	  a,	  is	  compared	  with	  another	  concept	  b,	  as	  either	  including	  or	  excluding	  this	  concept,	  then	  this	  relation	   is	   in	   the	   judgment”	  (R	  3920	  [1769];	  17:344-­‐345).	  And	  “in	  every	   judgment	   the	  subject	   in	  general	   is	  something	  =	  x	  which,	  cognized	  under	  the	  mark	  a,	  is	  compared	  with	  another	  mark”	  (R	  3921	  [1769];	  17:345).	  In	  these	  remarks,	  the	  “mark”	  a	   is	  distinguished	  from	  the	  “anything”	  or	  “something”	  x,	  and	  the	  cognition	  of	  x	  through	  a	  is	  called	  conceptual	  cognition.	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Kant’s	  claim	  runs	  exactly	  parallel	   to	  his	  explanation	  of	  All	  bodies	  are	  divisible:88	  a	  concept	  (like	   the	  concept	  of	  divisibility)	   is	  a	   concept	  only	  because	   it	   can	  be	   (by	  virtue	  of	  another	  concept,	  like	  the	  concept	  of	  body,	  being	  employed	  in	  a	  special	  way)	  related	  to	  objects	  (i.e.,	  via	  the	  intuitions	  falling	  under	  the	  concept	  of	  body).	  This	  refers	  us	  to	  the	  two	  different	  uses	  of	   the	   concept	   of	   body	   (in	   the	  A68/B93	   example):	   on	   the	   one	  hand,	   its	   use	   as	   a	   node	   to	  relate	  the	  concept	  of	  divisibility	  indefinitely	  downwards;	  on	  the	  other,	  its	  use	  in	  bringing	  a	  relation	   to	   an	   object	   into	   the	   judgment.	   To	   say	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   divisibility	   “can	   be	  related	   to	   objects”	   is	   just	   to	   say	   that	   according	   to	   one	   use	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   body,	   the	  concept	   of	   divisibility	   is	   related	   to	   objects.	   Kant	   reinforces	   this	   distinction	   by	   subtly	  changing	  his	  A68/B93	  example	  (All	  bodies	  are	  divisible)	  into	  a	  related	  variant:	  Every	  metal	  
is	  a	  body	  (see	  n.	  88).	  Again,	  Kant’s	  main	  point	  is	  that	  in	  the	  judgment	  Every	  metal	  is	  a	  body	  there	   is,	  once	  again,	  a	  concept	  (this	   time,	  metal)	   that	   is	  used	  transcendentally,	  namely,	   to	  subsume	   intuitions	   under	   a	   concept.	   But	   by	   now	   placing	   body	   in	   the	   predicate	   position,	  Kant	  performatively	  illustrates	  the	  two	  uses	  of	  concepts	  he	  has	  just	  distinguished,	  for	  in	  the	  A69/B94	  example	  the	  very	  same	  concept,	  body,	  is	  used	  merely	  logically	  that	  had	  been	  used	  both	  transcendentally	  and	  logically	  at	  A68/B93.	  Immediately	  upon	  giving	  this	  example,	  Kant	  restates	  his	  main	  claim:	  “The	  functions	  of	  the	  understanding	  can	  therefore	  all	  be	  found	  together	  if	  one	  can	  exhaustively	  exhibit	  the	  functions	  of	  unity	  in	  judgments”	  (CPR	  A69/B94). And	  in	  fact	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  summary	  presentation	   of	   Kant’s	   main	   argument	   precisely	   reflects	   his	   earlier	   claim	   that	   the	  
                                                88	  Kant	  complicates	  matters	  by	  changing	  his	  example	  from	  All	  bodies	  are	  divisible	  (at	  A68/B93)	  to	  Every	  metal	  
is	  a	  body	  (at	  A69/B94).	  When	  he	  says,	  “the	  concept	  of	  body	  thus	  signifies	  something	  .	  .	   .,”	  he	  has	  in	  mind	  the	  form	  of	   the	  example	  he	   is	  about	  to	  give	   at	  A69/B94.	   If	  we	  stick	  with	   the	  A68/B93	  example,	  as	   I	  will	   in	   the	  following	   explanation,	   we	   must	   accordingly	   transpose	   what	   he	   says	   about	   the	   “concept	   of	   body”	   into	   a	  discussion	  of	  “the	  concept	  of	  the	  divisible.”	  See	  below	  for	  an	  explanation	  of	  why	  Kant	  makes	  this	  move	  with	  so	  much	  potential	  to	  confuse	  his	  reader.	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understanding	  in	  general	  can	  be	  represented	  as	  a	  faculty	  for	  judging.	  Indeed,	  Kant	  proceeds	  without	  further	  ado	  to	  a	  presentation	  of	  the	  table	  of	  judgments.	  I	   will	   close	   this	   section	   with	   one	   final	   note.	   On	   my	   reading	   (as	   on	   most	   other	  readings)	   of	   Kant’s	   argument,	   its	   weight	   falls	   particularly	   heavily	   on	   one	   particular	  premise—namely,	  what	  I	  have	  above	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “no	  other	  use”	  claim.89	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  premise	  marks	  Kant’s	  view	  off	  from	  views	  like	  Spinoza’s,	  where	  concepts,	  instead	  of	  being	  “used”	  by	  the	  understanding	  in	  acts	  of	   judgment,	  are	  the	   ipsum	  intelligere	  (see	  p.	  48	   above).	   But	   for	   this	   very	   reason	   it	   is	   a	   bit	   hard	   to	   see	   what,	   if	   any,	   independent	  justification	  Kant	  has	  to	  offer	  for	  this	  premise.90	  Granted,	  as	  long	  as	  we	  accept	  the	  Cartesian	  distinction	  between	  acts	  of	  understanding	  and	  acts	  of	  judgment	  (which	  Spinoza,	  at	  any	  rate,	  sees	   as	   the	   relevant	   alternative	   to	   his	   own	   view),91	  Kant’s	   view	   has	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  plausibility.	  But	  it	  cannot	  simply	  function	  as	  an	  established	  premise	  in	  the	  Transcendental	  Deduction.	  Whether	  it	  does	  is	  a	  question	  I	  must	  leave	  for	  another	  occasion.	  
B128-­‐129:	  The	  Inner	  Principle	  of	  the	  Transcendental	  Deduction	  As	  Longuenesse	  has	  emphasized,	  the	  role	  of	  judgment	  in	  the	  Transcendental	  Deduction	  of	  the	  1781	  edition	  of	   the	  Critique	   remains	  merely	   implicit,	  a	  situation	  which	  accounts	   for	  a	  
                                                89	  In	  the	  A68/B93	  argument,	  the	  complete	  claim	  is:	  “Now	  the	  understanding	  can	  make	  no	  other	  use	  of	  these	  concepts	   than	   that	   of	   judging	   by	  means	   of	   them.”	   In	   its	   A69/B94	   restatement,	   Kant’s	   gloss	   is	   simply	   that	  concepts	  are	  “predicates	  of	  possible	  judgments.”	  90	  Kant	  does	  offer	  an	  interesting	  remark	  in	  a	  footnote	  to	  his	  belated	  entry	  into	  the	  pantheism	  controversy.	  He	  complains,	  understandably,	  about	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  are	  Spinozist	  undercurrents	  in	  the	  first	  Critique.	  A	  key	  point	   of	   difference,	   Kant	   points	   out,	   has	   to	   do	   with	   the	   different	   ways	   concepts	   are	   conceived	   in	   the	   two	  philosophies:	  “The	  Critique	  proves	  that	  the	  table	  of	  the	  pure	  concepts	  of	  the	  understanding	  has	  to	  contain	  all	  the	  material	   for	   pure	   thinking;	   Spinozism	   speaks	   of	   thoughts	  which	   themselves	   think	   [Gedanken,	   die	   doch	  
selbst	  denken],	  and	  thus	  of	  an	  accident	  that	  simultaneously	  exists	  for	  itself	  as	  a	  subject:	  a	  concept	  that	  is	  not	  to	  be	   found	   in	   the	  human	  understanding	   and	  moreover	   cannot	  be	  brought	   into	   it”	   (OOT	  8:143n).	  This	   rather	  crude	  misunderstanding	  of	  Spinoza’s	  view	  does	  not	  quite	  give	  one	  confidence	  that	  Kant	  has	  appreciated	  the	  stakes	  of	  the	  question.	  91 	  See,	   of	   course,	   Descartes’s	   extensive	   discussion	   in	   the	   Fourth	   Meditation	   (Descartes	   [1641],	   39ff.	  [VII:56ff.]).	  Cf.	  Spinoza	  (1677),	  484	  (EIIP49).	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good	   deal	   of	   its	   obscurity.92	  If	   we	   consider,	   even	   briefly,	   what	   is	   to	   be	   shown	   in	   the	  deduction,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   find	   fault	   with	   Longuenesse’s	   claim.	   In	   the	   Transcendental	  Deduction,	   Kant	   is	   trying	   to	   show	   that	   the	   pure	   concepts	   of	   the	   understanding,	   its	  most	  basic	  “categories”	  whose	  form	  can	  be	  found,	  we	  have	  seen,	  in	  the	  basic	  acts	  of	  judgment,	  are	  valid	  with	  respect	  to	  objects—objects	  with	  which	  we	  come	  into	  immediate	  contact	  only	  by	  means	  of	  (initially	  indeterminate)	  intuitions.	  In	  the	  third	  section	  of	  the	  “Clue”	  chapter	  (§10	  in	  the	  second	  edition),	  Kant	  sums	  up	  what	  must	  be	  proved	  in	  a	  succinct	  manner:	  “The	  same	  function	  that	  gives	  unity	  to	  the	  different	  representations	  in	  a	  judgment	  also	  gives	  unity	  to	  the	   mere	   synthesis	   of	   different	   representations	   in	   an	   intuition,	   which,	   expressed	  generally,	   is	   called	   the	   pure	   concept	   of	   the	   understanding”	   (CPR	   A79/B104-­‐105).	   In	   the	  second	  edition,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  Kant	  goes	  on	  to	  introduce	  the	  Transcendental	  Deduction	  by	   reminding	   us	   of	   the	   “precisely	   determined	   definition	   of	   judgment	   in	   general”	   (MFNS	  4:475n;	  cf.	  CPR	  B128-­‐129),	  and	  it	  should	  not	  be	  surprising	  that	  we	  find	  Kant	  turning	  back,	  once	   again,	   to	   the	   example	   he	   first	   introduced	   at	   A68/B93	   in	   his	   initial	   discussion	   of	  judgment:	  All	  bodies	  are	  divisible.	  His	  next	  moves,	  however,	  require	  some	  explanation.	  Kant	  begins	  with	  a	  claim	  that	  is	  new;	  with	  regard	  to	  All	  bodies	  are	  divisible,	  he	  now	  points	  out	  that	  according	  to	  the	  merely	  “logical	  use”	  of	  the	  understanding,	  “it	  would	  remain	  undetermined	  which	   of	   these	   two	   concepts	  will	   be	   given	   the	   function	   of	   the	   subject	   and	  which	  will	   be	   given	   that	   of	   the	   predicate.	   For	   one	   can	   also	   say:	   ‘Something	   divisible	   is	   a	  body’”	   (CPR	  B128-­‐129;	   cf.	  MFNS	   4:475n).	   Now,	  without	   Kant’s	   example,	   it	  might	   appear	  that	   his	   point	   is	   that	   although	   the	   form	   of	  All	  bodies	  are	  divisible	   is	   logically	   determined	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   functions	   of	   judgment,	   the	   placement	   of	   the	   concepts	   of	   body	   and	  
                                                92	  See	  Longuenesse	  (1998),	  55-­‐56.	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divisibility	   is	   not	   determined	   by	   logic	   alone.	   If	   this	   were	   his	   point,	   it	   would	   be	   a	  straightforward	  reflection	  of	  his	  oft-­‐repeated	  view	  that	   logic	  deals	  with	   the	   form,	  not	   the	  matter,	  of	  cognition	  (CPR	  A54/B78;	   JL	  9:12).	  Kant’s	  example,	  however	  (“For	  one	  can	  also	  say	   .	   .	   .”),	   indicates	   that	  he	   is	   after	   something	  else	  altogether—something	   concerning	   the	  relationship	  between	  All	  bodies	  are	  divisible	  and	  Something	  divisible	  is	  a	  body.	  The	  “one	  can	  also	   say”	   locution	  might	   even	   suggest	   that	  Kant	   takes	   the	   two	   statements	   to	   be	   logically	  equivalent,	   in	   the	   sense	  of	   entailing	   and	  being	   entailed	  by	   the	   same	   set	   of	   judgments.	  Of	  course,	  they	  clearly	  are	  not.	  To	   see	   what,	   alternatively,	   Kant	   might	   have	   in	   mind,	   we	   should	   first	   revisit	   his	  distinction	   between	   the	   “real”	   and	   “logical”	   uses	   of	   the	   understanding.	   By	   the	   merely	  “logical”	   use	   of	   the	   understanding	   Kant	   has	   in	   mind	   the	   acts	   by	   which	   logical	   form	   is	  conferred	  upon	  content	  initially	  given	  through	  sensibility,	  and	  in	  this,	  his	  position	  remains	  unchanged	  from	  the	  Inaugural	  Dissertation.93	  Such	  a	  use	  is	  called	  logical	  because	  it	  consists	  merely	  in	  giving	  clearer	  form	  to	  material	  that	  is	  given	  to	  it	  from	  elsewhere,	  whether	  that	  be	  accomplished	  by	  reflection	  of	  that	  material	  into	  concepts	  or	  determination	  of	  that	  material	  by	   concepts	   already	   reflected.	   By	   contrast,	   in	   its	   “real	   use”	   Kant	   now	   says	   that	   the	  understanding	  “brings	  a	  transcendental	  content	  into	  its	  representations”	  (CPR	  A79/B105).	  In	   this	   respect,	   of	   course,	   Kant	   no	   longer	   holds	   the	   view,	   characteristic	   of	   the	   1770	  
Dissertation,	  that	  the	  understanding	  can	  access	  a	  world	  of	  intelligible	  objects	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  give	   itself	   its	  own	  specific	  content;	   instead,	  he	  tells	  us,	   this	  “transcendental	  content”	   is	  introduced	  merely	  “by	  means	  of	  the	  synthetic	  unity	  of	  the	  manifold	  of	  intuition	  in	  general”	  (CPR	   A79/B105).	   Thus	   in	   its	   merely	   logical	   use,	   the	   understanding	   abstracts	   from	   any	  
                                                93	  See	  p.	  26	  above.	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relation	   to	   intuition,	   so	   that	   according	   to	   this	   use	   the	   judgment	   All	   bodies	   are	   divisible	  abstracts	   from	   all	   intuitive	   spatiotemporal	   representations. 94 	  In	   this	   mode	   of	  understanding,	   the	   judgment	  All	  bodies	  are	  divisible	   becomes	   about	   the	   relation	   between	  the	  concepts	  body	  and	  divisible,	  not	  about	  the	  actual	  bodies	  that	  are	  given	  to	  us	  in	  intuition.	  In	  the	  terminology	  introduced	  earlier,	  but	  which	  can	  now	  be	  seen	  to	  correspond	  to	  Kant’s	  own,	  we	  would	  say	  that	  the	  use	  of	  both	  concepts	  would	  be	  merely	  logical.	  Now,	  Kant’s	  claim,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  is	  that	  the	  function	  of	  the	  subject	  is,	  with	  respect	  to	   the	   logical	   use	   of	   the	   understanding,	   “undetermined,”	   a	   claim	  which	   he	   illustrates	   by	  reference	  to	  the	  judicium	  convertens	  (cf.	  DWL	  24:770),95	  i.e.,	  Something	  divisible	  is	  a	  body.	  Of	  course,	  as	  Kant	  well	  knows,96	  the	  two	  judgments	  are	  not	  logically	  equivalent:	  the	  judicium	  
convertens	   is	  weaker	   than	   the	  conversum.97	  But	  what	  Kant	   is	  drawing	  attention	   to	   is	   that	  when	  we	  use	  the	  understanding	  in	  a	  merely	  logical	  manner,	  a	  judgment	  is,	  for	  us,	  nothing	  over	  and	  beyond	  the	  inferences	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  it.	  This	  is	  connected,	  of	  course,	  with	  his	  original	  use	  of	  the	  example	  at	  A68/B93:	  according	  to	  the	   logical	  use	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  body,	   it	   functions	   as	   a	  mere	   node	   relating	   the	   concept	   of	   divisibility	   downwards	   to	   ever	  more	  specific	  concepts;	  in	  a	  parallel	  manner,	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  judgment	  is	  “undetermined”	  according	   to	   the	   logical	   use	   of	   the	   understanding	   because	   the	   judgment	   itself	   is	   nothing	  more	   than	   the	   initial	   node	   in	   the	   series	   of	   inferences	   that	   it	   makes	   possible.	   These	  inferences,	  of	  course,	  need	  not	  share	  the	  same	  logical	  form	  as	  the	  initial	  judgment,	  but	  that	  
                                                94	  Notice	  that	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  this	  judgment	  bears	  no	  relation	  to	  the	  concepts	  of	  space	  and	  time.	  95	  Kant	  follows	  §346	  of	  Meier’s	  textbook,	  reprinted	  in	  the	  Akademie	  edition	  at	  16:698-­‐699.	  96	  	  See	  JL	  9:118-­‐119;	  also	  DWL	  24:770-­‐771;	  HL	  91-­‐92.	  97	  In	  Kant’s	  terminology:	  the	  conversion	  is	  altered,	  not	  pure	  (JL	  9:118).	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is	  precisely	  Kant’s	  point:	  the	  concept	  of	  body	  may	  appear	  in	  either	  the	  subject	  position,	  as	  in	  the	  judicium	  conversum,	  or	  in	  the	  predicate	  position,	  as	  in	  the	  convertens.98	  What	   merits	   attention	   here,	   Kant	   thinks,	   is	   that	   the	   merely	   logical	   use	   of	   the	  understanding	   remains	   indifferent	   to	  which	   of	   the	   concepts	   (body	   or	  divisibility)	   is	   used	  transcendentally	   to	   subsume	   intuitions.	   Such	   a	   transcendental	   use,	   we	   will	   recall,	   is	  necessary	  if	  any	  judgment	  is,	  in	  fact,	  to	  be	  a	  judgment	  in	  the	  first	  place;	  this	  was	  the	  point	  of	  the	  example	  as	  it	  was	  originally	  introduced	  at	  A68/B93.	  Only	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  real	  use	  of	  the	  understanding	  is	  it	  determined	  which	  of	  the	  concepts	  is	  to	  be	  used	  transcendentally,	  a	  point	  Kant	  makes	  as	   follows:	   “Through	   the	  category	  of	   substance,	  however,	   if	   I	  bring	   the	  concept	  of	  a	  body	  under	  it,	  it	  is	  determined	  that	  its	  empirical	  intuition	  in	  experience	  must	  always	  be	  considered	  as	  subject,	  never	  as	  mere	  predicate;	  and	  likewise	  with	  all	   the	  other	  categories”	   (CPR	  B129).	  Reference	   to,	   or,	   as	  Kant	   sometimes	  puts	   it,	   the	  application	  of,	   a	  
category	  determines	  the	  concept	  of	  body	  to	  the	  position	  of	  subject	  in	  the	  judgment.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  linking	  the	  concept	  up	  with	  “its	  empirical	   intuition”;	  thus	  we	  are	  not	  only	  making	  a	  point	  about	  the	  conceptual	  relations	  between	  the	  bodily	  and	  the	  divisible,	  but	  referring	  to	  actual	  bodies,	  real	  objects	  in	  the	  world	  whose	  relations	  to	  one	  another	  always	  exceed	  the	  logical	   relations	  we	   can	   determine	  with	   respect	   to	   their	   concepts.	   “Likewise,”	   Kant	   says,	  
                                                98	  Longuenesse,	  who	  considers	   this	  passage	  several	   times	  and	   in	  some	  detail,	   illustrates	  Kant’s	  reference	   to	  convertibility	   by	   referring	   us	   to	   a	   passage	   in	   Metaphysik	   von	   Schön.	   Here,	   however,	   the	   example	   is	   the	  reversibility	   of	   Some	  men	  are	   learned	   and	   Some	   learned	   individuals	  are	  men	   (MS	   28:472).	   These	  particular	  affirmative	   judgments,	   however,	   are	   convertible	   simpliciter,	   which	   distinguishes	   them	   from	   universal	  affirmative	   judgments,	   which	   are	   only	   convertible	   per	   accidens	   (again,	   see	   JL	   9:118-­‐119;	   Longuenesse’s	  discussion	  is	  at	  Longuenesse	  [1998],	  250-­‐251).	  Thus	  the	  Metaphysics	  von	  Schön	  passage	  is,	  I	  think,	  somewhat	  misleading	  in	  this	  context,	  for	  it	  suggests	  that	  Kant	  is	  relying	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  judicium	  convertens	  has	  the	  same	  logical	  significance	  as	  the	  conversum,	  which	  is	  not,	  of	  course,	  the	  case	  in	  his	  example	  in	  the	  first	  Critique.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Kant’s	   point	   is	   not	   entirely	   captured,	   I	   think,	   in	   the	   mere	   acknowledgement	   that,	   as	  Longuenesse	  puts	  it	  elsewhere,	  “from	  the	  logical	  point	  of	  view	  any	  concept	  may	  be	  used	  either	  as	  subject	  or	  as	  predicate	  in	  a	  judgment”	  (Longuenesse	  [1998],	  326).	  This	  is,	  of	  course,	  true,	  but	  Kant	  is	  driving	  at	  something	  more	   here:	   from	   the	   logical	   point	   of	   view	   we	   abstract	   from	   any	   object	   the	   judgment	   could	   be	   about	   and	  consider	  it	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  occupies	  a	  syntactic	  place	  in	  a	  propositional	  calculus,	  the	  calculus	  to	  which	  the	  
judicium	  convertens	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  reference.	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“with	   all	   the	   other	   categories.”	   He	   means	   by	   this	   to	   indicate	   that	   the	   convertibility	   of	  judgments	  also	  shows	  how	  judgments	  can	  be	  varied	  with	  respect	  to	  quantity	  and	  quality;	  in	  the	  present	  example,	  when	  converted	  to	  Something	  divisible	  is	  a	  body,	   the	   judgment	  has	  a	  different	  quantity.	  In	  each	  case	  it	   is	  only	  by	  applying	  a	  category	  that	  a	   judgment	  is	   in	  fact	  determined	   in	   all	   three	   respects.	   (I	   leave	   aside	   here	   the	   more	   complex	   case	   of	   the	  categories	  of	  modality.)	  The	   contrast	   that	   emerges	   between	   the	   real	   and	   the	   (merely)	   logical	   use	   of	   the	  understanding	   is	   a	   stark	   one.	   The	   difference	   is	   between	   clarifying	   relations	   that	   obtain	  among	  concepts	  and	  actually	  saying	  something	  about	  an	  object,	  or	  objects,	  in	  the	  world.	  It	  is	  the	  object	  with	  which	  judgment,	   in	  its	  most	  proper	  sense,	   is	  concerned,	  for,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	   it	   is	   judgment	   that,	   according	   to	   its	   “precisely	   determined	  definition,”	   is	   “an	   action	  through	  which	  given	  representations	  first	  become	  cognitions	  of	  an	  object”	  (MFNS	  4:475n).	  Judging	   thus	   requires	   the	   real,	   not	   merely	   the	   logical,	   use	   of	   the	   understanding,	   and	  because	   the	  unity	  characteristic	  of	  concepts	   is	  entirely	  parasitic	  upon	   the	  unity	  of	   acts	  of	  judgment,	  the	  logical	  use	  of	  the	  understanding	  actually	  presupposes	  this	  real	  use.	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  the	  decisive	  step	  Kant	  takes	  in	  the	  first	  Critique	  beyond	  his	  doctrine	  in	  the	  Inaugural	  
Dissertation.	   In	   1770	   he	   had	   held	   that	   “there	   is	   no	   way	   from	   appearance	   to	   experience	  except	  by	  reflection	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  logical	  use	  of	  the	  understanding”	  (ID	  2:394).	  By	  1781	  he	   is	   ready	   to	  affirm	  not	   just	   that	   the	  understanding	  has	   a	   real	  use	  with	   respect	   to	  appearances,	   but	   that	   its	   logical	   use	   in	   reflecting	   appearances	   under	   concepts	   actually	  presupposes	   this.	   And	   this,	   it	   appears,	   is	   just	   what	   Kant	   recognizes	   in	   the	  Metaphysical	  
Foundations	  of	  Natural	  Science	   to	  be	   the	  key	   to	   the	  Transcendental	  Deduction	  and	  which	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leads	  him	  to	  reorient	  the	  deduction	  around	  the	  definition	  of	  judgment	  in	  the	  1787	  edition	  of	  the	  Critique.	  
A133/B172:	  The	  Power	  of	  Judgment	  Kant’s	   discussion	   of	   judgment	   does	   not,	   of	   course,	   end	   with	   the	   second-­‐edition	  Transcendental	  Deduction.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  architectonically	  surprising	  that	  the	  discussion	  has	  even	  begun.	  For	  the	  next	  major	  division	  of	   the	  book	  is	  officially	  titled	  the	  Transcendental	  Doctrine	  of	  the	  Power	  of	  Judgment,	  although	  it	  is	  now	  usually	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Analytic	  of	  Principles.	  The	  location	  of	  this	  extended	  discussion	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  corresponds	  to	   the	   traditional	   location	   of	   discussions	   of	   this	   faculty	   in	   logic	   textbooks;	   it	   is	   a	   faculty	  standing	   between	   the	   basic	   elements	   of	   cognition	   (concepts)	   and	   the	   comprehensive	  syllogistic	  system	  of	  reason.99	  This	  is	  certainly	  the	  role	  Kant’s	  reader	  would	  have	  expected	  judgment	   to	   play	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   project	   of	   a	   “transcendental	   logic,”	   and	   this	   is,	   of	  course,	  why	  Kant	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  justify	  his	  introduction	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  judgment	  earlier	  in	  the	  text.	  It	  is	  only	  because	  Kant	  has	  already	  argued	  that	  this	  faculty	  is	  supposed	  to	  contain	  the	  principle	  of	  all	  acts	  of	  the	  understanding	  that	  we	  are	  now	  encountering	  this	  faculty,	  as	  it	  were,	  for	  a	  second	  time.	  Now,	   if	   Longuenesse	   and	   I	   are	   right	   (despite	   our	  differences)	   that	   the	  Urteilskraft	  plays	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   First	   Section	   of	   the	   Clue,100	  we	   should	   expect	   to	   find	   a	   close	  connection	   between	   Kant’s	   introduction	   of	   the	  Urteilskraft	   and	   his	   earlier	   discussion.	   In	  fact,	  I	  think	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  we	  find	  in	  the	  Analytic	  of	  Principles,	  and	  Kant’s	  discussion	  
                                                99	  See	  p.	  43	  above,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  brief	  overview	  of	  the	  literature	  in	  Brandt	  (1995),	  54-­‐55.	  100	  Again,	  the	  difference	  is	  that	  for	  Longuenesse	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Urteilskraft	   is	   indirect:	   its	  activity	  is	  the	  goal	  towards	  which	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  Vermögen	  zu	  urteilen	  is	  ultimately	  directed.	  See	  p.	  48	  above.	  As	  far	  as	  I	  am	  aware,	   however,	   Longuenesse	   does	   not	   attempt	   to	   link	   Kant’s	   famous	   A133/B172	   passage	   back	   up	   to	   her	  interpretation.	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of	   the	  Urteilskraft	   sheds	   considerable	   light	   back	   onto	   the	  Transcendental	  Deduction	   that	  immediately	  precedes	   it.	   In	   fact,	   the	  points	   about	   judgment	   that	  Kant	  makes	  here,	  which	  are	  usually	  not	  discussed	  in	  connection	  with	  the	  deduction,	  seem	  to	  me	  to	  be	  crucial	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  the	  underlying	  significance	  of	  the	  latter.	  The	   power	   of	   judgment	   is	   that	   higher	   faculty	   of	   cognition	   that	   stands	   above	   the	  understanding	   and	   beneath	   reason.	   Here	   Kant’s	   classification	   remains	   altogether	  traditional;	   the	   understanding	   is	   a	   faculty	   of	   concepts	   (which	   are,	   as	   Kant	   understands	  them,	   rules),101	  judgment	   a	   faculty	   of	   the	   subsumption	   of	   particulars	   under	   concepts,102	  reason	   a	   faculty	   of	   principles,	   i.e.,	   universal	   cognitions	   used	   as	   major	   premises	   of	  syllogisms,	  so	  that	  the	  particular	  can	  be	  derived	  a	  priori	  from	  the	  universal.103	  Thus	  Kant’s	  unusual	   view	   that	   the	   faculty	   of	   judgment	   contains	   the	  unifying	  principle	   for	   all	   three	  of	  these	  subfaculties	  does	  not	  preclude	  him	  from	  seeing	  the	  role	  of	  judgment	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  activity	  of	  these	  faculties	  in	  a	  very	  traditional	  way,	  namely,	  as	  a	  mediator	  between	  the	  higher	  cognitive	  faculties	  of	  understanding	  and	  reason.104	  Kant	  begins	  by	  reminding	  us	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  general	  and	  transcendental	  logic	  (cf.	  CPR	  A50-­‐57/B74-­‐82;	  JL	  9:15).	  General	  logic,	  he	  says,	  “can	  give	  no	  precepts	  to	  the	  
                                                101	  Thus	  Kant	  typically	  identifies	  the	  understanding	  as	  a	  faculty	  of	  concepts	  (CPR	  A130/B169;	  CPJ	  5:228)	  or	  a	  faculty	  of	  rules	  (CPR	  A126;	  A	  7:199);	  only	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  judging	  is	  the	  basic	  form	  of	  acts	  of	  the	  understanding	  does	  he	  identify	  it	  as	  a	  faculty	  for	  judging	  (CPR	  A69/B94).	  102	  CPR	  A132/B171;	  CPJ	  5:179;	  A	  7:199.	  103	  CPR	  A11/B24-­‐25,	  A300/B357,	  A646/B674;	  CPJ	  5:167;	  A	  7:199.	  Kant	  also	  refers	  to	  reason	  as	  the	  “faculty	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  rules	  of	  understanding	  under	  principles”	  (CPR	  A302/B359),	  by	  which	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  particular	  rules	  of	  the	  understanding	  is	  what	  first	  makes	  possible	  the	  derivation	  of	  the	  particular	   from	   the	   universal.	   That	   is,	   only	  when	   unified,	   so	   that	   they	   no	   longer	   stand	   beside	   one	   another	  abstractly,	  do	  general	  rules	  suffice	  to	  determine	  particulars	  independently	  of	  the	  contributions	  of	  sensibility.	  104	  Longuenesse	   claims,	   and	   I	   strongly	   agree,	   that	   the	   reflecting	   activity	   of	   judgment,	   to	   which	   Kant	   only	  draws	  explicit	  attention	  in	  the	  third	  Critique,	  is	  in	  fact	  presupposed	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  first	  Critique.	  But	  just	  as	  we	  disagree	  about	  the	  (purported)	  conceptual	  priority	  of	  the	  Vermögen	  zu	  urteilen,	  so	  we	  disagree	  on	  the	  priority	   of	   the	   reflecting	   activity	   of	   judgment.	   On	   my	   view,	   the	   reflecting	   activity	   of	   judgment	   depends	  transcendentally	  on	  its	  determining	  use,	  not	  just,	  as	  Longuenesse	  would	  have	  it,	  in	  that	  the	  latter	  represents	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  former,	  but	  in	  that	  no	  reflection	  is	  possible	  without	  an	  initial	  determination.	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power	  of	  judgment”	  (CPR	  A135/B174),	  for	  in	  general	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  is	  a	  power	  of	  subsumption.	   Now,	   whether	   a	   particular	   case	   falls	   under	   a	   general	   concept	   is	   not	  something	  that	  can	  be	  thoroughly	  determined	  by	  means	  of	  a	  further	  concept	  or	  system	  of	  concepts,	  for	  if	  every	  rule	  itself	  required	  a	  rule	  in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  applied	  correctly,	  then,	  on	   pain	   of	   regress,	   no	   rule	   could	   ever	   be	   applied	   (CPR	   A133/B172;	   cf.	   TP	   8:275).	  Subsumption	   in	   general,	   and	   therefore	   the	   power	   of	   judgment,	   cannot	   be	   an	   essentially	  rule-­‐governed	  activity.	  Though	   Kant’s	   point	   is	   familiar,	   an	   example	   can	   nevertheless	   help	   make	   it	   clear.	  Suppose	  that	  subsumption	  were	  an	  essentially	  rule-­‐governed	  activity.	  In	  this	  case,	  to	  apply	  the	  concept	  otter	   to	   the	  body	   in	   front	  of	  me,	   I	  would	  need	   to	  appeal	   to	   the	  characteristic	  marks	  of	  otterness,	  so	  that	  I	  can	  conclude	  that	  I	  should	  apply	  the	  concept	  to	  this	  body	  if	  and	  only	   if	   these	  marks	  hold	  of	   it.	   To	   recognize	   these	  marks	   as	  holding	  of	   this	   body,	   in	   turn,	  would	   require	   recourse	   to	   still	   another	   set	   of	   characteristic	  marks,	   and	   so	  on	   and	   so	  on.	  Thus	   if	   a	   judgment	   is	   actually	   to	   reach	   its	   object,	   Kant	   concludes,	   some	   extraconceptual	  recognitional	  step	  must	  be	  involved.	  In	  other	  words,	  no	  matter	  how	  complete	  my	  grasp	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  empirical	  concept	  otter	  may	  be,	  there	  always	  remains	  nonconceptual	  work	  left	  to	  do	  in	  recognizing	  something	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  one;	  what	  is	  more,	  because	  such	  a	  nontrivial	  task	  of	  judging	  always	  remains,	  it	  is	  always	  possible	  to	  judge	  wrongly,	  even	  if	  one’s	   grasp	   of	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   concept	   to	   be	   applied	   is	   impeccable.	   In	   the	   first	  
Critique	  Kant	  expresses	  this	  point	  by	  emphasizing	  that	  “the	  power	  of	  judgment	  is	  a	  special	  talent	  that	  cannot	  be	  taught	  but	  only	  practiced”	  (CPR	  A133/B172),	  and,	  as	  we	  have	  already	  seen,	  he	  elsewhere	  claims	  that	  judgment	  is	  “the	  understanding	  that	  comes	  only	  with	  years”	  (A	  7:199).	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If	   all	   this	   appears	   at	   first	   blush	   to	   be	   a	   string	   of	   merely	   trivial	   truths,	   a	   brief	  reminder	   of	   the	   threat	   to	   judgment—or	   at	   least	   to	   the	   ineliminability	   of	   nonconceptual	  subsumption—in	  much	  of	  early	  modern	  philosophy	  may	  be	  of	  help.	  Descartes’s	  discussion	  of	   judgment	  in	  the	  Fourth	  Meditation,	   in	  particular,	  constitutes	  important	  background	  for	  Kant’s	   position.	  Descartes	   had	   argued	   that	   because	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  will	   is	   broader	   than	  that	  of	  the	  intellect,	  there	  arises	  the	  possibility	  of	  error,	  i.e.,	  judging	  falsely.	  If	  we	  are	  to	  use	  our	   intellect	   properly,	   at	   least	   in	   the	  domain	   of	   scientia,	  we	  must	   first	   train	   ourselves	   to	  restrict	   the	   scope	   of	   our	   willful	   judgment	   to	   that	   which	   we	   clearly	   and	   distinctly	  understand.105	  Thus	  for	  Descartes	  our	  faculty	  of	  judgment	  is	  properly	  reined	  in	  only	  when	  it	  sticks	  to	  the	  conceptual	  paths	  already	  carved	  out	  by	  the	  understanding.	  Malebranche,	  as	  we	  might	  expect,	  takes	  this	  principle	  even	  further:	  to	  accept	  an	  apparent	  truth	  without	  the	  evidence	  of	  clear	  and	  distinct	  perception	  is	  to	  “enslave	  oneself	  against	  the	  will	  of	  God”	  and	  to	  misuse	  the	  freedom	  He	  has	  granted	  us.	  “The	  use,	  therefore,	  that	  we	  should	  make	  of	  our	  freedom	  is	  to	  make	  as	  much	  use	  of	  it	  as	  we	  can,	  that	  is,	  never	  to	  consent	  to	  anything	  until	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  do	  so,	  as	  it	  were,	  by	  the	  inward	  reproaches	  of	  our	  reason.”106	  By	  contrast,	  Kant’s	   view	   is	   that	   to	   subject	   judgment	   to	   such	   strong	   restrictions	   is	   to	   eliminate	   it	   as	   a	  distinct	  (and	  necessary)	  faculty	  altogether.	  The	  work	  of	  judgment	  properly	  begins,	  in	  fact,	  precisely	  where	  the	  work	  of	  the	  understanding	  finds	  itself	  exhausted:	  we	  judge,	  in	  fact,	  only	  in	   cases	   in	   which	   we	   say	   a	   bit	   more,	   by	   way	   of	   a	   subsumption	   that	   goes	   beyond	   the	  conceptual,	  than	  we	  already	  understood.	  We	  can	  see	  this	  if	  we	  look	  at	  Kant’s	  account	  of	  error.	  “Taking	  something	  to	  be	  true	  is	  an	   occurrence	   in	   our	   understanding	   that	   may	   rest	   on	   objective	   grounds,	   but	   that	   also	  
                                                105	  Descartes	  (1641),	  41-­‐42	  (VII:59-­‐60).	  106	  Malebranche	  (1674-­‐1675),	  10;	  but	  see	  also	  xliii,	  70.	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requires	  subjective	  causes	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  him	  who	  judges”	  (CPR	  A820/B848).	  Now,	   if	   the	  grounds	  are	  in	  fact	  objectively	  sufficient,	  we	  say	  we	  are	  convinced,	  while	  if	  the	  grounds	  are	  only	   subjective,	   we	   say	   we	   are	   persuaded.107	  Crucially,	   however,	   there	   is	   no	   subjective	  means	  for	  distinguishing	  being	  convinced	  from	  being	  persuaded;	  the	  best	  we	  can	  do	  is	  to	  utilize	  “the	  experiment	  that	  one	  makes	  on	  the	  understanding	  of	  others,	  to	  see	  if	  the	  grounds	  that	   are	   valid	   for	  us	  have	   the	   same	  effect	   on	   the	   reason	  of	   others”	   (CPR	  A821/B849).	   In	  short,	   listening	  to	  Malebranche’s	  “inward	  reproaches	  of	  reason”	  is	  never	  sufficient	  for	  the	  achievement	   of	   objective	   cognition.	   This	   completely	   inverts	   the	   rationalist	   orthodoxy,	  which,	  since	  Descartes’s	  Fourth	  Meditation,	  had	  committed	  itself	  to	  the	  systematic	  excision	  of	   risk	   from	   properly	   scientific	   cognition.	   Now	   we	   find	   Kant	   insisting	   that	   scientific	  cognition,	   if	   it	   is	   really	   to	   be	   objective	   at	   all,	   is	   actually	   founded	   in	   the	   very	   risk	   that	  Malebranche	  had	  considered	  a	  veritable	  rebellion	  against	  God.	  Of	  course,	  Descartes	  and	  Malebranche	  are	  not	  eliminating	  the	  task	  of	  the	  faculty	  of	  judgment	  on	  account	  of	  some	  arbitrary	  whim.	  For	  them	  it	  reflects	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  the	  Enlightenment:	  to	  accept	  as	  true	  (at	  least	  in	  matters	  of	  scientific	  cognition)	  nothing	  beyond	  that	  which	  our	  own	  reason	  compels	  us	   to.	   So	  we	  must	   ask:	  how	  could	  Kant	  attempt	   this	  inversion	  of	  rationalist	  orthodoxy	  while	  retaining	  his	  claim	  to	  be	  an	  Aufklärer?	  If	   it	   is	  not	  judgment	  which	  must	  submit	  to	  the	  discipline	  of	  reason,	  but	  reason	  which	  must	  be	  rooted	  in	  judgment,	  what	  is	  to	  prevent	  disagreement	  from	  deteriorating	  into	  opposing	  judgments	  that	  are	  not	  ultimately	  responsible	  to	  reasons?	  Doesn’t	  Kant	  remark	  that	  all	  cognition	  must	  conform	  to	  rules,	  adding	  that	  “absence	  of	  rules	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  unreason”	  (JL	  9:139)?	  
                                                107	  Kant’s	  distinction	  is	  between	  Überzeugung	  and	  Überredung,	  respectively.	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These	   questions	   can	   only	   be	   answered	   if	   we	   draw	   an	   important	   distinction:	  although	   some	   act	   of	   judgment	   is	   the	   necessary	   condition	   for	   all	   subsequently	   rational	  cognition,	  no	  particular	  judgment	  can	  be	  appealed	  to	  in	  the	  context	  of	  objective	  cognition	  without	   an	   implicit	   commitment	   to	   further	   rational	   justification.	   To	   see	   Kant’s	   point,	  consider	   an	   example	   from	  practical	   philosophy.	   Surely	   it	  would	   be	   unsatisfying	   if,	   say,	   a	  dispute	  about	  the	  injustice	  of	  a	  particular	  action	  could	  at	  some	  point	  be	  declared	  to	  be	  no	  longer	   conceptually	   clarifiable,	   a	  mere	  matter	   of	   “judgment.”	   Perhaps	  we	   agree	   that	   it	   is	  wrong	  to	  engage	  in	  torture,	  but	  we	  cannot	  agree	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  particular	  case	  in	  front	  of	  us	   is	   subsumable	  under	   that	  concept.	   If	  we	   leave	   the	  dispute	   there,	  we	  are	  merely	   left	  with	  a	  case	  of	  one	  person	  judging	  in	  one	  way,	  another	  in	  a	  second,	  different	  way.	  Although	  we	  may,	  regrettably,	  in	  fact	  find	  ourselves	  stuck	  in	  suchlike	  situations	  from	  time	  to	  time,	  it	  is	   important	   to	  Kant	   that	   recourse	   to	   judgment	   as	   a	  way	   to	  end	   a	   dispute—to	  disengage	  from	   one	   another	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   matter	   at	   hand—is	   never	   a	   permissible	   move	   in	  rational	  discourse	  (again,	  see	  CPR	  A821/B849).	  In	   fact,	   to	   suppose	   that	   it	   would	   follow	   from	   Kant’s	   view	   of	   judgment	   that	   any	  particular	  judgment	  could	  be	  invoked	  as	  the	  endpoint	  of	  a	  rational	  argument	  would	  be	  to	  stand	   his	   view	   precisely	   on	   its	   head,	   for	   judgment	   is	   the	   opening	   gambit	   of	   all	   rational	  discourse,	  not	  its	  (infinitely	  distant)	  goal.	  Kant’s	  point,	  rather,	  is	  that	  until	  I	  take	  a	  stand	  one	  way	  or	  another—e.g.,	   judge	  that	  this	  action	  either	   is	  or	   is	  not	  an	  instance	  of	   injustice—no	  evidential	   standard	   has	   been	   established	   to	  which	   I	   or	   others	   can	   subsequently	   be	   held	  rationally	   responsible	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   The	   act	   of	   judgment,	   we	   might	   say,	   is	   the	  transcendental	   condition	   of	   rational	   agreement	   and	   disagreement,	   for	   there	   can	   be	   no	  objective	  matter	  about	  which	  we	  can	  even	  be	  said	  to	  genuinely	  disagree	  until	  we	  establish	  a	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relation	  to	  an	  (intersubjectively	  available)	  object	  by	  means	  of	  judging.	  Thus	  only	  when	  we	  say	   a	   bit	  more	   than	   can	   be	   conceptually	   elucidated	   at	   the	   present	   time—only	  when	  we	  move	  beyond	  a	  mere	  concept	  through	  an	  act	  of	  judgment—can	  we	  satisfy	  the	  conditions	  for	  discussing	  an	  object,	   rather	   than	  a	   free-­‐floating	  concept;	  only	   then	  can	  our	  discussion	  be,	  e.g.,	  about	  this	  very	  act	  of	  torture,	  instead	  of	  about	  the	  concept	  of	  justice.	  In	  what	  follows	  I	  will	   refer	   to	   this	   as	   the	   “transcendental	   risk”	   associated	   with	   the	   foundational	   role	   of	  judgment.	   Granted,	   once	   the	   realm	   of	   objective	   discourse	   is	   opened	   up,	   rationality	   and	  reason-­‐responsiveness	  are	  not	  responsibilities	  that	  can	  be	  casually	  tossed	  aside.	  But	  it	  is	  in	  and	  through	  the	  act	  of	  judgment	  that	  we	  first	  establish	  a	  mode	  of	  access	  to	  the	  discursive	  realm	  in	  which	  argument	  can	  be	  responsible	  both	  to	  reasons—an	  indefinitely	  expandable	  conceptual	   matrix	   restricted	   by	   the	   criterion	   of	   consistency—as	   well	   as	   evidence—the	  objects	   in	   the	  shared	  world	  with	  which	  we	  must	  ultimately	  have	   to	  do	   if	  our	  conclusions	  are	   to	   have	   any	   significance—without	   the	   reduction	   of	   either	   source	   of	   epistemic	  responsibility	  to	  the	  other.	  Another	  way	  to	  put	   this	  point	   is	   to	  simply	  say	  that,	   for	  human	  beings,	  at	   least,	   the	  existence	   of	   objective	   scientific	   cognition	   depends	   on	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   evidential	  commitment	  which	   is	   not	   itself	   scientific	   in	   nature.	  However	  we	   choose	   to	   organize	   and	  reorganize	   the	   system	   of	   concepts	   that	   constitutes	   science,	   the	   condition	   for	   a	   scientific	  system	  to	  ever	  acquire	  objective	  validity	  is	  for	  us	  to	  commit	  ourselves	  to	  the	  applicability	  of	  some	   concept(s)	   in	   that	   system	   to	   an	   object.	   Only	   by	   maintaining	   that	   this	   object	   is	   an	  instance	  of	  some	  concept	  do	  we	  lend	  objective	  validity	  to	  the	  system	  of	  concepts	  bound	  up	  with	   the	   latter.	   We	   may,	   of	   course,	   eventually	   abandon	   the	   view	   that	   this	   object	   is	   an	  instance	  of	  such	  a	  concept;	  Kant’s	  point	  is	  not	  that	  this	  particular	  commitment	  must	  be	  held	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come	  what	  may.	  But	  without	  holding	  onto	   some	   such	   commitment,	   a	   commitment	  which	  must,	   for	   the	   time	   being,	   at	   least,	   be	   held	   back	   from	   rational	   criticism,	   the	   condition	   for	  objective	  cognition	  in	  general	  will	  remain	  lacking.	  As	   far	   as	   the	   interpretation	   is	   concerned,	   the	   crucial	   point	   is	   this:	   the	   inability	   of	  judgment	  to	  be	  comprehensively	  rule-­‐governed	  is	  not	  some	  additional,	  incidental	  feature	  of	  this	   faculty	   which	   Kant	   can	   now	   (in	   the	   Analytic	   of	   Principles)	   simply	   append	   to	   his	  previous	  discussion	  of	  judgment	  (as	  analyzed	  above).	  Rather,	  Kant’s	  point	  here	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  one	  that	  was	  already	  implicitly	  assumed	  in	  the	  discussion	  at	  A68/B93.	  Not	  only	  that:	  the	  non-­‐rule-­‐governedness	   of	   judgment	   is	   the	   very	   reason	   why	   it	   is	   able	   to	   play	   such	   a	  foundational	   role	   in	   the	   earlier	   text	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   To	   see	   this,	   consider	   again	   the	  centrality	   of	   the	   unity	   of	   an	  action	   in	   Kant’s	   explanation	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   concepts.	   This	  action	   cannot	   rely	   on	   a	   unity	   given	   in	   advance	   of	   the	   act	   of	   judgment,	   for	   that	   unity	   of	  objective	   cognition	   was	   the	   very	   thing	   judgment	   was	   invoked	   to	   explain.	   Only	   through	  original	  acts	  of	  judging	  do	  we	  establish	  the	  links	  between	  concepts	  and	  intuitions	  that	  lend	  concepts	  in	  general	  their	  objective	  validity.	  Concepts,	  accordingly,	  can	  only	  be	  rules	  if	  they	  originate	  in	  the	  non-­‐rule-­‐governed,	  but	  nevertheless	  rule-­‐generating,	  acts	  of	  judgment.	  This	  explains	  how	  Kant	  can	  hold	  the	  seemingly	  paradoxical	  position	  that	  the	  understanding	  is	  at	  once	  a	  “faculty	  for	  judging”	  and	  a	  “faculty	  of	  rules,”	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Kant	  thinks	  judging	  is	  not	  rule-­‐governed:	  for	  Kant,	  the	  understanding	  can	  only	  be	  a	  faculty	  of	  rules	  because	  the	  norms	  governing	  its	  use	  hold	  sway	  over	  us	  just	  insofar	  as	  we	  have	  already	  discharged	  our	  original	  responsibility	  to	  judge.	  To	  sum	  up,	   then:	  Kant	  argues	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  Transcendental	  Analytic	   that	  all	  the	  acts	  of	  the	  understanding	  can	  be	  found	  together	  if	  we	  locate	  the	  principle	  underlying	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the	  various	  activities	  of	  our	  power	  of	  judgment.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  unity	  characteristic	  of	  concepts	   refers	   back	   to	   the	   unity	   of	   acts	   of	   judgment.	  Now,	   if	   acts	   of	   judgment	   could	   be	  analyzed	  in	  terms	  of	  conceptual	  clarity	  and	  distinctness,	  Kant’s	  explanation	  here	  would	  be	  circular,	  for	  the	  normative	  principles	  governing	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  would	  be	  immanent	  to	  the	  concepts	  which	  are	  themselves	  to	  be	  judged.	  Only	  because	  judgments	  require	  us	  to	  step	  beyond	  the	  confines	  of	  our	  concepts	  as	  currently	  constituted	  are	  they	  even	  eligible	  to	  play	   the	   role	   they	   play	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   Transcendental	   Analytic.	   A	   rational	  discussion	   about	   an	   object	   in	   the	   world	   presupposes	   that	   a	   judgment	   has	   already	   been	  rendered	  about	  this	  object,	  a	  judgment	  which	  makes	  cognition	  of	  this	  object	  possible	  in	  the	  first	   place.	   But	   for	   that	   very	   reason	   it	   cannot	   in	   the	   first	   instance	   have	   itself	   been	  thoroughly	  rational,	  i.e.,	  responsible	  to	  the	  rationalist	  ideals	  of	  clarity	  and	  distinctness.	  
Judgments	  of	  Perception	  and	  Judgments	  of	  Experience	  If	  we	   understand	   Kant’s	   objection	   to	   rationalist	   strategies	   for	   eliminating	   the	   distinctive	  role	  of	   judgment,	  we	  are	  well-­‐positioned	   to	  understand	  his	   fundamental	  objection	   to	   the	  empiricists,	  as	  well.	  Whereas	  the	  rationalists	  sought	  to	  elevate	  the	  faculty	  of	  cognition	  by	  identifying	  it	  with	  its	  highest	  part,	  reason,	  the	  empiricists	  sought	  to	  deflate	  its	  pretensions	  altogether	   by	   identifying	   it	   with	   its	   lowest	   part,	   sensible	   intuition.	   We	   can	   find	   this	  ambition	   at	   its	   crudest	   in	   the	   work	   of	   Helvétius,	   who	   asks,	   “What	   is	   it	   to	   judge?”	   He	  answers,	  “To	  tell	  what	  I	  feel.	  Am	  I	  struck	  on	  the	  head?	  Is	  the	  pain	  violent?	  The	  simple	  recital	  of	  what	  I	  feel	  forms	  my	  judgment.”108	  When	  I	  judge,	  I	  simply	  “make	  an	  exact	  report	  of	  the	  impressions	  I	  have	  received.”109	  Helvétius,	  at	  least,	  does	  not	  hesitate	  to	  draw	  the	  conclusion	  to	   which	   expressions	   like	   “exact	   report”	   and	   “simple	   recital”	   are	   obviously	   leading	   him:	  
                                                108	  Helvétius	  (1772),	  I:112.	  109	  Helvétius	  (1772),	  I:111.	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“This	   being	   settled,	   all	   the	   operations	   of	   the	  mind	   are	   reduced	   to	  mere	   sensations.	  Why	  then	  admit	  in	  man	  a	  faculty	  of	  judging	  distinct	  from	  the	  faculty	  of	  sensation?”110	  	   Hume,	   as	  we	   know,	   is	   not	   so	   tactless	   in	   his	   procedure.	   But	   alongside	   the	  work	   of	  Helvétius,	  Maupertuis,	  and	  Condillac,	  Hume’s	  own	  reduction	  of	  the	  acts	  of	  the	  mind	  formed	  part	   of	   a	  definite	   trend.111	  For	  his	  part,	  Hume	  had	  actually	   argued	   in	   the	  Treatise	   for	   the	  reduction	   of	   the	   acts	   of	   the	  mind—commonly	   taken	   (again	  Hume	   follows	   the	  Port-­‐Royal	  classification)	   to	   be	   conception,	   judgment,	   and	   reasoning—to	   conception	   alone.112	  Since,	  however,	  the	  acts	  of	  the	  understanding	  are	  ultimately	  referred,	  in	  Hume,	  to	  feeling,	  Hume’s	  reduction	  of	   judgment	   to	   “conception”	   takes	  on	   the	  opposite	  significance	   to	   that	  which	   it	  had	   for	   the	   rationalists:	   it	   is	   to	  eliminate	   judgment	   from	   the	  other	   side,	   as	   it	  were.	   If	   the	  rationalists	   ask	   us	   to	   rely	   on	   an	   intuitive	   seeing	   of	   truth,	   for	   the	   empiricists	   we	   are	  ultimately	  led	  to	  it	  by	  means	  of	  natural	  human	  sensations	  or	  sentiments.	  Hume,	  of	  course,	  has	   a	   subtle	   and,	   after	   its	   own	   manner,	   plausible	   story	   to	   tell	   about	   judgment	   and	  sentiment.	   In	   the	  willing	   hands	   of	   Helvétius,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   judgment	   becomes	   “the	  simple	  recital	  of	  what	  I	  feel.”	  	   In	   either	   case,	   of	   course,	   we	   know	  what	   Kant	  will	   say.	   The	   affective	   reduction	   of	  judgments	  (to	  feelings),	  just	  like	  the	  rational	  reduction	  of	  judgments	  (to	  concepts),	  divorces	  cognition	   from	   the	  moment	   of	   transcendental	   risk	   that	   is	   the	   necessary	   condition	   of	   its	  objective	   provenance.	   Thus	   the	   empiricists,	   like	   the	   rationalists,	   end	   up	   denying	   that	  we	  can	   judge	   about	   objects	   at	   all.	   “To	   substitute	   subjective	   necessity,	   that	   is,	   custom,”	   Kant	  
                                                110	  Helvétius	  (1772),	   I:113.	  Cf.	  Cassirer’s	  account	  of	  a	  similar	  attempt	  at	  a	  reduction	  in	  Maupertuis.	  Cassirer	  (1932),	  100-­‐101,	  120.	  111	  Cassirer,	  at	  any	  rate,	   sees	   the	  methodology	   that	  appears	  here,	   i.e.,	   that	  of	  reducing	   the	  operations	  of	   the	  mind	   to	   one	   original	   power,	   as	   “characteristic	   of	   and	   decisive	   for	   the	   entire	   eighteenth	   century.”	   Cassirer	  (1932),	  27.	  112	  Hume	  (1739-­‐1740),	  96-­‐97	  (1.3.7n).	  This	  is	  a	  footnote	  to	  Hume’s	  discussion	  of	  belief.	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says,	  “for	  objective	  necessity,	  which	  is	  to	  be	  found	  only	  in	  a	  priori	  judgments,	  is	  to	  deny	  to	  reason	   the	   ability	   to	   judge	   an	   object,	   that	   is,	   to	   cognize	   it	   and	  what	   belongs	   to	   it”	   (CPrR	  5:12).	  And	  given	  that	   the	  relation	  to	  an	  object	   is	  constitutive	   for	   judgment	   in	  general,	  we	  would	  expect	  Kant	  to	  go	  on	  to	  specify	  that	  the	  empiricist	  position	  rests	  on	  the	  denial	  that	  we	  can	  judge	  simpliciter.	  	   To	  the	  continued	  consternation	  of	  his	  interpreters,	  this	  is	  not	  what	  Kant	  does	  at	  all.	  In	  his	  most	  prolonged	  (though	  not,	  in	  Kant’s	  mind,	  most	  decisive)	  engagement	  with	  Hume,	  the	   Prolegomena,	   Kant	   introduces	   a	   distinction	   between	   judgments	   of	   perception	   and	  judgments	   of	   experience	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   appears	   to	   commit	   himself	   to	   the	   existence	   of	  judgments	   that	   are	  not	   objectively	   valid.	  Given	  what	  we	  have	   just	   seen,	   and	   given	   that	   a	  judgment	   is	   described	   in	   1781	   as	   a	   “mediate	   cognition	   of	   an	   object”	   (CPR	   A68/B93),	   in	  1786	   as	   “an	   action	   through	   which	   given	   representations	   first	   become	   cognitions	   of	   an	  object”	  (MFNS	  4:475n),	  and	  in	  1787	  as	  “the	  way	  to	  bring	  cognition	  to	  the	  objective	  unity	  of	  apperception”	  (CPR	  B141),	  this	  is	  surprising,	  to	  the	  say	  the	  least.113	  	   In	  the	  face	  of	  such	  difficulties,	  interpreters	  have	  adopted	  a	  remarkably	  wide	  array	  of	  approaches.	  We	  can	  roughly	  organize	  them	  into	  three	  categories.	  First,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  would	   simply	   acknowledge	   that	   Kant	   contradicts	   himself	   in	   an	   obvious	   manner.	   Guyer	  argues,	  for	  instance,	  that	  Kant’s	  confusion	  here	  is	  just	  a	  symptom	  of	  the	  two	  incompatible	  premises	   on	   which	   Kant	   sought,	   never	   successfully,	   to	   base	   the	   Transcendental	  
                                                113	  It	  might	  be	  pointed	  out,	  in	  this	  context,	  that	  the	  centrality	  of	  judgment	  to	  the	  Transcendental	  Deduction	  is	  in	  fact	  announced	  only	  in	  1786	  (see	  above,	  p.	  40)	  and	  subsequently	  executed	  in	  1787.	  Perhaps,	  even	  despite	  the	   textual	   evidence,	   this	  was	   just	  not	  Kant’s	   view	   in	  1781	  or	  1783.	  Against	   this,	   however,	  we	  have	  Kant’s	  insistence—presumably	   based	  on	   something	  more	   than	  mere	  pride	   in	   his	   1781	   accomplishment—that	   the	  second	  edition	  of	  the	  Deduction	  consists	  merely	  in	  a	  rearrangement	  of	  the	  presentation,	  not	  the	  “grounds	  of	  proof,”	  of	  the	  argument	  (CPR	  Bxxxvii-­‐xxxviii).	  This	  strongly	  suggests	  that	  he	  came	  to	  see	  judgment	  as	  the	  key	  to	  the	  A	  Deduction,	  as	  well,	  even	  if	  he	  came	  to	  find	  his	  earlier	  articulation	  of	  this	  point	  wanting.	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Deduction.114	  Second,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  think	  that	  ascribing	  an	  outright	  contradiction	  to	  Kant	   is	  avoidable	   so	   long	  as	  we	  recognize	   the	  deep	  methodological	  divide	  separating	   the	  
Prolegomena	   from	   either	   edition	   of	   the	   first	   Critique.	   Allison,	   for	   instance,	   takes	   it	   that	  because	  Kant	  is	  assuming	  that	  some	  objectively	  valid	  judgments	  exist	  (in	  accordance	  with	  the	  analytic	  method),115	  it	  is	  sufficient	  for	  him	  in	  the	  Prolegomena	  to	  show	  that	  even	  if	  there	  
were	  merely	  subjective	  judgments	  based	  on	  perception	  alone,	  they	  could	  not	  be	  rendered	  objectively	  valid	  without	  an	  application	  of	  the	  categories.	  And	  for	  this	  purpose	  it	  is	  simply	  unnecessary	   for	   Kant	   to	   also	   explain	   the	   role	   played	   by	   the	   categories	   in	   perception	  itself.116	  Finally,	  there	  are	  those	  who	  think	  there	  is	  no	  real	  contradiction	  at	  all	  between	  the	  texts.	  To	  show	  this,	  Longuenesse	  has	  offered	  an	  extremely	  detailed	  and	  subtle	  reading	  of	  the	  relevant	  passages.117	  Although	  it	  does	  not	  really	  do	  her	  argument	  justice,	  we	  might	  say	  loosely	   that,	   on	   her	   reading,	   judgments	   of	   perception	   correspond	   to	   the	   Vermögen	   zu	  
urteilen,	   judgments	   of	   experience	   to	   the	   Urteilskraft.	   Both	   involve	   the	   logical	   forms	   of	  judgment,	  but	  only	  in	  judgments	  of	  experience	  do	  we	  apply	  the	  categories,	  where	  the	  latter	  are	  understood	  not	  merely	  as	  forms	  of	  the	  Vermögen	  zu	  urteilen	  but	  as	  reflected	  universal	  concepts.118	  Far	  from	  contradicting	  himself,	  then,	  in	  the	  Prolegomena	  Kant	  makes	  explicit	  a	  distinction	  upon	  which	  he	  had	  been	  tacitly	  relying	  even	  in	  the	  first	  Critique.119	  
                                                114	  Guyer	  (1987),	  101.	  Sassen	  (2008)	  also	  falls	   into	  this	  camp,	  although	  her	  historical	  explanation	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  Guyer’s.	  115	  Kant	  announces	  that	  he	  will	  be	  pursuing	  an	  analytic	  method	  in	  the	  Prolegomena,	   rather	  than	  a	  synthetic	  one,	  at	  P	  4:275.	  Cf.	  P	  4:276n;	  JL	  9:149.	  116	  Allison	  (2004),	  182.	  117	  Longuenesse	  (1998),	  167-­‐197,	  esp.	  188-­‐195.	  118	  See	  esp.	  Longuenesse	  (1998),	  196.	  119	  This	   is	   not	   to	   say,	   however,	   that	   Longuenesse	  does	  not	   recognize	   differences	   in	   goals	   and	  methodology	  across	   the	   two	   texts	   (see,	   in	   particular,	   Longuenesse	   [1998],	   187-­‐188),	   just	   that	   on	   the	  whole	   her	   account	  attempts	  to	  show	  a	  deep	  affinity	  between	  them	  (in	  a	  way,	  e.g.,	  in	  which	  Allison	  does	  not).	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   My	   own	   approach,	   I	   think,	   fits	   best	   under	   the	   second	   category.	   It	   must	   be	  immediately	  acknowledged,	  however,	  that	  the	  interpretive	  problem	  is	  not	  confined	  to	  the	  
Prolegomena.	   Compare,	   for	   example,	   the	   following	  Reflexionen.	   First,	   consider	   one	   dated	  (by	   Adickes)	   1790-­‐1804	   that	   closely	   links	   judgment	   and	   objectivity	   in	   just	   the	   way	   we	  would	  typically	  expect:	  Judgment:	  The	  representation	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  different	  concepts	  belong	  to	  one	  consciousness	  objectively*	  (for	  everyone).	  *[Kant’s	  note]:	  (i.e.,	  in	  order	  to	  constitute	  a	  cognition	  of	  the	  object.)	  (R	  3055	  16:634)	  	  Now,	  however,	  consider	  this	  earlier	  note,	  dated	  1776-­‐1780s:	  The	  representation	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  different	  concepts	  (as	  such)	  *belong	  to	  one	  consciousness**	  (in	  general	  (not	  merely	  mine))	  is	  the	  judgment.	  They	  belong	   to	   one	   consciousness	   partly	   in	   accordance	   with	   laws	   of	   the	  imagination,	  thus	  subjectively,	  or	  of	  the	  understanding,	  i.e.,	  objectively	  valid	  for	  every	  being	  that	  has	  understanding.	  .	  .	  .	  *[Kant’s	  note]:	  universally	  necessary	  (empirical	  or	  a	  priori)	  **[Kant’s	   note,	   added	   later]:	   Concepts	   belong	   to	   one	   consciousness	  only	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  conceived	  under	  one	  another,	  not	  next	  to	  one	  another	  (like	  sensations).	  (R	  3051	  16:633)	  	  In	  the	  second	  note,	  at	  least,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Kant	  is	  thinking	  of	  judgment	  as	  a	  genus	  with	  both	  subjective	  and	  objective	  species.	  The	  Prolegomena	  distinction	  appears	  in	  several	  of	  Kant’s	  logic	   lectures	   (JL	   9:113;	   cf.	   DWL	   24:767),120	  and	   in	   the	   third	   Critique	   he	   deals	   with	  judgments	  which	   are	  merely	   subjectively	   valid.121	  In	   fact,	   I	   think	   it	   is	   fair	   to	   say	   the	   first	  
Critique	  is	  the	  exception,	  not	  the	  rule,	  in	  this	  respect.	  Thus	  if	  the	  problem	  is	  due	  to	  a	  special	  
                                                120	  In	  addition,	  if	  one	  agrees	  (as	  I	  do)	  with	  Longuenesse	  about	  the	  close	  link	  between	  the	  reflecting	  activity	  of	  judgment	   and	   judgments	   of	   perception,	  we	   could	   cite	   an	   earlier	   section	   of	   the	   Jäsche	  Logic,	   in	  which	  Kant	  distinguishes	  provisional	   from	  determining	  judgments	  (JL	  9:74)	  and	  goes	  on	  to	  note	  that	  “due	   to	   a	   lack	  of	  
reflection,	  which	  must	  precede	  all	  judging”	  (JL	  9:76),	  provisional	  judgments	  may	  be	  misused	  as	  determining	  judgments.	  121	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  at	  least,	  he	  does	  take	  pains	  to	  address	  the	  confusion	  into	  which	  the	  reader	  might	  be	  led.	  Aesthetic	   judgments	  are	  not	   really	   judgments	   in	   the	  strict	   sense	  at	  all,	   since	   “judgments	  belong	  absolutely	  only	   to	   the	   understanding	   (taken	   in	   a	   wider	   sense),”	   and	   “an	   objective	   judgment	   is	   always	   made	   by	   the	  understanding”	   (FI	   20:222).	   See	   also	   CPJ	   5:203-­‐204,	   287-­‐288,	   passages	   I	   will	   discuss	   in	   another	   context	  below.	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methodology,	  it	  is	  the	  method	  of	  the	  first	  Critique,	  not	  the	  Prolegomena,	  which	  is	  primarily	  relevant.	  If	  we	   turn,	   finally,	   to	   the	  Prolegomena	   itself,	  we	   find	   that	   the	  key	   feature	  of	  Kant’s	  distinction	  is	  that	  judgments	  of	  perception,	  unlike	  judgments	  of	  experience,	  do	  not	  require	  the	   “application”	   of	   a	   category	   and	   thus	   do	   not	   have	   the	   objective	   validity	   that	   only	   the	  categories	  can	  confer.	  
Empirical	   judgments,	   insofar	   as	   they	   have	   objective	   validity,	   are	  
judgments	  of	  experience;	  those,	  however,	  that	  are	  only	  subjectively	  valid	  I	   call	   mere	   judgments	   of	   perception.	   The	   latter	   do	   not	   require	   pure	  concepts	  of	  the	  understanding,	  but	  only	  the	  logical	  connection	  of	  perceptions	  in	   a	   thinking	   subject.	   But	   the	   former	   always	   demand	   .	   .	   .	   special	   concepts	  
originally	  generated	  in	  the	  understanding,	  which	  are	  precisely	  what	  make	  the	  judgment	  of	  experience	  objectively	  valid.	  (P	  4:298)	  	  Judgments	  of	  perception,	  which,	  according	  to	  what	  we	  have	  said,	  are	  the	  perplexing	  ones,	  require	  “only	  the	  logical	  connection	  of	  perceptions	  in	  a	  thinking	  subject.”	  So	  such	  a	  logical	  connection	  must	  be	  possible	  without	  an	  attendant	  application	  of	  a	  category.	  Before	  we	  turn	  to	   the	  question	  of	  what	  Kant	  might	  have	   in	  mind	  with	  this	  “logical	  connection,”	  however,	  we	  must	  note	  that	  Kant	  immediately	  goes	  on	  to	  apparently	  raise	  the	  stakes	  even	  further.	  If	  the	  first	  problem	  is	  how	  judgments	  of	  perception,	  which	  “do	  not	  require	  pure	  concepts	  of	  the	  understanding,”	  are	  to	  be	  counted	  as	  judgments	  at	  all,	  the	  second	  problem	  is	  that	  Kant	  claims	   that	   all	   empirical	   judgments	   begin	   as	   mere	   judgments	   of	   perception.	   Only	  
subsequently,	   and	   only	   in	   certain	   cases,	   are	   they	   raised	   to	   the	   status	   of	   judgments	   of	  experience	   by	   the	   application	   of	   a	   category	   (P	   4:298).	   This	   second	   problem	   appears	   to	  grant	  the	  empiricist	  considerably	  more	  than	  the	  first	  Critique	  was	  willing	  to	  concede.	  Taken	  together,	  the	  questions	  raise	  the	  following	  interpretive	  problem:	  if	  the	  “logical	  connections	  of	  perceptions	  in	  a	  thinking	  subject”	  precede	  category	  application,	  then	  what	  has	  become	  of	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Kant’s	  result	  that	  the	  real	  use	  of	  the	  understanding	  is	  the	  necessary	  condition	  of	  its	  logical	  use?	   A	  closer	  examination	  of	  the	  Prolegomena	  only	  puts	  a	  sharper	  point	  on	  this	  question.	  There	   are	   two	   “types”	   of	   judging,	   Kant	   tells	   us:	   in	   the	   first	   type	   (corresponding	   to	  judgments	   of	   perception)	   “I	   merely	   compare	   the	   perceptions	   and	   connect	   them	   in	   a	  consciousness	   of	   my	   state,”	   while	   in	   the	   second	   (corresponding	   to	   judgments	   of	  experience)	   “I	   connect	   them	   in	  a	   consciousness	   in	   general”	   (P	  4:300;	   cf.	   P	  4:304-­‐305).122	  Perhaps	   surprisingly,	   however,	   Kant	   has	   already	   expressed	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   comparison	   by	  saying	   that	   it	   establishes	  a	   connection	  which	   is	  merely	   “logical”	   (P	  4:298,	  quoted	  above).	  This	  may	  be	  surprising	  because	  logic	  is	  generally	  described	  by	  Kant	  as	  dealing	  essentially	  with	  rules	  (e.g.,	  CPR	  A52/B76;	  JL	  9:11-­‐13,	  33),	  and	  concepts,	  which	  always	  serve	  as	  rules	  in	  the	  context	  of	  cognition	  (CPR	  A105-­‐106),	  are	  based	  on	  functions,	  which	  in	  turn	  deal	  with	  “the	  action	  of	  ordering	  different	  representations	  under	  a	  common	  one”	  (CPR	  A68/B93).	  In	  brief,	   any	   connection	   that	   is	   “logical”—“merely”	   so	  or	  otherwise—would	   seem	   to	  be	   ipso	  
facto	   one	   of	   subordination,	   that	   is,	   subsumption,	   not	   mere	   “comparison.”	   Yet	   here	   Kant	  describes	   the	   comparison	   of	   perceptions	   as	   “logical,”	   even	   though	   they	  would	   appear	   to	  belong	   to	   one	   consciousness	   in	   virtue	   of	   laws	   of	   the	   imagination	   rather	   than	   of	   the	  understanding	  (see	  R	  3051,	  cited	  above).	  	   Yet	  while	  such	  references	  may	  indicate	  one	  sense	  of	  “logical,”	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  that	  Kant	   is	  also	  committed	  to	  a	  broader	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  one	  which	  encompasses	  both	  comparison,	   or	   reflection,	   and	   subordination,	   or	   determination,	   as	   complementary	  
                                                122	  On	  Longuenesse’s	  view,	  these	  types	  of	  judgment	  correspond	  to	  the	  reflecting	  and	  determining	  activities	  of	  judgment	  first	  explicitly	  distinguished	  in	  the	  third	  Critique.	  On	  this	  point,	  at	  least,	  I	  am	  basically	  in	  agreement	  with	  her.	  See	  Longuenesse	  (1998),	  165.	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activities	  of	  the	  understanding	  (ID	  2:393;	  see	  p.	  27	  above)	  in	  the	  formation	  and	  application	  of	   concepts.	   And	   this	   is	   on	   full	   display	   in	   Kant’s	   logic:	   “To	   make	   concepts	   out	   of	  representations	  one	  must	  thus	  be	  able	  to	   compare,	  to	   reflect,	  and	  to	  abstract,	   for	  these	  three	  logical	  operations	  of	  the	  understanding	  are	  the	  essential	  and	  universal	  conditions	  for	  the	   generation	   of	   every	   concept	   whatsoever”	   (JL	   9:94).	   Thus	   when	   Kant	   says	   that	   the	  connection	   in	   a	   judgment	   is	  merely	   “logical,”	   he	  means	   that	   it	   rests	   on	   the	   characteristic	  activities	   of	   concept	   formation,	   not	   those	   of	   concept	   application.	   But	   of	   course	   this	   only	  makes	   it	  all	   the	  more	  perplexing,	   for	   the	  time	  being,	  at	   least,	  why	  Kant	  would	  apparently	  concede	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  logical	  use	  of	  the	  understanding	  that	  precedes	  its	  real	  use.	  	   Now,	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  judgments	  of	  perception	  reveals	  that	  they	  fall	  into	  two	  classes:	  (1)	   judgments	  of	  perception	  that	  are	   inescapably	  subjective	  and	  hence	  can	  never	  become	  judgments	  of	  experience	  (e.g.,	  Wormwood	  is	  repugnant	   and	  Sugar	  is	  sweet;	  P	  4:299n)	  and	  (2)	  judgments	  of	  perception	  that	  would	  require	  only	  the	  application	  of	  a	  category	  to	  attain	  objective	  validity	  (e.g.,	  If	  the	  sun	  shines	  on	  the	  stone,	  it	  becomes	  warm;	  P	  4:301n).	  Although	  Kant	  does	  not	  say	  much	  in	  the	  Prolegomena	  about	  the	  difference	  between	  them,	  it	  will	  be	  helpful,	   I	   think,	   to	   consider	   it	   for	   a	  moment,	   since	   it	   illuminates	   some	  of	   the	  background	  that	  Kant	  is	  presupposing	  here.	  At	  the	  bottom	  of	  experience,	  Kant	  tells	  us,	  lies	  “the	  intuition	  of	  which	  I	  am	  conscious,	  i.e.,	  perception	  (perceptio)”	  (P	  4:300).	  Judgments	  of	  perception	  “express	  only	  a	  relation	  of	  two	   sensations	   to	   the	   same	   subject,	   namely	  myself,	   and	   this	   only	   in	  my	   present	   state	   of	  perception,	   and	  are	   therefore	  not	  expected	   to	  be	  valid	   for	   the	  object”	   (P	  4:299).	   In	  other	  words,	   there	   is	  a	  coordination	  of	   two	  sensations	  by	  way	  of	  reference	  to	  a	  third	  thing,	   the	  subject,	  in	  which	  they	  are	  connected.	  To	  invoke	  Kant’s	  first	  kind	  of	  example,	  Sugar	  is	  sweet	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indicates	  that	  two	  sensations—the	  taste	  of	  sweetness	  and,	  say,	  the	  visual	  representation	  of	  sugar—are	  connected	  according	  to	  my	  subjective	  perception.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  If	  the	  sun	  shines	  
on	  the	  stone,	  it	  becomes	  warm,	   sensations	  of	  sight	  and	   touch	  are	  coordinated	   in	  much	   the	  same	   way.	   As	   the	   difference	   in	   logical	   forms	   (across	   the	   two	   examples)	   shows,	   any	  subjective	  connection	  does,	  at	   least,	  have	  a	   logical	  form,123	  but,	  of	  course,	  this	  is	   just	  what	  we	  should	  expect,	  since	  comparison	  is	  a	  basic	  logical	  act	  of	  the	  understanding	  (JL	  9:94).124	  So	  far,	  we	  find	  confirmed—with	  regard	  to	  both	  classes	  of	  judgments	  of	  perception—what	  we	   had	   concluded	   before:	   such	   judgments	   rely	   on	   the	   (merely)	   logical	   use	   of	   the	  understanding.	  Now,	   as	  Kant	   clarifies	   elsewhere,	   sensations	   can	  be	   regarded	  as	   either	   internal	  or	  external	   representations:	   an	   internal	   representation	   directs	   our	   consciousness	   of	   the	  sensation	   to	   a	  motion	   in	   the	   sensory	  organ,	  while	   an	  external	   representation	  directs	  our	  consciousness	  to	  an	  object	  existing	  outside	  of	  us	  (A	  7:156).125	  Although	  these	  are	  two	  ways	  of	   directing	   our	   consciousness	   with	   respect	   to	   one	   sensation,	   not	   all	   sensations	   lend	  themselves	  equally	  to	  both	  modes	  of	  consciousness.	  In	  particular,	  sensations	  arising	  from	  our	  organs	  of	   touch,	  sight,	  and	  hearing	  contribute	  more	  to	  external	  representation,	  while	  those	   arising	   from	   taste	   and	   smell	   contribute	  more	   to	   internal	   representation	   (A	  7:154).	  
                                                123	  Here	   Longuenesse’s	   analysis	   of	   the	   passage	   is	   the	  most	   helpful.	   To	  my	  mind,	   at	   least,	   she	   convincingly	  demonstrates	  that	  in	  this	  sentence	  “wenn”	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  “if,”	  not	  “when”	  (Longuenesse	  [1998],	  178-­‐179).	  Sassen,	  who	  sharply	  separates	  empiricist	  laws	  of	  association	  from	  anything	  having	  logical	  form,	  defends	  the	   traditional	   translation	   (Sassen	   [2008],	   273n11).	  This	   is	   due,	   I	   think,	   to	  neglect	   of	   the	   relevant	   sense	  of	  “logical”	  in	  this	  passage.	  124	  Note	   that	   the	   example	   given	   in	   the	   Jäsche	  Logic	   of	   a	   judgment	   of	   perception	   is	   I,	  who	  perceive	  a	   tower,	  
perceive	  in	  it	  the	  red	  color,	  as	  contrasted	  with	  It	  is	  red	  (JL	  9:113).	  125	  In	   the	   Jäsche	   Logic	   Kant	   says,	   “All	   our	   cognition	   has	   a	   twofold	   relation,	   first	   a	   relation	   to	   the	   object,	  
second	   a	   relation	   to	   the	   subject.	   In	   the	   former	   respect	   it	   is	   related	   to	   representation,	   in	   the	   latter	   to	  
consciousness,	  the	  universal	  condition	  of	  all	  cognition	  in	  general.	  –	  (Consciousness	  is	  really	  a	  representation	  that	   another	   representation	   is	   in	  me.)”	   (JL	   9:33).	   I	   take	   it,	   however,	   that	   Kant	   is	   not	  maintaining	   that	   the	  relation	   to	   the	  subject	   is	   cognitive	  per	  se,	   just	   that	   it	  always	  accompanies	   the	  external	   representation	  of	  an	  object.	  So	  although	  cognition	  relates	  to	  the	  subject,	  that	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  a	  representation	  only	  relates	  to	  the	  subject	  is	  a	  feeling,	  not	  a	  cognition.	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The	   distinction	   is	   important,	   however,	   because	   representations	   contribute	   to	   cognition	  precisely	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  external,	  not	  internal.	  If	  they	  are	  internal,	  the	  representations	  are	  of	  “enjoyment”	  and	  are,	  presumably,	  referred	  not	  to	  the	  faculty	  of	  cognition	  but	  to	  that	  of	   the	   feeling	   of	   pleasure	   and	   displeasure	   (A	   7:154,	   157).126	  Thus	   we	   can	   see	   why	   Kant	  would	  hold	   that	   certain	   judgments	   of	   perception	   can	   simply	  never	  become	   judgments	   of	  experience:	   if	   one	   or	   both	   of	   the	   coordinated	   representations	   are	   “internal,”	   and	   if,	  furthermore,	   the	   sensations	   underlying	   the	   representations	   do	   not	   lend	   themselves	   (on	  account	  of	  their	  organs	  of	  origin)	  to	  external	  representation,	  then	  they	  are	  not,	  and	  cannot	  become,	   cognitions	   of	   an	   object	   at	   all.	   In	   Kant’s	   example,	   Sugar	   is	   sweet	   is	   inescapably	  subjective	   presumably	   because	   the	   sensation	   of	   sweetness	   originates	   in	   an	   organ	  which	  does	  not	  lend	  itself	  to	  externally	  representable	  sensations.	  Note	  that	  this	  accords	  well	  with	  the	  classification	  schema	  of	  the	  first	  Critique,	  where	  Kant	  distinguishes	  the	  two	  stems	  of	  perceptio	  as	  sensatio,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  cognitio,	  on	  the	   other	   (CPR	   A320/B376-­‐377).	   As	   is	   widely	   recognized,	   it	   is	   best	   not	   to	   take	   Kant’s	  terminology	  too	  strictly	  here;	  in	  particular,	  his	  use	  of	  “sensation”	  is	  notoriously	  shifty	  (see	  CPR	  A20/B34	  and	  CPJ	  5:189	  for	  passages	  which	  conflict	  with	  the	  A320/B376-­‐377	  schema).	  I	   take	   it,	   however,	   that,	   regardless	   of	   the	   vocabulary	   attached	   to	   it,	   the	   schema	   itself	  remains	  something	  to	  which	  Kant	  is	  committed.	  Accordingly,	  to	  say	  that	  a	  representation,	  like	  that	  of	  sweetness,	  remains	  internal,	  as	  the	  Anthropology	  puts	  it,	  is	  just	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  referred	   to	   the	   stem	   of	   perceptio	   (whatever	   we	   want	   to	   call	   it)	   that	   is	   opposite	   that	   of	  cognition.	  Moreover,	  this	  immediately	  suggests	  how	  other	  judgments	  of	  perception	  may,	  in	  
                                                126	  See	  CPJ	  5:203-­‐204:	  “Any	  relation	  of	  representations,	  however,	  even	  that	  of	  sensations,	  can	  be	  objective	  (in	  which	   case	   it	   signifies	   what	   is	   real	   in	   an	   empirical	   representation);	   but	   not	   the	   relation	   to	   the	   feeling	   of	  pleasure	  and	  displeasure,	  by	  means	  of	  which	  nothing	  at	  all	  in	  the	  object	  is	  designated,	  but	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  feels	  itself	  as	  it	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  representation.”	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the	   course	  of	   time,	   come	   to	  be	   accorded	  objective	   validity.	   Like	  Sugar	   is	  sweet,	   If	   the	  sun	  
shines	  on	   the	   stone,	   it	  becomes	  warm	   includes	   at	   least	   one	   representation	   that	   is	   internal	  (presumably,	   the	   feeling	   of	   warmth).	   Unlike	   the	   internal	   representation	   of	   sweetness,	  however,	  the	  internal	  representation	  of	  warmth	  originates	  in	  a	  tactile	  sensation	  that	  can	  be	  considered	   objectively,	   as	   well.	   In	   doing	   so	   we	   now	   find	   ourselves	   dealing	   with	   the	  
cognitive	   stem	  of	  perceptio	   (using	   the	  A320/B376-­‐377	   terminology).	   In	   such	   a	  manner	   a	  representation	  that	  is	  internal	  (e.g.,	  a	  feeling	  of	  roughness	  on	  the	  hand)	  can	  be	  transformed	  into	  an	  external	  one	  (e.g.,	  of	  the	  emery	  board	  that	  is	  being	  touched),	  and	  in	  this	  way	  what	  was	  originally	  a	  judgment	  of	  perception,	  to	  return	  to	  the	  terminology	  of	  the	  Prolegomena,	  is	  transformed	   into	   a	   judgment	   of	   experience.	   And	   now—here	   the	   terminology	   of	   the	  classification	  schema	  is	  helpful—it	  is	  cognitive	  in	  nature.	  If	  we	  turn	  our	  attention,	  now,	  to	  the	  third	  Critique,	  we	  will	  find	  the	  basic	  elements	  of	  this	  clarification	  confirmed:	  The	  perception	  of	  an	  object	  can	  be	   immediately	  combined	  with	  the	  concept	  of	   an	   object	   in	   general	   .	   .	   .	   for	   a	   judgment	   of	   cognition,	   and	   a	   judgment	   of	  experience	  can	  thereby	  be	  produced.	   .	   .	   .	  However,	  a	  perception	  can	  also	  be	  immediately	  combined	  with	  a	  feeling	  of	  pleasure	  (or	  displeasure)	  .	  .	  .	  and	  an	  aesthetic	   judgment,	  which	   is	   not	   a	   cognitive	   judgment,	   can	   thus	   arise.	   (CPJ	  5:287-­‐288)	  	  Kant	  goes	  on	  to	  make	  a	  statement	   that	   is	  relevant	   for	  us	  on	  account	  of	   the	  distinction	  he	  draws	  in	  it:	  Such	   a	   judgment,	   if	   it	   is	   not	   a	   mere	   judgment	   of	   sensation	   but	   a	   formal	  judgment	   of	   reflection	   [wenn	   es	   nicht	   bloßes	   Empfindungs-­‐,	   sondern	   ein	  
formales	  Reflexions-­‐Urteil	  ist],	  which	  requires	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  everyone	  as	  necessary,	   must	   be	   grounded	   in	   something	   as	   an	   a	   priori	   principle.	   (CPJ	  5:288)	  	  Now,	  if	  judgments	  of	  perception	  can,	  as	  this	  aside	  from	  the	  third	  Critique	  suggests,	  be	  called	  “judgments	  of	  sensation,”	  that	  refers	  us	  all	  the	  more	  decisively	  to	  Kant’s	  distinction	  in	  the	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first	  Critique	  between	   the	   two	  stems	  of	  perception—sensatio	   and	  cognitio—which	   in	   turn	  refers	   us	   to	   the	   distinction	   between	   internal	   and	   external	   representations	   of	   sensations.	  Thus	  we	  have	  a	  rough	  model,	  at	   least,	   for	  understanding	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  types	   of	   judgment	   of	   perception,	   a	   model	   which	   also	   suggests	   how	   the	   transition	   from	  judgments	  of	  perception	  to	  judgments	  of	  experience	  is	  accomplished.	  	   This	   is	   all	   the	  more	   reason,	  however,	   to	   see	  Kant’s	   insistence	  on	   the	  possibility	  of	  subjective	   judgments	   as	   more	   than	   a	   temporary	   lapse	   into	   which	   he	   falls	   in	   the	  
Prolegomena.	   Now,	   as	   I’ve	   indicated,	   Longuenesse’s	   view	   is	   that	   the	   account	   in	   the	  
Prolegomena	   actually	   complements	   and	   clarifies	   the	   account	   in	   the	   first	   Critique	   rather	  well.	   In	   particular,	   the	   Prolegomena	   clarifies	   the	   sense	   in	   which	   the	   reflection	   of	   the	  sensible	   manifold	   is	   guided	   by	   the	   logical	   forms	   of	   judgment.	   The	   first	   Critique	   already	  shows	  that	  this	  must	  be	  the	  case:	  because	  we	  have	  “no	  other	  use”	  for	  concepts	  than	  judging	  by	  means	  of	  them,	  their	  formation	  must	  be	  guided	  by	  the	  ways	  we	  judge.127	  And	  if	  this	  is	  so,	  then	  the	  forms	  of	   judgment	  govern	  the	  synthesis	  of	  the	  manifold	  of	   intuition	  prior	  to	  any	  “application”	   of	   the	   categories.	   As	   concepts,	   the	   categories	   themselves	   are	   products	   of	  reflection.	   They	   reflect,	   however,	   not	   (as	   is	   the	   case	   for	   empirical	   concepts)	   the	   given	  matter	   of	   sensible	   intuition,	   but	   rather	   its	   forms.128	  This	   means	   that	   while	   the	   initial	  synthesis	  of	   the	  sensible	  manifold	  will	  be	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	   forms	  of	  categories	  and	  judgments,	  it	  does	  not	  require	  the	  application	  of	  a	  (reflected)	  category.	  	   If	   Longuenesse	   is	   right,	   this	   opens	   up	   a	   space	   in	  which	   the	   first	  Critique	   and	   the	  
Prolegomena	  can	  coexist	  peacefully	  on	  the	  same	  terrain.	  Judgments	  of	  perception	  are	  those	  
                                                127	  See	  p.	  48	  above.	  128	  This	  is	  why	  it	  is	  so	  important,	  for	  Longuenesse,	  that	  space	  and	  time	  be	  reinterpreted	  in	  light	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  
synthesis	  speciosa	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Transcendental	  Deduction.	  See,	  in	  particular,	  the	  introduction	  to	  Pt.	  II	  and	  Ch.	  8	  of	  Longuenesse	  (1998).	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judgments	   in	   which	   categories	   are	   not	   applied.	   But	   this	   in	   no	   way	   implies	   that	   such	  judgments	  have	  no	   reference	   to	   the	   categories	   at	   all;	   on	   the	   contrary,	   the	   very	   synthesis	  that	   makes	   even	   judgments	   of	   perception	   possible	   is	   guided	   by	   the	   universal	   forms	   of	  judgments—and	   hence	   the	   universal	   forms	   of	   concepts.	   Concept	   application,	   in	   general,	  and	   therefore	   the	   application	   of	   the	   categories,	   in	   particular,	   is	   a	   subsequent	   step	   in	   the	  process	   of	   cognition.	   Concepts	  must	   first	   be	   formed	   (through	   reflection)	   before	   they	   are	  applied.	  When	  they	  are	  applied,	  however,	   judgments	  of	  experience	  result.	  The	  distinction	  between	   the	   two	   types	   of	   judgments	   depends	   not	   on	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   preconceptual	  awareness,	  but	  of	  a	  protoconceptual	  process	  of	  reflection	  that	  is	  guided	  from	  the	  very	  start	  by	   the	   logical	   forms	  of	   judgment.	   In	   Longuenesse’s	   terms,	   then,	   judgments	   of	   perception	  are	   judgments	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   mere	   Vermögen	   zu	   urteilen,	   while	   judgments	   of	  experience	  are	  judgments	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Urteilskraft.	  	   The	  merits	  of	  Longuenesse’s	   interpretation	  are	  numerous,	  even	   if	   it	  requires	  us	   to	  take	  on	  some	  interpretive	  baggage	  elsewhere.129	  As	  I	  have	  already	  indicated,130	  moreover,	  there	   is	   much	   in	   her	   general	   account	   with	   which	   I	   am	   in	   agreement.	   In	   particular,	   her	  insistence	   that	   the	   categories,	   like	   empirical	   concepts,	   are	   “made”	   with	   respect	   to	   their	  form	  (see	   JL	  9:93)	   is	   a	  helpful	   corrective	   to	   common	  assumptions	  about	   the	   relationship	  between	   Kant	   and	   innatism.	   Nevertheless,	   I	   do	   not	   think	   Longuenesse’s	   reading	   takes	  sufficiently	   into	   account	   the	   uniqueness	   of	   the	   task	   of	   a	   transcendental	   deduction	   of	   the	  categories	  as	  it	  is	  developed	  in	  the	  first	  Critique.	  When	  Kant	  rewrote	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  
Critique,	  he	  was	  careful	  to	  specify	  its	  peculiar	  task	  from	  the	  very	  start:	  
                                                129	  E.g.,	  CPR	  A69/B94	  and	  B160-­‐161n.	  130	  See	  p.	  52	  above.	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There	  is	  no	  doubt	  whatever	  that	  all	  our	  cognition	  begins	  with	  experience;	  for	  how	   else	   should	   the	   cognitive	   faculty	   be	   awakened	   into	   exercise	   if	   not	  through	   objects	   that	   stimulate	   our	   senses	   and	   in	   part	   themselves	   produce	  representations,	   in	  part	  bring	  the	  activity	  of	  our	  understanding	   into	  motion	  to	  compare	  these,	  to	  connect	  or	  separate	  them,	  and	  thus	  to	  work	  up	  the	  raw	  material	   of	   sensible	   impressions	   into	   a	   cognition	   of	   objects	   that	   is	   called	  experience?	  (CPR	  B1)	  	  Notice	  that	  Kant	  already	  refers	  to	  the	  basic	  acts	  of	   the	  understanding	  as	  comparative;	  his	  point	  is	  that,	  so	  long	  as	  we	  are	  talking	  about	  the	  fact,	  or	  genesis,	  of	  the	  pure	  concepts	  of	  the	  understanding,	   the	   empiricist	   thesis	   that	   all	   cognition	   arises	   with	   experience	   cannot	   be	  gainsaid.	   Thus	   in	   the	   second	   edition	   of	   the	   Critique	   Kant’s	   very	   first	   move	   is	   to	   lay	   the	  ground	   for	   what	   he	   later	   describes	   as	   the	   task	   of	   a	   “transcendental,”	   as	   opposed	   to	  empirical,	  deduction	  of	   the	  categories.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	   latter,	  Kant	  thanks	  the	  “famous	  Locke”	   for	   having	   opened	   the	   way	   to	   “a	   tracing	   of	   the	   first	   endeavors	   of	   our	   power	   of	  cognition	   to	   ascend	   from	   individual	   perceptions	   to	   general	   concepts,”	   a	   project	  which	   is	  “without	   doubt	   of	   great	   utility”	   (CPR	   A86/B118-­‐119).	   While	   this	   remark	   is	   sometimes	  taken	  as	  mere	  handwaving—so	  that	  Kant	  can	  basically	  accept	  the	  results	  of	  Locke’s	  Essay	  but	  bracket	  them	  as	  far	  as	  his	  own	  purposes	  are	  concerned—Kant	  really	  is	  committed	  to	  a	  broadly	  Lockean	  account	  of	  concept	  formation,	  based	  in	  acts	  of	  comparison,	  reflection,	  and	  abstraction.	  “The	  origin	  of	  concepts	  as	  to	  mere	  form	  rests	  on	  reflection	  and	  on	  abstraction	  from	  the	  difference	  among	  things	  that	  are	  signified	  by	  a	  certain	  representation”	  (JL	  9:93).	  Now,	  “general	  logic	  does	  not	  have	  to	  investigate	  the	  source	  of	  concepts,	  not	  how	  concepts	  
arise	  as	  representations,	  but	  merely	  how	  given	  representations	  become	  concepts	   in	  
thought”	  (JL	  9:94;	  trans.	  modified).	  Accordingly,	  Kant’s	  complaint	  against	  Locke	  in	  the	  first	  
Critique	  is	  not	  that	  a	  “physiological	  derivation”	  of	  pure	  concepts	  cannot	  be	  given,	  but	  rather	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that	  it	  does	  not	  amount	  to	  a	  proper	  deduction:	  it	  concerns	  the	  quid	  facti,	  not	  the	  quid	  juris	  (CPR	  A86-­‐87/B119).	  	   It	  is	  the	  quid	  juris,	  the	  task	  of	  a	  transcendental	  deduction,	  that	  is	  the	  proper	  goal	  of	  the	   first	  Critique,	   and	   so	   in	   cases	  where	   it	   appears	   inconsistent	  with	   his	   other	  works,	   it	  makes	  sense	  to	  begin	  by	  seeing	  if	  it	  is	  not	  the	  specificity	  of	  his	  task	  there	  which	  has	  led	  him	  down	  different	  paths.	  In	  fact,	  I	  think	  this	  is	  just	  what	  we	  find	  in	  the	  present	  case.	  Part	  of	  the	  reason,	  I	  suspect,	  why	  the	  Transcendental	  Deduction	  proved	  such	  a	  difficult	  task	  for	  Kant	  was	  that	  it	  required	  him	  to	  invert	  his	  long-­‐held	  view	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  judgment	  and	  experience.	   It	  had	  been	  (e.g.,	   in	   the	   Inaugural	  Dissertation)	  and	  would	  continue	  to	  be	  (e.g.,	   in	   the	  Prolegomena)	   his	   view	   that	   the	   reflective	   activity	   of	   the	   understanding	  must	  precede	  all	  objective	  judgments	  of	  experience.	  What	  he	  came	  to	  realize,	  however,	  was	  that	  this	  view	  did	  not	  prevent	  him	  from	  giving	  a	   transcendental	  account	  of	   the	   justification	  of	  pure	   concepts	   that	   moved	   in	   precisely	   the	   opposite	   direction.	   Although	   objective	  experience	   is	   genetically,	   or	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   fact,	   the	   subsequent	   step	   in	   our	   judging,	   an	  objective	  judgment	  is	  nevertheless	  the	  transcendental	  condition	  for	  even	  the	  logical	  use	  of	  our	  understanding.131	  
                                                131	  This	   distinction	   is	   also	   precisely	   what	   is	   necessary	   to	   solve	   an	   exactly	   analogous	   problem	   in	   the	  Amphiboly.	   There	   Kant	   distinguishes	   logical	   from	   transcendental	   reflection	   (see	   Ch.	   II,	   p.	   118).	   Kant	  acknowledges	  that	  logical	  reflection,	  which	  is	  in	  effect	  a	  mere	  comparison,	  is	  necessary	  “prior	  to	  all	  objective	  judgments”	  (CPR	  A262/B317).	  “Transcendental	  reflection,	  however,	  (which	  goes	  to	  the	  objects	  themselves)	  contains	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  objective	  comparison	  of	  the	  representations	  to	  each	  other”	  (CPR	  A263/B319).	  Again,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  appears	  that	  logical	  comparison	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  possible	  prior	  to	  
objective	   comparison.	   And	   yet	   “all	   judgments,	   indeed	   all	   comparisons”	   require	   a	   transcendental	   reflection	  (CPR	  A261/B317).	   And	  Kant	   has	   just	   insisted	   that	   “the	   first	   question	   prior	   to	   all	   further	   treatment	   of	   our	  representation	  is	  this:	  In	  which	  cognitive	  faculty	  do	  they	  belong	  together?”	  (CPR	  A260/B316).	  Now,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  when	  Kant	  says	  that	  “prior	  to	  all	  objective	  judgments	  we	  compare	  the	  concepts,”	  he	  does	  not	  mean	  to	  deny	  a	  different	  and	  specific	  kind	  of	  priority	   to	   transcendental	  reflection.	  And	   it	   is	   in	  precisely	   the	  same	  sense	   that	   a	   logical	   comparison	   of	   concepts	   precedes	   objective	   judgments.	   In	   each	   case	   it	   is	   essential	   to	  distinguish	   questions	   which	   have	   their	   proper	   homes	   in	   general	   logic	   from	   those	   which	   belong	   to	  transcendental	  logic.	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   This	   may	   well	   still	   sound	   paradoxical:	   how	   could	   an	   objective	   judgment,	   which	  according	  to	  the	  Prolegomena	  (and	  Kant’s	  general	  logic)	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  reflected	  and	  refined	   judgment	   of	   perception,	   be	   hazarded	   in	   advance	   of	   judgments	   of	   perception	  generally?	  After	  all,	   it	   is	  only	  through	  acts	  of	  reflection	  upon	  our	  perceptions	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  form	  concepts	  which	  will	  in	  turn	  be	  applicable	  to	  objects	  of	  intuition.	  As	  a	  general	  procedure,	  reflection	  leads	  to	  objective	  validity	  precisely	  because	  the	  manifold	  from	  which	  a	   concept	   is	   abstracted	   is	   necessarily	   connected	   to	   the	   manifold	   to	   which	   it	   is	   to	   be	  subsequently	  applied.132	  In	  short,	  the	  condition	  for	  the	  objective	  applicability	  of	  a	  concept	  appears	   to	   stand	   in	   a	   precisely	   determined	   relation	   to	   the	   activity	   of	   reflection	   that	   the	  understanding	  has	  undertaken	  on	  its	  behalf.	  If	   the	   power	   of	   judgment	   were	   reducible	   to	   rules,	   this	   difficulty	   would	   be	  insurmountable,	  for	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  applicability	  of	  a	  concept	  could	  extend	  no	  further	  than	  the	  reflection	  through	  which	  it	  was	  formed.	  But	  this,	  we	  have	  seen,	  is	  precisely	  what	  Kant	  denies	   at	   the	   very	   beginning	   of	   his	   discussion	   of	   the	   power	   of	   judgment.	   In	   fact,	   the	  predicament	   in	   which	   we	   now	   find	   ourselves—How	   is	   an	   objective	   judgment	   possible	   in	  
advance	  of	  reflected	  perception?—is	  one	  we	  have	   already	   confronted	   in	  our	  discussion	  of	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  Analytic	  of	  Principles,	  and	  it	  is	  solved	  in	  precisely	  the	  same	  manner.	  Earlier	   I	  noted	   that,	  while	  no	  particular	   judgment	  can	  be	  held	  come	  what	  may,	   there	   is	  a	  transcendental	  risk	   involved	   in	  any	   judgment	  whatsoever.	  The	  risk	  can—and	  must,	  given	  the	  norms	  of	  reason	  and	  understanding—be	  shifted	  around,	  so	  that	   there	   is	  no	   judgment	  which	  it	   is	  permissible	  to	  hold	  dogmatically	  and	  which	  bears	  the	  weight,	  as	   it	  were,	  of	  all	  
                                                132	  This	   point	   is	   closely	   connected	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   reflecting	   and	   determining	   power	   of	  judgment,	  a	  topic	  I	  will	  treat	  below	  (see	  p.	  117).	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objective	  science	  on	  its	  shoulders.	  Nevertheless,	  Kant’s	  point	  is	  that	  such	  risk	  can	  never	  be	  entirely	  excised	  from	  objective	  cognition	  altogether.	  My	   suggestion	   is	   that	   we	   should	   understand	   the	   transcendental	   role	   of	   objective	  judgments—what	   the	   Prolegomena	   calls	   “judgments	   of	   experience”—in	   the	   same	   way.	  There	  is	  no	  particular	  judgment	  of	  experience	  to	  which	  we	  could	  point	  as	  the	  judgment	  in	  which	   objective	   cognition	   rests.	   In	   fact,	   the	   norms	   of	   the	   understanding	   require	   us	   to	  consider	  every	   judgment	  of	  experience	  as	  a	  reflected	  and	  refined	   judgment	  of	  perception.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   however,	   the	  merely	   reflective	   logical	   connections	   that	   give	   unity	   to	  judgments	  of	  perception	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  the	  implicit	  reference	  back	  to	   determining	   acts	   of	   the	   power	   of	   judgment	   that	   they	   carry	   within	   themselves.	   The	  original	  acts	  of	  judgment	  to	  which	  all	  our	  rational	  discourse	  refers	  must,	  of	  course,	  remain	  indeterminate;	  that	  is	  the	  point	  of	  my	  remark	  above	  that	  judgment	  is	  not	  the	  end,	  but	  the	  starting	  point,	  of	  rational	  cognition.133	  This	   is	  precisely	  because	  any	  such	  act	  of	   judgment	  would	  have	  to	  involve	  the	  application	  of	  a	  concept	  which	  could	  not	  be	  justified	  by	  a	  prior	  
reflection	  of	  the	  sensible	  manifold.	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  Prolegomena,	  which	  borrows	  its	  basic	  concepts	  from	  general	  logic,	  objective	  judgments	  of	  experience	  can	  only	  be	  refined	  and	   reflected	   judgments	   of	   perception,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   transcendental	   account	   of	  experience	  (and	  even	  perception)	  requires	  a	  reference	  to	  an	  originally	  objective	  judgment	  as	  the	  ultimate	  source	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  all	  acts	  of	  the	  understanding.	  If	   my	   account	   here	   is	   on	   the	   right	   track,	   then	   the	   Prolegomena	   is	   far	   from	   being	  Kant’s	  definitive	  answer	   to	  empiricism	   in	  general,	  or	   to	  Hume	   in	  particular.	  Of	   course	  he	  never	   claimed	   that	   it	   was.	   Still,	   one	   may	   wonder	   why,	   given	   they	   way	   he	   uses	   Hume’s	  
                                                133	  See	  p.	  72	  above.	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Enquiry	   to	   frame	   the	  debate	   and	   even	  derides	   those	  whom	  he	   feels	   have	  not	   sufficiently	  appreciated	   the	  depth	  of	  Hume’s	   insight	   (P	  4:258),	  Kant	  would	  hold	  back,	   as	   it	  were,	  his	  own	  deepest	  attempt	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  Hume	  had	  posed.	  Although	   I	   am	   not	   convinced	   that	   his	   answer	   dissolves	   all	   worries	   that	   could	   be	  raised	  on	  this	  score,	  I	  do	  think	  that	  Allison’s	  strategy	  here	  is	  basically	  correct134	  (although	  I	  would	   emphasize	   the	   distinctiveness	   of	   the	   Critique’s	   methodology,	   not	   that	   of	   the	  
Prolegomena).	   At	   most,	   I	   think,	   the	   Prolegomena	   can	   convince	   the	   empiricist	   that	   the	  project	  of	  the	  first	  Critique	  is	  a	  necessary	  one.	  It	  does	  so,	  roughly,	  in	  the	  following	  manner.	  If	  we	  take	  for	  granted	  that	  natural	  science	  is	  actual,	  then	  there	  is	  objectively	  valid	  cognition	  of	  nature.	  But	  even	  on	  a	  general-­‐logical	  account	  of	  such	  cognition,	  the	  application	  of	  pure	  concepts	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  necessary.	  This	  immediately	  indicates,	  however,	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  transcendental-­‐logical	  account,	   for	   it	   raises	  precisely	   the	  question	   the	   first	  Critique	  poses	  for	   itself:	   that	  of	   a	  deduction	  of	   the	  pure	   concepts	  of	   the	  understanding.	  And	   they	  either	  admit	  of	  a	  transcendental	  deduction,	  or	  they	  do	  not.	  At	  first	  glance,	  such	  a	  dilemma	  may	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  much	  bite.	  But	  here	  we	  must	  keep	   in	  mind	   the	   context	   in	   which	   the	   Prolegomena	   was	   written,	   and,	   in	   particular,	   the	  composition	  of	  Kant’s	  intended	  audience.	  The	  early	  response	  to	  the	  first	  Critique,	  insofar	  as	  there	  was	  one,	  came	  from	  the	  camp	  of	  moderate	  Lockeans,	  including,	  most	  notoriously,	  the	  Garve-­‐Feder	   review	   of	   1782	   to	   which	   Kant	   responded	   in	   the	   appendix	   to	   the	  
Prolegomena.135	  Far	   from	   pushing	   empiricist	   principles	   to	   their	   skeptical	   conclusions,	   as	  Hume	  had	  done,	   the	  Lockeans	  of	  Kant’s	  day	  were	  pragmatic	  Popularphilosophen.	  Despite	  appearances,	   then,	   the	   proximate	   goal	   of	   the	  Prolegomena	   is	   not	   to	   plumb	   the	   depths	   of	  
                                                134	  See	  p.	  78	  above.	  135	  See	  Beiser	  (1987),	  165-­‐192,	  esp.	  172-­‐177.	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Hume’s	   insight	   in	   the	  Enquiry,	   but	   to	   apply	   pressure	   to	   the	  moderate	   position	   of	   Locke.	  What	  better	  way	  to	  do	  this	  than	  to	  impress	  on	  his	  readers	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  transcendental	  deduction?	  The	  pragmatic	  Lockean	  need	  not	  concern	  himself	  with	  how	  such	  a	  deduction	  is	  to	  be	  achieved;	   it	  will	  be	  enough	  to	  show	  him	  that	   if	  such	  a	  deduction	  is	  not	  possible,	  his	  empiricism	  will	   have	   to	   take	   an	   unsavory	   turn:	   he	  will	   now	   be	   forced	   to	   appreciate	   the	  depth	  of	  Hume’s	  worry	  and	  be	  faced	  with	  the	  specter	  of	  skepticism.	  Thus	   when	   Kant	   says	   in	   the	   Prolegomena	   that	   it	   is	   “now	   the	   place	   to	   dispose	  thoroughly	  of	  the	  Humean	  doubt”	  (P	  4:310),	  we	  must	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  this	  is	  intended	  to	  come	  as	  a	  relief	  to	  the	  Lockean	  moderates	  who	  have	  no	  stomach,	  in	  any	  event,	  for	  Hume’s	  own	   stubbornness.	   And	   let	   us	   not	   forget	   that	   foremost	   among	   those	   who	   had	   failed	   to	  appreciate	   the	   depth	   of	  Hume’s	   insight	  was	   none	   other	   than	  Hume	   himself.	   Even	  Hume,	  Kant	  (mistakenly)	  thinks,	  would	  have	  encountered	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  transcendental	  logic	  if	  only	  he	  had	   realized	   the	   implications	   for	  mathematics	  of	   the	  problem	  of	   causality	   across	  which	   he	   had	   stumbled	   (P	   4:273).	   All	   the	   more,	   then,	   will	   it	   be	   sufficient	   if,	   in	   the	  
Prolegomena,	  he	  can	  simply	  compel	  the	  moderate	  Lockean	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  critical	  project.	  
Conclusion	  If	   we	   return,	   at	   long	   last,	   to	   the	   first	   Critique,	   we	   can	   see	   immediately	   the	   reason	   why	  judgments	  of	  perception,	  despite	  Kant’s	  commitments	  both	  prior	  to	  and	  after	  the	  Critique,	  can	  have	  no	  role	  to	  play	  with	  respect	  to	  its	  chief	  aims.	  For	  judgments	  of	  perception,	  based,	  as	   they	   are,	   on	   merely	   subjective	   connections	   of	   representations,	   are	   really	   the	   mirror	  images	   of	   the	   rationalists’	   clear	   and	   distinct	   perceptions.	   In	   the	   same	   way	   that	   the	  rationalists	  had	  attempted	  to	  purge	  the	  transcendental	  risk	  involved	  in	  judgment	  from	  the	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top	  down,	  so	  the	  empiricists	  had	  tried	  to	  purge	  this	  risk	  from	  the	  bottom	  up.	  Judgments	  of	  perception,	  just	  like	  judgments	  that	  follow	  the	  deliverances	  of	  clear	  and	  distinct	  perception,	  do	  not	  allow	  for	  even	  the	  possibility	  of	  judging	  wrongly.	  Helvétius,	  once	  again:	  to	  judge	  is	  to	  report	   exactly	   what	   I	   feel.136	  There	   is,	   accordingly,	   a	   substantial	   philosophical	   insight	  undergirding	   the	   rhetorical	   parallelism	   of	   Kant’s	   famous	   remark	   that	   Leibniz	  intellectualized	   appearances	   just	   as	   Locke	   sensitivized	   concepts	   (CPR	   A271/B327).	   Both	  the	  empiricist	  and	  rationalist	  attempts	  to	  explain	  the	  possibility	  of	  scientific	  cognition	  lack	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  transcendental	  condition	  in	  virtue	  of	  which	  objective	  science	  is	  possible	  at	   all.	   	  We	   can	   certainly	   try	   to	   imagine	   the	   entirety	   of	   our	   cognitive	   activity	   in	   affective	  terms,	   but	   such	   an	   aggregate	   of	   perceptions	   would	   be	   connected	   “merely	   logically”	   in	  something	   like	   the	   same	   sense	   as	   Leibniz’s	   conceptual	   system:	   in	   each	   case	   there	   is	   an	  internal	   coherence	   to	   the	   system	  of	   cognition,	   but	   no	   objective	   reference.	   Such	   a	   system	  may	  well	   be	   coherent	   on	   its	   own	   terms,	   but	   it	   remains	   free-­‐floating	   so	   long	   as	   it	   is	   not	  moored	  in	  an	  act	  of	  judging	  by	  which	  an	  objective	  relation	  is	  established.	  Kant’s	  key	  insight,	  which	  he	  took	  to	  reflect	  the	  ripened	  judgment	  of	  his	  age,	  was	  that	  reason	  can	  gain	  a	  legitimate	  authority	  only	  where,	  and	  precisely	  to	  the	  extent	  that,	  one	  has	  been	  willing	   to	   judge.	   It	   provided	  him,	   at	   any	   rate,	  with	   a	  neat	  diagnosis	   of	   the	  dilemma	  handed	   down	   to	   him	   by	   the	   early	   modern	   rationalists	   and	   empiricists.	   The	   rationalist	  ambition	   was	   to	   render	   the	   understanding	   itself	   intuitive.	   If	   it	   could	   be	   made	   so,	   then	  judging	   would	   itself	   become	   a	   basically	   intuitive	   conceptual	   exercise:	   instead	   of	   judging	  that	  the	  matter	  is	  thus-­‐and-­‐so,	  it	  would	  ultimately	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  just	  seeing	  that	  it	  is	  thus-­‐and-­‐so.	  Since	  Descartes’s	  Meditations	  (and	  probably	  since	  his	  Rules),	  it	  had	  been	  the	  goal	  of	  
                                                136	  See	  above,	  p.	  75.	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  In	  the	  years	  between	  the	  two	  editions	  of	  the	  first	  Critique,	  two	  decisive	  events	  changed	  the	  course	   of	   philosophy	   in	   Germany.	   One	   exploded	   onto	   the	   public	   scene	   like	   a	   bombshell,	  while	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   other	  would	   only	   gradually	   become	   apparent	   over	   the	   next	  several	  decades.	  It	  was	  the	  brilliance	  of	  Herder	  to	  recognize,	  or	  perhaps	  just	  to	  concoct,	  a	  convincing	  link	  between	  them.	  Frederick	   Beiser	   identifies	   1785	   as	   the	   year	   the	   hegemony	   of	   the	   Enlightenment	  effectively	  ended	  in	  Germany.	  Goethe	  referred	  to	  the	  publication	  of	  Jacobi’s	  Briefe	  über	  die	  
Lehre	  von	  Spinoza	  as	  an	  “explosion.”	  Hegel	  called	  it	  a	  “thunderbolt	  out	  of	  the	  blue.”137	  With	  one	   blow,	  Hegel	  would	   explain	   to	   his	   students	  many	   years	   later,	   Jacobi	   had	   exposed	   the	  pretensions	   of	   the	   professional	   philosophical	   elite:	   those	   “self-­‐satisfied,	   self-­‐possessed,	  superior	   people” 138 	  who	   would	   reveal	   themselves	   in	   the	   ensuing	   controversy	   as	  fundamentally	   unserious	   thinkers.139	  Mendelssohn’s	   appeal	   in	  Morning	   Hours	   to	   healthy	  common	  sense	  came	  to	  typify	  the	  unprincipled	  moderation	  upon	  which	  the	  Enlightenment	  philosophy—if	  it	  was	  any	  longer	  to	  be	  considered	  philosophy	  at	  all—ultimately	  rested.	  One	  could	  even	  say,	  without	  too	  much	  extravagance,	  that	  Jacobi	  (who,	  after	  all,	  fancied	  himself	  a	  Humean)	  had	  awoken	  the	  German	  academy	  from	  its	  dogmatic	  slumber.	  
                                                137	  Beiser	  (1987),	  45-­‐46.	  138	  Hegel	  names	  Mendelssohn	  and	  Nicolai.	  139	  See	  Hegel	  (1840),	  411-­‐412.	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The	  year	  prior,	  Herder	  had	  published	  the	  first	  part	  of	  his	  monumental	  Ideas	  for	  the	  
Philosophy	   of	   History	   of	   Humanity.	   It	   was	   a	   book	   that	   would	   push	   the	   boundaries	   of	  philosophy	  towards	  and	  perhaps	  even	  into	  the	  territory	  traditionally	  occupied	  by	  natural	  science	   and	   history.	   Importantly,	   it	   would	   do	   so	   not	   just	   in	   theory,	   but	   in	   practice,	   and	  already	   by	   the	   middle	   of	   the	   decade	   Herder’s	   work	   was	   attracting	   attention	   from	   a	  surprisingly	   broad	   circle	   of	   intellectuals.	   The	   integration	   of	   reason	   and	   nature,	   Herder	  argued,	   can	   be	   achieved	   scientifically	   if	   we	   are	  willing	   to	   posit	   basic,	   organic	   powers	   in	  nature	   to	  be	  understood	  by	  analogy	   to	  our	  own	  powers	  as	   rational	  agents.140	  In	   this	  way	  Herder	  was	  generating	  a	  template	  for	  reintroducing	  teleological	  explanation	  as	  a	  basic	  and	  characteristic	   procedure	   of	   natural	   science,	   a	   position	   from	  which,	   despite	   the	   efforts	   of	  Leibniz,	  teleology	  had	  been	  more	  or	  less	  banished	  for	  well	  over	  a	  century.	  Unlike	  Leibniz,	  however,	   Herder	   succeeded	   in	   making	   his	   view	   plausible	   and	   intelligible	   to	   natural	  scientists	  by	  showing	  in	  a	  series	  of	  natural	  and	  historical	  examples	  just	  how	  this	  might	  be	  done.	   By	   1786	   Herder	   had	   enlisted	   one	   high-­‐profile	   ally	   from	   anthropology,	   Georg	  Forster,141	  and	   was	   about	   to	   publish	   a	   work	   in	   which	   he	   would	   claim	   another,	   albeit	  unlikely,	  ally	  from	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy:	  Spinoza.	  In	  a	  heroic,	   if	  not	  especially	   faithful,	   feat	  of	   interpretation,	  Herder	  tried	  to	  show	  in	  1787—with	   the	   publication	   of	   his	   dialogue	   God:	   Some	   Conversations—that	   Spinoza’s	  system	  constituted	  a	  “knot”	  from	  which	  it	  was	  nevertheless	  possible	  to	  “spin	  gold”	  if	  it	  were	  completed	   by	   an	   appeal	   to	   active	   forces	   as	   the	   ground	   of	   the	   unity	   of	   thought	   and	  
                                                140	  On	  the	  fundamental	  role	  of	  analogy	  in	  Herder’s	  view,	  see	  Herder	  (1787),	  154	  and	  Beiser	  (1987),	  145-­‐149.	  141	  Forster’s	   1786	   article	   directed	   against	   Kant’s	   theory	   of	   race	   was	   the	   occasion	   for	   Kant’s	  On	   the	  Use	   of	  
Teleological	  Principles	   in	  Philosophy.	   For	   an	   account	   of	   their	   exchange	   and	   the	   implicit	   role	   Herder’s	  work	  played	  in	  it,	  see	  Beiser	  (1987),	  154-­‐158.	  For	  an	  account	  of	  Forster’s	  anthropological	  work,	  see	  Beiser	  (1992),	  156-­‐162.	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extension. 142 	  On	   Herder’s	   reading,	   Spinoza’s	   rejection	   of	   teleological	   explanation,	  apparently	  so	  central	  to	  his	  project,	  in	  fact	  merely	  belies	  a	  residual	  Cartesian	  prejudice	  that	  has	   no	   place	   in	   a	   completed	   Spinozistic	   system.143	  This	   bias	   removed,	   Spinoza’s	   system	  reveals	  itself	  in	  its	  innermost	  tendency:	  it	  points	  not,	  as	  one	  would	  expect,	  to	  mechanistic	  and	   fatalistic	   atheism,	   but	   instead	   to	   Herder’s	   own	   dynamic	   vitalism,	   a	   new	   kind	   of	  philosophy	  of	  nature.	  Unsurprisingly,	   the	   bizarreness	   of	   Herder’s	   claim	   was	   no	   impediment	   to	   the	  reception	   and	   influence	   of	   his	   dialogue.	   In	   the	   long	   term,	   it	   forged	   a	   bond	   between	  Spinozism	  and	  teleological	  naturalism	  that	  would	  prove	  decisive	  for	  Schelling;	  in	  the	  short	  term,	  it	  posed	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	  Reinhold’s	  Letters	  on	  the	  Kantian	  Philosophy,	  the	  serial	  publication	  of	  which	  had	  begun	  in	  the	  German	  Mercury	  just	  the	  August	  before.	  Kant,	  all	  too	  aware	  that	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  Critique	  hung	  in	  the	  balance,	  and	  hastily	  at	  work	  revising	  it	  for	  the	  scheduled	  printing	  of	  its	  second	  edition,	  could	  hardly	  fail	  to	  take	  notice	  of	  this.	  From	  Kant’s	  point	  of	  view,	  at	  least,	  the	  conclusions	  of	  Herder	  and	  Reinhold	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  pantheism	   controversy	   were	   diametrically	   opposed;	   for	   Reinhold,	   it	   demonstrated	   the	  indispensability	  of	   the	   first	  Critique,	  while	   for	  Herder	   it	  only	  confirmed	   its	  contemporary	  irrelevance.	  Thus	  whether	  or	  not	  its	  maliciousness	  was	  driven,	  as	  Caroline	  Herder	  claimed,144	  by	  Kant’s	  holding	  Herder	  personally	  responsible	  for	  the	  poor	  reception	  of	  the	  first	  Critique	  at	  Weimar,	  Kant’s	  patronizing	  1785	  review	  of	  the	  first	  part	  of	  Herder’s	  Ideas	  at	  least	  proved	  to	  be	  clear-­‐sighted	  about	  the	  high	  stakes	  of	  the	  contest	  he	  was	  about	  to	  enter.	  In	  Kant’s	  view,	  
                                                142	  Herder	  (1787),	  103-­‐105,	  123;	  also	  141.	  143	  Herder	  goes	  as	  far	  as	  to	  claim	  that	  with	  a	  conception	  of	  active	  force,	  Spinoza’s	  system	  “would	  have	  been	  much	  more	  clear	  and	  unified”	  (Herder	  [1787],	  108).	  144	  See	  Beiser	  (1987),	  349-­‐350n68.	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Herder’s	  unrestrained	  use	  of	  teleology	  was	  not	  only	  scientifically	  disastrous;	  it	  threatened	  to	   undermine	   Kant’s	   own	   hard	   work	   in	   isolating	   the	   principles	   of	   morality	   from	   the	  principles	   of	   the	   natural	   sciences.145	  In	   any	   event,	   Kant	   concludes,	   Herder’s	   attempt	   to	  reintroduce	   teleology	   into	   natural	   science	   is	   unsuccessful;	   having	   failed	   to	   absorb	   the	  lessons	  of	  the	  first	  Critique,	  Herder’s	  project	  ultimately	  amounts	  to	  nothing	  more	  than	  the	  starry-­‐eyed	   “endeavor	   to	  want	   to	   explain	  what	   one	   does	   not	   comprehend	   from	  what	  
one	  comprehends	  even	  less”	  (RH	  8:53).	  In	  other	  words,	  despite	  its	  being	  dressed	  up	  in	  a	  more	   delicate	   and	   accessible	   literary	   garb,	   Herder’s	   reintroduction	   of	   teleology	   was	   at	  bottom	   just	  another	  appeal	   to	   the	  occult	  qualities	   that	  had	  rightfully	  been	  excluded	   from	  natural	  philosophy	  since	   the	  seventeenth	  century.	  When	  Herder	  distances	  his	  work	   from	  anything	   “metaphysical,”	   Kant	   is	   quick	   to	   pounce.	   Herder’s	   attitude	   is	   not	   serious,	   but	  merely	  a	  symptom	  of	  the	  fads	  of	  the	  times,	  for	  the	  vital	  forces	  required	  by	  his	  philosophy	  are	   the	  very	   type	  of	   the	  excesses	  of	  dogmatic	  metaphysics	  diagnosed	   in	   the	  Critique	   (RH	  8:54).	   Did	   Kant	   have	   an	   alternative	   account	   of	   the	   proper	   role	   of	   teleology	   to	   offer	   his	  readers?	   It	  must	  have	  seemed	   to	  him	   that	  he	  did.	  Though	   the	  book	  had	  so	   far	  been	   little	  read,	  he	  had	  discussed	  the	  issue	  at	  some	  length	  in	  the	  first	  Critique.	  The	   speculative	   interest	   of	   reason	   makes	   it	   necessary	   to	   regard	   every	  ordinance	   in	   the	  world	  as	   if	   it	  had	  sprouted	   from	  the	   intention	  of	  a	  highest	  reason.	   .	   .	   .	   As	   long	   as	   we	   keep	   to	   this	   presupposition	   as	   a	   regulative	  principle,	   then	   even	   error	   cannot	   do	   us	   any	   harm.	   (CPR	   A686-­‐687/B714-­‐715)	  	  
                                                145	  One	  could	  hardly	  imagine	  a	  more	  anti-­‐Kantian	  image	  of	  the	  value	  of	  human	  life	  than	  that	  which	  we	  find	  in	  Herder’s	   dialogue:	   “To	   pursue	   nature,	   first	   to	   conjecture	   her	   lofty	   laws,	   then	   to	   observe,	   test	   and	   confirm	  them,	  then	  to	  find	  them	  verified	  a	  thousandfold	  and	  to	  apply	  them	  anew,	  finally,	  to	  perceive	  everywhere	  the	  same	  wisest	  law,	  the	  same	  divine	  necessity,	  to	  come	  to	  love	  it	  and	  make	  it	  one’s	  own—all	  this	  gives	  human	  life	  its	  value”	  (Herder	  [1787],	  182-­‐183).	  
 100	  
Despite	  his	  naturalistic	  ambitions,	  Herder’s	  mistake	  was	  simply	  a	  species	  of	  the	  mistake	  of	  modern	  rationalism	  more	  generally:	  the	  conflation	  of	  regulative	  principles	  of	  reason	  with	  constitutive	  principles	  of	   the	  understanding.	  This	   illusion	   is	  natural	  enough,	  of	  course,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  Kant	  had	  devoted	  the	  entire	  Transcendental	  Dialectic	  of	  the	  first	  Critique	   to	  dissipating	  it.	  Herder,	  perhaps,	  is	  hardly	  to	  be	  blamed,	  but	  all	  the	  same	  the	  Ideas	  succumbs	  to	   a	   confusion	   which	   can	   now	   be	   definitively	   resolved.	   If	   the	   readers	   of	   Kant’s	   review	  harbored	  any	  residual	  sympathy	  for	  Herder’s	  extravagances,	  they	  could	  simply	  be	  referred	  back	  (or,	  more	  than	  likely,	  anew)	  to	  the	  Dialectic	  of	  the	  first	  Critique.	  If	   Kant	   ever	   thought	   this,	   and	   I	   suspect	   he	   did,	   then	   he	   was	   wrong.	   Herder’s	  fundamental	  mistake,	  granting	  Kant	  that	  he	  makes	  one,	  is	  not	  the	  inflation	  of	  reason	  in	  the	  theoretical	  sphere,	  but	  rather	  his	  attempt	  to	  subsume	  theory	  in	  general	  under	  a	  still	  more	  universal	   form	   of	   understanding.	   On	   this	   point	   Cassirer	   gets	   things	   exactly	   right:	   “What	  Herder	   sought	  was	   not	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   natural	   object,	   but	   the	   unity	   of	   all	   humanity.”146	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  for	  Herder,	  the	  unity	  to	  which	  teleology	  finally	  makes	  reference	  is	  located	  not	  in	   a	   theoretical	   object	   of	   some	   sort,	   whether	   rational	   or	   empirical,	   but	   in	   the	   historical	  perspective,	   ultimately	   the	   perspective	   of	   human	   history,	   from	   which	   both	   reason	   and	  experience	  become	  intelligible	  in	  their	  connection.	  With	  his	  liberal	  use	  of	  analogy,	  Herder	  sought	   to	   provide	   historical	   explanations	   in	   which	   theory	   and	   practice,	   mechanism	   and	  morality,	  no	  longer	  stand	  on	  opposite	  sides	  of	  a	  metaphysical	  ledger,	  but	  mutually	  reinforce	  one	  another	   in	  a	  unified	  historico-­‐scientific	  endeavor.	  Herder’s	  criterion	   for	  success	  does	  not,	   therefore,	   issue	   from	   the	   prerogatives	   of	   an	   independent,	   pre-­‐given	   unity	   of	   reason	  that	  would	  legislate	  the	  form	  of	  the	  historical	  object	  in	  advance	  of	  empirical	  investigation;	  
                                                146	  Cassirer	  (1929),	  34.	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instead,	  Herder	  stakes	  his	  claim	  on	  what	  is	  proper	  to	  a	  historical	  perspective:	  how	  we	  must	  look	  at	  the	  world	  if	  we	  are	  to	  understand	  our	  practical	  responsibilities	  in	  our	  own	  historical	  situation.	  An	  understanding	  of	  mankind’s	  historical	  destiny—which	   is	   really	  what	  Herder	   is	  after	  here—is	  not	  given	  by	  an	  idea	  of	  reason,	  nor	  is	  it	  simply	  discovered	  in	  the	  mountains	  of	   data	   the	   empirical	   sciences	   are	   amassing.	   Instead,	   it	   becomes	   visible,	   if	   at	   first	   only	  faintly,	   in	   the	   interstices	   between	   the	   empirical	   study	   of	   nature	   and	   the	   principles	   of	  rationality	   that	  we	   seek	   to	   find	   exemplified	   there.	  To	  discern	   it	   is	   the	  proper	   task	  of	   the	  narrator	  of	  history,	  who	  turns	  even	  the	  apparently	  irrational	  chronicles	  of	  the	  past	  to	  their	  proper	  edifying	  use.	  The	  noblest	  vocation	  of	  history	  is	  just	  this:	  It	  unfolds	  to	  us	  as	  it	  were	  the	  counsels	  of	  fate,	  and	  teaches	  us,	  insignificant	  as	  we	  are,	  to	  act	  according	  to	  God’s	  eternal	   laws.	  By	  teaching	  us	  the	  faults	  and	  consequences	   of	   every	   species	   of	   irrationality,	   it	   assigns	   us	   our	   short	   and	  tranquil	  scene	  on	  that	  great	  theater,	  where	  reason	  and	  goodness,	  contending	  indeed	  with	  wild	  powers,	  still,	  from	  their	  nature,	  create	  order,	  and	  hold	  on	  in	  the	  path	  of	  victory.147	  	  For	   Herder,	   historical	   reason	   does	   not	   reveal	   itself	   to	   us	   from	   the	   top	   down,	   nor	   is	   it	  directly	  discoverable	  in	  the	  chronicles	  of	  the	  past.	  As	  Kant	  came	  to	  realize,	  the	  empirically	  minded	   thinkers	   (like	   Forster)	  who	  were	   sympathetic	   to	  Herder	  were	  moved	  not	   by	   the	  illusion	   of	   an	   exhaustively	   rational	   explanation	   of	   the	   world,	   but	   by	   the	   prospect	   of	  reintegrating,	   from	  both	  sides	  at	  once,	   the	  reason	  and	  nature	   that	  Kant	  had	  so	  ruthlessly	  separated.	   To	   combat	   this	   would	   require	   something	  more	   than	   the	   Dialectic	   of	   the	   first	  
Critique	  had	  been	  able	  to	  provide.	  For	  the	  ground	  of	  this	  novel	  use	  of	  teleology	  was	  not	  one	  that	  Kant	  had	  imagined,	  much	  less	  discussed,	  there	  at	  all.	  
                                                147	  Herder	  (1784-­‐1791),	  467.	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The	   structure	   of	   the	   third	   Critique	   reflects	   Kant’s	   deepened	   appreciation	   of	   the	  question	   of	   teleological	   explanation.	   In	   particular,	   he	   is	   careful	   to	   pick	   the	   ground	   of	   his	  fight	  with	  Herder	  with	  great	  precision.	  The	  question,	  as	  Kant	  now	  sees	  it,	  is	  not	  ultimately	  about	   the	   permissibility	   of	   using	   analogical	   reasoning	   (based	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   our	   own	  will)	   in	   the	   investigation	  of	   nature,	  which	  Kant	  will	   grant	   (UTP	  8:181-­‐182),	   nor	   is	   it	   any	  longer	   the	   question	   of	  whether	  Herder’s	   analogies	   happen	   to	   be	   too	   extravagant	   (cf.	   RH	  8:53).	   Instead,	   the	   question	   is	   whether	   there	   is	   a	   perspective	   (in	   Herder’s	   case,	   that	   of	  human	   history)	   in	   which	   teleological	   judgments	   can	   be	   embedded	   so	   that	   they	   would	  constitute	   a	   scientific	   bridge	   from	   the	   principles	   of	   natural	   science	   to	   the	   principles	   of	  morality.	  Kant’s	  answer,	  of	  course,	  will	  be	  no,	  but	  in	  the	  course	  of	  explaining	  his	  dissent	  he	  will	  take	  care	  to	  show	  just	  how	  close	  Herder	  comes	  to	  getting	  things	  right.	  Kant	  will	  even	  grant	  that	  Herder	  is	  locating	  teleology	  at	  the	  right	  place:	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  rational	  and	  natural	  beings.	  But	  the	  utility	  of	  these	  principles	  is	  not	  what	  Herder	  thinks	  it	  is.	  Teleological	  judgments	  cannot	  form	  a	  proper	  part	  of	  natural	  science,	  they	  cannot	  delimit	  the	  conditions	  of,	  or	  explain,	  the	  possibility	  of	  causes	  that	  work	  through	  freedom,	  and	  they	  are	   not	   a	   more	   basic	   class	   of	   concepts	   of	   which	   natural	   and	   moral	   concepts	   might	   be	  expressions.	   Kant	   now	   realizes,	   however,	   that	   there	   is	   quite	   another	   story	   that	   explains	  why	  it	  appears	  as	  though	  teleology	  in	  organic	  nature	  were	  the	  key	  to	  bringing	  practical	  and	  theoretical	   philosophy	   together	   again.	   Herder’s	   teleology	   is	   a	  misuse	   not	   of	   a	   (properly)	  regulative	   principle	   of	   reason,	   but	   of	   a	   (properly)	   subjective	   principle	   of	   the	   power	   of	  judgment.	  What	  is	  more,	  the	  proper	  use	  of	  the	  latter	  does	  effect	  a	  transition	  from	  concepts	  of	  nature	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  freedom	  under	  the	  moral	  law.	  Herder’s	  (and	  Forster’s)	  desire	  to	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transcend	   Kantian	   dualism	   is	   not,	   then,	   just	   a	   simple	   error,	   but	   rather	   a	   genuinely	  philosophical	  impulse—pursued	  in	  what	  is	  almost	  the	  right	  direction.	  
On	  the	  Very	  Idea	  of	  a	  Third	  Critique	  As	   the	   titles	   of	   Kant’s	   Prolegomena	   to	   Any	   Future	   Metaphysics	   and	   Groundwork	   for	   the	  
Metaphysics	   of	   Morals	   suggest,	   Kant	   was	   centrally	   concerned	   with	   establishing	   the	  possibility	   of	   metaphysics. 148 	  Critique	   is	   the	   “propaedeutic”	   which	   inquires	   into	   the	  conditions	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  use	  of	  our	  cognitive	  faculty,	  making	  possible	  thereby	  the	  “philosophical	  cognition	  from	  pure	  reason	  in	  systematic	  interconnection,”	  i.e.,	  metaphysics	  (CPR	   A841/B869).149 	  Thus	   a	   critique	   is	   always	   a	   critique	   of	   a	   cognitive	   faculty	   that	  purports	   to	   operate	   according	   to	   a	   priori	   principles,	   asking	   after	   the	   validity	   of	   these	  principles	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  objects	  that	  the	  faculty	  seeks	  to	  cognize	  by	  means	  of	  them,	  and	  finally,	  through	  this	  inquiry,	  laying	  the	  ground	  for	  the	  doctrinal	  study	  of	  such	  objects	  under	  these	  principles	  (see	  CPJ	  5:168,	  179).	  Now,	  the	  first	  two	  installments	  in	  the	  critical	   system	  demonstrated	   the	  validity	  of	  a	  priori	  principles	   for	   the	  understanding	  and	  for	  reason.	  The	  understanding	  was	  assigned	  its	  legislative	  task	  with	  respect	  to	  concepts	  of	  nature,	  while	  reason	  was	  assigned	  to	  legislate	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  freedom,	  and	  in	  this	   Kant	   takes	   himself	   to	   have	   rigorously	   grounded	   (for	   the	   first	   time)	   the	   traditional	  division	  of	  philosophy	  into	  physics	  and	  ethics	  (G	  4:387),	  or,	  as	  he	  will	  more	  often	  refer	  to	  them,	   theoretical	   and	   practical	   philosophy.	   This	   division	   of	   philosophy	   necessitates	   a	  division	  between	  metaphysical	  doctrines,150	  such	  that	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  nature151	  and	  the	  
                                                148	  Of	   course,	   these	  works	  are	  not,	  properly	   speaking,	   critiques,	  nor	  does	   it	   appear	   that	   the	  Groundwork,	   in	  particular,	  was	  supposed	  to	  stand	  in	  for	  some	  such	  work	  (see	  Wood	  [1996],	  xxv-­‐xxvi).	  149	  A	  forerunner	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  critique	  as	  the	  indispensible	  preliminary	  for	  metaphysics	  can	  be	  found	  at	  ID	  2:395.	  150	  Philosophy,	  metaphysics,	  and	  doctrine	  are	  oftentimes	  used	  synonymously	  by	  Kant	  (although	  a	  doctrine	   is	  sometimes	  understood	  to	  include	  an	  empirical	  division,	  as	  well).	  Importantly,	  philosophy	  has	  a	  broader	  (and	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metaphysics	  of	  morals	  will	  constitute	  completely	  separate	  and	  heterogeneous	  sciences.152	  Two	  different	  sorts	  of	  concepts	  are	  operative	  within	  these	  sciences,	  concepts	  of	  nature	  and	  the	   concept	   of	   freedom	   (CPJ	   5:171;	   FI	   20:197), 153 	  and	   it	   is	   no	   small	   part	   of	   the	  accomplishment	   of	   the	   first	   Critique	   that	   it	   has	   (re)established	   the	   basis	   for	   a	   strict	  distinction	   here.	   Having	   marked	   this	   fundamental	   division	   in	   metaphysics,	   and	   having	  subsequently	  elaborated	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  its	  only	  two	  possible	  branches,	  Kant	  could	  be	  forgiven	  for	  thinking	  that	  another	  Critique	  was	  neither	  necessary	  nor	  possible.	  	   In	  fact,	  this	  seems	  to	  be	  precisely	  what	  he	  thought.	  Kant	  did	  not	  originally	  intend	  to	  write	  a	  third	  Critique,154	  despite	  the	  architectonic	  opening	  for	  such	  an	  enterprise	  that	  must	  have	  been	  apparent	  to	  him	  very	  early	  on.155	  The	  first	  two	  installments	  of	  the	  critical	  system	  
                                                                                                                                                       more	   fundamental)	   sense	   that	  we	  will	   be	   compelled	   to	   consider	   below.	   For	   the	   synonymy,	   however,	   cf.	   G	  4:387;	  CPrR	  5:12;	  CPJ	  5:169;	  MM	  6:375;	  FI	  20:195,	  248;	  CPR	  A838/B866,	  A841/B869,	  A845/B873.	  151	  This	   is	   already	   a	   narrowing	   of	   the	   broadest	   sense	   of	   “nature.”	   “Nature	   in	   the	  most	   general	   sense	   is	   the	  existence	  of	  things	  under	  laws”	  (CPrR	  5:43),	  and	  in	  this	  way	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  both	  sensible	  and	  supersensible	  nature.	   When	   Kant	   opposes	   laws	   of	   nature	   to	   laws	   of	   freedom,	   he	   is,	   then,	   already	   invoking	   a	   specific	  conception	  of	  the	  natural	  (e.g.,	  G	  4:455),	  but	  it	  is	  this	  more	  restricted	  notion	  of	  the	  natural	  which	  he	  typically	  employs.	  152	  Kant	  repeatedly	  insists	  on	  this	  (e.g.,	  G	  4:387-­‐388).	  This	  insistence	  is	  just	  one	  case	  of	  Kant’s	  more	  general	  injunction	  against	  mixing	  different	  sciences	  with	  one	  another.	  See	  CPR	  A842-­‐843/B870-­‐871;	  UTP	  8:162.	  153	  Following	  Kant,	  I	  will	  generally	  speak	  of	  the	  concept,	  not	  concepts,	  of	  freedom	  (at,	  e.g.,	  CPJ	  5:171,	  196;	  but	  see	   CPJ	   5:176).	   Kant	   does	   so	   because	   the	   domain	   of	  moral	   philosophy	   is	   systematically	   and	   constitutively	  unified	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  domain	  of	  philosophy	  of	  nature	  is	  not	  (see	  below,	  p.	  109).	  This	  difference	  is	  reflected,	  for	  Kant,	  in	  a	  difference	  of	  critical	  method:	  whereas	  the	  first	  Critique	  must	  begin	  with	  the	  forms	  of	  intuition	  before	   progressing	   to	   a	   consideration	   of	   the	   principles	   of	   reason,	   the	   second	   Critique	   must	   set	   out	   from	  principles	  and	  work	  its	  way	  down	  (CPrR	  5:45;	  cf.	  5:89-­‐90).	  Thus	  if	  theoretical	  philosophy	  is	  built	  up	  from	  the	  ground	   floor	   of	   our	   cognitive	   faculty	   (namely,	   sensibility),	   practical	   philosophy	  descends	   downwards	   from	  reason	  itself.	  154	  Guyer	  traces	  the	  genesis	  of	   the	  third	  Critique	   in	  some	  detail	   in	  the	   introduction	  to	  his	  translation	  of	   that	  work.	  See	  Guyer	  (2000),	  xiii-­‐xxiii.	  Kant	  did,	  it	  appears,	  form	  an	  intention	  to	  compose	  a	  critique	  of	  taste	  even	  in	  the	  1770s	  (and	  perhaps	  even	  before	  that),	  indicating	  as	  much	  to	  Herz	  in	  1772	  (Guyer	  [2000],	  xv-­‐xviii).	  But	  his	  evident	   surprise	   at	   discovering	   the	   possibility	   of	   such	   a	   project	   (now	   brought	   together	   with	   a	   critique	   of	  teleology)	   in	  a	  1787	   letter	   to	  Reinhold	   strongly	   suggests	   that	  he	  had	   in	   the	  meantime	  abandoned	  his	  early	  hopes	  (again,	  see	  Guyer	  [2000],	  xiii-­‐xiv).	  At	  any	  rate,	  while	  Kant’s	  1785	  denial	  that	  there	  can	  be	  a	  “science”	  or	  “metaphysics”	  of	  taste	  does	  not	  contradict	  his	  later	  position,	  his	  lack	  of	  qualification,	  even	  in	  passing,	  certainly	  suggests	   that	  he	  harbored	   little	  hope	  of	  establishing	  a	  priori	  principles	  governing	   the	   faculty	  of	   feeling.	  See	  MoMr2	  29:597-­‐598.	  155	  Kant	  emphasizes	  the	  architectonic	  point	  in	  his	  letter	  to	  Reinhold	  (see	  n.	  154),	  and	  he	  does	  at	  least	  suggest	  that	  he	   is	   relying	  more	  and	  more	  on	   the	   systematic	   character	  of	  his	   thinking	  as	  he	  grows	  older:	   “My	   inner	  conviction	   grows,	   as	   I	   discover	   in	   working	   on	   different	   topics	   that	   not	   only	   does	  my	   system	   remain	   self-­‐consistent	  but	  I	   find	  also,	  when	  sometimes	  I	  cannot	  see	  the	  right	  way	  to	  investigate	  a	  certain	  subject,	   that	  I	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deal	  with	  the	  legislation	  under	  which	  two	  of	  the	  three	  fundamental	  mental	  faculties	  stand,	  legislation	  which	  proceeds	  from	  two	  of	  the	  three	  higher	  cognitive	  faculties.	  Thus	  in	  the	  first	  
Critique	  the	  understanding	  is	  called	  upon	  to	  legislate	  for	  the	  faculty	  of	  cognition	  as	  a	  whole,	  while	  in	  the	  second	  Critique	  reason	  is	  called	  upon	  to	  legislate	  for	  the	  faculty	  of	  desire	  (CPJ	  5:167-­‐168,	  177-­‐178;	  FI	  20:245).	  Architectonically,	   at	   least,	   there	   is	  a	  prima	  facie	   case	   for	  the	   possibility	   that	   the	   remaining	   higher	   cognitive	   faculty	   (the	   power	   of	   judgment)	  legislates	   for	   the	   remaining	   fundamental	   faculty	   (that	   of	   the	   feeling	   of	   pleasure	   and	  displeasure),	  as	  Kant	  emphasizes	  in	  his	  Preface	  to	  the	  third	  Critique	  (CPJ	  5:168).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  and	  as	  Kant	  also	  points	  out,	  it	  is	  a	  bit	  strange	  to	  think	  of	  any	  kind	  of	   legislation	  governing	  the	  faculty	  of	   feeling:	  under	  what	  sort	  of	  principle	  could	  our	   pleasure-­‐taking	   possibly	   stand	   (see	   MoMr2	   29:597)?	   A	   feeling	   of	   pleasure	   or	  displeasure	  refers	  to	  “the	  subjective	  aspect	  in	  a	  representation	  which	  cannot	  become	  an	  
element	  of	  cognition	  at	  all”	  (CPJ	  5:189).	  Feeling	  cannot	  be	  derived	  from	  concepts,	  nor	  is	  it	  possible	   to	  cognize	   the	   influence	  of	  an	  object	  upon	  this	   faculty	  (CPJ	  5:190;	  FI	  20:229).	  At	  any	  rate,	  it	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  entirely	  mysterious	  how	  an	  a	  priori	  concept	  could	  “legislate”	  for	   a	   faculty	   that	   does	   not	   deal	   in	   concepts	   simpliciter.	   To	   be	   sure,	   connections	   between	  feeling	   and	   cognition	   are	   not	   far	   to	   be	   found:	   there	   are	   mediate	   ways	   in	   which	   reason	  makes	   certain	   claims	   on	   feeling,	   e.g.,	   through	   respect	   for	   the	  moral	   law,	  which	   “must	   be	  regarded	  as	  also	  a	  positive	  though	  indirect	  effect	  of	  the	  moral	  law	  on	  feeling”	  (CPrR	  5:79).	  
                                                                                                                                                       need	  only	  look	  back	  at	  the	  general	  picture	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  knowledge,	  and	  of	  the	  mental	  powers	  pertaining	  to	  them,	  in	  order	  to	  make	  discoveries	  I	  had	  not	  expected”	  (C	  10:514).	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Even	  reason,	  however,	  cannot	  determine	  what	  we	  should	  find	  directly	  pleasurable,	  nor	  can	  it	  constrain	  us	  to	  take	  pleasure	  in	  one	  set	  of	  objects	  rather	  than	  another	  (MM	  6:402).156	  	   A	   third	  Critique	   seems	  equally	  unlikely	   if	  we	   focus	  not	  on	   the	   fundamental	   faculty	  which	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  legislation,	  but	  instead	  on	  the	  cognitive	  faculty	  which	  would	  be	  doing	   the	   legislating,	   namely,	   the	   power	   of	   judgment.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   this	   faculty	   is	  characterized	  precisely	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  does	  not	  proceed	  according	  to	  rules.	  Rather—as	  the	   first	   Critique	   has	   it,	   at	   least—given	   a	   rule,	   our	   power	   of	   judgment	   seeks	   out	   the	  particular	  which	  can	  be	  subsumed	  under	   it,	  a	  subsumption	  which	  cannot	   itself	  be	  a	  rule-­‐governed	  activity.	  To	  suppose	  that	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  could	  legislate	  appears	  to	  be,	  if	  not	   contradictory,	   then	   at	   least	   extremely	   confused:	   judgment,	  we	   should	   say,	   cannot	   be	  legislative	  but	  only	  (of	  course!)	  judicial.	  So	  the	  problem	  is	  twofold:	  not	  only	  does	  the	  faculty	  of	  the	  feeling	  of	  pleasure	  and	  displeasure	  appear	  to	  resist	  the	  efforts	  of	  a	  legislator,	  but	  the	  presumptive	   legislator	   itself,	   the	  power	  of	   judgment,	   seems	   rather	  obviously	   ill-­‐suited	   to	  such	  a	  task.	  	   What	   finally	   convinced	   Kant	   that	   such	   seemingly	   intractable	   difficulties	   could	   be	  overcome?	  Perhaps	  it	  was	  just	  what	  he	  mentioned	  in	  his	  letter	  to	  Reinhold:157	  his	  growing	  confidence	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  systematic	  features	  of	  his	  work	  to	  lead	  him	  towards	  fruitful	  discoveries.	  More	  likely,	  however,	  his	  engagement	  with	  Herder	  and	  Forster	  opened	  Kant’s	  eyes	  to	  a	  (purported)	  use	  of	  teleology	  that	  he	  had	  not	  anticipated—at	  least	  not	  under	  the	  aspect	  whereby	  it	  now	  displayed	  itself—in	  the	  first	  Critique.	  In	  that	  book,	  Kant	  had	  battled	  against	  a	  view	  which,	  he	  thought,	  threatened	  to	  render	  ethics	  a	  mere	  branch	  of	  physics, as	  
                                                156	  It	  is	  true	  that	  there	  are	  aesthetic	  predispositions	  that	  are	  subjective	  conditions	  for	  even	  being	  receptive	  to	  the	   moral	   law,	   but	   these	   are	   not	   subject	   to	   legislation,	   and	   to	   even	   become	   conscious	   of	   them	   already	  presupposes	  consciousness	  of	  the	  law	  itself	  (MM	  6:399).	  157	  See	  n.	  154.	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depicted	   in	  Descartes’s	  Preface	  to	  the	  French	  edition	  of	   the	  Principles,158	  or,	   if	  you	  prefer,	  physics	   a	   mere	   branch	   of	   ethics,	   as,	   perhaps,	   had	   led	   Spinoza	   to	   call	   his	   philosophy	   an	  
ethics.	   Herder’s	   technique,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	  was	   to	   attempt	   a	   rapprochement	   of	   ethics	  and	  physics	  from	  both	  sides	  at	  once.	  His	  appeal,	  inchoate	  as	  it	  was,	  was	  not	  to	  a	  concept	  of	  nature	  or	  freedom,	  but	  to	  something	  else	  altogether,	  something	  historically	   teleological.	   If	  Herder’s	  appeal	   to	  history	  remained	  murky,	   it	  did	  not	  prevent	  the	  problem	  the	   Ideas	  had	  raised	   from	   finally	   setting	   itself	   before	   Kant	  with	   great	   clarity:	  what	   is	   the	   principle	   the	  misuse	  of	  which	  is	   leading	  to	  extravagances	   like	  Herder’s	  Ideas?	  And	  in	  what,	   if	  anything,	  does	  the	  proper	  use	  of	  this	  principle	  consist,	  against	  which	  its	  misuse	  can	  be	  diagnosed?	  	   My	   suggestion	   is	   that	   it	   is	   predominantly	   in	  working	   out	   an	   answer	   to	   this	   latter	  question	  that	  Kant	  realized	  that	  he	  could—and	  must—write	  a	  third	  Critique.	  His	  answer	  to	  it	   is	  surprising,	   to	  say	   the	   least.	  Teleological	   judgments	  depend	  upon	  the	  objective	  use	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  purposiveness	  of	  nature.	  As	  the	  first	  Critique	  had	  already	  established,	  such	  a	  use	  does	  not	  have	  strict	  scientific	  legitimacy,	  even	  if	  it	  has	  its	  heuristic	  utility	  even	  for	  science.	  But	  this	  heuristic	  utility	  is	  not,	  not	  here,	  at	   least,	  what	  has	  misled	  Herder	  and	  Forster.	   They	   have	   been	   misled	   by	   the	   prospect	   that	   teleology	   can	   mediate	   between	  concepts	  of	  nature	  and	  the	  concept	  of	   freedom.	  In	  this,	   they	  are	  very	  nearly	  right,	   for	  the	  same	   principle	   the	  objective	   use	   of	  which	   grounds	   teleological	   judgments	   grounds,	   in	   its	  
subjective	  use,	  aesthetic	  judgments.	  And	  it	  is	  the	  latter	  which	  provide	  for	  a	  kind	  of	  genuine	  mediation—what	   Kant	   calls	   an	   “Übergang,”	   or	   “transition”—between	   concepts	   of	   nature	  and	   the	   concept	   of	   freedom.	   This	   mediation	   is	   not	   a	   conceptual	   one,	   however,	   and	   it	  ultimately	   rests	   on	   the	   faculty	   of	   feeling,	   not	   the	   faculty	   of	   cognition.	   Herder’s	   mistake,	  
                                                158	  Descartes	  (1647b),	  186	  (IXB:14).	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accordingly,	   is	   to	   assign	   to	   the	   objective	  use	   of	   the	  principle	   of	   purposiveness	   the	  utility	  that	  properly	  belongs	  to	  its	  subjective	  use.159	  
The	  Transition	  from	  Natural	  to	  Moral	  Philosophy	  The	  results	  of	  the	  first	  two	  Critiques,	  Kant	  tells	  us	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  third,	  leave	  us	  in	  a	  rather	  curious	  situation:	  Although	   there	   is	   an	   incalculable	   gulf	   fixed	   between	   the	   domain	   of	   the	  concept	  of	  nature,	  as	  the	  sensible,	  and	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  freedom,	  as	  the	  supersensible,	  so	  that	  from	  the	  former	  to	  the	  latter	  (thus	  by	  means	  of	  the	  theoretical	  use	  of	  reason)	  no	  transition	  [Übergang]	  is	  possible	  .	  .	  .:	  yet	  the	  latter	   should	   have	   an	   influence	   on	   the	   former	   .	   .	   .;	   and	   nature	   must	  consequently	  also	  be	  able	   to	  be	  conceived	   [gedacht]	   in	   such	  a	  way	   that	   the	  lawfulness	  of	  its	  form	  is	  at	  least	  in	  agreement	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  ends	  that	   are	   to	   be	   realized	   in	   it	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   laws	   of	   freedom.	   (CPJ	  5:175-­‐176)	  	  We	  can	  begin	  by	  considering	  the	  sense	  of	  Kant’s	  “must”:	  we	  must	  be	  able	  to	  think	  nature	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  our	  transformation	  of	  it	  (into	  a	  progressively	  more	  moral	  world	  order)	  is	  conceivable	   in	  accordance	  with	  natural	   laws.	  Kant	  had	  devoted	  considerable	  effort	   in	   the	  second	  Critique	  to	  spelling	  out	  the	  force	  of	  this	  “must”	  with	  precision.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  do	   not	   need	   knowledge	   of	   the	   natural	   world,	   or	   any	   positive	   deliverance	   from	   theory	  whatsoever,160	  to	  recognize	  that	  we	  stand	  under	  the	  moral	  law.	  Reason	  proves	  its	  efficacy	  and	  grounds	  our	  freedom	  to	  act	  according	  to	  rational	  motives	  through	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  moral	  law	   alone.	   Thus	   “reason	   is	   by	   means	   of	   ideas	   itself	   an	   efficient	   cause	   in	   the	   field	   of	  
                                                159	  My	  reading	  of	  the	  basic	  project	  of	  the	  third	  Critique,	  then,	  is	  considerably	  less	  “balanced,”	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  respective	  significance	  of	  its	  two	  parts,	  than	  is	  the	  norm.	  Here,	  e.g.,	  is	  how	  Guyer	  sums	  up	  the	  relationship	  between	  aesthetics	  and	  teleology:	  “Thus	  what	  ties	  the	  two	  halves	  of	  the	  third	  Critique	  together	  is	  precisely	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  experiences	  of	  natural	  beauty	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  purposiveness	  of	  organisms	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  both	  offer	  us	  what	  we	  experience	  as	  evidence	  rather	  than	  a	  mere	  postulate	  of	  pure	  practical	  reason	  that	  the	  system	  of	  morality	  can	  be	  realized	  in	  nature”	  (Guyer	  [2006],	  426).	  This	  is	  true,	  as	  far	  as	  it	  goes,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  really	  the	  principle	  behind	  the	  division	  of	  the	  third	  Critique.	  Teleological	  judgments	  are	  considered	  only	  because	  they	  make	  use	  of	  the	  same	  principle	  as	  do	  aesthetic	  judgments.	  This	  is	  why	  Kant	  writes	  that	  only	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  third	  Critique	  is	  “essential”	  (CPJ	  5:193).	  160	  I	   say	   “positive”	   because	   we	   must	   at	   least	   recognize	   that	   no	   theoretical	   proof	   of	   the	   impossibility	   of	   a	  causality	  through	  freedom	  can	  be	  given	  (CPrR	  5:47).	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experience”	   (CPrR	   5:48).161	  But	   how	   reason	   can	   be	   efficacious	   in	   the	   field	   of	   experience	  remains,	  for	  us,	  completely	  inscrutable.	  The	   problem	   is	   deeper	   than	   that	   of	   merely	   lacking	   insight	   into	   reason’s	   hidden	  mechanism;	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  “the	  ends	  that	  are	  to	  be	  realized	  in	  [nature]	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  laws	  of	  freedom”	  are	  systematically	  organized	  under	  an	  idea	  of	  a	  whole,	  whereas	  the	  laws	  by	  which	  we	  cognize	  nature	  are	  mechanical	  and	  diverse	  in	  their	  principles,	  not	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  teleological	  laws)	  directed	  to	  and	  organized	  under	  a	  unified	  end.	  Because	  the	  representation	   of	   the	   highest	   good	   synthetically	   combines	   the	   ideas	   of	   happiness162	  and	  virtue,163	  its	   systematic	  expression	  must	  also	  be	  of	   a	  unified,	   systematic	   character.164	  The	  highest	  good	  is	  an	  (indeterminate)	  object	  for	  (or,	  provides	  objective	  reality	  to;	  OOT	  8:139)	  the	   ideal	   of	   pure	   reason,	   expressing	   the	   providential	   direction	   of	   an	   outcome	   from	   the	  whole	   of	   nature	   to	   its	   parts	   (CPrR	   5:124;	   TP	   8:279,	   310).165	  What	   must	   be	   conceivable	  
                                                161	  To	   the	   mere	   possibility	   of	   freedom	   the	   cognition	   of	   the	   moral	   law	   adds	   “the	   concept	   of	   a	   reason	  determining	  the	  will	  immediately	  (by	  the	  condition	  of	  a	  universal	  lawful	  form	  of	  its	  maxims),	  and	  thus	  is	  able	  for	  the	  first	  time	  to	  give	  objective	  though	  only	  practical	  reality	  to	  reason”	  (CPrR	  5:48).	  He	  sums	  up	  the	  point	  even	  more	   succinctly	   in	   1793:	   “In	   a	   theory	   that	   is	   based	   on	   the	   concept	  of	  duty,	   concern	   about	   the	   empty	  ideality	  of	  this	  concept	  quite	  disappears.	  For	  it	  would	  not	  be	  a	  duty	  to	  aim	  at	  a	  certain	  effect	  of	  our	  will	  if	  this	  effect	  were	  not	  also	  possible	  in	  experience”	  (TP	  8:276-­‐277;	  cf.	  CPJ	  5:275;	  TP	  8:287;	  TPP	  8:370).	  162	  Happiness,	  “the	  end	  assigned	  us	  by	  nature	  itself”	  (TP	  8:282),	  is	  an	  “idea”	  in	  which	  “all	  inclinations	  unite	  in	  one	  sum”	  (G	  4:399).	  It	  is	  not	  an	  end	  specific	  to	  human	  nature,	  but	  rather	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  finite	  rational	  being	  burdened	  with	   inclinations	   (CPrR	  5:25).	   In	   addition,	   such	  beings	   can	   only	   decide	   for	   themselves	  what	   this	  happiness	   is	   to	   consist	   in.	   Happiness	   is	   thus	   “the	   end	   assigned	   us	   by	   nature	   itself”	   in	   a	   subjective,	   not	  objective,	  sense	  (see	  G	  4:395;	  CPJ	  5:430).	  163	  On	  the	  ideality	  of	  virtue,	  see	  CPR	  A315/B371-­‐372,	  A569/B597.	  164	  This	  point	  is	  actually	  one	  of	  considerable	  complexity,	  for	  the	  requirement	  of	  a	  synthetic	  connection	  of	  two	  representations	  (in	  this	  case,	  the	  restriction	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  happiness	  by	  the	  condition	  of	  virtue),	  whatever	  the	  intrinsic	   nature	   of	   these	   representations	   might	   be,	   might	   seem	   to	   rule	   out	   the	   ideality	   of	   the	   resulting	  representation.	  But	  Kant	  draws	  precisely	   the	  opposite	   conclusion:	   just	  because	   the	  connection	   is	   synthetic,	  but	   there	   is	   no	   conceivable	   ground	   of	   this	   synthesis	   other	   than	   the	   activity	   of	   God,	   activity	  which	   is	   itself	  conceivable	  only	  as	  intuition	  which	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  intellectual,	  the	  highest	  good	  is	  representable,	  for	  us,	  as	   an	   idea,	   one	  with	   objective	   though	   indeterminate	   validity.	   In	   other	  words,	  what	   is	   synthetic	   for	   human	  cognition	  must	  be	  referred	  (indeterminately)	  to	  a	  ground	  that	   is	  analytic	   from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  God.	  On	  this	  point,	  Kant’s	  distinction	  between	  the	  highest	  original	  good	  and	  the	  highest	  derived	  good	  is	  relevant	  (see	  n.	  166).	  165	  Of	  course,	  we	  must	  be	  careful	  in	  this	  case	  not	  to	  misunderstand	  what	  it	  means	  to	  “provide	  an	  object”	  for	  morality.	  As	  Kant	  emphasizes	  again	  and	  again,	  such	  an	  object	  will	  not	  determine,	  but	  only	  be	  determined	  by,	  the	  merely	   formal	  conditions	  of	   the	  use	  of	  our	   freedom.	  Thus	  making	  the	  highest	  good	  one’s	  end	  “does	  not	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(though	  not	  determinately	  cognizable)	   is	  such	  direction	  happening	   in	  nature,	  and	   for	   this	  the	   lawfulness	   of	   nature’s	   form	   must	   be	   “at	   least	   in	   agreement	   with”	   the	   direction	   of	  providence,	  the	  causality	  of	  which	  moves	  from	  the	  whole	  to	  the	  parts.	  Now,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  be	  careful	  here.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Kant’s	   insistence	  that	  we	  “must”	   be	   able	   to	   conceive	   of	   nature	   as	   also	   standing	   under	   the	   concept	   of	   freedom	   is	  merely	  formal	  in	  character.	  It	  is	  not	  necessary,	  for	  example,	  that	  we	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  any	  particular	  natural	  process	  plays	  its	  part	  in	  bringing	  about	  the	  moral	  world,	  and	  this	  is	  why	  Kant’s	  claim	  does	  not	  require	  him	  to	  produce,	  or	  even	  to	  explain	  the	  possibility	  of,	   any	   specific	   theodicy.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	  however,	   to	   speak	  of	   the	  need	  as	  merely	  formal	  can	  be	  misleading,	  as	  well.	  For	  the	  “form”	  through	  which	  it	  must	  be	  possible	  to	   conceive	   the	   natural	   world	   is	   the	   form	   of	   an	   idea,	   moreover,	   an	   idea	   the	   grounding	  principle	  of	  which	  must	  be	   found	   in	   the	   ideal,	   an	   idea	   considered	  as	   “an	   individual	   thing	  which	  is	  determinable,	  or	  even	  determined,	  through	  the	  idea	  alone”	  (CPR	  A568/B596).166	  As	  Kant	  puts	  it	  in	  the	  first	  Critique,	  Thus	   happiness	   in	   exact	   proportion	   with	   the	   morality	   of	   rational	   beings,	  through	  which	  they	  are	  worthy	  of	  it,	  alone	  constitutes	  the	  highest	  good	  of	  a	  world	  into	  which	  we	  must	  without	  exception	  transpose	  ourselves	  [darin	  wir	  
uns	   .	   .	   .	   versetzen	   müssen]	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   precepts	   of	   pure	   but	  practical	  reason,	  and	  which,	  of	  course,	  is	  only	  an	  intelligible	  world,	  since	  the	  sensible	  world	  does	  not	  promise	  us	  that	  sort	  of	  systematic	  unity	  of	  ends,	  the	  reality	  of	  which	  can	  be	  grounded	  on	  nothing	  other	  than	  the	  presupposition	  of	  a	   highest	   original	   good,	   since	   self-­‐sufficient	   reason,	   armed	   with	   all	   of	   the	  sufficiency	   of	   a	   supreme	   cause,	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   most	   perfect	  purposiveness,	  grounds,	  conserves	  and	  completes	  the	  order	  of	  things	  that	  is	  universal	   though	   well	   hidden	   from	   us	   in	   the	   sensible	   world.	   (CPR	  A814/B842)	  
                                                                                                                                                       increase	   the	   number	   of	   morality’s	   virtues	   but	   rather	   provides	   these	   with	   a	   special	   point	   of	   reference	  [besondern	  Beziehungspunkt]	  for	  the	  unification	  of	  all	  ends”	  (Rel	  6:5).	  166	  “Thus	   only	   in	   the	   ideal	   of	   the	   highest	  original	   good	   can	   pure	   reason	   find	   the	   ground	   of	   the	   practically	  necessary	   connection	   of	   both	   elements	   of	   the	   highest	   derived	   good,	   namely	   of	   an	   intelligible,	   i.e.,	  moral	  world”	  (CPR	  A810-­‐811/B838-­‐839).	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  But	   if,	   indeed,	   according	   to	   the	   practical	   standpoint,	   “the	  world	  must	   be	   represented	   as	  having	   arisen	   out	   of	   an	   idea”	   (CPR	   A815-­‐816/B843-­‐844),	   then	   the	   limitations	   of	  considering	   Kant’s	   requirement	   for	   representing	   nature	   under	   the	   “form”	   of	   the	   moral	  world	  becomes	  apparent.	  For	  the	  form	  of	  the	  moral	  world	  is	  objective	  precisely	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  absolutely	  determining.	  That	  is,	  the	  moral	  law	  does	  not	  depend	  for	  its	  validity	  on	  its	  determination	  of	  a	  content	  given	  from	  sensibility.	  We	  could	  say	  that	  the	  form	  of	  the	  moral	  world	  immediately	  “determines”	  its	  content,	  although	  we	  would	  have	  to	  clarify	  that	  for	  this	  very	  reason	  no	  cognition	  of	  a	  determinate	  content	  standing	  under	  a	  moral	  form	  is	  possible.	  So	  what	  would	   it	  mean,	   then,	   to	   think	   of	   the	   natural	  world,	  which	   is	   an	   object	   of	  cognition	  for	  us,	  as	  having	  the	  form	  of	  the	  moral	  world,	  which	  is	  “objective”	  only	  ever	  as	  an	  object	  of	  our	  desire,	  and	  which	  dissolves	  into	  indeterminacy	  the	  moment	  we	  try	  to	  cognize	  it?	   It	   would	   appear	   that	   the	   very	   condition	   of	   representing	   the	   natural	   world,	   namely,	  tracing	   all	   thoughts	   of	   it	   back	   to	   a	   given	   intuition	   (CPR	   A19/B33),	   prevents	   us	   from	  understanding	  it	  as	  having	  a	  moral	  form.	  Part	   of	   what	   makes	   the	   problem	   appear	   so	   intractable,	   however,	   is	   a	   certain	  inappropriateness	  in	  our	  way	  of	  posing	  the	  question:	  How	  do	  we	  think	  of	  the	  world	  .	  .	  .?	  How	  
do	  we	  understand	  the	  world	   .	   .	   .?	  Although	  Kant	  himself	   falls	   into	   such	   locutions	  at	   times	  (see	   CPJ	   5:175-­‐176,	   quoted	   above),	   it	   should	   be	   clear	   that	   they	   are	  misleading,	   for	   they	  presuppose	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  Kant’s	  question	  will	  assume	  the	  form	  of	  a	  cognition.	  Strictly	  speaking,	  however,	  this	  is	  not	  what	  the	  question	  requires;	  what	  is	  required,	  rather,	  is	  a	  way	  of	  transitioning	  from	  the	  way	  we	  conceptualize	  the	  world	  when	  we	  desire	  to	  act	  in	  it	  to	  the	  way	  we	  conceptualize	   it	  when	  we	   look	  at	   it	   theoretically.	   If	  we	   look	  back,	  now,	   to	  5:175-­‐176,	  we	  see	  that	  Kant	  begins	  by	  saying	  that	  “from	  the	  former	  to	  the	  latter,”	  that	  is,	  from	  the	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domain	  of	  the	  concept(s)	  of	  nature	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  freedom,	  “no	  transition	  is	  possible.”	  Now,	  an	  Übergang	   indicates	  something	  quite	  specific	   for	  Kant.	  Every	  science,	  he	  holds,	  must	  be	  architectonically	  developed	  from	  its	  own	  inner	  principles	  (its	  grounding	  idea),	   for	  what	  makes	  a	  science	  a	  science	   is	  precisely	   that	   its	  basic	  principle	  delineates	   in	  advance	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  whole	  (CPR	  A832/B860;	  MFNS	  4:467).	  Only	  when	  a	  scientific	  edifice	  is	   completed	   according	   to	   its	   own	   inner	   principles	   is	   it	   permissible	   to	   construct	   an	  
Übergang	   to	   an	   adjacent	   scientific	   domain	   (CPJ	   5:381):	   a	   transition,	   in	   this	   sense,	   is	  permissible	   only	   where	   construction	   according	   to	   architectonic	   principles	   has	   been	  exhausted	   or	   is	   no	   longer	   appropriate.	   Accordingly,	   if	   a	   transition	   is	   possible	   between	  concepts	   of	   nature	   and	   freedom,	   such	   a	   transition	   can	   itself	   utilize	   neither	   concepts	   of	  nature	  nor	  of	  freedom,	  nor	  can	  it	  subordinate	  both	  under	  a	  higher	  conceptual	  genus.	  Now,	  such	  a	  transition	  will	  be	  impossible,	  Kant	  tells	  us,	  “by	  means	  of	  the	  theoretical	  use	   of	   reason,”	   i.e.,	   in	   the	   direction	   moving	   from	   concepts	   of	   nature	   to	   the	   concept	   of	  freedom.	  But	  if	  we	  look	  in	  the	  other	  direction,	  the	  situation	  is	  not	  so	  immediately	  dire.	  For	  there	  must	   still	  be	  a	  ground	  of	   the	  unity	   of	   the	  supersensible	   that	  grounds	  nature	   with	   that	   which	   the	   concept	   of	   freedom	   contains	   practically,	   the	  concept	   of	   which,	   even	   if	   it	   does	   not	   suffice	   for	   cognition	   of	   it	   either	  theoretically	   or	   practically,	   and	   thus	   has	   no	   proper	   domain	   of	   its	   own,	  nevertheless	  makes	   possible	   the	   transition	   [Übergang]	   from	   the	  manner	   of	  thinking	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	  principles	  of	   the	  one	   to	   that	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  other.	  (CPJ	  5:176)	  	  Now,	   as	   a	   ground	  of	   a	  mere	   “transition,”	   the	   relevant	   “unity”	   of	   theoretical	   and	  practical	  philosophy	   cannot	   itself	   be	   a	   proper	   part	   of	   scientific	   philosophy,167	  which	   is	   always	  
                                                167	  While	  I	  take	  it	  that	  this	  is,	  in	  fact,	  Kant’s	  considered	  view,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  it	  does	  seem	  to	  require	  a	  revision	   of	   a	   passage	   from	   the	   Architectonic	   of	   the	   first	   Critique:	   “Now	   the	   legislation	   of	   human	   reason	  (philosophy)	  has	  two	  objects,	  nature	  and	  freedom,	  and	  thus	  contains	  the	  natural	  law	  as	  well	  as	  the	  moral	  law,	  initially	   in	   two	   separate	   systems	   but	   ultimately	   in	   a	   single	   philosophical	   system”	   (CPR	   A840/B868).	   Now,	  Kant	   immediately	   indicates	   that	   “philosophy”	   can	   have	   a	   broader	   sense	   here,	   one	   that	   encompasses	   both	  propaedeutic,	   or	   critique,	   and	   system,	   or	   metaphysics	   (CPR	   A841/B869).	   But	   the	   reference	   to	   “a	   single	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rational	  cognition	  through	  concepts	  (CPR	  A713/B741;	  MFNS	  4:469).	  Thus	  we	  can	  already	  see	   that	   the	   third	  Critique	   cannot,	  as	   the	   first	   two	  had,	   lay	   the	  ground	   for	  any	  systematic	  metaphysics.	  But	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  this,	  as	  we	  will	  now	  see,	  that	  that	  it	  cannot	  justify	  any	  a	  priori	  principles	  whatsoever.	  
The	  Power	  of	  Judgment	  as	  the	  Legislator	  of	  the	  Transition	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  it	  is	  at	  first	  surprising	  to	  think	  that	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  could	  have	  any	  
a	  priori	  principle	  at	  all.	  What	  would	   its	  domain	  be?	  What	  could	   it	   legislate	  over?	  To	  help	  mitigate	  this	  problem,	  Kant	  draws	  one	  more	  distinction.	  A	  priori	  principles	  do	  not	  have	  to	  be	  objective.	  If	  an	  a	  priori	  principle	  is	  subjective,	  in	  particular,	  if	  it	  guides	  only	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  subject	  in	  seeking	  laws,	  such	  a	  principle	  would	  not	  legislate	  over	  objects—and	  hence	  it	  would	   have	   no	   domain—but	   nevertheless	   it	   would	   retain	   some	   territory	   “and	   a	   certain	  constitution	   [Beschaffenheit]	   of	   it,	   for	  which	   precisely	   this	   principle	   only	  might	   be	   valid”	  (CPJ	   5:177).	   Unfortunately,	   two	   obstacles	   block	   any	   easy	   understanding	   of	   Kant’s	   point	  here:	  (1)	  the	  reference	  back	  to	  his	  (already	  obscure)	  discussion	  of	  domain	  and	  territory	  at	  5:174	  and	  (2)	  his	  uncharacteristic	  use	  of	  “Beschaffenheit.”	  I	  will	  deal	  with	  each	  interpretive	  issue	  in	  turn.	  Kant	  begins	  by	  telling	  us	   that	  we	  can	  divide	  the	  set	  of	  all	  objects	   to	  which	  a	  priori	  concepts	   can	   be	   applied	   according	   to	   the	   “varying	   adequacy”	   of	   our	   faculties	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  a	  priori	  cognition.	  Now,	  if	  a	  concept	  is	  related	  to	  objects,	  then,	  even	  if	  we	  cannot	  cognize	  those	  objects,	  that	  concept	  has	  a	  “field,”	  and	  within	  that	  field	  resides	  the	  “territory”	  within	  which	  cognition	   is	  possible	   for	  us.	  Now,	  since	  we	  can	  cognize	  objects	  only	  as	   they	  
                                                                                                                                                       philosophical	   system”	   at	   A840/B868	   surely	   indicates	   that	   it	   is	   the	   latter	   he	   has	   in	   mind	   throughout	   the	  passage.	  At	  any	  rate,	  the	  revision	  at	  5:175-­‐176	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  capture	  Kant’s	  position,	  even	  as	  he	  would	  have	  held	  it	  in	  the	  first	  Critique,	  with	  considerably	  more	  precision.	  (The	  A840/B868	  passage	  can	  also	  be	  compared	  with	  a	  more	  felicitous	  formulation	  of	  the	  point	  at	  JL	  9:48-­‐49.)	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appear	  to	  us,	  not	  as	  they	  are	  in	  themselves,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  surprising	  that	  Kant	  identifies	  the	  territory	  of	  concepts	  in	  general	  as	  “the	  set	  of	  objects	  of	  all	  possible	  experience,	  insofar	  as	  they	  are	  taken	  as	  nothing	  more	  than	  mere	  appearances”	  (CPJ	  5:174;	  see	  also	  5:175).	  Our	  cognitive	  faculty	  legislates	  over	  this	  territory	  in	  two	  different	  ways,	  however,	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  two	  domains,	  corresponding	  to	  the	  understanding,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  to	  reason,	  on	   the	   other.	   These	   domains	   stand	   under	   the	   concepts	   of	   nature	   and	   the	   concept	   of	  freedom,	   respectively	   (CPJ	   5:174),	   and	   through	   these	   concepts	   the	   objects	   (i.e.,	   the	  appearances)	  become	  representable	  in	  two	  different	  ways:	  “The	  concept	  of	  nature	  certainly	  makes	  its	  objects	  representable	  in	  intuition,	  but	  not	  as	  things	  in	  themselves,	  rather	  as	  mere	  appearances,	   while	   the	   concept	   of	   freedom	   in	   its	   object	   makes	   a	   thing	   representable	   in	  itself	  but	  not	  in	  intuition”	  (CPJ	  5:175).168	  But	  this	  is	  confusing:	  Kant	  has	  already	  defined	  the	  relevant	   object	   as	   an	   appearance,	   and	   one	  wonders	   what	   an	   object	   of	   experience	   taken	  merely	  as	  an	  appearance	  (CPJ	  5:174)	  but	  nevertheless	  representable	  in	  itself	  (CPJ	  5:175)	  is	  supposed	   to	   be.	   In	   other	   words,	   how	   it	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   domain	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  freedom	   is	   the	   supersensible	   (CPJ	   5:175),	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   legislates	   only	   over	  appearances	  (CPJ	  5:174)?	  Kant’s	   point,	   however,	   is	   simply	   that	   the	   comportment	   towards	   objects	   that	   is	  relevant	   in	   practical	   philosophy	   is	   not	   cognitive	   but	   desiderative	   in	   nature.	   Cognitive	  comportment,	   after	   all,	   is	   always	   directed	   back	   to	   intuition	   as	   its	   goal	   (CPR	   A19/B33),	  intuition	   which	   relates	   immediately	   to	   an	   already	   present	   object,	   while	   practical	  comportment	   is	   directed	   not	   to	   an	   already	   present	   object,	   but	   to	   an	   object	   that	   is	   to	   be	  brought	  about.	  Thus	  the	  concept	  of	  freedom	  legislates	  over	  appearances,	  but	  not	  insofar	  as	  
                                                168	  As	  Kant	  clarifies,	  however,	  “Neither	  of	  the	  two	  can	  provide	  a	  theoretical	  cognition	  of	  its	  object	  (and	  even	  of	  the	  thinking	  subject)	  as	  a	  thing	  in	  itself”	  (CPJ	  5:175).	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these	  are	  to	  be	  related	  cognitively	  to	  objects.	  As	  appearances	  of	  the	  supersensible	  (as	  Kant	  emphasizes	   these	   must	   be	   taken	   at	   CPJ	   5:175),	   they	   are	   subject	   to	   reason’s	   legislation	  precisely	   insofar	   as	   they	   are	   represented	   through	   the	   faculty	   of	   desire.169	  Whether	   we	  speak	  of	  one	  or	  two	  sets	  of	  “objects”	  corresponding	  to	  these	  domains	  depends	  on	  whether	  we	  are	  restricting	  our	  perspective	  to	  the	  cognition	  of	  that	  which	  already	  exists	  or	  whether	  we	  are	  also	  willing	  to	  count	  as	  objects	  that	  which	  does	  not	  yet	  exist,	  but	  should.170	  This	  is	  not	   just	  a	  question	  of	  how	  we	  are	  using	   the	  word	   “object,”	   either;	   it	   actually	  depends	  on	  whether	  we	  adopting	  a	  theoretical	  or	  a	  practical	  standpoint	  at	  a	  given	  moment.	  We	   can	   now	   return	   to	   the	   passage	   at	   5:177	   to	   try	   to	   determine	   the	   sense	   of	  “Beschaffenheit”	  that	  is	  operative	  there.	  “Even	  though	  [the	  power	  of	  judgment]	  can	  claim	  no	  field	   of	   objects	   as	   its	   domain,	   [it]	   can	   nevertheless	   have	   some	   territory	   and	   a	   certain	  constitution	  of	   it	  [eine	  gewisse	  Beschaffenheit	  desselben],	   for	  which	  precisely	  this	  principle	  only	  might	  be	  valid”	  (CPJ	  5:177).171	  Now,	  “Beschaffenheit”	  is	  actually	  a	  word	  of	  considerable	  importance	   for	   Kant,	   although	   it	   functions	   differently	   in	   different	   contexts.	   In	   the	   first	  
Critique	   Kant	   speaks,	   for	   example,	   of	   the	   Grundbeschaffenheit	   der	   sinnlichen	   Erkenntniß	  
überhaupt,	  “the	  fundamental	  constitution	  of	  sensible	  cognition	  in	  general”	  (CPR	  A42/B59).	  Here	  it	  is	  the	  territory	  that	  is	  said	  to	  have	  a	  certain	  constituition,	  or	  character,	  a	  character	  which	  corresponds,	  however,	  to	  the	  way	  the	  power	  of	   judgment	  represents	  this	  territory.	  
                                                169	  Compare	  this	  point	  with	  my	  discussion	  of	  Allison	  in	  Ch.	  I,	  p.	  31.	  170	  Thus	  in	  other	  places	  Kant	  is	  perfectly	  willing	  to	  acknowledge	  that	  not	  just	  the	  concepts,	  but	  the	  objects,	  of	  nature	  and	  freedom	  are	  fundamentally	  distinct	  (CPR	  A840/B868;	  MoV	  27:479).	  Finally,	  although	  Kant	  does	  not,	   to	   my	   knowledge,	   ever	   make	   this	   point,	   it	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   the	   distinction	   can	   be	   related	   to	   the	  distinction	  between	  scholastic	  and	  worldly	  philosophy	   that	  he	  draws	  near	   the	  end	  of	   the	   first	  Critique	   (see	  below,	  p.	  144).	  171	  The	  German	  clause	  (where	  “welches”	  presumably	  refers	  back	  to	  “ein	  ihr	  eigenes	  Prinzip”	  runs	  as	   follows:	  
“.	  .	  .	  welches,	   wenn	   ihm gleich	   kein	   Feld	   der	   Gegenstände	   als	   sein	   Gebiet	   zustände,	   doch	   irgend einen	   Boden	  
haben	  kann	  und	  eine	  gewisse	  Beschaffenheit	  desselben,	  wofür gerade	  nur	  dieses	  Prinzip	  geltend	   sein	  möchte.”	  For	   that	   last	   part,	   Pluhar	   has	   “.	   .	   .	   and	   this	   territory	  might	   be	   of	   such	   a	   character	   that	   none	   but	   this	   very	  principle	  might	  hold	  in	  it.”	  Nuzzo	  has:	  “.	  .	  .	  and	  this	  territory	  might	  be	  so	  constituted	  as	  to	  allow	  only	  for	  this	  principle	  to	  be	  valid	  in	  it.”	  
 116	  
Recall	   that	   at	   5:174-­‐175	  Kant	   had	   distinguished	   between	   two	  ways	   in	  which	   (the	   same)	  objects	  might	  be	  represented	  in	  a	  given	  territory,	  suggesting	  that	  these	  two	  ways	  give	  rise	  to	   different	   domains,	  where	   an	   object	   is	   considered	  on	   the	   one	  hand	   (under	   concepts	   of	  nature)	   as	   “representable	   in	   intuition”	   and	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   (under	   the	   concept	   of	  freedom)	   as	   “a	   thing	   representable	   in	   itself	   but	   not	   in	   intuition.”	   The	  way	   the	   power	   of	  judgment	  represents	  this	  territory,	  I	  submit,	  is	  analogous	  to	  these	  modes	  of	  representation,	  but	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  “represent”	  the	  objects	  in	  a	  territory	  in	  a	  weaker	  sense.	  The	  point,	  however,	  can	  be	  made	  precise.	  Both	  understanding	  and	  reason	  are	  modes	  of	   cognition	   that	   make	   possible	   certain	   representations.	   But	   representations	   after	   the	  manner	   of	   the	  understanding	   (concepts)	   are	  different	   in	   kind	   from	   representations	   after	  the	   manner	   of	   reason	   (ideas),	   and	   to	   this	   difference	   corresponds	   a	   difference	   in	   the	  immanent	   norms	   of	   the	   representations	   they	   make	   possible.	   If	   we	   say	   that	   these	  representations	  are	  constitutive	  of	  (two	  distinct	  modes	  of)	  objectivity	  (which	  will	  depend	  on	  whether	  we	  are	  taking	  “object”	  in	  a	  sense	  broader	  than	  the	  merely	  cognitive	  one),	  then	  we	  can	  even	  say	  that	  objects	  are	  constituted	  differently	  in	  accordance	  with	  this	  difference.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  Beschaffenheit	  of	  a	  territory	  that	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  allows	  for	  is	  not,	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  an	  original	  mode	  of	  representation	  governing	  the	  constitution	  of	  a	  class	  of	  representations	  of	  objects.	  It	  is,	  rather,	  a	  mode	  of	  representation	  that	  already	  carries	  within	  itself	  a	  reference	  to	  another	  mode	  of	  representation,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Kant’s	  reference	  to	  judgment	  as	  a	  “representation	  of	  a	  representation”	  (CPR	  A68/B93).172	  As	  Kant,	  of	  course,	  immediately	  clarifies	  in	  the	  first	  Critique,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  judging	  is	  a	  derivative	  act	  
                                                172	  Kant	  emphasizes	  this	  point	  in	  the	  draft	  of	  his	  introduction	  to	  the	  third	  Critique,	  as	  well:	  “Yet	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  is	  such	  a	  special	  faculty	  of	  cognition,	  not	  at	  all	  self-­‐sufficient,	  that	  it	  provides	  neither	  concepts,	  like	  the	  understanding,	  nor	  ideas,	  like	  reason,	  of	  any	  object	  at	  all,	  since	  it	  is	  a	  faculty	  merely	  for	  subsuming	  under	  concepts	  given	  from	  elsewhere”	  (FI	  20:202).	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of	  the	  understanding,	  for	  in	  fact	  all	  other	  acts	  of	  the	  understanding	  are	  to	  be	  referred	  back	  to	  judgments.	  Kant’s	  novel	  point	  was	  precisely	  that	  the	  unity	  of	  intellectual	  representation	  is	  derived	  from,	  and	  can	  therefore	  be	  traced	  back	  to,	  acts	  (of	  judging)	  which	  had	  always,	  on	  account	  of	  their	  complexity,	  been	  assumed	  to	  be	  derivative.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  understanding	  in	  general	  refers	  back	  to	  an	  act	  of	  unifying	  that	  which	  initially	  presents	  itself	  as	  disunified,	  which	  is,	  as	  I	  have	  emphasized,	  why	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  must	  not	  itself	  be	  rule-­‐governed	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  the	  principle	  of	  all	  acts	  of	  the	  understanding.	  Now,	  the	  status	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  as	  an	  intermediary	  (Mittelglied)	  between	  understanding	   and	   reason	   (CPJ	   5:168)	   is	   intimately	   connected	   with	   this.	   As	   an	  intermediary,	   its	   representations	   will	   always	   have	   a	   reference	   to	   representations	  originating	  in	  either	  the	  understanding	  or	  in	  reason.	  It	  is	  thus	  a	  way	  of	  getting	  a	  hold	  of	  a	  representation	   whose	   original	   constitution	   as	   a	   representation	   has	   already	   been	  determined	  by	  another	  cognitive	  faculty.	  So	  although	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  does	  not	  first	  make	  the	  representation	   itself	  possible,	   it	  nevertheless	  governs	  a	  certain	  way	  that	  such	  a	  representation,	   originally	   constituted,	   e.g.,	   by	   reason	   as	   an	   idea,	   might	   be	   further	  constituted,	  but	  now	  in	  a	  weaker	  (because	  no	  longer	  constitutive	  of	  its	  being	  represented	  at	  all)	  sense.	  	   But	   how	   exactly	   does	   the	   power	   of	   judgment	   allow	   us	   to	   get	   a	   hold	   of	   a	  representation?	  In	  the	  first	  Critique,	  Kant	  had	  characterized	  it	  as	  a	  faculty	  of	  subsumption	  (CPR	   A132/B171).	   In	   this	   way,	   it	   allows	   us	   to	   grasp	   an	   intuition	   (the	   mode	   of	  representation	  proper	  to	  sensibility)	  as	  falling	  under	  a	  concept	  (the	  mode	  of	  representation	  proper	   to	   the	   understanding).	   Now,	   however,	   Kant	   casts	   the	   power	   of	   judgment	   in	   a	  broader	   light.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   task	   of	   subsumption,	  which	   is	   now	   characterized	   as	   the	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activity	   proper	   to	   the	   determining	   power	   of	   judgment,	   Kant	   adds	   a	   second	   task,	   to	   be	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  reflecting	  power	  of	  judgment.	  The	  power	  of	  judgment	  is	  reflecting	  when	  the	  particular	  is	  given	  and	  the	  general	  rule	  under	  which	  it	  is	  to	  be	  subsumed	  is	  sought	  after	  (CPJ	  5:179;	  FI	  20:211;	  JL	  9:131-­‐132).	  In	  the	  first	  Critique	  Kant	  had	  apparently	  assigned	  this	  task	  to	  reason	  in	  its	  hypothetical	  use	  (see	  CPR	  A646-­‐647/B674-­‐675).	  But	  it	  is	  not	  the	  first	  time	   that	   he	   had	   closely	   associated	   judgment	   and	   reflection.	   In	   the	   Amphiboly	   Kant	   had	  distinguished	   logical	   from	   transcendental	   reflection:	   logical	   reflection,	   which	   abstracts	  from	   the	   cognitive	   faculty	   to	   which	   the	   representation	   belongs,	   can	   be	   reckoned	   “mere	  comparison”	  (CPR	  A262/B318),	  while	  transcendental	  reflection	  “contains	  the	  ground	  of	  the	  possibility	   of	   the	   objective	   comparison	   of	   the	   representations	   to	   each	   other”	   (CPR	  A263/B319)	   and	   concerns	   “the	   comparison	   of	   representations	   in	   general	   with	   the	  cognitive	  power	  in	  which	  they	  are	  situated”	  (CPR	  A261/B317).	  Both	  sorts	  of	  reflection	  are	  necessary	   for	   judgments,	   although	   in	   different	   senses.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   transcendental	  reflection	   is	   necessary	   so	   that	   we	   do	   not	   mistake,	   as	   Leibniz	   had,	   the	   comparison	   of	  concepts	  for	  the	  comparison	  of	  things	  themselves.173	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  logical	  reflection	  is	  necessary	  for	  us	  to	  judge	  more	  generally,	  for	  “prior	  to	  all	  objective	  judgments	  we	  compare	  the	  concepts”	  (CPR	  A262/B317).174	  Although	   Kant	   is	   of	   course	   concerned	   in	   the	   Amphiboly	   primarily	   with	  transcendental	  reflection,	  his	  description	  of	  reflection	  in	  general	  accords	  quite	  closely	  with	  the	  reflecting	  power	  of	  judgment	  he	  introduces	  in	  the	  third	  Critique:	  
                                                173	  Although	  he	  does	  not	  explicitly	  qualify	  “reflection”	  as	  “transcendental	  reflection,”	  this	  is	  surely	  the	  point	  of	  Kant’s	   remark	   that	   “all	   judgments,	   indeed	   all	   comparisons,	   require	   a	   reflection,	   i.e.,	   a	   distinction	   of	   the	  cognitive	  power	  to	  which	  the	  given	  concepts	  belong”	  (CPR	  A261/B317).	  174	  But	   see	   n.	   131	   above:	   this	   does	   not	   entail	   that	   judging	   is	   not	   the	   transcendental	   condition	   for	   logical	  reflection	  and	  comparison.	  
 119	  
Reflection	  (reflexio)	  does	  not	  have	  to	  do	  with	  objects	  themselves,	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  concepts	  directly	  from	  them,	  but	  is	  rather	  the	  state	  of	  mind	  in	  which	  we	  first	  prepare	  ourselves	  to	  find	  out	  the	  subjective	  conditions	  under	  which	  we	   can	   arrive	   at	   concepts.	   It	   is	   the	   consciousness	   of	   the	   relation	   of	   given	  representations	   to	   our	   various	   sources	   of	   cognition	   [Erkenntnißquellen],	  through	   which	   alone	   their	   relation	   among	   themselves	   can	   be	   correctly	  determined.	  (CPR	  A260/B316)	  	  When	   he	   says	   that	   reflection	   concerns	   the	   relation	   of	   representations	   “to	   our	   various	  sources	   of	   cognition,”	   Kant	   is	   being	   slippery	  with	   his	   terminology,	   although	   not	  without	  reason.	  For	  the	  “sources”	  of	  cognition	  can	  refer	  either	  to	  concepts	  we	  have	  already	  acquired	  or	  else	  to	  the	  faculties	  to	  which	  the	  origin	  of	  those	  concepts	  can	  be	  traced.	  The	  rationalists	  will	  certainly	  agree	  with	  Kant	  when	  he	  suggests	  that	  we	  must	  ask,	  “Is	  it	  the	  understanding	  or	  is	  it	  the	  senses	  before	  which	  they	  are	  connected	  or	  compared?”	  (CPR	  A260/B316).	  For	  the	   rationalists,	   however,	   the	   criterion	   for	   answering	   this	   question	   is	   just	   the	   clarity	   or	  confusedness	  of	  the	  representations	  themselves,	  while	  for	  Kant	  what	  is	  first	  required	  is	  the	  transcendental	   reflection	   that	   identifies	   the	   (sensible	   or	   intellectual)	   origin	   of	   the	  representations.	  If	  we	  keep	  our	  attention	  on	  reflection	  in	  general,	  however,	  we	  can	  already	  see	  the	  key	  features	  of	  the	  reflecting	  power	  of	  judgment:	  it	  does	  not	  have	  to	  do	  with	  objects	  themselves,	  but	  with	  the	  subjective	  conditions	  of	  forming	  concepts	  of	  objects.	  In	  contrast	  to	  
determining	  judgments,	  in	  which	  we	  apply	  the	  concepts	  we	  have	  already	  made,	  in	  reflecting	  judgments	  we	  are	  engaged	  with	  the	  process	  of	  concept	   formation,	  examining	  the	  ways	   in	  which	  our	  representations	  are	  related	  to	  one	  another.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  activity	  of	  reflecting	  should	  not	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  mere	  inversion	  of	  determining,	  an	  activity	  which	  is	  otherwise	  separate	  from	  the	  latter.	   Indeed,	  these	  two	  activities	  must	  often	  work	  together	  to	  achieve	  the	  goal	  of	  cognition,	  as	  the	  (general-­‐logical)	  dependence	  of	  judgments	  of	  experience	  on	  judgments	  of	  perception	  amply	  illustrates.	  We	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may	   possess	   an	   empirical	   concept	   under	   which	   a	   particular	   intuition	   or	   a	   relatively	  particular	  concept	  can,	   in	  fact,	  be	  subsumed,	  but	  the	  latter	  (intuition	  or	  concept)	  may	  not	  be	   immediately	   recognizable	   as	   falling	  under	   the	   former.	   In	   such	   a	   case,	  we	   “reflect”	   the	  intuition	  or	  concept	  to	  be	  subsumed,	  seeking	  an	  intermediary	  concept	  or	  series	  of	  concepts	  that	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  judge—now	  in	  a	  determining	  manner—that	  in	  fact	  the	  subsumption	  is	  necessary.	  Now,	   the	   reflecting	   activity	   of	   judgment	   is	   not	   supposed	   to	   somehow	  provide	  our	  discursive	  understanding	  with	  a	  complete	  continuity	  of	  conceptual	  determinations	  that	  would	  render	  the	  ultimate	  subsumption	  “intuitive”	  (after	  the	  manner	  of	  the	  rationalists)	  in	  character.	   But	   it	   does	   guide	   the	   understanding	   to	   the	   point	   at	  which	   it	   can	   recognize	   an	  instantiation	   of	   its	   concept.	   Typically,	   then,	   the	   reflecting	   activity	   of	   judgment	   stands	   in	  service	   to	   its	  determining	  activity,	   coming	   to	   the	  aid	  of	   the	  understanding	  at	   those	   times	  when	   the	   empirical	   concepts	   of	   the	   latter	   appear	   at	   first	   insufficient	   to	   account	   for	   the	  present	  experience.	  Now,	  in	  the	  Analytic	  of	  Principles	  in	  the	  first	  Critique	  Kant	  had	  examined	  the	  a	  priori	  conditions	   for	   any	   appearance	   to	   be	   subsumable	   under	   any	   universal	   empirical	   rule	  whatsoever.	  In	  particular,	  he	  had	  proved	  in	  the	  Analogies	  the	  “thoroughgoing	  connection	  of	  everything	   contained	   in	   this	   totality	   of	   all	   appearances”	   (FI	   20:208;	   cf.	   CPR	   B218).	   This	  guarantees	  that	  nature	  is	  not	   just	  a	  mere	  aggregate	  of	  appearances	  that	  are	  subsequently	  compared	  according	  to	  their	  empirical	  marks,	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  follow	  from	  this,	  Kant	  tells	  us,	  perhaps	  surprisingly,	  that	  nature	  is	  “a	  system	  that	  can	  be	  grasped	  by	  the	  human	  faculty	  of	  cognition	   [ein	   für	  menschliche	  Erkenntnißvermögen	   faßliches	   System]”	   (FI	   20:209;	   cf.	   CPJ	  5:179-­‐180,	   183;	   and	   even	  CPR	  A654/B682).	   This	   is	   because,	   for	   all	   the	   first	  Critique	   has	  shown,	   the	   diversity	   and	  multiplicity	   of	   empirical	   laws	   could	   be	   so	   great	   that	   we	   could	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never	   collect	   them	   under	   a	   common	   principle.	   If	   this	   were	   so,	   Kant	   says,	   “it	   might	   be	  possible	   for	  us	   to	  connect	  perceptions	   to	  some	  extent	   in	  accordance	  with	  particular	   laws	  discovered	   on	   various	   occasions	   into	   one	   experience”	   (FI	   20:209).	   But	  we	  would	   not	   be	  able	  to	  grasp	  nature	  as	  a	  system.	  Is	  it	  really	  so	  obvious,	  however,	  that	  we	  do	  grasp	  nature	  as	  a	  system?	  If	  one	  did	  not	  know	  any	  better,	  one	  might	  mistake	  Kant’s	  invocation	  of	  a	  counterfactual	  scenario—one	  in	  which	  we	  succeed,	  but	  only	  to	  a	  limited	  extent,	  in	  collecting	  our	  perceptions	  together	  into	  one	  experience—for	  an	  astute	  description	  of	  the	  way	  modern	  science	  actually	  works.	  It	  is,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  not	  obvious	  that	  we	  must	  account	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  any	  further	  unity	  of	  our	  cognition.	  Here	   it	   is	   important	   to	   distinguish	  between	   the	   two	  noncompeting	   standpoints	   of	  the	  first	  and	  third	  Critiques.175	  In	  the	  first	  Critique,	  Kant	  had	  shown,	  against	  Leibniz,	  that	  the	  empirical	  laws	  of	  the	  understanding	  are	  not	  the	  result	  of	  the	  division	  of	  one	  unified	  matter	  given	  in	  advance	  to	  the	  understanding,	  but	  rather	  of	  the	  reflection	  of	  independently	  given	  matters	  that	  are	  only	  subsequently	  formed	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  understanding’s	  a	  priori	  laws	  (see	  esp.	  CPR	  A267/B322-­‐323).	  Thus	  for	  the	  cognition	  of	  things	  given	  from	  elsewhere,	  the	  ideal	  of	  a	  whole	  of	  reality	  given	  to	  thought	  prior	  to	  its	  determining	  activity	  can	  only	  be	  a	  heuristic,	  regulative	  principle	  to	  seek	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  diversity	  of	  its	  empirical	  laws	  as	  far	  as	  possible.	  The	  ideal	  unification	  of	  these	  laws	  need	  not	  be	  assumed,	  accordingly,	  as	  anything	  more	  than	  a	  focus	  imaginarius	  that	  guides	  our	  unifying	  activity	  (see	  CPR	  A644/B672).	  
                                                175	  For	  a	  completely	  opposite	  approach,	  see	  Longuenesse	  (1995),	  533-­‐536.	  She	  argues	  that	  the	  terms	  of	   the	  problem	  and	  its	  solution	  are	  fundamentally	  the	  same	  across	  the	  two	  texts,	  the	  third	  Critique	  merely	  adding	  a	  relation	   of	   the	   first	   Critique’s	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   transition	   from	   the	   concept	   of	   freedom	   to	  concepts	  of	  nature.	  I,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  think	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  transition	  demands	  a	  whole	  new	  solution,	  one	  which	  does	  not,	  however,	  require	  Kant	  to	  revise	  any	  substantive	  view	  he	  holds	  in	  the	  first	  Critique.	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As	  we	  have	  seen,	  however,	  what	  is	  required	  for	  the	  third	  Critique’s	  task	  is	  that	  we	  be	  able	  to	  think	  of	  nature	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  “the	  lawfulness	  of	  its	  form	  is	  at	  least	  in	  agreement	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  ends	  that	  are	  to	  be	  realized	  in	  it	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  laws	  of	  freedom”	  (CPJ	  5:176;	  see	  above,	  p.	  108).	  Recall	  that	  the	  transitional	  task	  Kant	  specifies	  in	  the	   third	   Critique	   moves	   not	   in	   the	   direction	   from	   laws	   that	   have	   the	   form	   of	   the	  understanding	  (constitutive	  of	  our	  comportment	  to	  objects	  of	  nature)	  to	  laws	  that	  have	  the	  form	   of	   reason	   (constitutive	   of	   our	   comportment	   to	   the	   object	   of	   freedom),	   but	   in	   the	  opposite	   direction.	   This	   means	   that	   the	   principles	   of	   reason	   to	   which	   Kant	   ascribed	  regulative	  validity	  in	  the	  first	  Critique,	  which	  presuppose	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  understanding	  as	  given	  (CPR	  A302/B359),	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  the	  task	  of	  transition.	  Instead,	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	   the	   laws	   of	   the	   understanding	   be	   representable	   as	   immanently	   (not	   merely	  potentially)	   bearing	   the	   form	   of	   reason.	   That	   is,	   we	   must	   represent	   nature	   as	   being	  purposive	   with	   respect	   to	   our	   power	   of	   judgment:	   because	   natural	   laws	   already	   have	   a	  thoroughgoing	  affinity	  amongst	  themselves,	  our	  power	  of	  judgment,	  which,	  in	  its	  reflecting	  activity,	   searches	   through	   the	   given	   particular	   laws	   for	   universal	   principles,	   is	   able	   to	  achieve	  success.	  This	  may	  sound	  a	  bit	  strange	  at	  first.	  Hasn’t	  Kant	  already	  shown	  in	  the	  first	  Critique	  that	   nature	   is	   suited	   to	   our	   power	   of	   judgment?	   After	   all,	   the	   Transcendental	   Deduction	  showed	  that	  nothing	  can	  even	  count	  as	  an	  object	   for	  us	  unless	  it	   is	  already	  the	  object	  of	  a	  judgment.	  Not	  only	   is	   it	  unnecessary	   to	  ask	  whether	   the	  power	  of	   judgment	   is	   “suited”	   to	  nature,	  but	   it	  positively	  misconstrues	  the	  nature	  of	   judgment,	   for	  acts	  of	   judging	  are	  only	  acts	  of	  judging	  when	  they	  involve	  a	  nonconceptual	  act	  of	  recognition.	  The	  purposiveness	  of	  nature	   to	   which	   Kant	   refers	   in	   the	   third	   Critique	   involves	   a	   hierarchical	   continuum	   of	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conceptual	   determinations	   in	   nature,	   but	   such	   a	   continuum	   appears	   to	   be	   exactly	   what	  Kant	  claimed	  in	  the	  first	  Critique	  that	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  does	  not	  require.	  To	  see	  clearly	  here,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  carefully	  distinguish	  the	  tasks	  of	  the	  first	  and	  third	   Critiques	   from	   one	   another.	   The	   cognition	   of	   nature	   requires	   us	   to	   criticize	   the	  pretensions	  of	  reason	  to	  legislate	  over	  that	  domain,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  task	  with	  which	  the	  first	  
Critique	   is	  primarily	   concerned.	  Given,	  however,	   that	   reason	   is	   legislative	  with	   respect	   to	  our	  faculty	  of	  desire,	  there	  arises	  a	  second	  question	  regarding	  nature,	  this	  time	  not	  about	  our	  cognition	  of	  it,	  but	  about	  our	  comportment	  to	  it	  in	  light	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  freedom.	  And	  this	  is	  what	  the	  third	  Critique	  is	  concerned	  to	  investigate.	  In	   light	   of	   these	   different	   tasks,	   the	   question	   of	   the	   suitability	   of	   nature	   for	   our	  power	  of	   judgment	  demands	  different	  answers.	  From	   the	   standpoint	  of	   the	   first	  Critique,	  the	  activity	  of	   the	  power	  of	   judgment,	  measured	  against	  an	   ideal	  of	   logical	  completeness,	  leaps	  over	  conceptual	  gaps.	  It	  owes	  us,	  however,	  no	  account	  of	  its	  right	  to	  do	  so,	  for	  only	  in	  virtue	  of	  nonconceptual	  subsumption	  is	  the	  recognition	  of	  nature	  in	  general	  possible.	  Any	  general	  attempt	  to	   impugn	  our	  power	  of	   judgment	  on	  this	  score	  illicitly	  assumes	  a	  God’s-­‐eye	   point	   of	   view.176	  When	  we	   look	   back,	   however,	   on	   our	   cognition	   of	   nature	   from	   the	  perspective	   afforded	   us	   by	   the	   practical	   standpoint,	   a	   perspective	   for	   which	   reason	   is	  legislative,	   matters	   stand	   somewhat	   differently.	   Now	   we	   must	   compare	   a	   discursively	  cognized	  world	  with	  one	  which	  unfolds	   itself	   intuitively	   from	  the	   top	  down,	  even	   though	  we	   lack	   a	   determinate	   cognition	   of	   the	   latter.	   In	   the	   light	   of	   such	   a	   comparison,	   the	  conceptual	   gaps	   that	   we	   jump	   over	   with	   our	   determining	   acts	   of	   judgment	   become	  problematic	   in	   a	   new	   way,	   for	   the	   gaps	   presupposed	   by	   our	   power	   of	   judgment	   are	  
                                                176	  Again,	   see	  my	  qualification	   in	  Chapter	   I:	   I	   am	  not	   saying	   that	   no	  particular	   judgment	   can	  be	   called	   into	  question.	  I	  am	  simply	  saying	  that	  no	  global	  skepticism	  about	  our	  ability	  to	  judge	  could	  ever	  get	  off	  the	  ground.	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precisely	  what	  are	  ruled	  out	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  ideal	  that	  contains	  its	  determinations	  within	  itself,	  unfolding	  them	  from	  the	  top	  down.	  Thus	   when	   we	   consider	   our	   acts	   of	   judgment	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	  supersensible	  world,	   they	   seem,	   to	   put	   it	   crudely,	   too	   quick.	   It	   is	   as	   if	  we	  had	  woven	   an	  intricate	  tapestry	  in	  our	  cognition	  of	  nature,	  but	  now	  find	  it	  threadbare	  upon	  the	  infinitely	  closer	   inspection	  that	  the	  practical	  standpoint	  demands	  of	  us.	   It	   is	   the	  sort	  of	   inadequacy	  that	   an	   intuitive	   understanding	  would	   find	  with	   the	   activity,	   however	   conscientious	   and	  thorough,	  of	  a	  discursive	  one.	  As	  Kant	  says	  later	  on	  in	  the	  third	  Critique,	  Our	  understanding	  thus	  has	  this	  peculiarity	  for	  the	  power	  of	  judgment,	  that	  in	  cognition	  by	  means	  of	  it	  the	  particular	  is	  not	  determined	  by	  the	  universal,	  and	   the	   former	   therefore	   cannot	   be	   derived	   from	   the	   latter	   alone;	   but	  nevertheless	  this	  particular	   in	  the	  manifold	  of	  nature	  should	  agree	  with	  the	  universal	   (through	   concepts	   and	   laws),	   which	   agreement	   under	   such	  circumstances	  must	  be	  quite	  contingent	  and	  without	  a	  determinate	  principle	  for	  the	  power	  of	  judgment.	  (CPJ	  5:406-­‐407)	  	  The	  possibility	  of	  such	  an	  agreement	  will	  be	  conceivable	  only	  if	  we	  at	  the	  same	  time	  conceive	  of	  another	  understanding,	  in	  relation	  to	  which,	  and	  indeed	  prior	  to	  any	  end	  attributed	  to	   it,	  we	  can	  represent	  the	  agreement	  of	  natural	   laws	  with	   our	   power	   of	   judgment,	   which	   for	   our	   understanding	   is	  conceivable	   only	   through	   ends	   as	   the	   means	   of	   connection,	   as	   necessary.	  (CPJ	  5:407)	  	  The	   latter	   sort	   of	   understanding	  will	   deal	   in	   universals	  which	   are	  not	   analytic	   (like	   ours	  are:	   contentful	   only	   insofar	   as	   discrete	   bits	   of	   sensible	   matter	   have	   been	   reflected	   into	  them),	   but	   rather	   synthetic	   (containing	   within	   themselves	   the	   power	   to	   determine	   the	  matter	  to	  which	  they	  apply).	  The	  difference	  between	  these	  two	  conceptions	  of	  universality	  now	  demands	  that	  we	  justify	  precisely	  that	  which	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  human	  cognition	  alone	  neither	  needed	  nor	  permitted	  any	  such	  justification.	  Failure	  to	  justify	  the	  prerogative	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  would	  have	  no	  consequences	  for	  the	  critique	  of	  cognition	  or	  the	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metaphysics	   of	   nature	   which	   it	   made	   possible.177	  Thinking	   of	   nature	   as	   purposive	   with	  respect	   to	  our	  power	  of	   judgment	  goes	  no	  way	   towards	  providing	  us	  with	  a	  determinate	  
cognition	   of	   it	   as	   such,	   but	   it	   brings	   the	   piecemeal,	   determinate	   world	   of	   theory	   into	  relation	  with	  a	  moral	  world	  with	  a	  thoroughly	  rational	  form.	  	   The	   distinctive	   question	   of	   the	   third	   Critique	   clarified,	   its	   answer	   is	   surprisingly	  simple.	  How	  do	  we	  know	  that	  nature	  is	  suited	  to	  our	  power	  of	  judgment,	  and	  hence	  that	  the	  nature	  we	  have	  discursively	   cognized	   can	  be	   the	   same	  nature	   that	  bears	   the	   form	  of	   the	  moral	  world	   immanently	  within	   itself?	  We	  can	   immediately	  establish	   the	   impossibility	  of	  both	   empirical	   and	  a	  priori	   proofs.	  An	   empirical	   investigation	   is	   only	  possible	  where	   the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  power	  of	   judgment	  is	  presupposed,	  but	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  third	  
Critique	   this	   involves	   an	   obvious	   petitio	   principii.	   Neither,	   however,	   is	   an	   a	   priori	   proof	  possible.	   For	   the	  mutual	   affinity	   of	   nature’s	   empirical	   laws	   is	   not	   a	   requirement	   for	   our	  cognitive	  relation	   to	  objects	   in	  general,	  and	   it	   therefore	  cannot	  be	  accorded	  the	  objective	  validity	  that	  attaches,	  e.g.,	  to	  the	  categories	  of	  the	  understanding.	  All	  that	  is	  left,	  then,	  is	  to	  subjectively	  assume	  that	  this	  principle	  obtains,	  that	  is,	  to	  assume	  that	  nature	  is	  suited	  to	  the	  needs	   of	   our	   power	   of	   judgment.	   As	   Kant	   puts	   it,	   the	   power	   of	   judgment	   prescribes	   a	  principle	  not	  to	  nature,	  but	  only	  to	  itself	  as	  a	  faculty	  for	  reflecting	  upon	  nature	  (CPJ	  5:185).	  	   Unlike	  Longuenesse,	  then,	  I	  see	  the	  question	  in	  the	  Introduction	  to	  the	  third	  Critique	  as	  a	  genuinely	  new	  one;	  unlike	  Guyer	  (see	  n.	  177),	  I	  see	  it	  as	  one	  whose	  answer	  does	  not	  require	  a	  revision	  of	  any	  central	  doctrine	  of	  the	  first	  Critique.	  The	  first	  Critique	  is	  a	  critique	  
                                                177	  Guyer,	  who	  denies	  this,	  sees	  Kant	  moving	  toward	  a	  “retraction	  of	  the	  first	  Critique’s	  doctrine	  of	  objective	  affinity,”	  replacing	  it	  with	  a	  presupposition	  which	  is	  “only	  a	  matter	  for	  judgment”	  (Guyer	  [1990],	  35).	  Guyer	  ends	  up	  with	  a	  Heidegger-­‐style	  claim:	  although	  Kant	  catches	  a	  glimpse	  of	   the	  necessity	   for	  regrounding	  the	  Transcendental	  Deduction	  in	  the	  merely	  subjective	  a	  priori	  principle	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judgment,	  he	  ultimately	  pulls	   back	   and	   attempts	   to	   hold	   onto	   the	  more	  metaphysically	   robust	   view	   of	   the	   first	  Critique.	   See	   Guyer	  (1990),	  38-­‐43.	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of	  our	   faculty	  of	   cognition,	  and	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	   cognition	   the	  affinity	  of	   the	  empirical	  manifold	   (as	   distinguished	   from	   the	   transcendental	   affinity	   of	   the	   manifold	   in	   general)	  cannot	   be	   established,	   but	   may	   be	   assumed	   as	   a	   heuristic	   principle	   in	   scientific	  investigation.	  Crucially,	   this	  assumption	  does	  not	  provide	  an	  a	  priori	  principle	  that	  would	  govern	  the	  faculty	  of	  feeling.	  The	  third	  Critique	  is	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  faculty	  of	  feeling.	  It	  tells	  us	   that	   we	   are	   permitted—in	   fact,	   required—to	   assume	   the	   affinity	   of	   the	   empirical	  manifold	  if	  a	  transition	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  freedom	  to	  concepts	  of	  nature	  is	  to	  be	  possible.	  This	  principle	  has,	  in	  fact,	  a	  cognitive	  use	  (as	  a	  teleological	  principle),	  but	  it	  is	  valid	  as	  an	  a	  
priori	   principle	   only	   for	   the	   faculty	   of	   feeling.	   Thus	   it	   does	   not	   permit	   us	   to	   cognize	   the	  empirical	  affinity	  of	  the	  manifold,	  but	  only	  to	  feel	  it.	  
Feeling	  and	  the	  Transition	  from	  Nature	  to	  Morals	  Kant’s	  task	  is	  obviously	  a	  rather	  delicate	  one.	  There	  must	  be	  a	  way	  of	  comporting	  ourselves	  to	   nature,	   to	  which	  we	   relate	   ourselves	   in	   the	   first	   place	   only	   cognitively	   and	   under	   the	  legislation	   of	   the	   understanding,	   as	   if	   it	   were	  materially	   determined	   by	   the	   form	   of	   our	  
practical	  cognition.	  Now,	  the	  relevant	  faculty	  by	  which	  we	  are	  able	  to	  effect	  the	  transition	  from	   nature	   to	   morals	   is	   not	   the	   faculty	   of	   cognition,	   but	   the	   faculty	   of	   the	   feeling	   of	  pleasure	   and	   displeasure.	   Although	   this	   is	   the	   key	   move	   that	   Kant	   makes	   in	   the	  Introduction	  to	  the	  third	  Critique,	   it	   is,	  admittedly,	  an	  obscure	  one,	  one	  the	  significance	  of	  which	  emerges	  more	  clearly	  only	  when	  we	  consider	  it	  in	  a	  broader	  context.	  If	  we	   go	   back	   to	   Kant’s	   original	   review	   of	   Herder’s	   Ideas,	   we	   can	   already	   see	   the	  clues	   that	  would	  allow	  Kant	   to	   identify	   feeling	  as	   the	   faculty	  by	  which	  nature	  and	  morals	  are	  to	  be	  connected.	  To	  be	  sure,	  Kant’s	  remarks	  at	  the	  time	  appeared	  to	  be,	  and	  probably	  were,	   a	  mere	   expression	  of	  Kant’s	   condescension	   towards	   the	   literary	  pretensions	   of	   his	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former	   student.	   Herder’s	   literary	   genius,	   but	   his	   philosophical	   weakness,	   consists	   in	   his	  ability	  to	  “captivate”	  the	  very	  object	  of	  his	  inquiry	  and	  hold	  it,	  as	  it	  were,	  at	  a	  distance	  from	  himself	   and	   his	   reader—approaching	   the	   object	   “through	   feeling	   and	   sensation”	   rather	  than	   through	   “cold	   judgment”	   (RH	   8:45).	   At	   the	   conclusion	   of	   his	   review,	   Kant	   advises	  Herder	  to	  accept	  the	  guidance	  of	  philosophy	  as	  a	  way	  of	  restraining	  his	  genius:	  he	  should	  complete	   his	   project	   not	   through	   an	   imagination	   powered	   by	   feeling,	   but	   by	   recourse	   to	  “determinate	  concepts”	  (RH	  8:55).	  Pedantic	   advice	   like	   this	   is	  well	   and	  good	   if	  Herder’s	  project	  of	   connecting	  nature	  and	   morality	   precludes	   ultimate	   reference	   to	   feeling	   and	   requires	   the	   employment	   of	  determinate	  concepts.	  Does	  it,	  though?	  In	  a	  sense,	  yes:	  insofar	  as	  such	  a	  project	  pretends	  to	  be	  scientific,	  it	  does.	  But	  in	  the	  years	  following	  his	  review	  of	  the	  Ideas,	  Kant	  would	  conclude	  that	  the	  true	  significance	  of	  Herder’s	  project	  lies	  in	  another	  direction	  entirely,	  even	  if	  this	  had	  not	  been	  clear	  to	  Herder	  himself.	  Looking	  back	  on	  his	  review,	  Kant	  could	  not	  fail	  to	  see	  Herder’s	  reliance	  on	  feeling	  at	  crucial	  points	  as	  symptomatic	  of	  a	  genuine	  role	  for	  this	  third	  faculty	   in	   the	  connection	  of	  nature	  and	  morals.	   In	   the	   introductory	  material	   for	   the	   third	  
Critique,	  Kant	  attempts	  for	  the	  first	  and	  only	  time	  to	  make	  this	  clear.	  The	  relevant	  feeling	  in	  this	  case	  is	  one	  of	  delight	  at	  finding,	  in	  particular	  instances,	  that	   nature	   is	   in	   fact	   purposive	  with	   respect	   to	   our	   faculty	   of	   cognition,	   that	   is,	   that	   the	  diversity	   of	   empirical	   laws	   which	   we	   discover	   is	   proportioned,	   after	   all,	   to	   the	   limited	  powers	  of	  our	  human	  understanding.	  Such	  a	  claim,	  it	  is	  true,	  requires	  some	  explanation,	  for	  it	  may	  seem	  to	  flatly	  contradict	  Kant’s	  earlier	  insistence	  that	  no	  empirical	  investigation	  can	  reveal	   to	   us	   the	   purposiveness	   of	   nature.	   Worse	   yet,	   it	   may	   seem	   as	   though	   we	   are	  discovering	  “empirically”	  nothing	  more	  than	  what	  we	  had	  already	  assumed	  as	  a	  principle:	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We	  are	   supposed	   to	   encounter	  nature’s	  purposiveness,	  Kant	   tells	   us,	   “just	   as	   if	   it	  were	   a	  happy	   accident	   which	   happened	   to	   favor	   our	   aim	   [ein	   glücklicher	   unsre	   Absicht	  
begünstigender	   Zufall]”	   (CPJ	   5:184).	   Thus	   we	   are	   not	   dealing	   simply	   with	   pleasure,	   but	  along	  with	  that	  a	   feeling	  of	  surprise	  and	  relief	  at	  having	  been	  unburdened	  of	  a	  need	  (see	  CPJ	  5:184).	  And	  yet	  if	  we	  have	  already	  assumed	  this	  very	  purposiveness	  a	  priori,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  why	  “finding”	  it	  in	  particular	  instances	  should	  occasion	  such	  satisfaction.	  	   Before	  we	  try	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  difficulties	  here,	  let’s	  see	  what	  utility	  this	  delight	  may	  have.	  It	  is	  a	  feeling	  of	  surprised	  pleasure,	  Kant	  tells	  us,	  in	  which	  a	  special	  form	  of	  reflecting	  judgment	   is	   grounded:	   aesthetic	   judgment.	   Now,	   he	   immediately	   clarifies	   that	   because	  there	   is	  and	  can	  be	  no	  objective	   sense	  of	  an	  aesthetic	   judgment,	  an	  aesthetic	   judgment	   is	  not,	  strictly	  speaking,	  really	  a	  judgment	  at	  all.	  For	  
judgments	   belong	   absolutely	   only	   to	   the	   understanding	   (taken	   in	   a	   wider	  sense),	  and	  to	   judge	  aesthetically	  or	  sensibly,	   insofar	  as	  this	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  cognition	  of	  an	  object,	  is	  itself	  a	  contradiction	  even	  if	  sensibility	  meddles	  in	  the	  business	  of	  the	  understanding	  and	  .	   .	   .	  gives	  the	  understanding	  a	  false	  direction;	   rather,	   an	   objective	   judgment	   is	   always	   made	   by	   the	  understanding,	  and	  to	  that	  extent	  cannot	  be	  called	  aesthetic.	  (FI	  20:222)	  	  If	   we	   nevertheless	   call	   aesthetic	   judgments	   “judgments,”	   this	   is	   because	   the	   feeling	   on	  which	   they	   are	   based	   is	   inseparable	   from	   the	   (reflecting)	   activity	   of	   judgment.	   In	   an	  aesthetic	  judgment	  “a	  given	  representation	  is	  certainly	  related	  to	  an	  object	  but	  .	  .	   .	  what	  is	  understood	  in	  the	  judgment	  is	  not	  the	  determination	  of	  the	  object,	  but	  of	  the	  subject	  and	  its	  feeling”	   (FI	   20:223).	   In	   the	   Schematism	   of	   the	   first	   Critique,	   Kant	   had	   considered	   the	  relation	  between	  understanding	  and	  imagination	  objectively,	  or	  cognitively,	  by	  considering	  the	  restraints	  on	  the	  intuition	  of	  objects	  that	  the	  understanding	  enforces	  by	  means	  of	  the	  imagination.	   But	   the	   relation	   between	   understanding	   and	   imagination	   can	   also	   be	  considered	  merely	  subjectively:	  instead	  of	  asking	  how	  our	  relation	  to	  cognizable	  objects	  is	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governed,	  we	  can	  ask	  about	   the	   feeling	   that	   is	  produced	   in	  us	  by	   the	  accordance	  (or	   lack	  thereof)	  between	  the	  two	  faculties	  (FI	  20:223).	  	   It	  should	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  reflecting	  power	  of	  judgment	  ultimately	  stands	  in	  service	   to	   its	   determining	   power:	   we	   reflect	   concepts	   under	   increasingly	   universal	  representations	   so	   that	   we	   can	   in	   turn	   determine	   sensible	   representations	   by	  means	   of	  those	  reflected	  concepts.	  The	  power	  of	  judgment	  is,	  after	  all,	  a	  faculty	  of	  cognition,	  and	  only	  in	  its	  determining	  activity	  is	  it	  productive	  of	  cognitions	  in	  the	  full	  sense	  of	  the	  latter,	  and	  we	  will	  recall	  that	  a	  cognition	  consists	  in	  “the	  determinate	  relation	  of	  given	  representations	  to	  an	  object”	  (CPR	  B137).	  Reflection	  is	  necessary	  in	  instances	  in	  which	  we	  do	  not	  immediately	  recognize	   our	   sensations	   as	   falling	   under	   familiar	   concepts.	   In	   such	   situations	   we	   are	  forced,	  as	  it	  were,	  to	  step	  back	  and	  observe	  the	  interplay	  between	  our	  cognitive	  faculties.	  This	   can,	   to	   be	   sure,	   result	   in	   mere	   frustration	   if	   we	   experience	   a	   complete	   lack	   of	   fit	  between	  the	  intuition	  and	  our	  concepts.	  But	  if	  the	  reflection	  is	  successful,	  an	  integration	  of	  our	   present	   experience	   with	   cognition	   in	   general	   becomes	   possible	   which	   was	   not	  immediately	  noticeable	  beforehand.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  allows	  us	  to	  cognize	  an	  object	  via	  the	  determining	  power	  of	  judgment,	  but	  the	  subjective	  effect,	  which	  is	  the	  sign	  that	  such	  a	  determination	  has	  been	  made	  possible,	  is	  one	  of	  surprised	  delight:	  we	  have	  been	  relieved	  of	  the	  need	  to	  find	  a	  concept	  for	  our	  intuition.	  An	  aesthetic	  judgment	  registers	  this	  feeling	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  activity	  of	  reflection:	  we	  take	  pleasure	  in	  realizing	  that	  we	  might	  yet	  overcome	  the	  experienced	  gap	  between	  our	  intuitions	  and	  our	  concepts.	  	   Beauty,	   the	   natural	   symbol	   of	   the	   morally	   good,	   is	   where	   we	   find	   this	   delight	  manifested	   in	   its	   most	   essential	   form.	   To	   say	   that	   a	   beautiful	   object	   is	   a	   symbol	   means	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something	   specific	   for	   Kant.	   Leibniz,	   distinguishing	   between	   intuitive	   and	   symbolic	  cognition,178	  had	  complained	  that	  on	   topics	   and	   circumstances	  where	   our	   senses	   are	   not	  much	   engaged,	   our	  thoughts	   are	   for	   the	  most	   part	   what	   we	  might	   call	   “blind”—in	   Latin	   I	   call	  them	   cogitationes	   caecae.	   I	   mean	   that	   they	   are	   empty	   of	   perception	   and	  sensibility,	  and	  consist	  in	  the	  wholly	  unaided	  use	  of	  symbols,	  as	  happens	  with	  those	   who	   calculate	   algebraically	   with	   only	   intermittent	   attention	   to	   the	  geometrical	  figures	  which	  are	  being	  dealt	  with.179	  	  But	  where	  Leibniz	  sees	  two	  possible	  kinds	  of	  cognition,	  Kant	  sees	  three,	  and	  what	  Leibniz	  labels	   “symbolic”	   Kant	   refers	   to	   as	   “discursive,”	   or	   “intellectual.”180	  For	   Kant,	   symbolic	  cognition,	  strictly	  speaking,	  is	  actually	  a	  species	  of	  intuitive	  cognition	  and	  can	  be	  properly	  contrasted	  with	  schematic	  cognition	  (CPJ	  5:351).	  According	  to	  Kant,	  All	   intuitions	  that	  are	  set	  under	  [unterlegt]	  concepts	  a	  priori	  are	  thus	  either	  
schemata	  or	  symbols,	   the	  first	  of	  which	  contain	  direct,	   the	  second	  indirect	  presentations	  of	  the	  concept.	  The	  first	  do	  this	  demonstratively,	  the	  second	  by	  means	  of	   an	   analogy	   (for	  which	   empirical	   intuitions	   are	   also	   employed),	   in	  which	   the	   power	   of	   judgment	   performs	   a	   double	   task,	   first	   applying	   the	  concept	   to	   the	  object	  of	  a	   sensible	   intuition,	   and	   then,	   second,	  applying	   the	  mere	   rule	   of	   reflection	   on	   that	   intuition	   to	   an	   entirely	   different	   object,	   of	  which	  the	  first	  is	  only	  the	  symbol.	  (CPJ	  5:352;	  trans.	  modified)	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  symbols,	  which	  are	  more	  indirect	  than	  schemata,	  nevertheless	  require	  an	   initial	  reference	  to	  a	  sensible	   intuition.181	  It	   is	  not,	  however,	   the	  reference	  to	  sensation	  itself	   in	   virtue	   of	   which	   symbolic	   cognition	   is	   intuitive,	   but	   only	   by	   transferring	   “the	  reflection	   on	   an	   object	   of	   intuition	   to	   an	   entirely	   different	   concept,	   to	  which	   perhaps	   no	  intuition	   can	   ever	   directly	   correspond”	   (CPJ	   5:352-­‐353;	   trans.	   modified).	   In	   this	   way	   it	  
                                                178	  For	  his	  most	  extensive	  development	  of	  this	  distinction,	  see	  Leibniz	  (1684),	  24-­‐25.	  Wolff	  rediscovered	  this	  early	  text	  and	  incorporated	  Leibniz’s	  distinction	  into	  his	  own	  thought	  in	  Wolff	  (1720),	  27	  (§316).	  See	  Wilson	  (1995),	  447-­‐448.	  179	  Leibniz	  (1703-­‐1705),	  185-­‐186.	  180 	  Kant,	   Leibniz,	   and	   Wolff,	   however,	   all	   take	   the	   reasoning	   that	   relies	   on	   words,	   or	   characters,	   as	  paradigmatic	  of	  this	  sort	  of	  cognition.	  See	  CPJ	  5:352;	  A	  7:191.	  181	  By	  contrast,	  schemata	  (of	  pure	  concepts)	  concern	  only	  the	  pure,	  universal	  form	  of	  our	  sensible	   intuition,	  i.e.,	  time	  (CPR	  A142/B181).	  
 131	  
functions	   “analogically”	   (CPJ	   5:352;	   A	   7:191).	   Thus	   an	   intuition	   functioning	   symbolically	  immediately	  deflects	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  understanding	  away	  from	  the	  intuition	  itself	  and	  onto	  the	  rule	  for	  which	  it	  serves	  as	  an	  instance.	  Kant	  expresses	  this	  by	  saying	  that	  it	  is	  “the	  form	  of	  the	  reflection,	  not	  the	  content,	  which	  corresponds	  to	  the	  concept”	  (CPJ	  5:351).	  It	   is	   this	   form	   of	   the	   reflection	   that	   corresponds	   to	   the	   possibility	   of	   an	   a	   priori	  principle	   of	   the	   power	   of	   judgment,	   for	   insofar	   as	   the	   activity	   of	   this	   faculty	   is	   merely	  reflecting,	  it	  is	  beholden	  not	  to	  the	  sensation	  itself,	  but	  rather	  to	  the	  mere	  attempt	  to	  bring	  this	  sensation	  into	  relation	  with	  concepts.	  Thus	  in	  this	  faculty	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  does	  not	  see	  itself,	  as	  is	  otherwise	  the	  case	   in	   empirical	   judging,	   as	   subjected	   to	   a	   heteronomy	   of	   the	   laws	   of	  experience;	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  objects	  of	  such	  a	  pure	  satisfaction	  it	  gives	  the	  law	  to	  itself,	   just	  as	  reason	  does	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  faculty	  of	  desire;	  and	  it	  sees	  itself,	   both	   on	   account	   of	   this	   inner	   possibility	   in	   the	   subject	   as	  well	   as	   on	  account	  of	  the	  outer	  possibility	  of	  a	  nature	  that	  corresponds	  to	  it,	  as	  related	  to	   something	   in	   the	   subject	   itself	   and	  outside	  of	   it,	  which	   is	   neither	  nature	  nor	   freedom,	   but	  which	   is	   connected	  with	   the	   ground	  of	   the	   latter,	   namely	  the	   supersensible,	   in	   which	   the	   theoretical	   faculty	   is	   combined	   with	   the	  practical,	  in	  a	  mutual	  and	  unknown	  way,	  to	  form	  a	  unity.	  (CPJ	  5:353)	  	  Now,	   the	   “inner	   possibility	   in	   the	   subject”	   and	   “the	   outer	   possibility	   of	   a	   nature	   that	  corresponds	   to	   it”	   refer	   us	   back	   to	   the	   “happy	   accident”	  Kant	   had	   spoken	  of	   earlier	   (CPJ	  5:184):	  the	  coincidence	  of	  the	  parsimony	  of	  laws	  encountered	  in	  nature	  with	  the	  subjective	  needs	  of	  our	  power	  of	  judgment.	  Kant’s	  point	  is	  that	  the	  very	  expression	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  imagination,	   reflecting	  upon	   the	  sensibly	  given,	  proves	   itself	   to	  coincide	  with	   the	  need	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  to	  cognize	  nature	  determinately.	  The	  power	  of	  judgment	  “sees	  itself	  .	   .	   .	  as	  related	  to	  something	   in	   the	  subject	   itself	  and	  outside	  of	   it”;	   that	   is,	   it	   relates	  at	   the	  same	  time	  to	  the	  particular	  laws	  of	  nature	  and	  to	  the	  subjective	  need	  to	  find	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  highest	  good	  reflected	  there,	  making	  possible	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  freedom	  to	  concepts	  of	  nature.	  
 132	  
Now,	  Kant	  warns	  us	  that	  “to	  claim	  (with	  Swedenborg)	  that	  the	  real	  appearances	  of	  the	  world	   present	   to	   the	   senses	   are	  merely	   a	   symbol	   of	   an	   intelligible	  world	   hidden	   in	  reserve	   is	  enthusiasm”	   (A	  7:191).	  To	  do	  so	  would	  be,	   I	   think,	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	   the	  symbolic	  anyway:	  to	  try	  to	  impose,	  in	  a	  determining	  manner,	  a	  schema	  onto	  the	  world	  as	  a	  whole	  already	  precludes	  the	  very	  essential	  role	  for	  the	  reflecting	  activity	  of	  judgment	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  symbolic	  cognition,	  for	  to	  judge	  of	  an	  object	  that	  it	   is	  beautiful	  requires	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  encountered,	  not	  expected	  or	  contrived,	  misfit	  between	  the	  object	  and	  the	  concept	   under	   which	   it	   ultimately	   becomes	   subsumable	   (though	   not	   necessarily	  subsumed).	   Only	   in	   this	   way	   is	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   object	   reflected	   beyond	   its	   previous	  borders	  and	  do	  judgments	  of	  taste	  become	  possible	  at	  all.	  Accordingly,	  we	  must	  take	  Kant’s	  idea	  of	  a	  “double	  task”	  for	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  quite	  literally	  (CPJ	  5:352,	  quoted	  above).	  First,	   it	   seeks	   to	  apply	  some	  concept	   to	   the	  object	  of	  a	  sensible	   intuition.	  The	  application	  initially	   fails,	  which	  occasions	  an	  activity	  of	  reflection.	   In	   the	  course	  of	   this	  reflecting,	   the	  concept	  and	  the	  intuition	  are	  brought	  into	  proximity	  to	  one	  another	  by	  way	  of	  analogy,	  and	  the	   delight	   accompanying	   this	   accomplishment	   signals	   to	   us	   the	   uncanny	   proximity	   of	  nature	   to	  our	   concepts.	   It	   is	   this	   very	  proximity,	   the	  unexpected	   coincidence	  of	  what	  we	  discursively	   cognize	   and	   what	   a	   natural	   world	   unfolded	   from	   the	   top	   down	   as	   an	   ideal	  would	  be	  like,	  that	  allows	  the	  morally	  good,	  itself	  an	  indeterminate	  idea,	  to	  shine	  forth	  from	  the	   particular	   aesthetic	   experiences.	   Although	   these	   experiences	   always	   point	   in	   the	  direction	   of	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   intelligibility	   of	   the	   world,	   they	   are	   only	   aesthetic	  experiences	  insofar	  as	  we	  abstract	  from	  the	  determining	  activity	  of	  judgment	  to	  which	  such	  experiences	  point.	  To	  proceed	  straightaway	  to	  determining	  judgments	  is	  the	  familiar	  error	  of	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  intellectualize	  aesthetic	  experience,	  losing	  what	  is	  specific	  to	  it	  in	  the	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process.	   Crucially,	   the	   delight	   that	   grounds	   aesthetic	   judgments	   and	   accompanies	   our	  discovery	   of	   the	   purposiveness	   of	   nature	   with	   respect	   to	   us	   attends	   not	   the	   ensuing	  determination	  (if	  we	  even	  make	  one),	  but	  only	  the	  activity	  of	  reflection	  so	  long	  as	  we	  are	  able	  to	  linger	  in	  it.	  	   Perhaps	   it	   is	   not	   yet	   clear,	   however,	   whether	   the	   delight	   grounding	   aesthetic	  judgments	   is	   really	   something	   to	   which	   we	   are	   entitled.	   Nietzsche	   once	   observed,	   “If	  someone	  hides	   something	  behind	  a	  bush,	   looks	   for	   it	   in	   the	   same	  place	  and	   then	   finds	   it	  there,	   his	   seeking	   and	   finding	   is	   nothing	  much	   to	   boast	   about.”182	  Haven’t	  we	   simply	   set	  ourselves	  up	  for	  this	  delight	  by	  virtue	  of	  presupposing	  a	  priori	  the	  purposiveness	  of	  nature	  with	   respect	   to	   our	   faculty	   of	   cognition?	  Regardless	   of	   the	  presumed	  necessity	   of	   such	   a	  principle,	   doesn’t	   it,	   to	   put	   the	   point	   bluntly,	   rather	   cheapen	   the	   pleasure	   that	   our	  subsequent	   experience	  manifests?	  More	   to	   the	  point,	   perhaps:	   doesn’t	   it	   suggest	   that	  we	  have	  really	   just	   tricked	  ourselves	   into	   finding	  a	   symbol	  of	  morality	   in	   the	  natural	  world?	  Have	  we	  done	  anything	  more	  than	  hide	  it,	  ourselves,	  behind	  the	  bush	  of	  appearances,	  and	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  beauty,	  are	  we	  really,	  in	  fact,	  doing	  anything	  more	  than	  congratulating	  ourselves	  for	  finding	  it	  there?	  We	   can	   acknowledge,	   of	   course,	   that	   we	   should	   not	   be	   delighted	   to	   “find,”	   say,	  causality	   in	  nature,	   for	  the	  presence	  of	   this	  causality	   in	  the	  relations	  of	  natural	  objects	  to	  one	  another	   is	  entirely	  determined	  by	  our	   faculty	  of	  cognition.	  We	  could	  not	  encounter	  a	  natural	  object	  at	  all	  were	  it	  not	  already	  determined	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  category.183	  But	  to	  
                                                182	  Nietzsche	  (1873),	  147.	  183	  Well,	  this	  actually	  sells	  Kant’s	  story	  short	  in	  several	  respects,	  neglecting,	  as	  it	  does,	  his	  distinction	  between	  the	   mathematical-­‐constitutive	   and	   the	   dynamic-­‐regulative	   principles	   of	   the	   understanding	   (CPR	   A178-­‐181/B221-­‐224).	   But	   even	   the	   dynamic-­‐regulative	   principles	   are	   constitutive	   of	   objectivity	   in	   the	   sense	  required	  here,	  making	  possible	  (and	  being	  restricted	  to)	  the	  field	  of	  possible	  experience	  as	  a	  whole	  (see	  CPR	  A509-­‐510/B537-­‐538).	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regard	  nature	  as	  purposive	  for	  our	  power	  of	  judgment	  already	  requires	  our	  looking	  at	  the	  cognition	   of	   nature	   in	   light	   of	   our	   duty	   to	   transform	   it.	   The	   power	   of	   judgment,	   which	  represents	  objects	  only	  when	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	  their	  representation	  are	  already	  given	  by	  another	  faculty,184	  is	  not	  constitutive	  of	  objects,	  either	  of	  cognition	  or	  of	  desire.	  Thus	  its	  
a	  priori	  principle	  is	  merely	  subjective,	  and	  it	  follows	  that	  the	  assumption	  of	  purposiveness	  is	  not	  thought	  along	  with	  the	  thought	  of	  its	  objects.	  This	  allows	  for	  an	  element	  of	  surprise	  when	  the	  subjective	  principle	  governing	  this	  faculty	  finds	  the	  conditions	  of	  its	  fulfillment	  in	  the	  objective	  world.	  In	  such	  cases	  we	  feel,	  as	  it	  were,	  reason	  in	  nature,	  finding	  ourselves	  on	  the	  cusp	  of	  a	  new	  possibility	  for	  the	  determining	  power	  of	  judgment	  which	  we	  had	  not	  seen	  before.	  There	   are	   two	   ways	   to	   consider	   this	   possibility,	   however:	   subjectively	   and	  objectively.	   The	   aesthetic	   judgment	   takes	   the	   former	   path,	   abstracting	   entirely	   from	   the	  determination	  which	  the	  reflection	  has	  made	  possible.	  This	  is	  why	  Kant	  will	  go	  on	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  “free	  play”	  of	  the	  understanding	  and	  the	  imagination	  (CPJ	  5:217):	  the	  play	  is	  “free”	  precisely	   because	   the	   act	   of	   determining	   is	   deferred	   indefinitely.	   If	   the	   latter	   is	  consummated,	  the	  imagination	  is	  again	  strictly	  subordinated	  to	  the	  understanding,	  and	  the	  play	   between	   the	   two	   ceases.185	  Teleological	   judgments,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   take	   the	  objective	   path:	   they	   consider	   the	   purposiveness	   on	   the	   side	   of	   the	   object	   and	   are	   hence	  logical,	  i.e.,	  determined	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  concepts	  (CPJ	  5:193).	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  are	  themselves	  determining	  judgments:	  as	  presumptive	  cognitions,	  they	  could	  only	  be	  such	  if	   they	  restricted	  themselves	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  mechanical	  explanation.	  But	  by	  focusing	  
                                                184	  That	  is,	  it	  has	  a	  “certain	  Beschaffenheit	  of	  them”;	  see	  p.	  115	  above.	  185	  In	  his	  1792	  logic	  lectures,	  Kant	  puts	  the	  point	  this	  way:	  “There	  really	  is	  no	  beautiful	  cognition.	  In	  cognition	  it	  is	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  relation	  to	  the	  object—if	  it	  is	  met	  with,	  then	  it	  is	  true,	  but	  only	  the	  exhibition	  can	  be	  
beautiful”	  (DWL	  24:705).	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on	  the	  reflected	  concept	  of	  the	  object,	  not	  the	  feeling	  in	  the	  subject,	  teleological	  judgments	  belong	   originally	   to	   the	   sphere	   of	   cognition	   and	   are	   thus	   not	   appropriate	   for	   the	  transitional	  task	  with	  which	  the	  third	  Critique	  is	  principally	  concerned.	  
The	  Significance	  of	  Feeling	  For	  all	  its	  ambitions,	  the	  introductory	  material	  to	  the	  third	  Critique	  maintains	  a	  scholastic	  distance	   from	  the	  conclusion	   to	  which	   it	   leads:	   that	  only	   through	   feeling	   is	   the	   transition	  from	  natural	  to	  moral	  philosophy	  possible.	  Kant	  had	  already	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  this	  thought,	   however,	   in	   the	   1786	   essay	   that	   cemented	   his	   position	   as	   a	   champion	   of	   the	  Enlightenment,	  What	  Does	  It	  Mean	  to	  Orient	  Oneself	  in	  Thinking?	  In	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   initial	   storm	   of	   1785	   Jacobi	   had	   fervently	   hoped,	   and	   even	  expected,	  that	  he	  would	  soon	  be	  able	  to	  enlist	  Kant	  as	  an	  ally.186	  Kant	  was,	  after	  all,	  still	  the	  author	   of	   the	  Dreams,	   and	  Mendelssohn’s	   own	   skeptical	   interpretation	   of	   Kant’s	   project,	  combined	  with	  the	  respectful	  distance	  he	  kept	  from	  it,	  no	  doubt	  emboldened	  Jacobi	  in	  his	  expectations.	   It	  was	   to	  his	   severe	  disappointment,	   then,	   that	   Jacobi	   found	  Kant	   taking	  up	  Mendelssohn’s	  cause	  in	  the	  orientation	  essay.	  That	  Kant	  was	  doing	  so	  only	  nominally	  was	  of	   little	   consolation;	   if	   anything,	   Jacobi	   was	   only	   further	   provoked	   by	   the	   interpretive	  gymnastics	  he	  witnessed	  Kant	  performing	  in	  order	  to	  “defend”	  Mendelssohn.	  Disappointed,	  he	  finally	  gave	  up	  on	  Kant	  and	  his	  critical	  project.187	  Jacobi’s	   exasperation,	   at	   least,	   is	   understandable,	   for	   Kant’s	   appropriation	   of	  Mendelssohn’s	  approach	  in	  Morning	  Hours	  borders	  on	  disingenuousness.	  Mendelssohn	  had	  
                                                186	  He	  even	  quotes	  extensively	  from	  the	  first	  Critique	  to	  defend	  himself	  against	  Mendelssohn’s	  accusations,	  a	  use	  of	  his	  philosophy	  that	  was	  likely	  irksome	  to	  Kant.	  See	  Jacobi	  (1786),	  158.	  For	  the	  background	  to	  this,	  see	  Beiser	  (1987),	  113-­‐115,	  122.	  187	  This	   found	   expression,	   of	   course,	   in	   Jacobi’s	   famous	   criticisms	   of	   the	   very	   foundations	   of	   the	   critical	  philosophy.	  See	  Beiser	  (1987),	  122-­‐126.	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argued	  that	  although	  it	  is	  the	  task	  of	  philosophy	  to	  correct	  common	  sense,	  the	  philosopher	  must	   be	   careful	   not	   to	   stray	   too	   far	   afield:	   if	   the	   philosopher	   finds	   herself	   committed	   to	  propositions	  that	  fly	  in	  the	  face	  of	  received	  wisdom,	  she	  is	  to	  retrace	  her	  steps	  back	  to	  the	  point	  from	  which	  she	  originally	  parted	  ways	  with	  common	  sense,	  a	  point	  at	  which	  she	  can	  and	  must	  reorient	  her	  thinking	  anew.188	  Even	   in	  this	  brief	  sketch,	   it	   is	  easy	  to	  see	  at	   least	  the	   basis	   for	   Hegel’s	   later	   charge	   of	   unseriousness,189	  and	   Jacobi—whatever	   illusions	   he	  might	  have	  harbored	  about	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  critical	  philosophy—could	  surely	  have	  expected	  the	   “all-­‐crushing	  Kant,”	  who	   had	  written	  what	  was	   being	   called	   the	   “doomsday	   book”	   of	  philosophy,190	  to	  take	  Mendelssohn	  to	  task.	  But	  Kant	  does	  not.	  Instead,	  he	  recasts	  Mendelssohn’s	  appeal	  to	  “common	  sense”	  as	  an	  altogether	  appropriate,	   if	   not	  quite	   adequately	  understood,	   appeal	   to	   feeling:	   it	   is	   this	  faculty,	   not	   a	   cognitive	   one	   at	   all,	   by	  which	  we	   can	   reorient	   ourselves	  when	   lost.	  On	   the	  surface,	   this	  bears	  a	   striking	   resemblance	   to	   Jacobi’s	  own	  alternative	   to	  Mendelssohn,	  an	  appeal	  to	  “intuition,”	  which	  is	  not,	  at	  least	  for	  Jacobi,	  strictly	  cognitive	  in	  nature,	  but	  has	  an	  ethical	   significance,	   as	   well.191	  But	   Kant	   makes	   a	   move	   which	   is	   surprising,	   though	   in	  retrospect	   perhaps	   less	   so:	   he	   links	   the	   “feeling”	   by	  which	  we	   are	   to	   orient	   ourselves	   in	  thinking	  to	  a	  strictly	  cognitive	  faculty,	  not	  to	  understanding	  or	  to	  intuition,	  however,	  but	  to	  the	  power	  of	  judgment.	  	   Kant	   begins	   his	   essay	   by	   considering	   the	   plight	   of	   a	   disoriented	   astronomer	  stranded	   on	   a	   clear	   night	   under	   the	   constellations	   he	   knows	   so	   well.	   No	   quantity	   of	  objective	   scientific	   cognition	  will	   help	   him	   find	   his	   way	   home	   if	   he	   does	   not	   also	   relate	  
                                                188	  Beiser	  (1987),	  98-­‐102.	  189	  See	  n.	  138	  above.	  190	  Windelband	  (1892),	  536.	  191	  Beiser	  (1987),	  81-­‐83.	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himself	  subjectively,	  by	  means	  of	   feeling	  the	  difference	  between	  right	  and	   left,	   to	  what	  he	  knows	   (OOT	  8:135).	  Reason,	   too,	  Kant	  wants	  us	   to	   see,	   spins	   an	   essentially	  directionless	  web	  of	  pure	  thought,	  one	  in	  which	  we	  can	  easily	  become	  lost.	  Perhaps	  getting	  lost	  in	  it	  was	  Leibniz’s	   ambition,	   but	   it	   was,	   at	   any	   rate,	   the	   specter	   Jacobi	   was	   raising	   against	  Mendelssohn	  (and	   the	  Enlightenment	  as	  a	  whole).	   In	  reality,	   it	  was	   just	  a	  new	  version	  of	  Rousseau’s	  conclusion	  in	  the	  first	  Discourse,	  i.e.,	  that	  science,	  left	  to	  its	  own	  devices,	  cannot	  be	   a	   true	   philosophy	   at	   all,	   for	   true	   philosophy	   has	   an	   unbreakable	   connection	   with	   a	  deeper	  truth	  that	  lies	  only	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  individual.	  To	  sever	  this	  connection	  is	  to	  cut	  scholastic	  philosophy	  off	  from	  the	  only	  possible	  source	  of	  its	  own	  validity.	  	   Thus	  we	  are	  confronted	  with	  an	  apparent	  dilemma,	  one	  to	  which,	  if	  the	  rationalists’	  ambitions	   were	   fulfillable,	   no	   solution	   would	   be	   possible.192	  But	   the	   first	   Critique	   has	  shown	   that	   they	   are	   not,	   and	   in	   the	   inevitability	   of	   this	   very	   failure	   resides	   the	   clue	  we	  need.	   Reason,	   chastened	   by	   criticism,	   finds	   itself	   unable	   to	   decide,	   from	   cognitive	  considerations	   alone,	   upon	   inescapable	   questions	   of	   the	   utmost	   practical	   importance.	  Mendelssohn	  wanted	  to	  use	  this	  inability	  as	  a	  pretense	  for	  yet	  another	  species	  of	  cognitive	  justification	   for	   certain	   answers,	   but	   that	   was	   a	   mistake.	   Reason’s	   actual	   route	   is	   more	  circuitous:	   “It	   has	   insight	   into	   its	   lack	   and	   through	   the	   drive	   for	   cognition	  [Erkenntnißtrieb]	   it	   effects	   the	   feeling	  of	   a	  need”	   (OOT	  8:139n).	  Reason	   is	   a	   “faculty”	  of	  cognition,	  but	  one	  whose	  special	  principles	  lead	  not	  to	  cognition	  at	  all,	  but	  only	  to	  illusion.	  Since	  no	  cognitive	  resolution	  of	  this	  illusion	  is	  possible,	  this	  lack	  can	  manifest	  itself	  only	  as	  
                                                192	  This	  is	  the	  heart	  of	  Kant’s	  disagreement	  with	  Jacobi.	  For	  Jacobi	  takes	  it	  that	  the	  rationalists’	  ambitions	  are	  eminently	  fulfillable	  (and	  have,	   in	  Spinoza,	  been	  fulfilled).	  This	   is	  why	  the	  noncognitive	  “solution”	  endorsed	  by	  Jacobi	  is	  another,	  and	  more	  radical,	  sort	  of	  solution	  altogether.	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a	  feeling,	  that	  is,	  as	  an	  inescapable	  burden	  placed	  on	  the	  subject	  himself,	  a	  burden	  that	  no	  cognition,	  however	  subtle,	  can	  alleviate.	  Still,	   so	   long	   as	   we	   confine	   ourselves	   to	   the	   theoretical	   sphere,	   this	   need	   is	  something	   we	   can	   live	   with.	   It	   may	   tempt	   us,	   as	   it	   tempted	   Mendelssohn,	   to	   leap	   to	  unjustifiable	  conclusions,	  but	  through	  discipline	  such	  temptation	  can	  at	  least	  be	  warded	  off	  indefinitely.	   Only	   in	   the	   context	   of	   reason’s	   practical	   employment	   does	   this	   need,	   if	   left	  unsated,	  become	  downright	  intolerable.	  Here—and	  only	  here—Kant	  emphasizes,	  “we	  have	  
to	   judge”	   (OOT	   8:139).	   In	   this	   context,	   this	  means:	  we	   have	   to	   decide,	   not	   on	   objective,	  cognitive	  grounds,	  but	  on	  subjective,	  aesthetic	  (which	  is	  not	  to	  say	  arbitrary)	  ones,	  whether	  we	   are	   to	   believe	   in	   the	   existence	   of	   God	   and	   the	   immortality	   of	   our	   souls.193	  Here	   the	  limitations	  of	   the	   traditional	   rationalist	  approaches	   to	   judgment	  are	  again	  brought	   to	   the	  fore	  (see	  Kant’s	  allusion	  to	  Descartes’s	  Fourth	  Meditation	  at	  OOT	  8:136).	  To	  refrain	   from	  judgment	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  intuitively	  complete	  evidence	  can	  indeed	  shelter	  us	  from	  error	  indefinitely,	  but,	  as	  we	  have	  already	  seen,	  objective	  cognition	  would	  not	  be	  possible	  if	  we	  were	  not	  originally	  responsible	  for	  violating	  this	  stricture.	  Now	  Kant	  adds	  a	  crucial	  second	  dimension	  to	  this	  point:	  it	  is	  not	  just	  that	  cognition	  is,	   if	  you	  will,	  dependent	  on	  judgment	  on	  the	  “front	  end.”	  It	  is	  dependent	  on	  it	  on	  the	  “back	  end,”	  too,	  that	  is,	  when	  it	  comes	  time	  to	  relate	  our	  scientific	  cognition	  to	  the	  ultimate	  ends	  of	  human	  reason.	  Again,	   there	   is	  no	  compulsion	  to	  so	   judge,	  but	  adhering	  to	  Descartes’s	  ethics	  of	   judgment	  will	  consign	  us	   to	  the	  position	  of	  the	  disoriented	  astronomer.	  Only	  by	  way	  of	  responding	  to	  our	  feeling	  with	  judgment—and	  thus	  going	  beyond	  grounds	  that	  are	  conceptually	  clarifiable—can	  “a	  human	  
                                                193	  Thus	  Kant’s	   answer	   to	   the	   title	   question	   of	   the	   essay:	   “To	  orient	   oneself	   in	   thinking	   in	   general	  means:	  when	   objective	   principles	   of	   reason	   are	   insufficient	   for	   holding	   something	   true,	   to	   determine	   the	   matter	  according	  to	  a	  subjective	  principle”	  (OOT	  8:136n).	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being	   who	   has	   common	   but	   (morally)	   healthy	   reason	   .	   .	   .	   mark	   out	   his	   path,	   in	   both	   a	  theoretical	  and	  a	  practical	  respect,	  in	  a	  way	  which	  is	  fully	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  whole	  end	  of	  his	  vocation	  [Bestimmung]”	  (OOT	  8:142).	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   Kant’s	   reference	   to	   the	   subjective	   grounds	   of	   belief	  would	   have	  been	  altogether	  familiar	  to	  readers	  of	  the	  first	  Critique	  (see	  CPR	  A827/B855).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  his	   foregrounding	  of	   the	  power	  of	   judgment	   in	   this	  respect	  could	  only	  be	  described	  as	  suggestive	  without	  the	  grounding	  provided	  by	  the	  third	  Critique.	  In	  1793	  Kant	  explicitly	  links	  up,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  am	  aware,	  the	  transition	  between	  theory	  and	  practice	  with	  a	  corresponding	  transition	  between	  concept	  and	  intuition.	  “It	  is	  obvious,”	  he	  writes,	  that	   between	   theory	   and	  practice	   there	   is	   required,	   besides,	   a	  middle	   term	  [Mittelglied]	   connecting	   them	  and	  providing	  a	   transition	   [Überganges]	   from	  one	  to	  the	  other,	  no	  matter	  how	  complete	  a	  theory	  may	  be;	  for,	  to	  a	  concept	  of	   the	   understanding,	   which	   contains	   a	   rule,	   must	   be	   added	   an	   act	   of	  judgment	  by	  which	  a	  practitioner	  distinguishes	  whether	  or	  not	  something	  is	  a	  case	  of	  the	  rule.	  (TP	  8:275)194	  	  By	  now,	  however,	  he	  has	  the	  analyses	  of	  the	  first	  and	  third	  Critiques	  to	  call	  upon	  to	  specify	  the	  precise	   scope	  of	   this	   claim	  and	   the	   central	   role	   of	   the	   faculty	   of	   feeling.	   Because	   our	  understanding	  is	  discursive,	  not	  intuitive,	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  is	  a	  necessarily	  non-­‐rule-­‐governed	   faculty	   that	   in	   its	   determining	   use	   leaps	   over	   the	   gaps	   that	   inevitably	   present	  themselves	  to	  us	  in	  the	  course	  of	  our	  attempts	  to	  cognize	  the	  world.	  Such	  gaps,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	   pose	   no	   threat	   to	   the	   objective	   validity	   of	   theoretical	   cognition,	   but	   the	   need	   for	   a	  transition	  from	  morals	  to	  nature	  first	  draws	  attention	  to	  such	  gaps	  in	  a	  new	  way.	  For	  the	  concept	   of	   freedom	   demands	   that	   nature	   be	   conceived	   after	   the	   manner	   of	   an	   ideal,	   in	  
                                                194	  Kant	  continues	  by	  repeating	  the	  argument	  (from	  the	  first	  Critique)	  that	   judgment	  cannot	  itself	  be	  a	  rule-­‐governed	  activity	  (CPR	  A133/B172).	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relation	   to	  which	  our	  merely	  discursive	  understanding	  appears	   insufficient.	   It	   is	  only	   the	  reflecting	  power	  of	  judgment,	  considered	  precisely	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  reflecting,	  that	  works	  to	  close	   those	   gaps,	   giving	   rise	   through	   its	   activity	   to	   a	   feeling	   of	   delight	   in	   its	   unexpected	  success	   in	   doing	   so.	   Aesthetic	   judgments	   are	   the	   results	   of	   those	   moments,	   sometimes	  fleeting,	   to	  be	  sure—and	  always	  subjective—in	  which	  we	  see	   the	  world	  as	   it	  ought	   to	  be	  symbolized	  in	  the	  beauty	  of	  the	  natural	  world.	  This	  makes	  a	  “transition”	  between	  symbol	  and	  symbolized	  possible	  in	  a	  correspondingly	  subjective	  sense:	  we	  feel	  it.	  
Herder’s	  Abuse	  of	  Teleology	  Reconsidered	  We	   have	   come	   this	   far	  with	   precious	   little	   positive	   discussion	   of	   teleological	   judgments.	  This	  may	  well	   seem	  amiss,	   for	  my	   initial	   suggestion	  was	   to	  read	   the	   third	  Critique	   as	   the	  kind	  of	   careful	   response	   to	   the	  challenge	  posed	  by	  Herder	   that	  Kant’s	  earlier	   review	  had	  not	   been.	   Since	   the	   crux	   of	   that	   challenge	   is	   Herder’s	   novel	   employment	   of	   teleological	  explanation,	  it	  would	  seem	  to	  follow,	  if	  I	  am	  right,	  that	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  third	  Critique	  is	  its	  most	  important.	  But	  this,	  it	  could	  then	  be	  pointed	  out,	  is	  just	  the	  opposite	  of	  what	  Kant	  really	   says	   (CPJ	   5:194).	   And	   it	   is	   certainly	   the	   opposite	   of	  what	  my	   analysis	   here	  might	  suggest.	  What	  is	  going	  on?	  	   I	  claimed	  earlier	  that	  Kant’s	  task	  was	  to	  find	  the	  principle	  the	  misuse	  of	  which	  had	  resulted	   in	  Herder’s	   inflation	  of	   the	   significance	  of	   teleology,	   and	   I	   suggested	   that	   such	  a	  principle	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  purposiveness	  of	  nature.	  Now,	  however,	  we	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	   lend	   that	   claim	   some	   much	   needed	   clarification.	   We	   know	   already	   that	   the	   specific	  difference	  between	  aesthetic	  and	  teleological	  judgments	  is	  that	  the	  former	  make	  subjective	  use	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   purposiveness,	   while	   the	   latter	   make	   objective	   use	   of	   that	   same	  principle.	   Now,	   Kant’s	   point	   in	   the	   third	   Critique	   is	   not	   simply	   that	   the	   former	   use	   is	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legitimate,	   the	   latter	   illegitimate.	   If	   it	  were,	   the	   two	   parts	   of	   the	   third	  Critique	  would	   be	  related	   something	   like	   the	  Analytic	   and	   the	  Dialectic	   of	   the	   first	  Critique.	   But	  Kant	  never	  wants	  to	  deny	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  teleological	  judgments.	  To	  be	  sure,	  we	  could	  never	  hope	  to	  prove	  a	  priori	  that	  there	  must	  be	  objective	  purposiveness,	  i.e.,	  natural	  ends,	  within	  nature.	  But	  it	  is	  empirically	  true—as	  a	  fact,	  you	  might	  say—that	  we	  do,	  in	  fact,	  judge	  this	  way	  (UTP	  8:182).	   And	   once	   we	   do	   judge	   this	   way,	   teleological	   explanations	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	  mechanical	   ones	   (UTP	   8:179).	   This	   distinguishes,	   for	   example,	   the	   description	   of	   nature	  from	   natural	   history	   (UTP	   8:161-­‐162,	   169).	   It	   would	   be	   a	   mistake	   to	   look	   for	   a	  transcendental	  deduction	  of	  the	  objective	  purposiveness	  of	  nature,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  folly	  to	  simply	  eliminate,	  for	  that	  reason,	  teleological	  explanations	  altogether.	  We	   can	   sum	   up	   Kant’s	   view	   as	   follows:	   even	   though	   an	   a	  priori	   deduction	   of	   the	  principle	  of	  purposiveness	  is	  only	  available	  in	  a	  subjective	  sense,	  and	  this	  entails	  only	  that	  nature	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  purposive	  with	  respect	  to	  our	  faculty	  of	  cognition,	  nevertheless	  the	  presence	  of	   such	  a	   concept	   licenses	   its	   objective	  use	   so	   long	  as	  we	  empirically	   judge	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  one	  natural	  end	  (FI	  20:218).195	  For	  once	  we	  make	  the	  latter	  judgment,	  we	  are	  committed	  to	  pursuing	  teleology	  indefinitely	  along	  its	  own	  proper	  explanatory	  path,	  and	   the	   availability	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   purposiveness	   in	   a	   subjective	   respect	   at	   least	  guarantees	   the	   intelligibility	   of	   this	   sort	   of	   explanation.	   This	   by	   no	   means	   grants	  teleological	  explanation	  the	  same	  validity	  that	  attaches	  to	  mathematical	  natural	  science;	  in	  fact,	   the	   basic	   explanatory	   principles	   of	   the	   two	   domains	   remain	   entirely	   heterogeneous	  
                                                195	  As	  Kant	   says,	   “It	   is	   entirely	   consistent	   that	   the	  explanation	   [Erklärung]	   of	   an	   appearance,	  which	   is	   an	  affair	  of	  reason	  in	  accordance	  with	  objective	  principles	  of	  reason,	  be	  mechanical,	  while	  the	  rule	  for	  judging	  of	   the	   same	   object,	   in	   accordance	   with	   subjective	   principles	   of	   reflection	   on	   it,	   should	   be	   technical”	   (FI	  20:218).	  In	  other	  words,	  teleological	  judgment	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  competitor,	  or	  even	  a	  rigorously	  grounded	  alternative,	  to	  mechanical	  explanation.	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(UTP	  8:161-­‐162).	  And	  it	  does	  not,	  just	  as	  importantly,	  allow	  for	  metaphysical	  foundations	  of	  teleology.	  The	  “sciences”	  which	  are	  grounded	  in	  teleology	  are	  not	  sciences	   in	  the	  same	  respect	  as	  those	  with	  metaphysical	  foundations.196	  	   Despite	  these	  restrictions,	  it	  might	  still	  appear	  as	  though	  those	  disciplines	  grounded	  in	  teleology—most	  significantly,	  natural	  history,	  given	  the	  significance	  Herder	  ascribes	  to	  the	  latter—are	  the	  obvious	  locus	  of	  the	  transition	  from	  natural	  to	  moral	  philosophy.	  After	  all,	   it	   is	  here	   that	  we	   judge	   the	  natural	  world	   to	  have	   an	   ideal	   form,	   to	  proceed	   from	  the	  whole	  to	  its	  parts.	  Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  understanding	  the	  systematic	  significance	  of	  the	   third	   Critique	   to	   recognize	   that	   it	   is	   only	   aesthetic	   judgments,	   not	   teleological	   ones,	  which	  provide	  the	  occasion	  for	  the	  true	  transition	   from	  moral	   to	  natural	  philosophy.	   It	   is	  crucial	  for	  Kant	  that	  this	  transition	  be	  possible,	  but	  it	  is	  equally	  crucial	  that	  it	  be	  grounded	  in	  subjective	  feeling—and	  it	  is	  precisely	  feeling	  that	  falls	  out	  of	  the	  picture	  when	  we	  judge	  teleologically.	  Recall	   that	  teleological	   judgments,	  unlike	  aesthetic	   judgments,	  are	   logical—determined	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  concepts	  (CPJ	  5:193).	  In	  this	  the	  teleological	  power	  of	  judgment,	  even	   though	   it	   is	   a	   variety	   of	   reflecting	   judgment	   in	   general,	   has	   an	   ultimately	   cognitive	  significance	  (even	  if	  its	  significance	  is	  not	  grounded	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  understanding	   considered	   in	   the	   first	   Critique).	   Among	   cognitive	   judgments,	   teleological	  judgments	   are	   unique	   in	   that	   they	   make	   objective	   use	   of	   a	   concept	   (that	   of	   the	  purposiveness	   of	   nature)	   that	   is	   a	   special	   principle	   of	   aesthetic	   judgments.	   Only	   for	   this	  reason	  do	   teleological	   judgments,	  which	  are	  not	  proper	   to	   the	   third	  Critique	   (in	   fact,	   they	  have,	  as	  we	  know,	  already	  been	  treated	  in	  the	  first),	  nevertheless	  fall	  under	  consideration	  here,	  as	  well	  (CPJ	  5:194;	  cf.	  5:360).	   It	   is	  not	  that	  teleological	   judgments	  do	  not	  have	  their	  
                                                196	  I	  say	  this	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Kant	  at	  times	  casually	  uses	  “Wissenschaft”	  to	  refer	  to	  natural	  history,	  as	  well	  (e.g.,	  UTP	  8:162).	  
 143	  
own	  sphere	  of	  legitimacy.	  But	  the	  immense	  significance	  ascribed	  to	  them	  by	  so	  many	  must	  be	  relocated	  to	  the	  sphere	  of	  aesthetic	   judgments.	  Teleology	  may	  show	  us,	  after	  a	  certain	  manner,	  what	  the	  transition	  between	  the	  highest	  good	  and	  the	  natural	  world	  would	  “look”	  like,	  and	  to	  that	  extent	  it	  can	  be	  a	  kind	  of	  cognitive	  shadow	  of	  nature’s	  beauty.	  But	  Kant’s	  deeper	  point	  in	  the	  third	  Critique	  is	  that	  this	  transition	  doesn’t	  look	  like	  anything	  at	  all:	  it	  is,	  rather,	  something	  we	  feel	  (in	  accordance,	  however,	  with	  an	  a	  priori	  principle)	  in	  aesthetic	  experience.	  	   At	   one	   stroke,	   then,	   we	   see	   the	   source	   of	   Herder’s	   error,	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   we	  immediately	   appreciate	   just	   how	   easy	   it	   was	   for	   him	   to	   fall	   into	   it.	   Herder,	   just	   like	  Mendelssohn,	   was	   unable	   to	   recognize	   his	   reliance	   on	   feeling.	   Whereas	   Mendelssohn	  misascribed	  the	  orientation	  it	  provided	  to	  the	  faculty	  of	  cognition,	  Herder	  misascribed	  the	  transition	   it	   made	   possible	   to	   those	   historical	   ruminations	   by	   which	   he	   hoped	   to	   link	  together	  the	  explanatory	  paradigms	  of	  nature	  and	  morals.	  In	  fact,	  such	  teleologically-­‐driven	  natural	  history	  can	  be	  no	  more	  than	  the	  cognitive	  image	  of	  the	  transition	  between	  nature	  and	   morals	   that	   is	   possible	   through	   feeling	   alone.	   Natural	   history,	   Kant	   had	   instructed	  Forster,	   is	  a	  discipline	  that	  “for	  now	  (and	  maybe	   forever)	   is	  realizable	  more	   in	  silhouette	  than	  in	  deed”	  (UTP	  8:162).	  He	  could	  have	  added:	  whatever	  degree	  of	  articulation	  it	  attains,	  it	  will	   remain,	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	   transition,	  at	   least,	  a	  mere	  projection	  of	  our	  subjective	  feeling	  onto	  the	  form	  of	  the	  natural	  world.	  In	  this	  manner,	  however,	  Kant	  was	  finally	  able	  to	  turn	   his	   condescending	   rhetoric	   of	   1785,	   in	   which	   he	   repeatedly	   praised	   the	   depth	   of	  Herder’s	   “feeling,”	   into	   a	   philosophical	   insight:	   it	   was	   Herder’s	   feeling	   in	   which	   the	  distinctive	  brilliance	  of	  the	  Ideas	  was	  grounded.	  The	  only	  problem	  was	  that	  both	  its	  author	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and	  its	  readers	  located	  that	  brilliance	  in	  its	  extravagant	  natural	  history	  and	  so	  mistook	  the	  work	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  an	  ersatz	  science.	  
Philosophy,	  World,	  and	  the	  Human	  Being	  In	  the	  first	  Critique	  Kant	  had	  carefully	  distinguished	  between	  the	  scholastic	  and	  the	  worldly	  conceptions	   of	   philosophy—that	   is,	   between	   philosophy’s	   Schulbegriff	   and	   its	  
Weltbegriff.197	  Distinguishing	   oneself	   from	   overly	   scholastic	   philosophy	  was,	   of	   course,	   a	  favorite	   pastime	   of	   the	   early	   moderns:	   witness	   Descartes’s	   enactment	   of	   “the	   simple	  reasoning	   which	   a	   man	   of	   good	   sense	   naturally	   makes,”198	  as	   well	   as	   Locke’s	   insistence	  upon	  the	  “historical,	  plain	  method.”199	  Kant’s	  distinction,	  however,	  probably	  owes	  more	  to	  the	   insistence	   of	   the	   early	   Aufklärer	   upon	   a	   philosophy	   that	   could	   be	   accessible	   and	  practically	   meaningful	   to	   everyone,	   e.g.,	   Thomasius’s	   distinction	   between	  Gelehrheit	   and	  
Gelahrheit.200	  In	  Kant	  this	  distinction	  has	  lost	  most	  of	  its	  polemical	  edge,	  but	  he	  is	  careful	  to	  clarify	   that	   even	   in	   his	   view	   the	   Schulbegriff	   of	   philosophy	   is	   derived	   from,	   and	   hence	  always	  stands	  in	  service	  to,	  its	  Weltbegriff.	  Its	  Schulbegriff	  concerns	  “a	  system	  of	  cognition	  that	  is	  sought	  only	  as	  a	  science	  without	  having	  as	  its	  end	  anything	  more	  than	  the	  systematic	  unity	  of	  this	  knowledge,”	  whereas	  the	  Weltbegriff	  concerns	  “the	  science	  of	  the	  relation	  of	  all	  cognition	   to	   the	  essential	   ends	  of	  human	   reason”	   (CPR	  A838-­‐839/B866-­‐867;	   cf.	   JL	  9:23),	  i.e.,	   the	  relation	  of	  cognition	  to	  the	  wisdom	  that	  “secure[s]	  the	  value	  of	   life	  for	  the	  human	  
                                                197	  Given	   their	   cognate	   status,	   I’ll	   leave	   these	   terms	   untranslated.	   I	   will	   say	   that	   Young’s	   translation	   of	  
Weltbegriff	   as	   “worldly	   concept”	   has	   a	   certain	   advantage	   over	   Guyer	   and	  Wood’s	   “cosmopolitan	   concept,”	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Kant’s	  Latin	  equivalent	  is	  “conceptus	  cosmicus.”	  Kant	  does,	  I	  think,	  want	  to	  emphasize	  that	  even	  the	  worldly	  concept	  of	  philosophy	  is	  rooted	  in	  an	  ideal,	  so	  that	  turning	  the	  ends	  of	  philosophy	  towards	  the	   ends	   of	   ordinary	   human	   beings	   is	   not	   misunderstood	   as	   an	   empirical	   exercise	   in	   application.	   Kant’s	  motives	   are	   shown	   well	   in	   his	   incidental	   remark	   about	   the	   “philosopher,”	   that	   “he	   himself	   is	   still	   found	  nowhere,	  although	  the	  idea	  of	  his	  legislation	  is	  found	  in	  every	  human	  reason”	  (CPR	  A839/B867;	  cf.	  A	  7:280n).	  198	  Descartes	  (1637),	  117	  (VI:12-­‐13).	  199	  Locke	  (1689),	  44	  (I.i.2).	  200	  See	  Sassen	  (2014)	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  worldly	  conception	  of	  philosophy	  for	  early	  eighteenth-­‐century	  thought.	  Kant’s	  distinction	  can	  also	  be	  usefully	  compared	  to	  his	  remarks	  (at	  JL	  9:48)	  about	  the	  necessity	  for	  “common	  understanding”	  to	  examine	  and	  perfect	  what	  is	  merely	  “scholastically	  correct.”	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being”	  (A	  7:239).	  This	  concept	  of	  philosophy	  resides	  most	  especially,	  however,	  in	  the	  ideal	  of	   the	   philosopher	   (CPR	   A839/B867;	   A	   7:280n),	   or,	   as	   Kant	   sometimes	   puts	   it,	   in	   the	  “practical	  philosopher”:	  “A	  practical	  philosopher	  is	  one	  who	  makes	  the	  final	  end	  of	  reason	  the	  principle	  of	  his	  actions	  and	  joins	  with	  this	  such	  knowledge	  [Wissen]	  as	  is	  necessary	  for	  it”	  (MM	  6:375n;	  cf.	  JL	  9:24).201	  Now,	  in	  the	  first	  Critique,	  Kant’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  relationship	  of	  these	  two	  concepts	  of	   philosophy	   leads	   him	   to	   the	   following	   remark:	   “The	   legislation	   of	   human	   reason	  (philosophy)	   has	   two	   objects,	   nature	   and	   freedom,	   and	   thus	   contains	   the	   natural	   law	   as	  well	   as	   the	   moral	   law,	   initially	   in	   two	   separate	   systems	   but	   ultimately	   in	   a	   single	  philosophical	  system”	  (CPR	  A840/B868).202	  The	  “legislation”	  here	  refers,	  presumably,	  back	  to	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  practical	  philosopher:	  “the	  idea	  of	  his	  legislation	  is	  found	  in	  every	  human	  being”	  (CPR	  A839/B867).	  This	  connects	  Kant’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  Weltbegriff	  of	  philosophy	  to	  the	  project	  of	  transition	  which	  he	  will	  finally	  develop,	  albeit	  in	  a	  direction	  he	  could	  not	  yet	  have	  anticipated,	  in	  the	  third	  Critique.	  By	  showing	  how	  a	  transition	  is	  possible	  between	  two	  apparently	  separate	  sciences,	  the	  third	  Critique	  shows	  how	  metaphysics,	  and	  a	  divided	  one	   at	   that,	   can	   relate	   to	   the	   essential	   ends	   of	   human	   reason.	   Here	  we	   find	   Kant’s	   final	  answer	  to	  his	  critics	  who	  doubt	  whether	  “scholastic”	  philosophy	  is	  not	  just	  a	  distortion	  of	  true	  philosophy.	  Among	   these	  we	  can	   certainly	  number	  Hamann,	  Herder,	   and	   Jacobi,	  but	  Kant	   would	   have	   traced	   their	   concerns	   all	   the	   way	   back	   to	   the	   work	   of	   Voltaire	   and	  Rousseau.	  All	  had	  objected	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  philosophy	  with	  theoretical	  science	  and	  insisted	  upon	  an	  irreducible	  role	  for	  subjectivity	  in	  the	  true	  philosophy.	  
                                                201	  Thus	  wisdom	  is	  ultimately	  the	  “idea	  of	  a	  practical	  use	  of	  reason	  that	  conforms	  perfectly	  with	  the	  law”	  (A	  7:200).	  202	  See	  n.	  167	  above	  for	  my	  reservations	  concerning	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “single	  philosophical	  system”	  here.	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Kant’s	   practical	   philosopher	   would	   be	   both	   scientific	   and	   wise	   at	   the	   same	   time,	  expressing	   the	   ideal	   of	   Rousseau	   as	   much	   as	   that	   of	   Leibniz.	   In	   his	   logic	   lectures,	   Kant	  explains	  that	   the	  practical	  philosopher	   is	  able	   to	   turn	  science	  to	  the	  essential	  ends	  of	  her	  own	  reason	  by	  connecting	  the	  answers	  to	  four	  questions.	  The	   field	  of	  philosophy	   in	   this	   cosmopolitan	  sense	  can	  be	  brought	  down	   to	  the	  following	  questions:	  
1. What	  can	  I	  know?	  
2. What	  ought	  I	  to	  do?	  
3. What	  may	  I	  hope?	  
4. What	  is	  the	  human	  being?	  
Metaphysics	   answers	   the	   first	   question,	  morals	   the	   second,	   religion	   the	  third,	   and	   anthropology	   the	   fourth.	   Fundamentally,	   however,	   we	   could	  reckon	  all	  of	  this	  as	  anthropology,	  because	  the	  first	  three	  questions	  relate	  to	  the	  last	  one.	  (JL	  9:25)203	  	  For	  readers	  of	  the	  first	  Critique,	   this	  list	  of	  questions	  will	  be	  surprising,	  and	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  fourth	  even	  more	  so.	  In	  the	  first	  Critique,	  after	  all,	  Kant	  had	  stopped	  with	  the	  third	  question	  and	  strongly	  suggested	  that	  because	  it	   is	  “simultaneously	  practical	  and	  theoretical”	   it	   serves	   to	   unite	   the	   first	   two	   (CPR	  A804-­‐805/B832-­‐833).	   Now,	   however,	   a	  fourth	   question	   appears.204	  What	   is	   the	   relationship	   between	   anthropology	   and	   religion,	  and	  what	   does	   all	   this	   have	   to	   do	  with	   the	   transitional	   project	   of	   the	   third	   Critique,	   the	  project	   that	   was,	   after	   all,	   intended	   to	   bring	   the	   practical	   and	   theoretical	   standpoints	  together	  in	  a	  certain	  way?	  First,	  a	  word	  about	  “anthropology,”	  for	  Kant,	  is	  in	  order.	  Kant	  does	  not	  have	  in	  mind	  here	  empirical	  anthropology,	  either	  as	  a	  positive	  science	  or	  as	  “philosophical	  knowledge	  of	  
                                                203	  Cf.	  VL	  24:799.	  Here,	  however,	  Kant	  proceeds	  straightaway	   to	   the	  questions	  of	   (1)	   the	  sources	  of	  human	  cognition,	  (2)	  its	  utility,	  and	  (3)	  its	  limits.	  That	  Kant,	  at	  any	  rate,	  sees	  a	  close	  conceptual	  connection	  between	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  questions	  is	  apparent	  at	  JL	  9:25.	  204	  It	  would	  not	  have	  surprised	  Stäudlin,	  at	  least,	  for	  in	  his	  letter	  of	  May	  4,	  1793	  to	  him	  Kant	  had	  announced,	  after	  enumerating	  the	  three	  questions	  as	  he	  had	  stated	  them	  in	  the	  first	  Critique,	  that	  “a	  fourth	  question	  ought	  to	  follow,	  finally:	  What	  is	  the	  human	  being?”	  (C	  11:429).	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the	  human	  being”;	  instead,	  he	  is	  indicating	  the	  pragmatic	  anthropology	  that	  considers	  what	  the	   human	   being	   can	   make	   of	   herself.	   Such	   a	   pragmatic	   anthropology	   actually	   fits	   the	  
Weltbegriff	   of	   philosophy	   rather	   well,	   as	   Kant’s	   remarks	   at	   the	   very	   beginning	   of	   the	  
Anthropology	   indicate.	  The	  human	  being,	  Kant	   insists,	   is	   the	  most	   important	  object	   in	   the	  world	  to	  which	  all	  acquired	  cognition	  can	  be	  applied,	  for	  only	  the	  human	  being	  is	  its	  own	  final	  end.	  “Therefore	  to	  know	  the	  human	  being	  according	  to	  his	  species	  as	  an	  earthly	  being	  endowed	   with	   reason	   especially	   deserves	   to	   be	   called	   knowledge	   of	   the	   world	  [Weltkenntniß],	   even	   though	   he	   constitutes	   only	   one	   part	   of	   the	   creatures	   on	   earth”	   (A	  7:119).	  Just	  as	  he	  does	  in	  the	  first	  Critique,	  Kant	  contrasts	  Welt	  with	  Schule:	  Such	  an	  anthropology,	   considered	  as	  knowedge	   of	   the	  world,	  which	  must	  come	  after	  our	  schooling	   [die	  Schule],	   is	  actually	  not	  yet	  called	  pragmatic	  when	  it	  contains	  an	  extensive	  knowledge	  of	  things	  in	  the	  world,	  for	  example,	  animals,	  plants,	  and	  minerals	  from	  various	  lands	  and	  climates,	  but	  only	  when	  it	   contains	   knowledge	   of	   the	   human	   being	   as	   a	   citizen	   of	   the	   world	  [Weltbürgers].	  (A	  7:120)	  	  Since	  the	  human	  being	  is	  her	  own	  final	  end,	  however,	  her	  knowledge	  of	  herself	  can	  only	  be	  completed	  by	  relating	  it	  practically	  to	  that	  very	  end.	  The	  question	  What	  is	  the	  human	  being?	  is	   answerable,	   therefore,	   only	   by	   taking	   the	   task	   upon	   oneself	   to	   relate,	   in	   one’s	   own	  person,	  all	  Schule	  to	  the	  Welt.	  Thus	  the	  human	  being’s	  self-­‐knowledge	  is	  Weltkenntniß	  in	  an	  exemplary	  sense.	  Kant’s	  identification	  of	  religion,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  anthropology,	  on	  the	  other,	  as	  the	   focal	   points	   of	   reason’s	   essential	   ends,	   may	   seem	   rather	   obviously	   contradictory.	  Mustn’t	  one	  declare	  oneself,	  after	  all,	   to	  be	  either	   for	  or	  against	  humanism?	  But	   in	   fact	   in	  Kant’s	   thought	   the	   two	   apparently	   competing	   answers	   dovetail	   nicely,	   for	   religion	   only	  unites	   the	  ends	  of	   the	  human	  being	  when	   it	  brings	  him	  finally	  back	   to	  himself	  as	  a	  being	  who	  does	  not	  simply	  exist	  among	  other	  beings	  in	  the	  world	  but	  is	  himself	  his	  own	  final	  end.	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If	  he	  himself	  must	  unite	  the	  essential	  means	  to	  this	  end,	  then	  the	  divided	  science	  (split	  into	  the	   metaphysics	   of	   nature	   and	   the	   metaphysics	   of	   morals)	   that	   answers	   the	   first	   two	  questions	   must	   permit	   a	   means	   of	   transitioning	   between	   its	   parts,	   the	   transition	   Kant	  traces	  in	  the	  introductory	  material	  for	  the	  third	  Critique.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  third	  Critique	  shows	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	  the	  relation	  of	  science	  back	  to	  the	  subject	  that	  even	  in	  the	   first	   Critique	   he	   had	   held	   to	   be	   necessary	   if	   science	   were	   to	   finally	   open	   out	   onto	  wisdom.	  In	  one	  sense,	  this	  can	  be	  reckoned	  religion,	  for	  only	  through	  rational	  faith	  can	  we	  hope	   for	   the	   world	   we	   had	   vainly	   sought	   through	   the	   theoretical	   and	   practical	   uses	   of	  reason.	  In	  another	  sense,	  however,	  this	  can	  be	  reckoned	  anthropology,	  for	  the	  hope	  that	  is	  permitted	  to	  the	  human	  being	  retains	  an	  essential	  reference	  back	  to	  his	  very	  subjectivity.	  If	  the	   scientific	   task	   drives	   the	   human	   being	   out	   of	   himself	   and	   into	   the	  world,	   the	   task	   of	  wisdom	  calls	  him	  back	  to	  make	  of	  himself	  what	  he	  will.	  
Conclusion	  Near	   the	  end	  of	   the	   first	  Critique	  we	   find	  Kant	  at	  his	  most	  Rousseauian.	   “In	  regard	  to	   the	  essential	   aims	   of	   human	   nature,”	   he	   says,	   “even	   the	   highest	   philosophy	   cannot	   advance	  further	   than	   the	   guidance	   that	   nature	   has	   also	   conferred	   on	   the	   most	   common	  understanding”	  (CPR	  A831/B859).205	  If	   this	   is	  so,	   then	  Kant’s	  practical	  philosopher	  bears,	  at	   first	  glance,	  an	  unexpectedly	  strong	  resemblance	  to	  Rousseau’s	  Savoyard	  vicar.	  “Thank	  heaven,”	  the	  latter	  had	  proclaimed,	  “we	  are	  delivered	  from	  all	  that	  terrifying	  apparatus	  of	  philosophy.	  We	  can	  be	  men	  without	  being	  scholars.”206	  We	  can	  live,	  as	  Voltaire	  could	  have	  
                                                205	  Note	   that,	   as	  Kant	   clarifies,	   the	   “essential”	  aims	  of	   reason	   include	  not	   just	   its	  highest	  aim,	  but	  all	  means	  necessary	  for	  it,	  as	  well	  (CPR	  A840/B868).	  206	  Rousseau	  (1762a),	  290.	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put	  it,	  without	  philosophizing	  and	  return	  from	  the	  mistrials	  of	  metaphysics	  to	  the	  practical	  task	  at	  hand.	  But	   this,	  we	   know,	   is	   not	   quite	  what	  Kant	   has	   in	  mind.	  When	  he	   exalts	   the	   “most	  common	  understanding,”	  he	  is	  announcing	  a	  conclusion	  which	  “reveals	  what	  one	  could	  not	  have	   foreseen	   in	   the	   beginning”	   (CPR	   A831/B859).	   And	   it	   is	   not	   simply	   that	   we	   have	  undertaken	  a	  necessary	  detour	   to	  return	  back	   to	  where	  we	  were.	  For	  Kant	  never	   tires	  of	  stating	  and	  restating	  that	  the	  goal	  of	  wisdom	  is	  inseparable	  from	  the	  path	  of	  science	  along	  which	  we	  must	   trod	   to	   find	   it	   (CPR	  A850/B878;	  G	  4:405;	  CPrR	  5:141).	   Science	  may	  well	  threaten	   to	  occlude	   this	  wisdom	  at	  every	   turn,	  but	   this	   is	   reason	  not	   to	  cast	   it	  off,	  but	   to	  discipline	   it	   through	   criticism.	   Thus	   critique	   is	   the	   inescapable	   task	   that	   confronts	   us	   if	  science	  is	  to	  finally	  become	  suitable	  for	  wisdom.	  The	  critical	  task,	  for	  its	  part,	  relies	  on	  the	  power	  of	   judgment	  to	  establish	  both	  the	  possibility	  of	  science	  in	  the	  first	  place	  and	  its	  relation,	  in	  the	  end,	  to	  human	  wisdom.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  critique	  of	  cognition	  shows	  that	  the	  moment	  of	  judgment	  corresponds	  to	  the	  moment	  of	   establishing	   a	   cognitive	   relation	   to	   the	  objective	  world.	  The	   cognitive	   subject	  cannot	   reach	   it	   simply	  by	  heeding	  a	  mark	  of	   objective	   truth	   immanent	   to	   representation	  itself;	   instead	  she	  must	   judge	   that	  an	  object	  given	  through	  intuition	  bears	  the	  form	  of	  her	  own	   thinking.	   In	   doing	   so,	   she	   assumes	   a	   risk	   that	   can	   never	   be	   excised	   but	   which	   is	  necessary	  if	  rational	  norms	  are	  to	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  cognition	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  On	  the	  other	   hand,	   to	   be	   wise	   in	   our	   actions	   requires	   returning	   from	   the	   objective	   to	   the	  subjective.	  This,	  too,	  carries	  with	  it	  a	  certain	  risk.	  Here,	  Kant	  held	  against	  Mendelssohn,	  we	  
have	  to	  judge.	  To	  take	  on	  this	  second	  risk	  is	  only	  possible,	  however,	  once	  we	  have	  already	  assumed	  the	  burden	  of	  the	  first,	  for	  only	  on	  condition	  of	  having	  opened	  ourselves	  up	  to	  the	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world	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	   its	   relation	   back	   to	   our	   own	   ends	   is	   no	   longer	   guaranteed	   can	  we—and	  must	  we—take	  up	  the	  task	  of	  relating	  it	  back	  to	  ourselves	  in	  a	  second	  movement,	  as	  it	  were.	  Both	  science	  and	  the	  wisdom	  to	  which	  it	  must	  lead	  would	  be	  impossible	  were	  it	  not	  for	  the	  power	  of	  judgment,	  which	  plants	  the	  ambitions	  of	  reason	  in	  the	  objective	  world	  even	  as	  it	  frees	  our	  cognition	  of	  the	  latter	  for	  its	  highest	  service.	  The	   Savoyard	   vicar	   finally	   turned	   his	   back	   on	   the	   science	   of	   the	   modern	   age	   to	  relocate	  nature’s	  wisdom	  within	  himself. I	  have	  never	  been	  able	  to	  believe	  that	  God	  commanded	  me,	  under	  penalty	  of	  going	  to	  hell,	   to	  be	  so	  learned.	  I	  therefore	  closed	  all	  the	  books.	  There	  is	  one	  open	   to	   all	   eyes:	   it	   is	   the	   book	   of	   nature.	   It	   is	   from	   this	   great	   and	   sublime	  book	   that	   I	   learn	   to	   serve	   and	   worship	   its	   divine	   Author.	   No	   one	   can	   be	  excused	   for	   not	   reading	   it,	   because	   it	   speaks	   to	   all	  men	   a	   language	   that	   is	  intelligible	  to	  all	  minds.	  Let	  us	  assume	  that	  I	  was	  born	  on	  a	  desert	  island,	  that	  I	  have	  not	  seen	  any	  man	  other	   than	  myself,	   that	   I	  have	  never	   learned	  what	  took	   place	   in	   olden	   times	   in	   some	   corner	   of	   the	   world;	   nonetheless,	   if	   I	  exercise	   my	   reason,	   if	   I	   cultivate	   it,	   if	   I	   make	   good	   use	   of	   my	   God-­‐given	  faculties	   which	   require	   no	   intermediary,	   I	   would	   learn	   of	   myself	   to	   know	  Him,	  to	  love	  Him,	  to	  love	  His	  works,	  to	  want	  the	  good	  that	  He	  wants,	  and	  to	  fulfill	   all	  my	  duties	  on	  earth	   in	  order	   to	  please	  Him.	  What	  more	  will	  all	   the	  learning	  of	  men	  teach	  me?207	  	  Kant’s	  sage,	  by	  contrast,	  knows	  that	  the	  unavoidable	  demand	  of	  our	  age	  is	  to	  work	  through	  science	  to	  recover	  Rousseau’s	  practical	  wisdom.	  “Wisdom	  without	  science,”	  Kant	  says,	  “is	  a	  silhouette	  of	  a	  perfection	  to	  which	  we	  shall	  never	  attain”	  (JL	  9:26).	  Rousseau’s	  conclusion,	  as	  vehemently	  as	  he	  would	  have	  denied	  it,	  was	  really	  not	  so	  far	  from	  that	  of	  Descartes	  and	  Malebranche,	   after	   all.	   For	   Rousseau,	   just	   like	   the	   ambitious	   rationalists	   of	   the	   century	  before	   him,	   sought	   to	   escape	   the	   burden	   of	   judgment	   by	   inventing	   within	   himself	   a	  paradise	  where	   no	   harm	   could	   befall	   him.	   This	   picture	   is	   illustrated	   dramatically	   in	   the	  Savoyard	  vicar	  on	  his	  desert	  island	  and	  most	  purely,	  perhaps,	  in	  the	  land	  of	  the	  love	  of	  Julie	  
                                                207	  Rousseau	  (1762a),	  306-­‐307.	  
 151	  
and	  Saint-­‐Preux.	   “In	   seclusion,”	  Rousseau	  would	  have	  us	  believe,	   “one	  has	   other	  ways	  of	  seeing	  and	  feeling	  than	  in	  involvement	  with	  the	  world.”	  In	  seclusion,	  one	  is	  finally	  no	  longer	  “obliged	  at	  every	  moment	  to	  make	  assertions	  one	  doesn’t	  believe.”208	  Never	  mind	  that	  this	  land	  of	  pure	  love	  is	  imaginary;	  Rousseau	  freely	  admits	  as	  much	  in	  the	  Confessions:	  “The	  impossibility	  of	  reaching	  real	  beings	  threw	  me	  into	  the	  country	  of	  chimeras,	  and	  seeing	  nothing	  existing	  that	  was	  worthy	  of	  my	  delirium,	  I	  nourished	  it	  in	  an	  ideal	  world	  which	  my	  creative	   imagination	  soon	  peopled	  with	  beings	   in	  accordance	  with	  my	  heart.”209	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  purity	  of	  their	  passion	  where	  we	  are	  finally	  supposed	  to	   encounter	   the	   “sublime	   science	   of	   simple	   souls”	   projected	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   first	  
Discourse.210	  “Filled	  with	  the	  single	  sentiment	  that	  occupies	  them,	  they	  are	  in	  delirium,	  and	  think	   they	   are	   philosophizing.	   Would	   you	   have	   them	   know	   how	   to	   observe,	   judge,	  reflect?”211	  Yes,	  Kant	   insists,	   they	  will	  have	   to	   judge,	   for	  science	   is	  only	  possible	  when	  we	  forego	  Rousseau’s	  innocence	  and	  say	  a	  bit	  more	  than	  we	  are	  really	  entitled	  to,	  and	  the	  road	  to	  wisdom	  travels	  only	  along	  the	  path	  of	  science.	  Feeling	  and	  beauty,	  sought	  by	  Rousseau	  as	  the	   ground	   of	   the	   unity	   of	   all	   humanity	   (to	   borrow	   Cassirer’s	   phrase)212	  do,	   to	   be	   sure,	  make	  fleeting	  glimpses	  of	  this	  unity	  possible,	  but	  precisely	  this	  feeling	  lapses	  quickly	  into	  enthusiasm	  if	  one	  supposes	  it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  ground	  true	  philosophy.	  	   	  








Part	  Two	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  What	  Kant	  actually	  is,	  I	  can	  never	  know.	  	  Jaspers,	  1928	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By	  the	  end	  of	  1929,	  the	  chair	  of	  the	  philosophy	  faculty	  in	  Berlin	  had	  been	  vacant	  for	  six	  and	  a	  half	  years.213	  The	  faculty	  had	  long	  hesitated	  in	  hopes	  of	  finding	  a	  worthy	  chair	  who	  could	  connect	  to	  and,	  in	  a	  sense,	  represent	  the	  younger	  generation	  of	  philosophers	  causing	  such	  a	  stir	   on	   the	   peripheries	   of	   the	   academic	   mainstream.214	  But	   in	   1930	   a	   committee	   of	   the	  faculty	  finally	  concluded	  that	  none	  of	  the	  candidates	  who	  would	  actually	  fit	  such	  a	  bill	  were	  sufficiently	   qualified	   to	  merit	   an	   appointment	   to	   a	   position	   so	   prestigious.	   So	   they	  went	  ahead	  and	  nominated	  Cassirer	  instead,	  a	  move	  that	  only	  underscored	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  committee,	  exasperated,	  had	  abandoned	  the	  hope	  of	  adding	  something	  of	  the	  German	  interwar	  spirit	  to	  its	  ranks.215	  Cassirer,	  only	  55	  and	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  most	  productive	  and	  creative	  period	  of	  his	  career,	  was	  nevertheless	  already	  seen	  by	  many	  as	  a	  relic	  of	  a	  bygone,	  more	  innocent	  era,	  a	  time	  that	  lacked	  the	  sense	  of	  urgency	  so	  palpable	  in	  Weimar	  Berlin.216	  Without	  a	  doubt,	  Cassirer	  was	  the	  most	  qualified	  candidate	  the	  members	  of	  the	  committee	  considered.	   But	   it	   was	   as	   if	   they	   had	   nominated	   Henry	   James	   to	   lead	   a	   faculty	   whose	  students	  were	  all	  reading	  Hemingway.	  
                                                213	  Troeltsch,	   the	   previous	   chair,	   had	   died	   in	   February	   1923;	   the	   position	   would	   only	   be	   filled	   with	   the	  eventual	  appointment	  of	  Hartmann	  (see	  n.	  219)	  in	  January	  1931.	  214	  The	  energy	  the	  faculty	  wanted	  to	  capture	  was	  intellectual,	  but	  the	  latter	  was	  just	  part	  of	  the	  cultural	  and	  political	  chaos	  that	  had	  engulfed	  Berlin	  for	  nearly	  a	  decade.	  Tillich,	  who	  was	  a	  Privatdozent	  at	  the	  university	  in	   the	   early	   1920s,	   described	   the	   state	   of	   the	   city	   this	   way:	   “Political	   problems	   determined	   our	   whole	  existence;	   even	   after	   revolution	   and	   inflation	   they	   were	   matters	   of	   life	   and	   death;	   human	   relations	   with	  respect	  to	  authority,	  education,	  family,	  sex,	  friendship,	  and	  pleasure	  were	  in	  a	  state	  of	  creative	  chaos”	  (Tillich	  [1952],	  13).	  Reflecting	  in	  1921	  on	  Max	  Weber’s	  untimely	  death,	  Rickert	  could	  only	  write	  that	  it	  was	  “as	  if	  the	  infirmity	  of	  our	  time	  could	  no	  longer	  endure	  anything	  whole”	  (Rickert	  [1921],	  9).	  215	  Peter	   Gordon	   sums	   up	   the	   situation	   this	   way:	   “Especially	   among	   students	   professing	   an	   attraction	   to	  religious	  philosophy	  and	  radical	  politics,	  it	  was	  not	  uncommon	  to	  hear	  the	  complaint	  that	  Cassirer	  was	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  present	  needs.	  He	  simply	  could	  not	  satisfy	   those	  who	   longed	   for	  a	   ‘philosophical	  penetration	  of	  life.’	   Even	   established	   colleagues	   would	   admit	   in	   private	   that	   despite	   his	   tremendous	   erudition,	   Cassirer	  somehow	  failed	  to	  inspire”	  (Gordon	  [2010],	  86).	  216	  As	   Peter	   Hohendahl	   puts	   it,	   “Orthodox	  Neo-­‐Kantianism	  was	  waning	   not	   only	   because	   of	   a	   generational	  shift	  .	  .	  .,	  but	  also,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  because	  of	  its	  understanding	  of	  the	  project	  of	  philosophy	  essentially	  as	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  prewar	  era”	  (Hohendahl	  [2010],	  36).	  Politically,	  as	  well,	  the	  progressive	  promise	  of	  prewar	   Neokantianism	   seemed	   a	   misfit	   for	   the	   turbulent	   Weimar	   Republic:	   the	   political	   implications	  Neokantianism	  had	  come	  to	  assume	  in	  a	  Wilhelmine	  context	  (see	  Moynahan	  [2003],	  57-­‐61)	  would	  have	  lost	  some	  of	  their	  reformist	  edge	  in	  the	  new	  republican	  context.	  
 154	  
Besides	  Cassirer,	  the	  three	  other	  finalists	  had	  been	  Hartmann,	  Tillich,	  and	  Misch.217	  Heidegger,	  for	  his	  part,	  had	  just	  turned	  40	  the	  autumn	  before	  but	  had	  already	  garnered	  an	  outsized	  share	  of	  attention	  for	  Being	  and	  Time	  and	  his	  participation	  (with	  Cassirer)	  in	  the	  famous	  Davos	  Hochschule	   course	   in	   the	   spring	   of	   1929.	   Although	   he	  was	   not	   among	   the	  finalists	  considered	  by	  the	  committee,	  they	  nevertheless	  deemed	  it	  appropriate	  to	  include	  in	  their	  final	  report	  a	  paragraph	  explaining	  the	  reasons	  for	  his	  exclusion.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  committee	  (especially	  Spranger)218	  had	  serious	  doubts	  as	  to	  whether	  his	  reputation	  as	  a	   teacher	  was	  based	  upon	  genuine	  philosophical	  aptitude	  or	  merely	  his	   idiosyncratic	  and	  memorable	  personality:	  “Even	  his	  partisans,”	  the	  committee	  wrote,	  “recognize	  that	  hardly	  any	  of	  the	  students	  who	  flock	  to	  him	  can	  in	  fact	  understand	  him.	  .	  .	  .	  [If	  he	  came	  to	  Berlin,]	  even	   the	   students	   who	   would	   be	   impressed	   by	   his	   teaching	   would	   not	   get	   a	   strong	  philosophical	   grounding.”	   To	   this	   relatively	   straightforward	   explanation,	   however,	   the	  committee	  added	  a	  somewhat	  cryptic	  note:	  “This	  is	  a	  time	  of	  crisis	  for	  Heidegger;	  it	  would	  be	  best	  to	  wait	  for	  its	  outcome.	  To	  have	  him	  come	  now	  to	  Berlin	  would	  be	  wrong.”219	  
                                                217	  Farías	   (1987),	   73.	   Cassirer	   was	   the	   oldest	   of	   the	   group.	   Misch,	   an	   important	   editor	   and	   interpreter	   of	  Dilthey’s	  work	  who	  was	  also	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  phenomenology,	  was	  51;	  Hartmann,	  influenced	  primarily	  by	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle,	  but	  by	  Scheler	  and	  Husserl,	  as	  well,	  had	  just	  turned	  48;	  Tillich	  was	  only	  43.	  Heidegger	  was	  younger	  than	  all	  of	  them.	  218	  Spranger,	  a	  humanist	  whom	  the	  Allies	  would	  eventually	  appoint	  rector	  of	  the	  occupied	  University	  of	  Berlin	  in	  1945,	  studied	  under	  Dilthey	  and	  developed	  a	  Neo-­‐Hegelian	  philosophy	  of	  culture	  and	  education.	  Despite	  his	  background	  in	  Lebensphilosophie,	  his	  sweepingly	  broad	  humanist	  interests	  (he	  had	  produced,	  for	  example,	  a	   1924	   volume	   on	   adolescent	   psychology	   that	   had	   gone	   through	   through	   eight	   editions	   in	   just	   two	   years)	  placed	   him	   much	   closer	   to	   Cassirer	   than	   to	   Heidegger	   (see	   Loemker	   [1967],	   1-­‐2;	   on	   his	   opposition	   to	  Heidegger,	   see	   Safranski	   [1994],	   210).	   Heidegger	   regarded	   him	   as	   the	   complete	   antithesis	   of	   everything	  Dilthey	  ever	  stood	  for	  (see	  L	  21:91).	  In	  March	  1933,	  Heidegger	  would	  ally	  himself	  with	  the	  blood-­‐and-­‐soiler	  Ernst	  Krieck	  in	  opposing	  the	  universalist	  humanism	  of	  the	  German	  Academics’	  Association,	  the	  organization	  chaired	  by	  Spranger	  (Safranski	  [1994],	  235-­‐236).	  219	  Quoted	  in	  Farías	  (1987),	  73.	  Ironically,	  it	  was	  Heidegger	  who	  would	  actually	  receive	  the	  invitation	  for	  the	  chair.	  The	  newly	  appointed	  Prussian	  minister	  of	  culture,	  Adolf	  Grimme,	  chose	  to	  override	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  faculty.	   In	   March	   1930,	   he	   publicly	   extended	   the	   invitation	   to	   Heidegger,	   an	   invitation	   Heidegger	   would	  decline	  a	  month	  and	  a	  half	   later	  (although	  not	  after	  serious	  negotiations).	   In	   the	  end	   it	  was	  Hartmann	  who	  would	  finally	  accept	  the	  appointment.	  See	  Safranski	  (1994),	  210-­‐211	  for	  a	  fuller	  account.	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Heidegger	  had	  returned	  to	  Freiburg	  in	  1928,	  apparently	  in	  triumph,	  after	  the	  1927	  publication	  of	  Being	  and	  Time.	  As	  the	  committee’s	  report	  suggests,	  however,	  he	  had	  by	  no	  means	   secured	   universal	   acceptance	  within	   the	  German	   academy.	   To	   be	   sure,	  Heidegger	  had	  achieved	  an	   impressive	  reputation	  as	  a	   teacher	  as	  early	  as	  his	   first	   stint	  at	  Freiburg.	  Gadamer	   would	   later	   recall	   that	   in	   Heidegger	   “there	   was	   an	   existential	   passion,	   an	  emanation	   of	   intellectual	   concentration,	   that	   made	   everything	   that	   preceded	   it	   seem	  feeble.”220	  To	   those	  not	   present	   at	   his	   lectures,	   his	   notoriety	  must	   have	   seemed	   fantastic	  indeed.	   As	   Arendt	   famously	   put	   it,	   “There	   was	   hardly	  more	   than	   a	   name,	   but	   the	   name	  traveled	   all	   over	   Germany	   like	   the	   rumor	   of	   the	   hidden	   king.”221	  To	   those	   outside	   the	  Freiburg	  and	  Marburg	  circles,	  however,	  the	  only	  public	  evidence	  of	  the	  actual	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  man	  consisted	  in	  Being	  and	  Time	  and	  the	  inaugural	  address	  he	  delivered	  at	  Freiburg	  (“What	  Is	  Metaphysics?”)	  in	  July	  1929.	  The	  forbiddingness	  of	  the	  former’s	  prose,	  combined	  with	   the	   general	   bizarreness	   of	   the	   latter—“das	  Nichts	   selbst	   nichtet,”	   Heidegger	   soberly	  informs	  us	  (WM	  9:114)—only	   intensified	   the	  suspicions	  of	   those	  who,	   like	  Spranger,	  had	  heard	  quite	  enough	  about	  their	  new	  king.	  As	   if	   that	  weren’t	  enough,	  Heidegger’s	  recent	  exchange	  with	  Cassirer	  at	  Davos	  had	  quickly	  assumed	  a	  rather	  fantastical	  air.	  Again	  and	  again	  Cassirer	  emphasized	  the	  points	  of	  similarity—as	   he	   saw	   them,	   at	   least—between	   Heidegger’s	   existentialism	   and	   his	   own	  philosophy	  of	   symbolic	   forms.	  Again	  and	  again	  Heidegger	  would	  decline	   the	   invitation	   to	  arrive	   at	   any	  basic	   agreement,	   instead	   emphasizing	   just	   how	   fundamentally	   different	   his	  position	   was	   from	   Cassirer’s.	   To	   be	   sure,	   this	   was	   not	   simple	   intellectual	   pride	   or	  obstinance	  on	  Heidegger’s	  part.	  Since	  as	  early	  as	  1921,	  he	  had	  been	  trying	  to	  impress	  upon	  
                                                220	  Gadamer	  (1963),	  139.	  221	  Arendt	  (1971),	  50.	  
 156	  
his	  students	  that	  “if	  there	  is	  one	  thing	  that	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  philosophy,	  that	  is	  compromise	  as	  a	  way	  of	  getting	  to	  the	  point	  [Sache]”	  (PIA	  61:13).	  Philosophy	  fulfills	  its	  ultimate	  function	  not	  when	   it	   assimilates	   competing	  worldviews	   under	   a	  more	   comprehensive	   conceptual	  structure,	   but	   when	   it	   lays	   bare	   a	   decision	   which	   must	   be	   rendered	   about	   the	   things	  themselves.	  Regardless,	  however,	  of	  the	  depth	  of	  Heidegger’s	  philosophical	  point,	  he	  could	  barely	   conceal	   the	   pleasure	   he	   took	   in	   physically	   performing	   the	   difference	   between	   the	  stubborn	   provinciality	   of	   his	   own	   thought	   and	   Cassirer’s	   eager	   cosmopolitanism.	   While	  Cassirer—in	   part,	   no	   doubt,	   because	   he	   was	   ill	   for	   most	   of	   the	   conference—kept	   a	   low	  profile,	   Heidegger	   went	   out	   of	   his	   way	   to	   cut	   a	   figure	   amongst	   the	   cultured	   urbanites	  encamped	  at	   the	  resort.	  He	  wrote	  to	  Elisabeth	  Blochmann	  that	  “in	  the	  evenings,	  after	  the	  whole	   ringing	   momentum	   of	   our	   far-­‐ranging	   journey,	   our	   bodies	   full	   of	   sun	   and	   the	  freedom	  of	  the	  mountains,	  we	  then	  came,	  still	  dressed	  in	  our	  ski-­‐suits,	  among	  the	  elegance	  of	   the	   evening	   toilette.”222	  While	  Heidegger’s	   evident	   glee	   aroused	   the	   enthusiasm	   of	   the	  students	   in	   attendance,	   it	   only	   confirmed	   the	   consensus	   of	   the	   older	   generation	   that	  Heidegger	  was,	  if	  not	  exactly	  unhinged,	  at	  the	  very	  least	  disturbingly	  eccentric.	  This	  performance,	  taken	  together	  with	  the	  obscure	  book	  which	  had	  preceded	  it	  and	  the	  bombastic	  lecture	  that	  would	  follow	  on	  its	  heels,	  undoubtedly	  contributed	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  crisis	  surrounding	  Heidegger	  to	  which	  the	  Berlin	  committee	  had	  referred	  in	  its	  report.	  Of	  course,	  Heidegger	  had	  mostly	  himself	  to	  blame.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  disagree	  with	  the	  committee’s	  final	  verdict	  on	  Heidegger:	  it	  simply	  remained	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  Heidegger’s	  work	  could	  actually	   transcend	   his	   idiosyncratic	   personality	   and	   speak,	   in	   a	   constructive	  way,	   to	   the	  philosophical	  community	  at	  large.	  
                                                222	  Quoted	  in	  Gordon	  (2010),	  110.	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   Clearly,	   the	   members	   of	   the	   committee	   expected	   that	   soon	   enough	   some	   kind	   of	  resolution	  to	  Heidegger’s	  “crisis”	  would	  manage	  to	  work	  itself	  out.	  Indeed,	  the	  events	  of	  the	  next	   five	  years,	  culminating	  with	  Heidegger’s	   installation	  as	  the	  rector	  at	  Freiburg,	  would	  prove	   them	  right.	  Heidegger’s	   crisis,	  however,	  was	  not	   just	  a	  personal	  one.	   In	   spite	  of	  all	  appearances,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1929	  Heidegger	  found	  himself	  closer	  to	  the	  mainstream	  of	  the	  German	  academic	   tradition	   than	  he	  had	  ever	  been	  before.	  To	  be	  sure,	  his	   reading	  of	   that	  tradition—as	   manifest	   in	   Kant	   and	   the	   Problem	   of	   Metaphysics,	   which	   was	   published	   in	  summer	  1929—placed	  him	  directly	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  still-­‐dominant	  Neokantian	  history	  of	  philosophy.	  But	  Heidegger’s	  attempt	  to	  claim	  a	  genuinely	  Kantian	  heritage	  for	  himself	  was	  a	   sincere	   one.	   It	  was	   rooted,	  moreover,	   not	   in	   some	   desire	   to	   assume	   the	   role	   of	   Kant’s	  representative	   on	   the	   contemporary	   scene,	   but	   in	   an	   inner	   necessity	   of	  Heidegger’s	   own	  thinking.	  For	  he	  firmly	  believed	  that	  the	  project	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  was	  destined	  to	  fail	  if	  its	  Kantian	  provenance	  could	  not	  be	  demonstrated.	  At	  least,	  this	  is	  what	  he	  thought	  at	  the	  time	  of	  both	  Being	  and	  Time	  and	  Kant	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics.	  This	  conviction	  did	  not	  survive	  the	  tumult	  of	  the	  1930s.	  Heidegger	  gradually	  came	  around	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   it	   was	   not	   Kant,	   but	   Nietzsche,	   who	   was	   his	   proximate	  historical	   forebearer.	  Even	  as	  his	  enthusiasm	  for	  the	  National	  Socialist	  regime	  waxed	  and	  waned	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   decade,	   Heidegger’s	   philosophical	   path	  would	   continue	   to	  become	   increasingly	   isolated	   from	   a	   recognizable	   academic	   tradition	   in	   philosophy.	  Although	  he	  would	  never	  altogether	  cease	  engaging	  figures	  in	  classical	  German	  philosophy,	  his	   later	   thought	   came	   to	   be	   inspired	   by	   Nietzsche’s	   attempt	   to	   step	   back	   from	   that	  tradition,	  not	  by	  a	  sustained	  effort	  to	  engage	  it	  systematically.	  It	  is	  hard	  not	  to	  look	  back	  at	  
Kant	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics,	  coming	  as	  it	  did	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  Davos,	  and	  just	  a	  few	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years	  before	  the	  politically	  decisive	  events	  leading	  up	  to	  his	  Rectoral	  Address	  at	  Freiburg,	  as	   a	   crucial	   turning	   point	   for	   Heidegger—and	   perhaps	   even	   for	   the	   phenomenological	  movement	  as	  a	  whole.	  In	  1929	  no	  one	  knew	  anything	  of	  the	  role	  Heidegger	  was	  to	  play	  in	  the	  upheaval	  of	  the	   coming	   decade.	   But	   for	  Heidegger’s	  most	   astute	   contemporaries,	   and	   for	   Cassirer,	   in	  particular,	  the	  stakes	  were	  already	  clear.	  When	  Cassirer	  brought	  to	  a	  close	  his	  cautious	  yet	  devastating	   review	   of	   Kant	   and	   the	   Problem	   of	   Metaphysics,	   he	   did	   so	   by	   expelling	  Heidegger’s	  thought	  from	  Kant’s	  conceptual	  terrain	  and	  consigning	  it	  to	  the	  margins	  of	  the	  academy.	   Heidegger’s	   views,	   Cassirer	   wrote,	   are	   ultimately	   “explicable	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  world	   of	   Kierkegaard,	   but	   in	   Kant’s	   intellectual	   world	   they	   have	   no	   place.”223	  Whether	  Cassirer	   was	   right	   or	   wrong	   in	   this	   judgment,	   it	   must	   be	   admitted	   that	   he	   correctly	  identified	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  matter.	  It	  is	  easy	  now,	  perhaps,	  to	  look	  back	  at	  the	  Kantbook	  as	  just	   an	   ill-­‐fated	   attempt	   to	   envelop	   Kant’s	   first	   Critique	   into	   the	   soon-­‐to-­‐be-­‐abandoned-­‐anyway	  historical	  project	  announced	  in	  Being	  and	  Time.	  Although	  it	  is	  this,	  too,	  Heidegger’s	  primary	   objective	   in	   the	   book	   is	   not	   to	   place	   Kant’s	   thought	   in	   the	   context	   of	  Being	  and	  
Time,	   but	   rather	   to	   answer	   the	  question	  of	   his	   own	  place	   in	   the	  history	  of	  German	  post-­‐Kantian	  thought,	  a	  question	  that	  had	  stakes	  both	  professional	  and	  philosophical	  for	  him.	  It	  is	  a	  battle	  that	  Heidegger	  himself	  may	  seem	  to	  have	  conceded,224	  and	  in	  any	  event	  it	  seems	  undeniable	   that	   it	   is	   a	   battle	   he	   has,	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   plain	   historical	   fact,	   largely	   lost—so	  much	   so	   that	   in	   1992	   Lévinas,	   speaking	   of	   Davos,	   could	   offer	   his	   interviewer	   a	   casual	  
                                                223	  Cassirer	  (1931),	  156.	  224	  I	   have	   in	   mind	   his	   concession	   in	   the	   1950	   Preface	   to	   the	   Second	   Edition	   of	   the	   Kantbook	   that	   his	  interpretation	  of	  Kant	  was	  a	  violent	  one	  in	  which	  his	  own	  shortcomings	  as	  a	  thinker	  manifest	  themselves.	  See	  p.	  259	  below.	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reminder:	   “As	   you	   know,	   thought	   inspired	   by	   Kant	   and	   the	   Enlightenment	   heritage,	  represented	  mainly	  by	  Cassirer,	  disappeared	  from	  Germany	  after	  [Davos].”225	  Did	   this	   have	   to	   be	   the	   case?	   Could	   Heidegger	   have	   really	   become	   an	   heir	   to	   the	  Kantian	   tradition	   that	  was	   still	   so	   dominant	   in	   the	   German	   academy?	  Or	  was	   he	   always	  destined	   to	   remain	   an	  outsider	   to	   that	   tradition,	   taking	   it	   up	   in	  ways	   that	  would	   remain	  forever	  incomprehensible	  to	  those	  who	  remained	  within	  its	  grasp?	  If,	  as	  I	  will	  suggest,	  the	  philosophical	   answer	   is	   some	   version	   of	   both/and,	   the	   professional	   answer	   nevertheless	  proved	   in	   short	   order	   to	   be	   strictly	   either/or.	   As	   a	   consequence	   of	   Heidegger’s	   political	  radicalization,	  the	  urgency	  attached	  to	  his	  Kant	  interpretation	  quickly	  waned,	  giving	  way	  to	  a	  subtler,	   though	  perhaps	  no	   less	  decisive	  confrontation	  with	  the	  Nazis	  over	  Nietzsche	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1930s.	  I	  will	  be	  satisfied	  in	  the	  following	  if	  I	  can	  return	  to	  Heidegger’s	  Kant	  interpretation	  some	  of	  the	  provocative	  power	  it	  so	  quickly	  lost	  after	  1929.	  	   	  





	  In	   the	   very	   first	   hour	   of	   Heidegger’s	   1919	   Kriegnotsemester	   course	   (henceforth	   “KNS	  course”)226	  we	   find	   him	   laying	   the	   groundwork	   for	   the	   university	   reform	   which	   would	  remain	  a	  passion	  of	  his	  until	  his	  1933	  appointment	  to	  the	  rectorate	  at	  Freiburg.	  The	   renewal	   of	   the	   university	   means	   a	   rebirth	   of	   genuine	   scientific	  consciousness	  and	  connections	  to	  life.	  But	  relations	  to	  life	  are	  renewed	  only	  by	  going	  back	  into	  the	  genuine	  origins	  of	  the	  spirit.	  As	  historical	  phenomena	  they	  need	  the	  peace	  and	  security	  of	  genetic	  solidification,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  inner	  truthfulness	  of	  a	  worthwhile,	  self-­‐cultivating	  life.	  Only	  life,	  not	  the	  din	  of	  hurried	  cultural	  programs,	  makes	  an	  “epoch.”	  (KNS	  56/57:4-­‐5)	  	  Though	   his	   references	   to	   the	   “genuine	   origins	   of	   the	   spirit,”	   “genetic	   solidification,”	   and	  life’s	   “inner	   truthfulness”	   remain	   vague,	   they	   at	   least	   serve	   to	   indicate	   a	   tendency	  which	  would	  remain	  decisive	   for	  Heidegger	   through	  all	   the	   twists	  and	   turns	  his	   thinking	  would	  take	   over	   the	  next	   several	   decades.	   The	   life	   of	   the	   intellect,	   especially	   as	  manifest	   in	   the	  university	   community,	   has	   genuine	   content	   only	   insofar	   as	   it	   draws	   its	   inner	  motivation	  from	  the	  concrete	  lives	  of	  those	  who	  think.	  The	  university	  cannot	  simply	  be	  a	  place	  we	  go	  to	  learn	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  “great	  conversation”	  which	  could	  just	  as	  well	  subsist	  without	  our	  personal	   investment.	   Instead	   of	   being	   a	   place	   where	   concepts	   only	   pile	   upon	   existing	  concepts,	  spawning	  theories	  that	  beget	  theories	  still	  more	  subtle,	  the	  university	  must	  once	  again	  become	  a	  place	  where	  the	  original	  motivation	  of	  all	   theory	  whatsoever	   from	  out	  of	  
                                                226	  The	  course	  was	  titled	  “The	  Idea	  of	  Philosophy	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Worldview.”	  Heidegger	  had	  originally	  announced	   that	   it	  would	   be	   a	   course	   on	  Kant,	   but	   the	   title	   and	   topic	  were	   changed	  before	   the	   start	   of	   the	  semester,	  a	  semester	  which	  ran	  from	  January	  until	  April	  of	  1919	  and	  was	  designed	  to	  accommodate	  veterans	  returning	  from	  the	  war.	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the	   life	   of	   the	   community	   is	   confirmed	   and	   rendered	   transparent.	   Such	   a	   renewal	  would	  have	  appeared	  especially	  urgent	  for	  the	  generation	  returning	  home	  from	  the	  Western	  front.	  Nevertheless,	  Heidegger	  cautioned	  his	  students	  that	  its	  time	  remained	  well	  into	  the	  future.	  “Today	  we	  are	  not	  ripe	  for	  genuine	  reforms	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  the	  university.	  Becoming	  ripe	  for	  them,	  moreover,	  is	  a	  task	  [Sache]	  for	  an	  entire	  generation”	  (KNS	  56/57:4).	  	   It	  was	  only	  fourteen	  chaotic	  years	  later,	  however,	  that	  Heidegger	  found	  the	  time	  to	  renew	  the	  university	  already	  at	  hand—and	  with	  himself	  uniquely	  positioned	  to	  facilitate	  it.	  Upon	   assuming	   the	   rectorship	   at	   Freiburg,	   he	   moved	   quickly	   (though	   not	   necessarily	  successfully)	  to	  implement	  the	  reforms	  he	  had	  announced	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  earlier.	  Thus	  after	   years	   of	   warning	   about	   the	   crisis	   of	   the	   sciences,	   Heidegger	   suddenly	   found	   his	  opportunity	  standing	  directly	  before	  him.	  The	   time	  had	  at	   last	  come	  to	  decisively	  re-­‐root	  German	  thought	  in	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  German	  people.	  Against	  all	  liberal-­‐humanist	  appeals	  to	  “freedom	  of	  thought,”	  it	  must	  be	  insisted	  that	  such	  freedom	  amounts	  merely	  to	  caprice	  if	  thought	   is	   left	  to	  float	  adrift	   from	  the	  life	  of	  the	  people	  which	  sustains	   it.	  By	  contrast,	   the	  
genuine	  freedom	  of	  Denken	  can	  emerge	  only	  when	  it	  is	  moored	  to	  the	  Volk.	  Even	   for	   those	   entirely	   unfamiliar	   with	   Heidegger’s	   work,	   the	   airing	   of	   such	  sentiments	  by	   the	  newly	   installed	  Nazi	  rector	  would	  hardly	  have	  come	  as	  a	  shock.	  Nor—assuming	  they	  had	  perused	  at	   least	   the	   first	  chapter	  of	  Rosenberg’s	  1930	  best-­‐seller227—would	   they	   have	   found	   anything	   to	   be	   surprised	   about	   in	   Heidegger’s	   subsequent	  identification	  of	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  German	  spirit	  in	  classical	  Greece.	  Science,	  he	  insisted,	  can	  only	   truly	   exist	   in	   the	   academy	   “if	   we	   place	   ourselves	   again	   under	   the	   power	   of	   the	  
                                                227	  Rosenberg’s	  Myth	  of	   the	  Twentieth	  Century	   sold	   a	  million	   copies,	   although	   it	  was	  no	  doubt	   considerably	  less	  widely	  read	  than	  such	  a	  startling	  figure	  would	  suggest.	  Hitler	  himself	  claimed	  it	  was	  too	  difficult	  to	  get	  through	  and	  that	  most	  Nazi	  leaders	  had	  likely	  read	  little	  of	  it	  (Evans	  [2005],	  250).	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beginning	  of	  our	  spiritual-­‐historical	  existence	  [Dasein].	  This	  beginning	  is	  the	  departure	  of	  Greek	  philosophy”	  (RA	  11).	  Far	  from	  maintaining	  a	  dispassionate	  interest	  in	  truth	  as	  such,	  Greek	   science	   represented,	   for	   the	  Greeks,	   their	   fundamental	   response	   to	   the	  mystery	  of	  being,	  their	  grand	  failure	  in	  the	  face	  of	  being	  overwhelmed	  by	  fate.228	  Despite	  its	  apparent	  banality,	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  ordinary	  German	  folk	  retains	  to	  this	  day	  an	  indelible	  reference	  to	  this	  ancient	  beginning.229	  If	  one	  abstracts,	  however,	  from	  the	  charged	  political	  context	  of	  the	  rectoral	  address,	  it	   is	   clear	   that	   Heidegger’s	   1919	   and	   1933	   pronouncements	   on	   university	   reform	   share	  much	  in	  common.	  Science	  can	  only	  be	  rooted	  anew	  by	  reconnecting	  it	  to	  its	  origin,	  an	  origin	  it	   is	   always	   in	   danger	   of	   forgetting	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   its	   own	  progress.	   In	   1919	   this	  means	  science	  must	  ultimately	  be	  referred	  to	  “life,”	  which	  as	  a	  “historical	  phenomenon”	  requires	  “genetic	   solidification.”	   By	   contrast,	   this	   reference	   to	   “life”	   has	   dropped	   out	   entirely	   by	  1933,	  now	  replaced	  by	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  beginnings	  of	  the	  Western	  philosophical	  tradition.	  But	   this	   apparent	   departure	   is	   really	   the	   result	   of	   a	   consolidation	   in	   Heidegger’s	   own	  thought.	  When	  we	  look	  below	  the	  surface	  we	  find	  that	  between	  the	  1919	  KNS	  class	  and	  the	  1927	  publication	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  Heidegger	  had	   ingeniously	  assimilated	   the	  project	  of	  the	   Lebensphilosophen	   to	   a	   historico-­‐philosophical	   project,	   so	   much	   so	   that	   in	   the	  introduction	  to	  Being	  and	  Time	  he	  was	  able	  to	  present	  the	  methods	  of	  Phänomenolgie	  and	  
                                                228	  “All	  knowledge	  concerning	  things	  remains	  from	  the	  start	  delivered	  up	  to	   fate’s	  overpowerment	  and	  fails	  before	  it”	  (RA	  11).	  229	  And	  in	  fact	  H.S.	  Chamberlain,	  whose	  work	  Rosenberg	  aspired	  to	  emulate	  and	  complete,	  had	  maintained	  the	  supreme	   significance	   of	   this	   unlikely	   connection	   since	   the	   turn	   of	   the	   century.	   “This	   barbarian	   [i.e.,	   the	  German],	  who	  would	   rush	  naked	   to	  battle,	   this	   savage,	  who	  suddenly	   sprang	  out	  of	  woods	  and	  marshes	   to	  inspire	  into	  a	  civilized	  and	  cultivated	  world	  the	  terrors	  of	  a	  violent	  conquest	  won	  by	  the	  strong	  hand	  alone,	  was	  nevertheless	  the	  lawful	  heir	  of	  the	  Hellene	  and	  the	  Roman,	  blood	  of	  their	  blood	  and	  spirit	  of	  their	  spirit”	  (Chamberlain	   [1899],	   494).	   Of	   course	   in	   all	   this	   he	   is	   deeply	   influenced	   by	   Wagner,	   into	   whose	   family	  Chamberlain	  eventually	  married.	  Nietzsche,	  before	   the	  break	  with	  Wagner,	  paints	  a	   striking	  portrait	  of	   the	  modern	  German,	  exhausted	  by	  his	  own	  “culture,”	  throwing	  it	  off	  in	  favor	  of	  Greece	  at	  the	  culmination	  of	  §§20	  and	  23	  of	  the	  Birth	  of	  Tragedy.	  See	  Nietzsche	  (1872),	  97-­‐98,	  111.	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Destruktion	   as	   two	   sides	   of	   the	   same	   coin.	   No	   longer	   invested	   in	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   “life,”	  Heidegger	  nevertheless	  took	  it	  upon	  himself	  to	  show	  that	  what	  the	  Lebensphilosophen	  had	  really	   been	   after—a	   regrounding	   of	   science	   in	   the	   basic	   experiences	   that	   underlie	   our	  conceptual	   abstractions—was	   possible	   only	   by	  means	   of	   historical	   research	  which	   could	  unprejudice	   our	   eyes	   in	   the	   face	   of	   life.230	  In	   other	  words,	   to	   root	   philosophy	   in	   “life”	   is	  really	  just	  to	  root	  it	  once	  again	  in	  its	  own	  history.	  Thus	  Heidegger’s	  conclusion	  in	  1933	  was	  more	  than	  just	  a	  reflection	  of	  Rosenberg’s	  racial	  thesis;	  it	  was	  the	  culmination	  of	  more	  than	  a	   decade	   of	   Heidegger’s	   own	   thought:	   the	   essence	   of	   the	   German	   people	   just	   is	   their	  rootedness—however	  forgotten	  it	  may	  be	  today—in	  the	  beginnings	  of	  Greek	  philosophy.	  	   Many	  years	  after	  the	  debacle	  of	  his	  rectorship,	  in	  July	  of	  1961,	  Heidegger	  was	  invited	  back	  to	  his	  hometown	  of	  Messkirch	   to	  say	  some	  evening	  words	  at	   its	  Seventh	  Centennial	  Jubilee.	  What	  does	  it	  mean,	  he	  asked	  his	  audience,	  to	  come	  back	  home	  anymore?	  Whatever	  significance	  the	  idea	  of	  homecoming	  may	  once	  have	  held	  is	  quickly	  disappearing	  amidst	  the	  technological	  marvels	   of	   the	  modern	  world.	   After	   all,	   for	   the	  world-­‐savvy	   cosmopolitan,	  home	  can	  easily	  be	  everywhere	  and	  nowhere.	  Gesturing	  towards	  the	  antennae	  perched	  on	  the	  houses,	  he	  admits	  to	  his	  audience	  that	  “they	  indicate	  that	  people	  are	  no	  longer	  at	  home	  in	  those	  places	  where,	  from	  the	  outside,	  they	  seem	  to	  ‘dwell’	  [“Wohnen”]”	  (H	  16:575).	  Once	  the	  cosmopolitan	  was	  a	  stranger	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  community;	  now	  even	  in	  the	  humble	  homes	  of	  Messkirch	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  no	  traces	  left	  of	  that	  “inner	  truthfulness	  of	  a	  worthwhile,	  self-­‐cultivating	  life”	  to	  which	  he	  had	  referred	  back	  in	  1919.	  
                                                230	  This	   is	   not	   to	   imply	   that	   Heidegger’s	   interest	   in	   the	   history	   of	   philosophy	   was	   a	   new	   one	   or	   slow	   to	  develop.	  Far	   from	   it:	   it	   always	  represented	   (even	   in	  his	  1915	   thesis)	  his	  deepest	  philosophical	  passion.	  My	  claim	  is	  only	  that	  he	  succeeded	  more	  and	  more,	  as	  the	  1920s	  wore	  on,	  in	  transposing	  the	  Lebensphilosophie	  project	  into	  a	  historical	  one.	  As	  he	  finds	  less	  and	  less	  use	  for	  the	  language	  of	  Existenz	  and	  Phänomenologie	  in	  his	   later	   thought,	   the	   transposition	   is	  more	  or	   less	  completed.	  But	   the	   latter	   topic	  exceeds	   the	  scope	  of	  my	  project	  here.	  
 164	  
	   For	  someone	  who	  had	  always	  maintained	  that	  the	  pastoral	  existence	  of	  the	  German	  peasantry	  was	  the	   lifeblood	  of	  even	  the	  nation’s	  most	  abstract	  cultural	  achievements,	   the	  vanishing	  of	   that	  way	  of	   life,	  which	  Heidegger	  witnessed	   first-­‐hand,	  posed	  an	  apparently	  insuperable	   obstacle	   not	   only	   to	   his	   thinking,	   but	   to	   thought	   in	   general.	   Faced	  with	   this	  consequence,	   however,	   he	   hesitates.	   Despite	   all	   appearances	   to	   the	   contrary,	   he	   insists,	  home	   has	   not	   disappeared	   from	   the	   modern	   world	   just	   yet.	   “For	   a	   moment	   we	   are	  reflecting	  on	  whether	  and	  how	  there	  is	  still	  home	  amidst	  the	  alienation	  [Umheimischen]	  of	  the	  modern	  technological	  world.	  It	  still	  exists	  and	  concerns	  us,	  but	  as	  that	  which	  is	  sought	  
after	   [aber	   als	   die	   Gesuchte]”	   (H	   16:579).	   That	   is,	   home	   is	   present	   for	   us	   even	   in	   its	  palpable	  absence:	  as	  long	  as	  we	  seek	  home,	  the	  essence	  of	  homecoming	  cannot	  altogether	  vanish	  from	  this	  world.231	  	   Such	  a	  solution	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  bit	  too	  convenient.	  Faced	  with	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  way	  of	  life	  in	  which	  he	  had	  always	  sought	  to	  ground	  his	  philosophy,	  Heidegger	  simply	  relocates	  the	  source	  of	  his	  thought	  from	  that	  way	  of	  life	  itself	  to	  the	  search,	  however	  futile	  we	  might	  already	  know	   it	   to	  be,	   for	   its	   traces.	  But	   such	  a	  verdict	  on	  Heidegger’s	   thought	  would	  be	  too	  quick,	  for	  in	  fact	  the	  answer	  he	  gives	  to	  the	  question	  of	  home	  in	  1961	  was	  the	  same	  as	  the	  answer	  Heidegger	  had	  always	  given	  to	  this	  question.	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  even	  in	  his	  earliest	   lectures	   the	  appeal	   to	  “life”	  was	  never	   intended	  to	  be	  an	  appeal	   to	  a	  determinate	  region	  of	  phenomenological	  or	  historical	   content	   from	  which	   the	   free-­‐floating	   theories	  of	  the	   day	   might	   be	   materially	   reconstructed	   and	   thereby	   grounded.	   Nor	   are	   the	   Greeks	  assigned	   such	   a	   role	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Heidegger’s	   history	   of	   philosophy.	   The	  Husserlian	  motto	  To	  the	  things	  themselves!	  never	  represented,	  for	  Heidegger,	  the	  imperative	  to	  turn	  to	  
                                                231	  Although	  he	  turns	  to	  “The	  Anaximander	  Fragment,”	  this	  is	  precisely	  the	  logic	  in	  Heidegger’s	  thought	  that	  Derrida	  exploits	  in	  tracing	  the	  logic	  of	  différance.	  See	  Derrida	  (1968),	  23-­‐26.	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life	   itself,	   or	   to	   the	   phenomena	   themselves,	   if	   by	   such	   things	   are	   understood	   beings	   that	  might	  be	  given	  to	  us	   in	  their	  bodily	  presence,	  so	  to	  speak.	  Heidegger	  himself	  could	  adopt	  such	   a	  motto	   only	   on	   the	   understanding	   that	   it	   offered	   a	   directive	   to	   phenomenological	  research.	  To	  put	   it	   in	  his	  1961	  terminology,	  we	  might	  say:	  yes,	   there	   is	   life—yes,	   there	   is	  Greece—but	   as	   that	   for	   which	   we	   are	   searching.	   And	   as	   he	   himself	   put	   it	   in	   1933:	  philosophy	  must	   be	   the	  most	   rigorous	   response	   possible	   to	   the	   inevitable	   failure	   of	   this	  search.	  
Phenomenology	  and	  Life	  Philosophy	  This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   Heidegger	  was	   not	   attracted	   to	   Husserl’s	   radical	   rhetoric	   on	   this	  score.	  Heidegger	  was,	  and	  would	  always	  remain,	  suspicious	  of	  the	  real	   foundations	  of	  the	  theories	  bandied	  about	   in	   the	  schools.	   “Philosophers,”	  he	  complained	  to	  his	  students,	   “no	  longer	  philosophize	  from	  the	  issues	  [aus	  den	  Sachen]	  but	  only	  from	  out	  of	  the	  books	  of	  their	  colleagues”	  (L	  21:84).	  In	  Husserl,	  by	  contrast,	  he	  found—or	  so	  it	  initially	  appeared	  to	  him—the	   ultimate	   advocate	   for	   rooting	   theory,	   in	   the	   most	   general	   sense,	   in	   something	  immediately	  demonstrable.	  The	  entire	  method	  of	  phenomenology,	  after	  all,	  was	  designed	  to	   ensure	   that	   all	   theory	   be	   rigorously	   grounded	   in—and	   meticulously	   built	   up	   from—evidence	   which	   is	   available	   to	   everyone	   and	   requires	   no	   prior	   initiation.	   In	   this	   way	  Heidegger,	   following	   Husserl,	   would	   demand	   the	   birth	   certificates	   of	   the	   conceptual	  constructions	   of	   the	   philosophical	   tradition,	   and	   they	   would	   be	   deemed	   genuine	   only	  insofar	   as	   they	   could	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   a	   phenomenal	   basis	   which	   could	   be	   concretely	  demonstrated	   in	   intuition.	   This	   basic	   methodological	   point	   shone	   forth—for	   Husserl,	   at	  least—with	  supreme	  self-­‐evidence.	  But	  enough	  of	  erroneous	  theories.	  No	  conceivable	  theory	  can	  make	  us	  stray	  from	   the	   principle	   of	   all	   principles:	   that	   each	   intuition	   affording	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[something]	   in	   an	   originary	   way	   is	   a	   legitimate	   source	   of	   knowledge,	  that	  whatever	  presents	  itself	  to	  us	  in	  “Intuition”	  in	  an	  originary	  way	  (so	  to	  speak,	  in	  its	  actuality	  in	  person)	  is	  to	  be	  taken	  simply	  as	  what	  it	  affords	  
itself	  as,	  but	  only	  within	   the	   limitations	   in	  which	   it	  affords	   itself	   there.	  Let	   us	   continue	   to	   recognize	   that	   each	   theory	   in	   turn	   could	   itself	   draw	   its	  truth	  only	  from	  originary	  givenness.	  Thus,	  every	  assertion	  that	  does	  nothing	  further	   than	   give	   expression	   to	   such	   givennesses	   through	  mere	   explication	  and	   meanings	   conforming	   precisely	   to	   them	   is	   actually	   .	   .	   .	   “an	   absolute	  
beginning,”	   called	   upon	   to	   lay	   the	   ground	   in	   the	   genuine	   sense,	   a	  
principium.232	  	  The	  legitimation	  of	  cognition	  in	  general	  resides	  in	  the	  intuitive	  sphere,	  and	  such	  legitimacy	  can	  be	  transferred	  upwards	  into	  theory	  only	  insofar	  as	  the	  latter	  restrains	  itself	  from	  doing	  anything	  more	   than	  merely	  conferring	  expression	  upon	  what	   is	   seen	   in	   intuition.	  Only	   in	  such	  a	  manner	  can	  concepts	  of	  all	  varieties	  be	  rigorously	  grounded.	  	   Husserl’s	  principle	  of	  principles	  promised	  a	  return	   to	  philosophical	  honesty	   in	   the	  grand	   tradition	   of	   British	   empiricism,	   although	   Husserl,	   of	   course,	   thought	   that	   the	  empiricists	  had	  built	  rather	  too	  much	  into	  their	  theories	  (including	  assumptions	  regarding	  the	   indirectness	   of	   perception)	   from	   the	   very	   start.	   Indeed,	   the	   key	   insight	   of	   modern	  philosophy	  stemmed	  not	  from	  the	  empiricists	  (though	  their	  critical	  insights	  were	  certainly	  to	   be	   admired),	   but	   from	   its	   rationalist	   founder.	   If	   we	   want	   to	   understand	   how	   a	   bare	  intuition	  can	  be	  rendered	  accessible	   for	   the	  most	  basic	   level	  of	  description,	  we	  would	  do	  well	  to	  turn	  back	  to	  Descartes’s	  Meditations.	  In	  the	  First	  Meditation	  Descartes	  meticulously	  clears	  away	  all	   the	   typical	  assumptions	   that	  are	  naturally	  attached	  to	  our	   intuition	  of	   the	  phenomena,	  most	   notably,	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   objects	  we	   perceive	   actually	   exist	   as	  part	  of	  the	  natural	  world.	  When	  we	  suspend	  the	  “natural	  attitude,”	  however,	  what	  remains	  for	  us	  is	  a	  pure	  field	  of	  phenomena—the	  same	  objects	  intended	  in	  the	  natural	  attitude,	  but	  now	   considered	   only	   and	   precisely	   as	   they	   are	   intended.	   Unfortunately,	   Descartes,	   after	  
                                                232	  Husserl	  (1913),	  43	  (§24).	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creating	   the	   logical	   space	   for	   phenomenology,	   moved	   straightaway	   to	   the	   questions	   of	  traditional	  metaphysics	  in	  the	  Second	  Meditation.	  But	  he	  had	  made	  tangible	  the	  possibility,	  at	  least,	  of	  a	  purely	  descriptive	  science	  of	  phenomena.233	  If	  we	  follow	  Descartes	  up	  to,	  but	  no	  further	  than,	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  “natural	  attitude”—the	  positing	  of	  external	  objects	  as	   really	   existing—is	   put	   out	   of	   play,	   we	   have	   the	   blueprint	   for	   a	   method	   aimed	   at	  rigorously	  securing	  “an	  intrinsically	  sui	  generis	  region	  of	  being	  that	  can	  indeed	  become	  the	  field	  of	  a	  new	  science:	  phenomenology.”234	  Although	  both	  were	  reluctant	  to	  acknowledge	  it,	  over	  the	  next	  decade	  Husserl	  and	  Heidegger	   would	   move	   away	   from	   the	   “principle	   of	   principles.”	   In	   each	   case,	   Natorp’s	  critical	   review	   of	   Ideas	   I	   was	   an	   important	   catalyst	   for	   their	   paths	   of	   intellectual	  development,235	  but,	   as	   we	   would	   expect	   of	   two	   thinkers	   working	   independently,	   their	  responses	   assumed	   quite	   divergent	   characters.	   For	  Husserl	   himself,	   his	  work	   on	   passive	  synthesis	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   Natorp’s	   review	   led	   him	   to	   his	   mature	   “genetic”	   method	   of	  phenomenology,	   where	   intuitive	   evidence	   will	   be	   assimilated	   to	   a	   phenomenological	  variety	   of	   interpretation.236	  As	   is	   well	   known,	   Husserl	   admitted	   little	   of	   this	   publicly.	   A	  month	  before	  Heidegger’s	  disputation	  with	  Cassirer	   in	  Davos,	  Husserl	  could	  still	  say	  with	  
                                                233	  On	  Husserl’s	  view,	  Descartes	  “stands	  before	  the	  greatest	  of	  all	  discoveries—in	  a	  sense	  he	  has	  already	  made	  it—yet	  fails	  to	  see	  its	  true	  significance,	  that	  of	  transcendental	  subjectivity”	  (Husserl	  [1929],	  9	  [Hua	  I:9-­‐10]).	  234	  Husserl	  (1913),	  58	  (§33).	  235	  For	   his	   own	   part,	   Natorp	   clearly	   intended	   it	   as	   a	   friendly	   review	  which	  would	   nevertheless	   raise	   some	  basic	   questions	   about	   Husserl’s	   methodology.	   Two	   factors,	   I	   think,	   help	   to	   explain	   its	   significance.	   (1)	   He	  succeeded	   in	   summing	   up	   the	  Neokantian	  worry	   about	   life	   philosophy	   in	   a	   simple	   and	   direct	  manner	   and	  applying	   it	   to	  phenomenology.	   (2)	  Natorp	  himself	  was	  esteemed	  by	  (and,	   for	  his	  own	  part,	   sympathetic	   to)	  both	  Husserl	  and	  Heidegger.	  Despite	  the	  latter’s	  polemical	  remarks	  about	  the	  Marburg	  school	  (especially	   in	  the	   context	   of	   Kant	   interpretation,	   where	   Natorp’s	   aggressive	   reading	   of	   B160-­‐161n	   in	   the	   first	   Critique	  helped	  to	  confirm	  Cohen’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  Transcendental	  Aesthetic),	  he	  almost	  always	  saved	  his	  true	  vitriol	  for	  Rickert.	  Cohen	  and	  Natorp	  are	  generally	  credited	  with	  having	  a	  genuine	  philosophical	  motivation	  for	  their	  narrow	   interpretation	   of	   Kant	   (see,	   e.g.,	   PIK	   25:78).	   Windelband	   and	   Rickert	   are	   typically	   accused	   of	  trivializing	  and	  distorting	  any	   real	  philosophical	  point	  of	   the	  Marburg	  School	  beyond	   recognition	   (see,	   e.g.,	  HCT	  20:20).	  236	  On	   Husserl’s	   genetic	   phenomenology	   as	   a	   response	   to	   Natorp,	   see	   Luft	   (2011),	   207-­‐234,	   esp.	   227-­‐230.	  Much	  of	  my	  analysis	  here	  is	  indebted	  to	  Luft’s	  work.	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confidence	   that	   “we	  must	   regard	  nothing	  as	  veridical	  except	   for	   the	  pure	   immediacy	  and	  givenness	   in	   the	   field	   of	   the	   ego	   cogito	   which	   the	   epoché	   has	   opened	   up	   to	   us.	   In	   other	  words,	   we	  must	   not	   make	   assertions	   about	   that	   which	   we	   do	   not	   ourselves	   see.”237	  But	  beneath	   the	   veneer	   of	   a	   stable	   global	   theory	   of	   phenomenology	   that	   appeared	   to	   be	  essentially	  unchanged	   from	   Ideas	   I	   (1913)	   to	   the	  appearance	  (in	  France)	  of	   the	  Cartesian	  
Meditations	   (1931)	   there	   were	   springing	   up	   from	   Husserl’s	   incredibly	   disciplined	   and	  detailed	   research	   results	   which	   were	   very	   much	   difficult	   to	   square	   with	   the	   publicly	  affirmed	  founding	  principles	  of	  the	  science.	  Heidegger,	  too,	  was	  not	  entirely	  explicit	  about	  his	  move	  away	  from	  the	  research	  project	  of	  Ideas	  I,238	  although	  it	  was	  clear	  enough	  that	  the	  conception	  of	   phenomenology	  put	   forward	   in	   §7	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	   strayed	   considerably	  from	  anything	  resembling	  a	  Husserlian	  orthodoxy.	  Be	   this	  as	   it	  may,	  as	   late	  as	  WS	  1927-­‐1928	   Heidegger	   could	   still	   celebrate	   Husserl’s	   “rediscovery”	   of	   the	   basic	   character	   of	  cognition	   as	   intuitive	   (PIK	   25:83-­‐84),	   and	   it	   was	   not	   until	   1929	   that	   it	   finally	   became	  obvious	  to	  both	  Husserl	  and	  Heidegger	  that	  their	  philosophies	  could	  no	  longer	  constitute	  a	  shared,	  phenomenological	  path.239	  In	   fact,	   Heidegger	   had	   been	   offering	   strongly	   heterodox	   readings	   of	   Husserl’s	  phenomenology	  since	  at	   least	  1919.240	  The	  pressure	  that	  he	  brought	  to	  bear,	  aggressively	  and	  consistently,	  on	  Husserl’s	  position	  emanated	  from	  the	  direction	  of	  life	  philosophy.	  Life	  
                                                237	  Husserl	  (1929),	  9	  (Hua	  I:9).	  238	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  he	  would	  not	  openly	  criticize	  Husserl.	  But	  even	  when	  he	  did,	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  shared	  endeavor	   managed	   to	   come	   through	   convincingly.	   So,	   for	   example,	   in	   1925	   Heidegger	   accuses	   Husserl	   of	  neglecting	  the	  question	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  being	  and	  failing	  to	  provide	  an	  adequate	  basis	  for	  the	  question	  of	  the	   human	   being.	   In	   the	   same	   breath,	   however,	   he	   carefully	  measures	   his	   critique	   and	   acknowledges	   that	  Husserl	  may	  well	  have	  sufficiently	  answered	  such	  objections	  in	  his	  recent	  research	  (Heidegger	  admits	  he	  is	  not	  fully	  aware	  of	  its	  contents).	  “It	  almost	  goes	  without	  saying,”	  he	  tells	  his	  students,	  “that	  even	  today	  I	  still	  regard	  myself	  as	  a	  learner	  in	  relation	  to	  Husserl”	  (HCT	  20:168).	  239	  See	  Sheehan	  (1997b),	  28-­‐32.	  240	  See,	  e.g.,	  p.	  182	  below	  on	  Heidegger’s	  reading	  of	  Husserl’s	  principle	  of	  principles	  in	  the	  KNS	  class.	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philosophy	  was	   a	   diverse	   philosophical	  movement,	   and	   not	   an	   exclusively	   philosophical	  one	   at	   all.	   From	  Nietzsche	   to	  Dostoevsky,	   from	  Goethe	   to	   Spengler	   (whose	  Decline	  of	  the	  
West	   first	  appeared,	  presciently,	   it	  seemed,	   in	  1918),	  the	  emphasis	  on	  capturing	  life	   in	   its	  dynamic	   facticity	   was	   ubiquitous	   in	   immediate	   postwar	   Germany.	   Like	   Husserl,	  
Lebensphilosophie	   criticized	   traditional	   philosophy	   for	   its	   overreliance	   on	   conceptual	  abstractions	   the	   provenance	   of	   which	   was	   no	   longer	   clear.	   Unlike	   Husserl,	   who	   could	  articulate	   a	   clear	   methodology	   aimed	   at	   securing	   ultimate	   foundations	   for	   thought,	   the	  diffuse	   movement	   of	   life	   philosophy	   naturally	   gave	   rise	   to	   a	   bewildering	   array	   of	  suggestions	  as	  to	  how	  this	  might	  be	  done	  and,	  perhaps	  more	  convincingly,	  explanations	  of	  the	   failures	   of	   traditional	   thought	   to	   do	   so.	  At	   any	   rate,	   nothing	   like	   a	   research	  program	  (like	  Husserl’s)	  had	  emerged	  from	  the	  movement.	  The	  exception	  to	  this	  characterization,	  however,	  may	  have	  been	  the	  most	  important	  philosophical	   contributor	   to	   this	  movement,	  even	   if	  he	  himself	  would	  not	  have	   identified	  with	   Lebensphilosophie	   (of	   course,	   few	   did).	   This	   was	   Dilthey,	   and	   his	   influence	   on	  Heidegger	  was	  profound.	  Dilthey	  was	  hardly	  a	  poet,	  and	  his	  accession	  in	  1882	  to	  the	  Berlin	  chair	  at	  one	  time	  occupied	  by	  Hegel	  contrasts	  sharply	  with	  Nietzsche’s	  itinerant	  academic	  exile	   during	   that	   same	   decade.	   Nor	   is	   the	   first	   volume	   of	   the	   Introduction	   to	   the	  Human	  
Sciences	  likely	  to	  be	  mistaken	  for	  Thus	  Spoke	  Zarathustra.	  But	  however	  strange	  a	  bedfellow	  Dilthey	  may	  have	  been	  for	  the	  movement,	  his	  philosophical	  interests	  pushed	  him	  again	  and	  again	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  its	  foundations.	  In	  a	  century	  still	  effectively	  dominated	  by	  Comte’s	  positivism,	  Dilthey	  was	  urgently	  after	  a	  foundation	  for	  the	  Geisteswissenschaften	  that	  could	  justify	   the	   autonomy	   and	   distinctiveness	   of	   their	   methods	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   mathematical	  natural	  sciences.	   In	  Dilthey’s	  view	  the	   foundation	  of	  early	  modern	  philosophy—he	  has	   in	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mind	   the	   epistemology	   of	   Locke,	   Hume,	   and	   Kant—is	   inadequate	   for	   erecting	   such	   a	  foundation.	   The	   problem	   is	   that	   the	   human	   sciences—and	   we	   can	   take	   biography	   as	  paradigmatic	  here,	  as	  Dilthey	  tends	  to	  do—have	  a	  subject	  matter	  that	   lies	  beneath	  and	  is	  prior	   to	   the	   matrix	   of	   cognitive	   concepts	   with	   which	   philosophers	   have	   been	   centrally	  concerned.	   To	   reconstruct	   and	   explain	   the	   story	   of	   a	   life	   requires	   us	   to	   find	   unities	   of	  concepts	   that	   reflect	   the	   deepest	   unity	   of	   a	   human	   being’s	   experience.	   To	   restrict	   the	  sphere	   of	   legitimate	   concepts	   to	   those	   available	   to	   a	   cognitive	   subject,	   who	   is	   centrally	  concerned	   to	   justify	   claims	   about	   the	  world,	   already	   forecloses	   this	   possibility.	   “No	   real	  blood,”	  Dilthey	   laments,	   “flows	   in	   the	  veins	  of	   the	  knowing	  subject	  constructed	  by	  Locke,	  Hume,	  and	  Kant,	  but	  rather	  the	  diluted	  extract	  of	  reason	  as	  a	  mere	  activity	  of	  thought.”241	  Life	  as	  it	  is	  really	  lived—that	  whole	  of	  experience	  which	  includes	  the	  activity	  of	  reasoning	  that	  philosophers	  have	  privileged	  but	  is	  by	  no	  means	  reduced	  to	  it—this	  is	  what	  must	  be	  grasped	   in	   an	   original	  manner	   if	   the	   human	   sciences	   are	   to	   be	   rendered	   secure	   in	   their	  foundations,	  for	  this	  lived	  experience	  constitutes	  the	  basic	  “facts,”	  as	  it	  were,	  to	  which	  they	  are	  finally	  responsible,	  no	  matter	  how	  subtle	  or	  ingenious	  their	  expressive	  form.	  Even	  this	  much,	  however,	  undersells	  the	  radicality	  of	  Dilthey’s	  project.	  He	  does	  not	  seek	   only	   to	   juxtapose	   the	   foundations	   of	   the	   human	   sciences	  with	   those	   of	   the	   natural	  sciences.	   For	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   basic	   Erlebnis	   that	   grounds	   the	   human	   sciences	   is	   that	   to	  which	  even	   the	   foundations	  of	   the	  abstract	  mathematical	   sceinces	  must	  be	   traced	  back	   if	  
                                                241	  Dilthey	  (1883),	  50	  (I:xviii).	  This	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  rather	  fantastic	  description	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Hume,	   in	  particular,	  but	  Dilthey’s	   complaint	   is	  not,	  of	   course,	  about	   the	  conclusions	  of	  any	  of	   the	  early	  moderns,	  but	  rather	  the	  limitations	  their	  starting	  points	  impose	  on	  their	   inquiry.	  Even	  the	  empiricists,	  Dilthey	  thinks,	  are	  dealing	  in	  a	  currency	  (ideas:	  whatever	  is	  present	  before	  the	  mind,	  as	  Locke	  tells	  us)	  that	  stands	  in	  need	  of	  a	  prior	  methodological	  justification.	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we	   are	   to	   be	   able	   to	   understand	   their	   genesis	   and	   significance.	   Thus	   Dilthey’s	   project	  emerges	  in	  its	  universal	  scope:	  I	  will	  relate	  every	  component	  of	  contemporary	  abstract	  scientific	  thought	  to	  the	   whole	   of	   human	   nature.	   .	   .	   .	   The	   result	   is	   that	   the	   most	   important	  components	  of	  our	  picture	  and	  knowledge	  of	  reality	   .	   .	   .	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  totality	  of	  human	  nature.	  In	  the	  real	  life-­‐process,	  willing,	  feeling,	  and	  thinking	  are	  only	  different	  aspects.242	  	  The	   parallels	   with	   the	   Husserlian	   project	   are	   clear	   enough,	   and	   of	   course	   they	   are	   not	  entirely	   accidental.243	  Both	   were	   concerned	   to	   get	   back	   behind	   the	   foundations	   of	   the	  special	   sciences	   provided	   by	   early	   modern	   philosophy.	   Whereas	   Husserl	   sought	   deeper	  foundations	   in	   the	   givenness	   of	   pure	   intuition,	   Dilthey	   sought	   them	   in	   the	   “real	   life-­‐process.”	  	   The	  advantage	  of	  Husserl’s	  approach,	  when	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  Dilthey,	  is	  that	  the	  reference	   to	   the	  phenomenologically	   reduced	   field	  of	   intuition	  appears	   to	  be	  much	  more	  determinate	  than	  the	  gesture	  towards	  the	  “real	  life-­‐process.”	  But	  it	  is	  entirely	  possible	  that	  Husserl	   can	  only	  buy	  such	  determinacy	  at	  a	   certain	  price.	  The	  principle	  of	  principles,	  we	  will	   recall,	   instructs	   us	   to	   begin	   simply	  with	  what	   is	   there	   to	   be	   seen,	   but	   an	   argument	  (even	  if	  it	  is	  a	  good	  one)	  seems	  to	  be	  required	  to	  show	  that	  the	  phenomenological	  reduction	  is	  actually	  a	  viable	  path	  to	  such	  simple	  seeing.244	  The	  very	  character	  of	  Dilthey’s	  appeal	  to	  life,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   designed	   to	   obviate	   any	   concern	   that	   he	   has	   not	   sufficiently	  radicalized	  the	  foundations	  of	  science	  by	  reaching	  an	  ultimate	  starting	  point,	  but,	  of	  course,	  for	  this	  very	  reason	  the	  appeal	  to	  life	  appears	  to	  remain	  vague	  in	  his	  thought,	  perhaps	  even	  
                                                242	  Dilthey	  (1883),	  51	  (I:xviii).	  243	  Husserl	  admits	  Dilthey	  into	  the	  “first	  rank”	  of	  philosophers	  and	  credits	  him	  with	  the	  “intuition	  of	  genius,”	  even	  though	  he	  was	  “not	  a	  man	  of	  rigorous	  scientific	  theorizing”	  (Husserl	  [1928],	  181	  [§48;	  Hua	  4:172-­‐173]).	  244	  Natorp	  hints	  at	  something	  like	  this	  in	  his	  review	  of	  Ideas	  I:	  “Why	  is	  any	  method	  at	  all	  permitted	  to	  uncover	  [what	  is	  absolutely	  given],	  since	  to	  uncover	  it,	  after	  all,	  just	  means	  to	  give	  it?”	  (Natorp	  [1917-­‐1918],	  239).	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hopelessly	  so.245	  Dilthey	  himself	  recognizes	  and	  acknowledges	  the	  unique	  place	  this	  appeal	  holds	   in	   his	   thought;	   it	   is	   a	   primitive	   that	   Dilthey	   can	   only	   “evoke”	   in	   his	   reader’s	  “memory,”246	  not	   pin	   down	   through	   conceptual	   determination.	   Heidegger,	   attracted	   to	  Dilthey’s	   unflinching	   resolve	   to	   radically	   ground	   his	   analysis,	   but	   dissatisfied	   with	   the	  unexplained	  appeal	  to	  “life,”	  will	  seek	  to	  preserve	  the	  former	  while	  working	  out	  a	  rigorous	  methodology	   for	   reaching	   the	   latter. 247 	  The	   end	   result	   will	   be	   that	   Husserl’s	  phenomenology	  will	  be	  given	  a	   lived	  basis	  prior	   to	   the	  priority	  of	  originary	   intuition—at	  least	  as	  Husserl	  would	  have	  understood	  and	  recognized	  the	  latter.	  But	  Heidegger	  will	  take	  himself	   to	   be	   adhering	   to	   Husserl’s	   own	   methodological	   directives,	   in	   particular	   the	  principle	  of	  principles,	  for	  quite	  some	  time.	  	   Eventually,	  Heidegger’s	   commitment	   to	   a	   recognizably	  Husserlian	  phenomenology	  would	  wither	  away,	  although	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  say	  just	  when	  he	  would	  have	  taken	  himself	  to	  
                                                245	  See,	  e.g.,	  the	  criticisms	  of	  Betanzos	  (1988),	  55-­‐56.	  246	  See	  his	  attempt	  to	  do	  just	  that	  at	  Dilthey	  (1910),	  126-­‐127.	  247	  How	   central	   does	   this	   make	   Dilthey	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   problem	   that	   would	  ultimately	  emerge	  in	  Being	  and	  Time?	  In	  the	  same	  year	  the	  latter	  was	  published,	  Heidegger	  credited	  Dilthey	  with	  providing	  “the	  impetus	  for	  the	  development	  of	  phenomenological	  research”	  (HPC	  3:305).	  Robert	  Scharff	  has	   argued,	   forcefully	   and	   in	   detail,	   that	   Dilthey	   deserves	   pride	   of	   place	   among	   Heidegger’s	   formative	  influences,	  not	  so	  much	  for	  the	  content	  of	  Dilthey’s	  thought	  that	  Heidegger	  was	  able	  to	  appropriate,	  but	  as	  a	  model	  of	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  philosophy	  ought	  to	  be	  done	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  answerable	  to	  the	  standpoint	  of	  life.	  I	  can	  go	  at	   least	  halfway	  with	  Scharff:	   I	   think	   it	  was	   the	  demands	  of	   the	  Lebensphilosophen	   that	  most	  deeply	  animated	  him—or	  at	  least	  came	  to	  animate	  him	  relatively	  early	  on.	  And	  indeed	  he	  consistently	  singles	  Dilthey	  out	   from	   amongst	   those	   influences	   as	   contributing	   insight	   on	   the	   most	   decisive	   points.	   But	   I	   am	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	  view	  that	  Husserl,	  e.g.,	  or	  Kant,	  later	  on,	  merely	  provided	  conceptual	  structures	  which	  were	   filled	   in	   by	   (as	   Scharff	   says)	   “Diltheyan	   intuitions.”	   Perhaps,	   to	   choose	   one	   example,	   Heidegger’s	  development	  of	  the	  method	  of	  formal	  indication	  owed	  originally,	  or	  at	  any	  rate	  most	  decisively,	  to	  a	  Diltheyan	  impetus.	  (I	  do,	  after	  all,	  present	  an	  account	   largely	  so	  motivated	  in	  this	  chapter.)	  There	  can	  be	  no	  question,	  though,	  that	  Heidegger’s	  appropriation	  of	  Husserl’s	  procedure	  of	  formalization	  not	  only	  helped	  him	  fill	  in	  the	  details	  of	  a	  method,	  but	  provided	  an	  articulation	  of	  it	  that	  pushed	  back,	  as	  it	  were,	  on	  the	  original	  motivations	  that	   led	   to	   the	  borrowings	   from	  Husserl	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  process	  of	  working	   through	  Aristotle,	  Husserl,	  and	  Kant	  (and,	  still	   later,	  Nietzsche)	  did	  not	   just	  show	  Heidegger	  how	  to	   fulfill	  Diltheyan	  desiderata	  through	  more	  satisfactory	  means;	  doing	  so	  revealed	  to	  him	  new	  “intuitions,”	  if	  you	  will,	  regarding	  life	   and	  history	   that	   exerted	   their	  own	   force	  on	  his	   thought.	  But	   see	  Scharff	   (1997),	   esp.	  127-­‐128.	   In	  1925	  Heidegger	  allows	  that	  Dilthey	  had	  alive	  in	  him	  the	  tendency	  to	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  being,	  but	  he	  immediately	  adds:	   “With	   the	   great	   indeterminacy	   of	   Dilthey’s	   formulations,	   precisely	   in	   the	   dimension	   of	   fundamental	  phenomena,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  document	  the	  presence	  of	  this	  tendency	  objectively”	  (HCT	  20:173-­‐174).	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have	   moved	   beyond	   it.248	  And	   even	   in	   his	   later	   work	   he	   would	   often	   emphasize	   the	  necessity	   of	   the	   path	   carved	   out	   by	   Being	   and	   Time.249	  By	   contrast,	   the	   later	   Heidegger	  shows	   almost	   no	   residual	   sympathy	   for	   the	   claims	   of	   Lebensphilosophie,	   and	   in	   his	  directives	   for	   the	   Gesamtausgabe	   he	   left	   the	   decision	   as	   to	   whether	   his	   early	   Freiburg	  lectures	   courses—the	  courses	   in	  which	  his	   commitment	   to	  Lebensphilosphie	   is	   clearest—merited	   publication	   at	   all	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   his	   literary	   executors.250	  Already	   by	   1937,	  Heidegger’s	  final	  verdict	  on	  Lebensphilosophie	  is	  swift	  and	  harsh:	  to	  appeal	  to	  Erlebnis251	  is	  precisely	   to	   avoid	   an	   encounter	   with	   the	   true	   subject	   matter	   of	   philosophy	   (see	   esp.	   C	  65:109).	  252	  
Natorp’s	  Challenge	  Natorp’s	  review	  of	  the	  Ideas	  had	  a	  threefold	  significance.	  One	  the	  one	  hand,	  its	  basic	  stance	  remained	  decisive	   for	  Cassirer’s	   attitude	   towards	  phenomenology	   throughout	   the	  1920s.	  
                                                248	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  Heidegger	  had	  decided	  relatively	  early	  on	  that	  he	  had	  broken	  with	  Husserl	  but	  chose	  to	   downplay	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   break	   for	   professional	   reasons.	   In	   his	   personal	   letters	   (to	   Löwith	   and	  Jaspers)	  of	  1922	  and	  1923	  he	  is	  casually	  dismissive	  of	  Husserl’s	  entire	  project,	  writing	  even	  that	  “I	  am	  now	  convinced	   that	   Husserl	   was	   never	   a	   philosopher,	   not	   even	   for	   one	   second	   in	   his	   life”	   (quoted	   in	   Sheehan	  [1997],	   17).	   Whatever	   weight	   one	   chooses	   to	   afford	   such	   silliness,	   the	   details	   of	   Heidegger’s	   continued	  engagement	  with	  Husserl	  undermines	  its	  validity.	  But	  it	   is	  certainly	  possible	  that	  Heidegger	  harbored	  more	  fundamental	  doubts	  about	  Husserlian	  phenomenology	   than	  he	  was	   typically	  willing	   to	   let	  on	   in	  public.	  For	  Husserl’s	  part,	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  attempted	  collaboration,	   in	  1927,	  on	   the	  article	  on	  phenomenology	   for	   the	  
Encyclopædia	  Britannica	  was	  probably	  the	  turning	  point,	  and	  by	  the	  time	  he	  studied	  Heidegger’s	  writings	  in	  detail	  in	  1929	  the	  break	  had	  become	  obvious—and	  disappointing—to	  him	  (Sheehan	  [1997],	  23-­‐32).	  249	  At	  any	  rate,	  this	  is	  what	  Heidegger	  writes	  in	  his	  preface	  to	  the	  seventh	  edition	  of	  1953.	  250	  The	   decision	   to	   publish	   them	   came	   only	   in	   1984;	   they	   constitute	   a	   “supplement”	   to	   the	   division	   of	   the	  
Gesamtausgabe	  devoted	  to	  Heidegger’s	  lecture	  courses.	  This	  is	  why	  their	  volume	  numbers	  exceed	  those	  of	  the	  (later)	   Marburg	   courses,	   even	   though	   the	   basic	   organization	   of	   the	   Gesamtausgabe	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	  chronological.	   See	   van	   Buren	   (1994),	   15.	   For	   a	   critical	   and	   vitriolic—and	   entirely	   justified,	   I	   might	   add—indictment	  of	  the	  principles	  adopted	  by	  the	  Gesamtausgabe	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  see	  Kisiel	  (1995a).	  251	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   it	  passes	   itself	  off	   as	   a	   counter-­‐concept	   to	  machination,	   “Erlebnis”-­‐talk	   in	   truth	   just	  affirms	  the	  latter	  all	  the	  more	  decisively	  and	  unconditionally	  (see	  C	  65:134n).	  252	  The	  story	  of	  the	  decline	  and	  fall	  of	  Heidegger’s	  Lebensphilosophie	  vocabulary	  is	  one	  that	  deserves	  its	  own	  study.	  Two	   factors,	  however,	  must	  be	  emphasized:	   (1)	  As	  we	  will	   see,	  Heidegger	  came	  to	  see	   the	  appeal	   to	  
Erlebnis	   as	   less	   formal	   than	   he	   had	   initially	   hoped.	   Even	   by	   the	   mid-­‐1920s	   Heidegger	   was	   becoming	  convinced	  that	  referring	  to	  lived	  experience	  presupposed—or	  at	  least	  gave	  the	  impression	  of	  presupposing—too	  much.	   (2)	  Connected	  with	   this,	   but	   beyond	   the	   scope	  of	   this	   paper,	   is	   the	  biologistic	   connotations	   that	  became	  harder	  and	  harder	  to	  separate	  from	  “life”	  once	  the	  Nazis	  swept	  into	  power.	  This	  context	  is	  important	  to	  understanding	  Heidegger’s	  confrontation	  with	  the	  thought	  of	  Nietzsche	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1930s.	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On	  the	  other	  hand,	   it	  provided	  not	  only	  Husserl	  but	  also	  Heidegger	  with	  the	  lens	  through	  which	   they	  would	   refine	   their	   versions	   of	   phenomenological	  methodology	   in	   the	   1920s.	  This	   is	   no	   accident:	   Husserl	   had	   brought	   Natorp’s	   criticisms	   to	   Heidegger’s	   attention	   in	  September	  1918.253	  For	  his	  own	  part,	  Heidegger	  surely	  shared	  some	  inward	  sympathy	  with	  the	   spirit	   of	  Natorp’s	   criticisms,254	  and	   so	   it	  was	   all	   the	  more	   important	   for	  him	   to	   show	  why	   they	   did	   not	   reach	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   matter	   (as	   he	   claims	   at	   KNS	   56/57:102).	   As	   a	  matter	  of	  fact,	   it	   is	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  see	  where	  exactly	  Heidegger	  diverges	  from	  Natorp,	  and	   it	  may	  well	  be	  that	  Heidegger	  ends	  up	  considerably	  closer	  to	  Natorp	  than	  he	  does	  to	  Husserl.	  Be	  that	  as	  it	  may,	  Heidegger	  is	  basically	  concerned	  to	  defend	  Husserl,	  including—and	  especially—Husserl’s	  principle	  of	  principles,	  which	  bore	  much	  of	  the	  force	  of	  Natorp’s	  critique.	  	   For	  his	  own	  part,	  Natorp	  is	  nearly	  completely	  convinced	  that	  Husserl’s	  project	  is	  at	  bottom	   the	   same	   as	   his	   own.	   The	   difference	   in	   their	   views	   is	   “almost	   merely	  terminological,”255	  and	   the	  apparently	   radical	  difference	   in	   their	   treatment	  of	   subjectivity	  “has	  been	  dissolved,	  under	   closer	   scrutiny,	   almost	   into	  nothing.”256	  For	  all	   that,	   however,	  Natorp	   insisted	   that	   the	   kind	   of	   immediate	   access	   to	   phenomena	   promised	   by	   Husserl’s	  phenomenological	  reduction	  was	  entirely	  illusory.	  The	  stated	  goal	  of	  phenomenology	  was	  to	  get	  below	  the	  level	  of	  concepts	  altogether	  so	  that	  their	  intuitive	  basis,	  upon	  which	  they	  are	  constructed,	  or	  through	  which	  they	  are	  constituted,	  might	  be	  met	  with	  by	  a	  fresh	  set	  of	  unprejudiced	   eyes.	   Thus	   Husserl	   speaks	   as	   if	   the	   description	   of	   the	   phenomena	   could	  
                                                253	  Kisiel	  (1993),	  518n14.	  254	  An	   outward	   sign	   of	   this	   is	  Heidegger’s	   claim	   that	  Natorp	   is	   the	   only	   one	   to	   have	   brought	   “scientifically	  noteworthy	  objections”	  against	  Husserl’s	  position	  (KNS	  56/57:101).	  255	  Natorp	  (1917-­‐1918),	  226.	  256	  Natorp	  (1917-­‐1918),	  246.	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somehow	   proceed	   independently	   of	   the	   conceptual	   structures	   which	   the	   phenomena	  purportedly	   constitute.	   In	   description,	   we	   are	   supposed	   to	   accept	   what	   is	   offered	   in	  intuition	  “simply	  as	  what	  it	  affords	  itself	  as.”	  But	  isn’t	  any	  description,	  however	  careful	  and	  restrained,	  immediately	  a	  conceptualization?257	  Can	  there	  really	  be	  an	  “absolute	  beginning”	  of	  phenomenological	  inquiry	  in	  the	  way	  Husserl	  imagines?	  	   Indeed,	   Natorp’s	   basic	   challenge	   to	   Husserl	   comes	   most	   clearly	   to	   light	   when	   he	  accuses	  him	  of	  falling	  into	  a	  species	  of	  the	  old	  rationalist	  amphiboly	  first	  diagnosed	  by	  Kant.	  Husserl	   is	   perfectly	   correct	   to	   note	   that	   a	   self-­‐giving	   intuitive	   cognition	   is	  demanded,	   or	  
presupposed,	   by	   any	   cognition	   that	   purports	   to	   be	   objective,	   but	   only	   deeper,	  transcendental	   researches	   into	   the	   possibility	   of	   such	   self-­‐giving	   would	   justify	   Husserl’s	  positing	  of	  a	  (Cartesian)	  pure	  field	  of	  phenomenological	  research.	  In	  this	  way,	  The	  requirement	  to	  exhibit	  pure	  consciousness	  appears	  to	  be	  conflated	  with	  
that	   which	   can	   be	   exhibited	   in	   actual	   cognition.	   .	   .	   .	   A	   more	   detailed	  investigation	  of	  how	  and	  through	  which	  methods	  such	  an	  exhibition	  is	  even	  possible,	  i.e.,	  the	  transcendental	  investigation	  into	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  pure	  exhibition	  of	  that	  of	  which	  we	  are	  purely	  conscious,	  yields	  the	  conclusion	  that	  it	  can	  be	  exhibited	  in	  its	  absoluteness	  just	  as	  little	  as	  the	  transcendent	  object,	  which	  requires	  nothing	  less	  absolute	  but	  is	  not	  on	  that	  account	  given,	  even	  possibly	  so.258	  	  Husserl’s	   neglect	   of	   the	   transcendental	   question	   leaves	   him	   open	   to	   one	   of	   the	   oldest	  charges	   in	   the	  book:	   the	  act	  of	  describing	  consciousness	  changes,	   through	   the	  very	  act	  of	  description,	  the	  character	  of	  that	  which	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  described.259	  In	  other	  words,	   in	  trying	  to	  grasp	  the	  stream	  of	  lived	  experience,	  Husserl	  inevitably	  stills	  the	  stream	  and	  thus	  
                                                257	  As	   Rickert	   expressed	   the	   point	   several	   years	   later,	   “It	   seems	   to	  me	   that	   the	   irrational	   is	   scientifically	  admissible	   in	   one	   way	   only:	   by	   forming	   concepts	   of	   it.	   This	   is	   because	   whatever	   we	   have	   not	   somehow	  conceived	  and	  whatever	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  designate	  by	  means	  of	  rationally	  comprehensible	  words	  cannot	  be	  spoken	  of	   in	  science	  at	  all,	  regardless	  of	  how	  suprarational	  the	  content	  may	  be	  of	  that	  from	  which	  we	  form	  our	  concepts”	  (Rickert	  [1921],	  7-­‐8).	  258	  Natorp	  (1917-­‐1918),	  238;	  see	  also	  240-­‐242.	  259	  Natorp	  (1917-­‐1918),	  240.	  
 176	  
fails	   to	   grasp	   its	   character	   as	   a	   “streaming	   stream”:	   “The	   stream	   in	   its	   flowing	   forth	   is	  something	   other	   than	   that	   which	   is	   apprehended	   of	   it	   and	   held	   fast	   in	   reflection.”260	  Husserl,	   of	   course,	   is	   hardly	   to	   be	   blamed:	   no	   reflection,	   as	   such,	   could	   reach	   the	  “streaming”	   stream.	   But	   the	   consequence,	   which	   Husserl	   appears	   unwilling	   to	  acknowledge,	   is	   that	   the	   field	   of	   phenomenology	   is	   “given”—if	   we	   insist	   on	   retaining	   a	  somewhat	   misleading	   expression—only	   as	   an	   infinite	   task.	   Transcendental	   subjectivity	  must	  become,	   as	   it	   is	   for	  Natorp,	   something	   to	  be	  recovered,	   not	   something	  accessible	  as	  given	  through	  the	  phenomenological	  epoché.261	  	   Confronted	  with	  such	  a	  dilemma,	  Natorp	  simply	  cannot	  bring	  himself	  to	  believe	  that	  Husserl	  would	   continue	   to	   insist	   on	   the	  givenness	  of	   the	  phenomena,	   and	   this	   is	  why	  he	  projects	   the	   collapse	   of	   Husserl’s	   phenomenology	   into	   Natorp’s	   own	   reconstructive	  psychology—hence	  his	  confidence	   in	   the	  existence	  of	  a	  shared	  endeavor	  underlying	  their	  apparently	  irreconcilable	  research	  programs.	  Now,	  Natorp’s	  review	  of	  the	  Ideas	  made	  such	  an	  impression	  on	  Heidegger,	  I	  suspect,	  in	   large	   part	   because	   he	   found	   so	  much	   of	   it	   congenial	   to	   his	   own	  motivations.	   Granted,	  Heidegger	  thought	  Natorp	  drew	  a	  conclusion	  precisely	  opposite	  to	  the	  one	  he	  should	  have	  drawn:	   instead	   of	   concluding	   that	   Husserl’s	   project	   was	   essentially	   Neokantian,	   Natorp	  should	   have	   acknowledged	   just	   how	   far	   removed	   from	   Neokantianism	   Husserl’s	  phenomenology	  had	  to	  be.262	  Indeed,	  in	  the	  KNS	  course	  Heidegger	  attempts	  to	  stake	  out	  the	  grounds	  for	  the	  position	  Natorp	  thinks	  Husserl	  simply	  cannot	  countenance:	  doubling	  down	  
                                                260	  Natorp	  (1917-­‐1918),	  237.	  261	  On	  the	  task	  of	  recovering	  subjectivity	  from	  the	  objectified	  world	  (which	  must	  remain	  always	  only	  a	  task),	  see	  Zahavi	  (2003),	  173n9.	  262	  Note	   that	   this	   foreshadows	  Heidegger’s	   rejection	   of	   Cassirer’s	   attempt	   at	   Davos,	   a	   decade	   later,	   to	   fold	  phenomenology	  and	  Neokantianism	  back	  together	  again.	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on	  both	  the	  principle	  of	  principles	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  accessing	  subjectivity	  in	  advance	  of	  objective	  (in	  Natorp’s	  terms,	  objectivating)	  reflection.	  He	  does	  so,	  however,	  by	  emphasizing	  the	  very	  features	  of	  subjectivity	  that	  Natorp	  takes	  to	  support	  his	  own	  position.	  And—as	  we	  will	  see—at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  day	   it	   is	  by	  no	  means	  certain	   just	  how	  much	  of	  Natorp’s	  view	  Heidegger	  is	  really	  committed	  to	  rejecting.	  What	   is	   immediately	  striking	  about	  Heidegger’s	  encounter	  with	  Natorp	  is	  his	  deep	  reluctance	  to	   lay	  at	  Husserl’s	   feet	   the	  charge	  that	  one	  so	  often	  hears	  repeated	  nowadays:	  the	  charge	  of	  an	  overly	  observational,	  or	  theoretical,	  stance	  towards	  the	  phenomena.	  Such	  a	  charge	  is	  not	  without	  its	  prima	  facie	  plausibility.	  But	  at	  the	  time	  Heidegger	  was	  not	  moved	  by	  it	  at	  all.	  In	  response	  to	  Natorp’s	  criticisms,	  Heidegger	  refuses	  to	  give	  an	  inch	  on	  Husserl’s	  principle	   of	   principles,	   instead	   offering	   a	   rather	   remarkable	   reinterpretation	   of	   it,	   an	  interpretation	   according	   to	   which	   Husserl	   had	   already	   anticipated	   the	   basic	   thrust	   of	  Natorp’s	  criticisms	  but	  had	  implicitly	  rejected	  the	  exclusively	  theoretical	  standpoint	  which	  undergirded	  them.263	  Recall	   that	   Natorp’s	   view	   is	   that	   if	   we	   want	   to	   approach	   the	   field	   of	   originary	  intuition	   (in	   Husserl’s	   sense),	   we	   have	   no	   choice	   but	   to	   try	   to	   reconstruct	   it	   from	   the	  objective	  world	  which	   is	   itself	   constructed	   on	   its	   basis.	   Natorp	   agrees	  with	  Husserl	   that	  attention	  to	   transcendental	  subjectivity	   is	  essential;	  without	   it,	  our	  account	  of	  reality	  will	  harbor	  an	  objective	  prejudice	  and	  remain	  incomplete.	  But	  Husserl’s	  attempted	  shortcut	  to	  subjectivity,	   the	   phenomenological	   epoché,	   is	   impossible;	   we	   must	   instead	   traverse	   the	  long,	  roundabout	  way	  of	  beginning	  with	  constructions	  (in	  the	  Marburg	  tradition:	  the	  fact	  of	  science)	  and	  reconstructing	  on	  their	  basis	  that	  which	  grounds	  their	  genesis.	  
                                                263	  Heidegger	  could	  find	  some	  freedom	  in	  this	  area	  since	  (as	  far	  as	  he	  was	  aware,	  at	  least)	  Husserl	  had	  not	  yet	  responded	  to	  Natorp	  (KNS	  56/56:101).	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But	  what	  could	  possibly	  serve	  as	  a	  criterion	   for	   the	  success	  of	   the	  reconstruction?	  This	  is	  the	  critical	  point	  Heidegger	  puts	  forth	  in	  the	  KNS	  class.	  Having	  abandoned	  all	  hope	  of	  accessing	  subjectivity	  except	   through	   that	  which	   it	   constructs	  as	  objective,	  what	   is	   the	  basis	  for	  Natorp’s	  claim	  that	  it	  really	  is	  subjectivity,	  after	  all,	  which	  is	  being	  reconstructed?	  If	  we	  examine	  Natorp’s	  premise	  carefully—the	  premise	  that	  only	  what	  is	  objective	  is	  at	  all	  given	  to	  us	  in	  phenomenological	  analysis—we	  will	  see	  that	  it	  rests	  on	  an	  illicit	  restriction	  of	  experience.	  For,	  pace	  Natorp,	  we	  do	  not	  first	  and	  foremost	  comport	  ourselves	  to	  a	  world	  of	  “objects”	   at	   all. 264 	  The	   problem	   is	   that	   Natorp	   (not	   Husserl!)	   has	   taken	   the	   mere	  observation	  of	  a	  thing	  as	  paradigmatic	  for	  our	  comportment	  to	  the	  world	  in	  general.	  In	  fact,	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	  observational	  stance	  what	  Natorp	  says	  is	  perfectly	  right:	  we	  are	  absorbed	  by	  the	  object,	  and	  we	  are	  absorbed	  by	  it,	  moreover,	  no	  further	  than	  it	  is	  in	  itself,	  as	  distinguished	  from	  the	  possible	  multiplicity	  of	  experiences	  of	  it.	  As	  Heidegger	  puts	  it,	  In	  the	  mere	  experience	  of	  a	  thing	  a	  remarkable	  breach	  shows	  itself	  between	  experiencing	  and	  experienced.	  What	  is	  experienced	  [das	  Erlebte]	  has	  entirely	  broken	   out	   of	   the	   rhythm	   that	   characterized	   the	   minimal	   experience	   and	  stands	   on	   its	   own,	   intended	   only	   in	   cognition.	   The	   sphere	   of	   objects	   is	  generally	   characterized	   by	   being	   merely	   intended,	   by	   being	   that	   at	   which	  cognition	  aims.	  The	  sense	  of	  reality	  is	  the	  intendability,	  persevering	  through	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  experiences,	  of	  everything	  objective.	  (KNS	  56/57:98)	  	  Now,	  if	  “the	  mere	  experience	  of	  a	  thing”	  is	  taken	  as	  paradigmatic	  of	  experience	  in	  general,	  then	  Natorp’s	  approach	  indeed	  stands	  as	  the	  only	  way	  to	  do	  justice,	  however	  inadequately,	  to	   transcendental	   subjectivity:	   to	   recognize	   that	   between	   experiencing,	   constructing	  subjectivity	   and	   experienced,	   constructed	   objectivity	   there	   is	   a	   necessary	   and	   exact	  correspondence,	  a	  correspondence	  which	  makes	  possible	  the	  recovery	  of	  subjective	  acts	  by	  analyzing	  objects	  into	  the	  constitutive	  acts	  through	  which	  they	  are	  objectified.	  Between	  the	  
                                                264	  See	  Natorp	  (1917-­‐1918),	  241.	  He	  takes	  this	  to	  be	  a	  presupposition	  shared	  by	  Husserl.	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subjective	  and	  objective	  poles	  of	  cognition	  there	  is	  nothing	  but	  one	  unitary	  path:	  the	  law	  of	  the	  construction	  of	   the	  objective	  world.	  And	  yet	   the	   immediate	   subjectivity	   in	  which	   this	  law	   is	   active	   remains	   infinitely	   distant	   for	   us.265	  At	   best	   we	   can	   be	   on	   the	   way	   to	   the	  recovery	  of	  subjectivity.	  	   Natorp’s	   prejudice	   in	   favor	   of	   cognitive	   comportment	   prevents	   him	   from	   taking	  Husserl’s	   principle	   of	   principles	   seriously	   (KNS	   56/57:109),	   and	   in	   fact	   it	   is	   a	   prejudice	  which	  is	  a	  symptom	  of	  this	  very	  neglect.	  Cognizing	  an	  object	  is	  not	  the	  only	  comportment	  we	  bear	  to	  things	   in	  the	  world;	   in	  fact,	   theoretical	  experience	  relies	  on	  an	  interruption	  of	  our	  typical	  commerce	  with	  things,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  intelligible	  against	  the	  background	  of	  this	  pretheoretical	   understanding	   of	   the	   world.	   The	   experience	   of	   things,	   i.e.,	   the	   species	   of	  comportment	   in	   which	   we	   find	   ourselves	   merely	   representing	   objects,	   relies	   on	   what	  Heidegger	   goes	   so	   far	   as	   to	   call	   an	   Ent-­‐lebnis	   of	   Erlebnis—a	   devivification	   of	   lived	  experience	  (KNS	  56/57:90,	  100).	  By	  contrast,	  we	  typically	  deal	  with	  the	  world	  in	  a	  direct,	  engaging,	  and	  practical	  manner.	  Here	  we	   find	  Heidegger	  experimenting	  with	   terminology	  to	   capture	   this	   sense	   of	   engagement.	   The	   manner	   of	   this	   comportment	   he	   simply	   calls	  “worldly”	  (KNS	  56/57:74);	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  world	  of	  things	  is	  a	  worldly	  “environment.”	  It	  is	  not	  even	  clear	  that	  we	  should	  say	  that	  the	  environmental	  exists,	  for	  it	  is	  not—not	  directly,	  at	  least—objectively	  determinable	  from	  a	  theoretical	  point	  of	  view.	  Heidegger	  suggests	  we	  say	  only	  that	  it	  “worlds,”	  not	  that	  it	  even	  “is”	  (KNS	  56/57:73,	  91;	  cf.	  MFL	  26:220ff.).	  	   Heidegger’s	  terminological	  acrobatics	  in	  trying	  to	  describe	  the	  more	  original	  sphere	  of	  Erlebnis,	  over	  against	  Natorp’s	  reduction	  of	  it	  to	  theoretical	  cognition,	  may	  only	  seem	  to	  
                                                265	  As	   Heidegger	   parses	   Natorp’s	   point,	   “The	   process	   of	   objectification	   has	   its	   infinitely	   distant	   goal	   in	   the	  unity	   of	   objectivity,	   which	   is	   the	   unity	   of	   the	   lawfulness	   of	   consciousness.	   And	   precisely	   the	   law	   of	   this	  lawfulness	  is	  the	  infinite	  task	  of	  the	  opposite	  path	  of	  cognition,	  that	  of	  subjectification.	  Both	  meet	  and	  become	  identical	  in	  the	  infinite”	  (KNS	  56/57:106).	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confirm	  Natorp’s	  point.	  In	  retreating	  to	  language	  such	  as	  “es	  weltet”	  Heidegger	  is	  stretching	  his	   conceptual	   resources	   to	   the	   limit,	   if	   not	   well	   beyond	   that.	   In	   either	   case,	   however,	  Natorp’s	  dilemma	  appears	   to	  remain	   insurmountable:	  either	  Heidegger	   is	  relying,	  despite	  his	   grammatical	   transgressions,	   on	   concepts	   of	   world	   and	   the	   environment	   to	   furnish	  immediately	   falsifying	   descriptions	   of	   Erlebnis,	   or	   else	   he	   is	   giving	   up	   the	   descriptive	  enterprise	   altogether	   and	   putting	   nonsense	   in	   place	   of	   meaning	   (as	   Carnap,	   of	   course,	  would	  charge	  a	  decade	  later).266	  Only	  by	  illicitly	  playing	  on	  the	  unclarity	  of	  expressions	  like	  “es	  weltet”	  can	  Heidegger	  give	  even	  the	  appearance	  of	  offering	  a	  description	  of	  Erlebnis	  that	  captures	  its	  character	  as	  Erlebnis.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Natorp,	   in	   his	   attempt	   to	   recapture	   subjectivity	   through	  objectivity,	   is	   clearly	   in	   danger	   of	   falling	   into	   the	   trap	   of	   trying	   to	   explain	   subjectivity	  through	   categories	   heterogeneous	  with	   it.267	  “Above	   all,”	  Heidegger	   complains,	   “it	   cannot	  be	   seen	   how	   the	   immediate	   is	   to	   be	  more	   easily	   attained,	   or	   accessible	   at	   all,	   through	   a	  mediated	   theorization	   which	   travels	   along	   the	   path	   of	   dissecting	   analysis.	   From	   where	  would	  I	  ever	  draw	  the	  standard	  for	  reconstruction?”	  (KNS	  56/57:107).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  resources	  at	  Natorp’s	  disposal	  for	  the	  task	  of	  reconstruction	  are	  inadequate	  for	  the	  success	  of	   the	   reconstructive	   project.	   To	   be	   sure,	  Natorp	   himself	   conceives	   of	   subjectivity	   as	   the	  infinitely	  distant—and	  hence	  actually	  unobtainable—goal	  of	  reconstruction.	  But	  Heidegger	  is	  perfectly	  within	  his	  rights	  to	  wonder	  what	  then	  remains,	  if	  anything,	  of	  Natorp’s	  idea	  of	  
recovering	   transcendental	   subjectivity	   and	   hence	   grounding	   a	   genuine	   alternative	   to	   the	  method	   of	   Husserl.	   The	   upshot	   seems	   to	   be	   that	   Natorp	   acknowledges	   the	   existence	   of	  
                                                266	  See	  Carnap	  (1932).	  267	  Here	  the	  worry	  is	  the	  classical	  one	  raised	  by	  Kierkegaard	  against	  Hegel.	  We	  must	  constantly	  bear	  in	  mind,	  he	  insists,	  that	  “the	  subjective	  problem	  is	  not	  something	  about	  an	  objective	  issue,	  but	  is	  the	  subjectivity	  itself”	  (Kierkegaard	  [1846],	  115).	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subjectivity	  only	  to	  bar	  himself,	  contrary	  to	  his	  own	  intentions,	  from	  any	  point	  of	  entry	  into	  it.268	  As	  Heidegger	  says,	  Natorp’s	  “systematic	  panlogical	  basic	  orientation	  keeps	  him	  from	  any	   free	   access	   to	   the	   sphere	   of	   lived	   experience,	   to	   consciousness.”269	  Because	   of	   his	  immediate	   pivot	   to	   the	   objective,	   “this	   is	   and	   remains	   essentially	   a	   theoretical	  consciousness	  of	  objects,	  and	  indeed	  one	  resolved	  into	  the	  lawfulness	  of	  constitution”	  (KNS	  56/57:108).	  	   Heidegger’s	   criticism	   of	   Natorp	   is	   hardly	   decisive;	   in	   fact,	   like	   Kierkegaard’s	  criticism	  of	  Hegel	  (see	  n.	  267),	  it	  begs	  the	  question	  rather	  obviously.	  If	  we	  look	  a	  bit	  closer,	  however,	   we	   find	   something	   interesting:	   Heidegger’s	   insistence	   on	   a	   preobjective	  subjectivity	  is	  nearly	  matched	  in	  its	  intensity	  by	  Natorp’s	  insistence	  on	  the	  very	  same	  point.	  The	  lesson	  that	  Natorp	  draws	  from	  the	  Ideas	  is	  that	  Husserl	  has	  reached	  only	  the	  first	  rung	  of	  true	  Platonism:	  Husserl	  remains	  captivated	  by	  the	  fantasy	  of	  fixed,	  immovable	  essences,	  whereas	   Plato’s	   highest	   accomplishment	   was	   to	   finally	   “liquefy	   them	   into	   the	   ultimate	  continuity	  of	  the	  thinking	  process.”270	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  picture	  suggested	  by	  Husserl,	  or	  at	  least	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   results	   delivered	   by	   the	   method	   he	   recommends,	   “thinking	   is	  
movement,	   not	   standing	   still;	   just	   as	   a	  point	   cannot	  be	   so	  much	  as	   ‘determined’	   for	   and	  through	  itself	  before	  a	  line	  is	  drawn,	  things	  that	  stand	  still	  should	  be	  considered	  merely	  as	  gateways.”271	  If	  this	  is	  so,	  then,	  far	  from	  disclosing	  a	  pure	  field	  of	  phenomena	  for	  research	  into	   essences,	   even	   the	   phenomenological	   reduction	   (whose	   exemplary	   methodological	  
                                                268	  Natorp	   himself	   acknowledges	   that	   (subjective)	   reconstruction	   and	   (objective)	   construction	   are	   finally	  distinguishable	  only	  by	  indicating	  them	  in	  different	  ways.	  Since	  “every	  difference	  in	  the	  act	  expresses	  itself	  in	  something	   of	   its	   correlate	   and,	   indeed,	   is	   primarily	   represented	   in	   the	   latter,”	   one	   must	   conclude	   that	  “nothing	  remains	  left	  over	  but	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  regard”	  (Natorp	  [1917-­‐1918],	  244-­‐245).	  269	  Heidegger	   would	   have	   understood	   Neokantian	   “panlogicism”	   to	   include	   the	   Southwest	   School,	   as	   well	  (although	  possibly	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Lask).	  See,	  for	  example,	  Rickert	  (n.	  257	  above)	  on	  the	  universality	  of	  logic	  in	  philosophy.	  270	  Natorp	  (1917-­‐1918),	  231.	  271	  Natorp	  (1917-­‐1918),	  230.	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character	   is	   now	   called	   into	   doubt)	   can	   at	  most	   disclose	   a	  manifold	   of	   gateways	   to	   pure	  consciousness,	  not	  pure	  consciousness	  itself.	  	   Indeed,	  Heidegger	  will	   insist	  upon	  similar	  points	   throughout	  the	  1920s.	  But	  while,	  for	   Natorp,	   such	   considerations	   tell	   decisively	   against	   the	   possibility	   of	   getting	  straightaway	  “to	  the	  things	  themselves,”	  Heidegger	  draws	  the	  opposite	   lesson:	   if	  Natorp’s	  conclusion	  has	   the	  appearance	  of	   inevitability,	   that	   is	  only	  because	  we	  shrink	  away	   from	  the	  radical	  demand	  of	  phenomenology	  all	  too	  easily.	  In	  fact,	  the	  transcendental	  researches	  that	   Natorp,	   invoking	   Kant,	   claims	   are	   necessary	   (to	   establish	   the	   possibility	   of	  phenomenology)	   actually	   belie	   the	   very	   theoretical	   prejudice	   that	   the	   things	   themselves	  suffice	  to	  dissolve.	  	   For	   this	   reason	  Heidegger	   begins	   his	   defense	   of	   Husserl	   by	   citing	   his	   principle	   of	  principles	  and	  emphasizing	  its	  fundamental	  import	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  matter	  at	  hand	  (KNS	  56/57:109).	  Husserl’s	   insistence	   that	  no	   theory	   can	   lead	  us	   astray	  when	   it	   comes	   to	   this	  principle	  is	  a	  clue	  to	  his	  deeper	  intention	  here	  (which	  Natorp	  has	  missed).	  No	  theory	  can	  lead	  us	  astray	  here	  precisely	  because	   the	  principle	   is	  pretheoretical	   in	  character.272	  But	   it	  can	  only	  be	  valid	  as	  a	  pretheoretical	  principle	  if	  in	  fact	  there	  is	  a	  realm	  of	  phenomena	  prior	  not	  just	  to	  any	  philosophical	  theory,	  but	  to	  any	  theoretical	  comportment	  to	  the	  world	  more	  generally.	  What	  is	  this	  pretheoretical	  realm	  of	  phenomena	  which	  is	   indicated	  in	  Husserl’s	  principle	  of	  principles?	  Heidegger	  tells	  us	  that	  the	  principle	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  the	   original	   intention	   of	   any	   genuine	   life,	   the	   original	   bearing	   of	   lived	  experience	  and	  life	  as	  such,	  the	  absolute	  sympathy	  with	  life	  that	  is	  identical	  
                                                272 	  It	   should	   be	   noted	   that,	   even	   in	   the	   Logical	   Investigations,	   Husserl	   had	   conceived	   his	   project	   as	  metatheoretical—scientifically	  investigating	  the	  constraints	  on	  theory-­‐formation	  in	  science.	  He	  says,	  “We	  are	  dealing	  with	   systematic	   theories	   which	   have	   their	   roots	   in	   the	   essence	   of	   theory,	   with	   an	   a	   priori,	  
theoretical,	  nomological	  science	  which	  deals	  with	  the	  ideal	  essence	  of	  science	  as	  such.	  .	  .	  .	  In	  a	  profound	  sense,	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  the	  theory	  of	  theory,	  with	  the	  science	  of	  the	  sciences”	  (Husserl	  [1900-­‐1901],	  I:152	  [§66;	  Hua	  18.1:244];	  see	  also	  I:155-­‐156	  [§69;	  Hua	  18.1:248-­‐249]).	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with	  lived	  experience	  itself.	  .	  .	  .	  The	  same	  basic	  bearing	  first	  becomes	  absolute	  when	  we	  live	  in	  it,	  and	  no	  system	  of	  concepts,	  however	  high	  it	  has	  been	  built	  up,	   will	   reach	   this;	   it	   is	   only	   reached	   through	   phenomenological	   life	   in	   its	  growing	  intensification	  of	  itself.	  (KNS	  56/57:110)	  	  Here	  we	  see	  Heidegger	   first	  clearly	  stake	  out	  a	  position	  which	  will	   remain	  crucial	   for	  his	  thought	   throughout	   the	   following	   decade:	   phenomenology	   is	   ultimately	   not	   a	   first-­‐order	  competitor	   to	   traditional	   philosophical	   theories,	   but	   rather	   a	   way	   of	   life	   in	   which	  philosophy	  must	  be	  grounded.	  It	   is	  not	  that	  Heidegger	  wants	  to	  dismiss	  or	  even	  diminish	  the	   significance	   of	   traditional	   philosophical	   questions;	   instead,	   he	   wants	   to	   return	   the	  discussion	  of	  such	  questions	  to	  the	   life-­‐contexts	   in	  which	  they	  arise	  and	  from	  which	  they	  can	  gain	  their	  bearing.	  The	  goal	  is	  not	  simply	  to	  replace	  philosophy	  with	  lived	  experience,	  but	  to	  trace,	  livingly,	  the	  genesis	  of	  philosophy	  from	  life	  itself.	  This	  means	  that	  philosophy	  must	  henceforth	  not	  content	  itself	  to	  be	  a	  mere	  theory—even	  a	  theory	  about	  life—but	  must	  rather	  be	  life	  itself,	  according	  to	  a	  certain	  mode.273	  To	  speak	  of	  phenomenological	  life’s	  “growing	  intensification	  of	  itself,”274	  as	  opposed	  to	   the	   construction	   of	   a	   “system	   of	   concepts,”	   answers	   Natorp	   by	   challenging	   his	  supposition	   that	   phenomenological	   description	   is	   dependent	   on	   concepts	   which	   have	   a	  form	   which	   is	   necessarily	   foreign	   to	   the	   “streaming	   stream”275 	  of	   life.	   By	   contrast,	  Heidegger’s	  suggestion	   is	   that	   the	   form	  of	  phenomenological	  concepts	   is	   isomorphic	  with	  the	   form	   of	   life.	   To	   be	   sure,	   this	   requires	   a	   new	   way	   of	   thinking	   about	   philosophical	  
                                                273	  In	  1925	  Heidegger	  would	  credit	  the	  kernel	  of	  this	  insight	  to	  Dilthey.	  In	  approaching	  “the	  reality	  of	  psychic	  life	  itself,”	  Dilthey	  advanced	  to	  the	  “most	  extreme	  position”	  he	  was	  able	  to	  attain	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  life.	  Dilthey	  says	  that	  the	  structures	  of	  psychic	  life	  are	  “the	  primary	  vital	  unity	  of	  life	  itself	  and	  not	  merely	  classificatory	  schemata	  for	  its	  apprehension”	  (WDR	  155).	  On	  this	  connection,	  see	  also	  Kisiel	  (1983),	  173-­‐176.	  274	  The	  “growing	  intensification	  of	   itself”	  that	  occurs	  in	   living	  brings	  us	  close	  to	  the	  Christian	  provenance	  of	  Heidegger’s	  method,	  which	  I	  admittedly	  undersell	  in	  this	  chapter.	  Dahlstrom,	  who	  emphasizes	  the	  theological	  and	  transformational	  aspects	  of	  formal	  indication,	  can	  be	  a	  helpful	  complement	  to	  my	  presentation	  (see	  esp.	  Dahlstrom	   [1994],	   790-­‐795).	  Dahlstrom,	   for	   his	   part,	   seems	   to	  me	   to	   undersell	   the	  Husserlian	  background	  rather	  severely.	  275	  See	  p.	  176	  above.	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“concepts,”	   but	   if	  we	  build	   our	   understanding	   of	   conceptuality	   itself	   up	   from	   the	   ground	  floor	   of	   life,	   there	   is	   no	   reason	   this	   cannot	   be	   accomplished.	   As	   we	   will	   see,	   Heidegger	  adopts	   as	   one	   of	   his	   chief	   tasks	   of	   the	   early	   1920s	   the	   development	   of	   a	   method	   for	  concept-­‐formation	   in	   philosophy	   that	   is	   designed	   to	   allow	   the	   forms	   of	   philosophical	  concepts	  to	  emerge	  from	  life	  itself.	  On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  such	  a	  project	  may	  well	  still	  appear	  to	  be	  absurd.	  Natorp	  certainly	  thought	   so.	   He	   considers—just	   for	   a	   moment—the	   possibility	   that	   Husserl	   is	   after	   a	  presentation	  of	  pure	  consciousness	  which	  is	  not	  itself	  conceptually	  mediated,	  but	  is	  instead	  aimed	   at	   the	   living	   of	   our	   lived	   experience.	   But	   he	   just	   as	   quickly	   dismisses	   the	   notion:	  “Why	  on	  earth	  would	  a	  science,	  a	  method,	  be	  required	  for	  that?”276	  No	  doubt	  Natorp	  was	  keeping	  in	  mind	  Husserl’s	  insistence	  that	  philosophy	  be	  (or	  at	  any	  rate	  become)	  a	  rigorous	  science.	   And	   it	  must	   be	   immediately	   acknowledged	   that	   it	   is	   by	   no	  means	   clear	   how	   life	  
itself—where	   that	   at	   least	   indicates	   that	   we	   are	   not	   ultimately	   dealing	   with	   a	   theory	   of	  life—could	  be	  rigorous	  in	  any	  even	  remotely	  analogous	  way.	  Four	   years	   before	   his	   death,	   Dilthey	   observed	   the	   following	   about	   the	   “modern	  philosophy	  of	  life”:277	  Insights	   are	   united	   in	   unsystematic	   but	   impressive	   interpretations.	   In	   its	  substitute	  of	  persuasion	  for	  orderly	  proof	  this	  kind	  of	  writing	   is	  akin	  to	  the	  ancient	  art	  of	  the	  sophists	  and	  rhetoricians,	  whom	  Plato	  banished	  so	  sternly	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  philosophy.	  And	  yet	  a	  strong,	  inner	  relation	  joins	  some	  of	  these	   thinkers	   with	   the	   philosophical	   movement	   itself.	   Their	   art	   of	  persuasion	   is	   strangely	   combined	   with	   an	   awful	   seriousness	   and	   a	   great	  sincerity.	  Their	  eyes	  remain	  focused	  on	  the	  riddle	  of	  life,	  but	  they	  despair	  of	  solving	  it	  by	  a	  universally	  valid	  metaphysics,	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  world-­‐order.	  Life	  
                                                276	  Natorp	   (1917-­‐1918),	   237.	   Presumably,	   Heidegger	   was	   eventually	   able	   to	   convince	   Natorp	   that	   such	   a	  casual	  dismissal	  was	  in	  fact	  too	  quick:	  see	  n.	  283	  below.	  277	  Dilthey	  names	  Carlyle,	  Ruskin,	  Nietzsche,	  Tolstoy,	  and	  Maeterlinck.	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is	  to	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  itself—that	  is	  the	  great	  thought	  that	  links	  these	  writers	  with	  experience	  of	  the	  world	  and	  with	  poetry.278	  	  Dilthey’s	  words	  are	  apt,	  and	  he	  raises	  the	  crucial	  question	  Heidegger	  must	  face	  in	  the	  years	  to	  come:	  is	  there	  anything	  linking	  the	  “great	  thought”	  of	  Lebensphilosophie	  with	  the	  rigor	  of	  philosophy	   besides	   its	   unquestionable	   seriousness	   and	   sincerity?	   Heidegger	   speaks	   of	   a	  
movement	   of	   phenomenological	   life:	   towards	   “self-­‐intensification.”	   But	   how,	   as	   a	   form	   of	  life,	   is	   such	   a	   movement	   to	   be	   distinguished,	   and	   what,	   if	   anything,	   could	   serve	   as	   a	  criterion	   of	   its	   rigor?	   As	   Heidegger	   fully	   realizes,	   the	   adequacy	   of	   his	   answer	   to	   Natorp	  depends	  almost	  entirely	  on	  showing	  that	  a	  normative	  conception	  of	  philosophical	  rigor	  can	  be	   retained	   on	   the	   life-­‐philosophical	   approach.	   The	   basic	   problem	   of	  method,	   Heidegger	  announces,	  boils	  down	  to	  how	  this	  rigor	  is	  to	  be	  achieved,	  and	  in	  this	  way	  “it	  becomes	  clear	  why	   the	  problem	  of	  method	  occupies	   a	  more	   central	   position	   in	  phenomenology	   than	   in	  any	  other	  science”	  (KNS	  56/57:110).	  Nevertheless,	  it	  does	  not	  appear	  that	  Heidegger	  was	  able	   to	   satisfactorily	   articulate	   anything	   more	   than	   the	   most	   general	   sketch	   of	   such	   a	  method	   in	   1919.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   criteria	   for	   philosophy	   are	   to	   be	   located	   in	   lived	  experiences,	  precisely	  as	  they	  are	  lived,	  but,	  beyond	  that,	  Heidegger’s	  basic	  idea	  remained	  sketchy.	  To	  be	   sure,	   in	   the	   final	  hour	  of	   the	   course	  he	  makes	   some	  extremely	   suggestive	  statements,	   and	   it	   has	   even	   been	   claimed	   that	   the	   KNS	   course	   represented	   Heidegger’s	  “breakthrough	  to	  the	  topic”	  of	  Being	  and	  Time.279	  The	   pre-­‐worldly	   and	  worldly	   signifying	   functions	   have	  what	   is	   essential	   to	  them	   in	   drawing	   out	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   event;	   that	   is,	   they	   go	   along	  (experiencing	  and	  experiencing	  the	  experienced)	  with	  experience,	  live	  in	  life	  itself	   and,	   going	   along	   with	   it,	   are	   at	   once	   originating	   and	   carry	   their	  provenance	  in	  themselves.	  (KNS	  56/57:117)	  	  
                                                278	  Dilthey	  (1907),	  31.	  279	  Kisiel	  (1993),	  21,	  458.	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But	  this	  was	  not	  yet	  enough	  to	  keep	  worries	  like	  Natorp’s	  at	  bay.	  What	  was	  needed	  was	  an	  articulation	  of	  the	  awful	  seriousness	  of	  life	  philosophy	  that	  linked	  it	  in	  an	  intelligible	  way	  to	  something	  recognizable	  as	  philosophy.	  
Philosophy	  and	  Method	  The	  1920s	  could	  well	  be	  reckoned	  Heidegger’s	  methodological	  decade.	   In	  Being	  and	  Time	  Heidegger	   tells	   us	   that	   “the	   expression	   ‘phenomenology’	   signifies	   primarily	   a	  
methodological	  conception”	  (BT	  27).	  To	  be	  sure,	  he	  never	  means	  to	  conflate	  method	  with	  technique	   (see	  BT	  27,	   303),	   and	   sometimes	  he	   even	   explicitly	   denies	   that	   he	   is	   trying	   to	  provide	  a	  methodology	  for	  phenomenology	  (O	  63:79).	  But	  this	  is	  simply	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  fact	   that,	   even	   in	   his	   earliest	   years,	   Heidegger	   did	   not	   really	   take	   the	   “method”	   of	  philosophy	  to	  be	  separable	  from	  philosophy	  proper.	  Later	  on,	  he	  will	  take	  this	  to	  what	  may	  well	  be	  its	  logical	  conclusion:	  by	  1937,	  he	  holds	  that	  we	  can	  at	  best	  cultivate	  what	  he	  has	  come	  to	  call	  a	  “basic	  attunement,”	  a	  disposition	  that	  only	  becomes	  more	  difficult	  to	  attain	  as	  we	   try	   to	   understand	   and	   comprehend	   it.	   As	   Heidegger	   says,	   “Every	   recollection	   of	   this	  basic	  attunement	   is	  always	  only	  a	  cautious	  preparation	   for	   the	  way	  the	  basic	  attunement	  comes	  over	  us	  and	  attunes	  us	  [auf	  den	  stimmenden	  Einfall	  der	  Grundstimmung],	  which	  must	  remain	  something	  basically	  fortuitous”	  (C	  65:22).280	  In	  the	  more	  or	  less	  faithful	  hands	  of	  his	  perceptive	   student	   Gadamer,	   Heidegger’s	   early	   search	   for	   a	   genuinely	   philosophical	  methodology	  was	  finally	  turned	  against	  method	  in	  the	  most	  general	  sense.281	  
                                                280	  In	  short,	  and	  very	  roughly:	  attempts	  to	  describe	  how	  one	  ought	  to	  encounter	  the	  philosophical	  tradition	  do	  more	   to	  prevent	   a	   radical	   engagement	  with	   the	   tradition	   than	   they	   facilitate	   it.	   “Every	  naming	  of	   the	  basic	  attunement	   in	  a	   single	  word	   fixes	  on	  a	   false	  notion.	  Every	  word	   is	   taken	  again	   from	  the	   tradition.	  That	   the	  basic	  attunement	  of	  the	  other	  beginning	  must	  bear	  multiple	  names	  is	  not	  an	  argument	  against	   its	  unity	  but	  rather	  confirms	  its	  richness	  and	  strangeness”	  (C	  65:22).	  281	  Truth	  and	  Method	  must	  not	  be	  understood	  narrowly	  as	  a	  defense	  of	  truth	  against	  the	  inroads	  of	  just	  those	  specific	   “scientific”	   methodologies	   which	   are	   designed	   to	   legislate	   in	   advance	   the	   conditions	   for	   the	  appearance	  of	  truth,	  although	  it	  is	  that,	  too.	  As	  Gadamer	  puts	  it	  elsewhere,	  hermeneutic	  reflection	  “destroys	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   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   even	   in	   the	   1930s—and	  well	   beyond	   those	   years—Heidegger	  retained	  a	  privileged	  place	  for	  beginnings	  in	  philosophy.	  His	  old	  mentor	  Husserl	  had	  never	  really	  been	  able	  to	  escape	  the	  need	  to	  begin	  ever	  anew,	  a	  predilection	  that	  resulted	  in	  his	  apparent	   inability	   to	   ever	   deliver	   on	   the	   promise	   of	   building	   upon	   the	   foundations	   of	  phenomenology	  he	  had	   laid	   early	   in	   his	   career—and	   then	   laid	   over	   and	  over	   again	   after	  that.282	  But	   a	   case	   could	   be	   made	   that	   beginnings	   held	   an	   even	   more	   central	   place	   for	  Heidegger	   than	   they	   did	   for	   Husserl.	   At	   any	   rate,	   like	  Husserl,	   Heidegger	   had	   principled	  reasons	   for	   taking	  his	  beginnings	  so	  seriously,	  and	   in	   the	  early	  1920s	  he	  again	  and	  again	  confronts	  “introductory”	  questions	  about	  the	  nature	  and	  method	  of	  philosophy	  head-­‐on—and	  often	  at	  an	  almost	  embarrassing	  length.	  	   In	  WS	  1921-­‐1922	  Heidegger	  offered	  the	  first	  of	  his	  courses	  on	  Aristotle.	  Although	  it	  appears	  that	  Heidegger	  did	  consciously	  intend	  for	  the	  course	  to	  provide	  a	  general	  initiation	  into	  phenomenological	  research	  in	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy,	  the	  “introductory”	  section	  of	  the	  course	  rapidly	  grew	  out	  of	  proportion	  to	  its	  allotted	  task.	  As	  it	  stands,	  the	  manuscript	  of	  the	   course	   stands	   entirely	   under	   the	   heading	   “Introduction.”283 	  As	   he	   introduces	   his	  students	  to	  philosophy,	  he	  notes	  that	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  philosophy	  presents	  something	  of	  a	  puzzle:	   since	   the	  question	  of	   the	  nature,	   task,	  and	  subject	  matter	  of	  philosophy	   is	   itself	  a	  philosophical	  question,	  philosophy	  finds	  itself	  in	  no	  position	  to	  borrow	  its	  methodological	  
                                                                                                                                                       self-­‐understanding	  and	  reveals	  a	  lack	  of	  methodological	  justification”	  (Gadamer	  [1971],	  281),	  even	  though,	  to	  be	  sure,	  such	  neediness	  in	  thinking	  is	  finally	  the	  condition	  for	  universal	  agreement.	  Cf.	  Kisiel	  (1969),	  363.	  282	  Of	  course,	  as	   the	  tens	  of	   thousands	  of	  pages	  of	  Husserliana	  amply	  testify,	  such	  an	  “inability”	  was	  merely	  apparent.	   External	   observers	  who	   had	   access	   only	   to	   his	   published	  works,	   however,	   could	   be	   forgiven	   for	  wondering	   whether	   Husserlian	   phenomenology	   really	   could	   make	   progress	   beyond	   the	   foundational	  questions	  and	  so	  furnish	  a	  new	  ground	  for	  the	  sciences.	  For	  the	  publication	  history,	  see	  Luft	  (2011),	  3-­‐7.	  Like	  Husserl,	  Heidegger	  tended	  to	  publish	  only	  the	  very	  tips	  of	  the	  icebergs	  of	  his	  concrete	  research.	  283	  It	  subsequently	  became	  the	  first	  draft	  of	  what	  he	  projected	  as	  an	  introduction	  to	  a	  book	  on	  Aristotle.	  An	  intermediate	  draft	  (in	  October	  of	  1922)	  was	  sent	  by	  Heidegger	  to	  Marburg	  and	  Göttingen.	  See	  Kisiel	  (1993),	  555n12.	  Both	  Misch	  (at	  Göttingen)	  and	  Natorp	  (at	  Marburg)	  were	  impressed,	  and	  the	  manuscript	  led	  directly	  to	  Heidegger’s	  being	  offered	  the	  Marburg	  post	  (effectively	  replacing	  Hartmann,	  who	  was	  being	  promoted	  to	  Natorp’s	  chair)	  in	  June	  1923	  (Ott	  [1988],	  122-­‐124).	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principles	   from	   another	   science.	   And	   yet	   if	   it	   cannot	   receive	   a	   binding	   directive	   from	  elsewhere,	  it	  is	  equally	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  it	  could	  produce	  one	  for	  itself	  in	  a	  way	  that	  does	  not	  beg	  the	  question,	  for	  it	  could	  only	  do	  so,	  it	  seems,	  if	  some	  determinate	  conception	  of	  the	  nature,	  scope,	  or	  method	  of	  philosophical	  inquiry	  were	  already	  presupposed.	  	   In	  practice,	   to	  be	  sure,	  we	  tend	  to	  avail	  ourselves	  of	  a	  rough	  and	  ready	  solution	  to	  this	  problem:	  we	  simply	  take	  our	  directive	  from	  what	  others	  whom	  we	  already	  agree	  are	  “philosophers”—Socrates	   and	   suchlike—have	  actually	   accomplished	   in	   the	  past,	  much	  as	  Hume	  sets	  out	  to	  answer	  questions	  about	  virtue	  in	  the	  second	  Enquiry	  by	  asking	  about	  the	  acts	  we	  typically	  recognize	  as	  virtuous.284	  But	  it	  is	  hard	  for	  most	  of	  us	  to	  escape	  the	  feeling	  that	  such	  an	  approach	  has	  all	   the	  advantages	  of	  theft	  over	  honest	  toil.	  Heidegger	  remains	  correct	  today,	  I	  believe,	  when	  he	  says	  that	  the	  question	  What	  is	  philosophy?	  “gives	  rise	  for	  the	  most	  part	  to	  an	  abundance	  of	  annoyance”	  (PIA	  61:13).	  Heidegger	  insists,	  however,	  that	  the	  question,	  considered	  carefully,	  has	  fundamental	  implications	   for	  philosophy	  and	   its	  method.	   It	   is	  not	  exactly	  that	   the	  problem	  admits	  of	  a	  neat	  solution.	  Instead,	  Heidegger	  wants	  to	  show	  that	  the	  problem	  itself	  is	  a	  philosophically	  productive	   one:	   taking	   it	   seriously	   bestows	   at	   the	   very	   least	   a	   positive	   directionality	   on	  philosophical	   inquiry.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   strict	   constraint	   that	   the	   problem	   imposes	   on	  us—we	  must	   determine	   the	   point	   of	   philosophy	  philosophically—determines	   the	   specific	  form	  which	  all	  basic	  concepts	  in	  philosophy	  must	  assume.	  If	  they	  are	  to	  play	  foundational	  roles	  in	  philosophy,285	  they	  must	  maintain	  an	  openness	  to	  the	  inescapable	  indeterminacy	  of	  philosophy’s	  starting	  point.	  
                                                284	  See	  Hume	  (1751),	  6-­‐7	  (§1).	  285	  And	  indeed	  they	  are	  assigned	  a	  function	  in	  Heidegger’s	  phenomenology	  somewhat	  analogous	  to	  the	  role	  of	  regional	  essences	  in	  Husserl’s.	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As	  Heidegger	  well	  realizes,	  it	  follows	  from	  this	  that	  research	  in	  philosophy	  is,	  in	  an	  important	  sense,	  never	  independent	  of	  the	  question	  of	  what	  philosophy	  itself	  is.	  And	  this	  is	  apt	   to	   be	   frustrating	   not	   only	   for	   those	   who	   would	   like	   to	   have	   done	   with	   preliminary	  questions	  and	  move	  on	   immediately	   to	  subdisciplines	  of	  philosophy,	  whether	   that	  means	  logic,	   physics,	   or	   ethics,	   but	   even	   for	   phenomenologists.	   Isn’t	   the	   very	   point	   of	  phenomenology	   to	   quit	   it	   already	   with	   the	   handwringing	   and	   look	   at	   the	   things	  themselves?	  But	  philosophy	   can	   be	   reproached	   for	   turning	   perpetually	   upon	   preliminary	  questions	  only	  if	  the	  criterion	  for	  judging	  it	  is	  borrowed	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  sciences	  and	  if	   it	   is	  demanded	  that	  philosophy	  solve	  concrete	  problems	  and	  construct	  a	  worldview.	  I	  wish	  to	  increase	  and	  keep	  awake	  philosophy’s	  need	  to	   be	   ever	   turning	   upon	   preliminary	   questions,	   so	   much	   so	   that	   it	   will	  actually	   become	   a	   virtue.	   About	  what	   is	   proper	   to	   philosophy	   itself,	   I	   have	  nothing	  to	  say	  to	  you.	  (IPR	  60:4-­‐5)	  	  Because,	  however,	  philosophy	  must	  be	  essentially	  about	  itself,	  this	  perpetual	  turning	  back	  to	  preliminary	  questions	  does	  not	  mean	   turning	  away	   from	  philosophy’s	  genuine	  subject	  matter.	   Indeed,	  “The	  two	  questions	  of	  philosophy	  are,	   in	  plain	  terms:	  1.	  What	   is	  the	  main	  issue	   [Hauptsache]?	   2.	  Which	  way	   of	   posing	   questions	   is	   genuinely	   directed	   to	   it?”	   (PIA	  61:12).	   And	   Heidegger	   could	   have	   added:	   the	   two	   questions	   are	   inseparable.	   For	   in	  philosophy	  we	  must	  keep	  before	  us	  only	   the	  Hauptsache,	   even	  while	  we	  remain	  radically	  nondogmatic	  about	  what	  that	  actually	  is.	  	   Thus	  Heidegger	  is	  separated	  by	  only	  the	  thinnest	  of	  margins	  from	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	   Neokantian	   “panlogicism.”	   Fourteen	   years	   before	   he	   would	   (nominally)	   supervise	  Heidegger’s	  habilitation	  work,	  Rickert	  laid	  out	  his	  methodological	  program	  as	  follows:	  We	  give	  priority	  over	  every	  substantive	  assertion	  to	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  science	  has	  the	  right	  to	  make	  any	  assertion	  here	  at	  all.	  Thus	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every	  problem	  of	  the	  general	  conception	  of	  the	  world	  and	  life	  is	  transformed	  into	  a	  problem	  of	  logic,	  of	  epistemology.286	  	  Never	   mind	   that	   Rickert,	   as	   a	   member	   of	   the	   Southwest,	   not	   Marburg,	   School	   of	  Neokantianism,	  maintained	   an	   essential	   place	   in	   his	   thought	   for	   a	   nonrational	   reality	   to	  which	   all	   our	   concepts	   are	   responsible.	   The	   transposition	   of	   substantive	   questions	   into	  epistemological	  ones	   is	  unavoidable	  and	   in	  part	  reflects	  the	  need	  to	  combat	  the	   insidious	  threat	  of	  Lebensphilosophie	  on	  scientific	  terrain.	  In	  fact,	  Rickert	  offers	  a	  rather	  remarkable	  diagnosis	  of	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  fin	  de	  siècle:	  Our	  courage	  to	  pursue	  knowledge,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Hegel	  possessed	  it,	   has	   been	   broken.	   For	   us,	   epistemology	   has	   become	   a	   matter	   of	   good	  conscience,	   and	   we	   will	   not	   be	   prepared	   to	   listen	   to	   anyone	   who	   fails	   to	  justify	   his	   ideas	   on	   this	   basis.	   Perhaps	   this	   will	   appear	   to	   later—and	  happier—times	   as	   a	   sign	   of	   weakness.	   .	   .	   .	   At	   this	   point,	   those	   who	   are	  contemptuous	  of	  epistemological	   investigations	  must	  all	  be	  seen	  as	   fanatics	  who	  pose	  a	  greater	  threat	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  comprehensive	  theory	  of	  life	   and	   the	   world	   on	   a	   scientific	   basis	   than	   those	   all	   too	   modest	   and	  understanding	   natures	   who	   want	   nothing	   more	   than	   specialization	   in	  science.287	  	  Rickert’s	  dilemma	  between	  Hegelian	  courage	  and	  Kantian	  humility	  presupposes,	  of	  course,	  that	  the	  real	  subject	  matter	  of	  philosophy	  recedes	  into	  the	  background	  when	  preliminary	  and	  methodological	  questions	  come	  to	  the	  fore.	  Heidegger	  would	  spend	  the	  better	  part	  of	  the	  1920s	  working	  to	  undermine	  this	  view.	  
Formal	  Indication	  Of	  course	  Husserl,	  too,	  had	  argued	  that	  philosophy,	  because	  it	  must	  ground	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  regional	  sciences,	  can	  derive	  neither	  its	  basic	  concepts	  nor	  its	  standards	  of	  rigor	  from	  
                                                286	  Rickert	  (1901),	  21.	  Such	  a	  result	  would	  never	  have	  been	  acceptable	  to	  Heidegger,	  for	  there	  is	  no	  a	  priori	  guarantee	   that	   the	  problems	  of	   logic	  will	   reproduce,	   faithfully	  or	  otherwise,	   “the	  general	   conception	  of	   the	  world	  and	  life.”	  Logos,	  Heidegger	  will	  try	  to	  demonstrate	  at	  some	  length	  in	  1925,	  is	  always	  about	  something,	  at	  least	  according	  to	  its	  Greek	  conception:	  for	  the	  Greeks,	  “the	  basic	  achievement	  of	  speech	  consists	  in	  making	  visible,	  manifest,	  what	  one	  is	  speaking	  about,	  what	  one	  is	  discussing”	  (L	  21:6;	  cf.	  PIK	  25:202-­‐203).	  Thus	  logic	  has	  inescapable	  metaphysical	  foundations,	  the	  theme	  of	  his	  SS	  1928	  lecture	  course.	  287	  Rickert	  (1901),	  21.	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them.	  So	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  Heidegger	  is	  merely	  repeating	  Husserl’s	  polemic	  in	  the	  
Logical	   Investigations	   against	   nineteenth-­‐century	   naturalism	   and	   materialism	   when	   he	  insists	   that	   “the	   concept	   and	   sense	  of	  rigor	   is	   originally	  philosophical	   and	  not	   scientific;	  only	  philosophy	  is	  originally	  rigorous;	  it	  possesses	  a	  rigor	  in	  the	  face	  of	  which	  the	  rigor	  of	  science	   is	   merely	   derivative”	   (IPR	   60:10).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   for	   both	   Husserl	   and	  Heidegger	   the	   rejection	   of	   derivative	   standards	   of	   philosophical	   rigor	   was	   directed	   also	  against	  the	  Neokantians,	  who,	  despite	  their	  shared	  aversion	  to	  psychologism,	  would	  not	  go	  so	   far	   as	   to	   grant	   to	   philosophy	   a	   distinctive	   content	   (like	   Husserl’s	   pure	   field	   of	  phenomena)	   given	   to	   it	   independently	   of	   the	   results	   of	   the	   regional	   sciences.	   Here,	   too,	  Heidegger	   shares	   and—as	  we	   have	   seen	   in	   our	   review	   of	   the	  KNS	   class—even	   amplifies	  Husserl’s	  concerns.	  For	   Heidegger,	   the	   peculiar	   rigor	   of	   philosophy	   must	   be	   determined	   by	   its	  thoroughgoing	   and	   unsurpassable	   directedness	   towards	   what	   really	   matters,	   the	  
Hauptsache,	  but	  this	  directedness	  must	  remain	  radically	  nondogmatic	  about	  the	  content	  of	  the	  latter.	  Nominally,	  at	  least,	  the	  Heidegger	  of	  the	  early	  1920s	  is	  perfectly	  happy	  to	  adopt	  the	   slogans	   and	   terminology	   of	   the	   Lebensphilosophen	   as	   his	   own.	   It	   is	   “life”	   to	   which	  philosophical	   concepts	   are	   to	   be	   referred	   if	   they	   are	   to	   retain	   their	   fundamental	  significance	   and	   rigor.	   But	   what	   is	   “life”?	   The	   common	   complaint	   about	   the	  
Lebensphilosophen,	   of	   course,	   was	   that	   their	   appeal	   to	   life	   remained	   vague	   and	  indeterminate.	   Heidegger’s	   idea,	   however,	   is	   to	   expose	   the	   philosophical	   function	   of	   this	  very	   indeterminacy.288	  For	   Heidegger	   it	   is	   sufficient	   that	   the	   reference	   to	   life,	   or	   lived	  experience,	   lends	  philosophy	  a	  certain	  directionality	  back	   from	  concepts	  and	  abstractions	  
                                                288	  And	  when	  Heidegger	  gives	  up	  the	  language	  of	  Lebensphilosophie,	  it	  will	  not	  be	  because	  the	  reference	  to	  life	  is	  too	  empty;	  rather,	  he	  will	  decide	  that	  it	  is	  too	  conceptually	  (in	  this	  case,	  biologistically)	  laden.	  See	  n.	  252.	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to	   the	   concrete	   experiences	   in	   which	   they	   were	   originally	   formed.	   A	   formal	   indication	  should	   indicate	   precisely	   this	   directionality:	   “a	   connection	   [Bindung]	   is	   pregiven	   that	   is	  indeterminate	   with	   respect	   to	   content,	   but	   determinate	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   manner	   in	  which	   the	   connection	   is	   carried	  out	   [vollzugshaft	  bestimmte	  Bindung]”	   (PIA	  61:20).	  Were	  the	  indication	  to	  immediately	  determine	  the	  content	  of	  its	  object,	  Heidegger	  would	  already	  be	   falling	   into	   the	   trap	  Natorp	  has	   laid	   for	   him,	   for	   the	   conceptual	   content	   of	   the	   formal	  indicator	  would	  immediately	  falsify	  the	  pre-­‐	  or	  protoconceptual	  phenomenon.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  vollzugshaft	  bestimmte	  Bindung	  must	  be	  determinate,	  intending	  what	  philosophy	  is	  after	  without	  yet	  rendering	  it	  transparent.	  In	   the	   next	   paragraph	   Heidegger	   goes	   on	   to	   speak	   of	   a	   Verstehenvollzug:	   “In	   a	  decisive	   sense,	   with	   [the	   phenomenological	   definition],	   the	   understanding’s	   enactment	  [Verstehenvollzug]	  is	  such	  that	  the	  path	  from	  out	  of	  a	  basic	  experience	  [Grunderfahrung]	  is	  traversed	   ‘back’	   in	  the	  way	  it	   is	   indicated”	  (PIA	  61:20).	  Now,	  “fulfillment,”	  “actualization,”	  “enactment,”	   “performance,”	   and	   even	   “consummation”	   are	   all	   more	   or	   less	   adequate	  English	  alternatives	  for	  Heidegger’s	  “Vollzug.”	  The	  Vollzug	  is	  a	  working-­‐through,	  a	  carrying-­‐out,	   of	   the	   directedness	  we	   find	   ourselves	   caught	   up	   in	  within	   the	   task	   of	   philosophical	  definition.289	  It	  requires,	  as	  it	  were,	  the	  active	  participation	  of	  the	  philosopher	  herself	  and	  is	  not	  ultimately	  separable	  from	  the	  latter.	  The	  “formal”	  aspect	  of	  formal	  indication	  means	  that	  what	  is	  enacted	  in	  philosophy	  cannot	  be	  set	  down	  losslessly	  in	  a	  finished	  doctrine,	  and	  it	  would	  be	  a	  serious	  mistake	  to	  complain	  that	  we	  could	  never	  traverse	  the	  path	  from	  the	  
Vollzug	   to	  the	  Gehalt,	   for	  to	  lose	  the	  Vollzug	   in	  a	  determinate	  content—that	  is,	  to	   lose	  the	  
                                                289	  The	  main	  text	  of	  the	  Introduction	  course	  can	  profitably	  be	  read	  as	  a	  progressive	  determining	  of	  this	  sense	  of	  movement.	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actualization	   in	   something	   which	   has	   been	   actualized—is	   precisely	   the	   danger	   that	  Heidegger	  is	  trying	  to	  fend	  off	  with	  his	  use	  of	  formally	  indicative	  concepts.	  As	  he	  insists,	  As	  indicative,	  the	  definition	  is	  characterized	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  precisely	  does	  not	   fully	   and	   properly	   present	   the	   object	   which	   is	   to	   be	   determined	   and	  instead	  only	   indicates	   it—genuinely	   indicating	   it,	   though,	   so	   that	   it	   directly	  gives	  in	  advance	  its	  principle.	  It	  lies	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  indication	  that	  concretion	  cannot	  be	  had	  without	  further	  ado	  but	  rather	  presents	  a	  task	  of	  its	  own	  kind	  and	  a	  task	  of	  enacting	  constituted	  in	  its	  own	  manner.	  (PIA	  61:32)	  	  Thus	  we	  can	  see	  why	  Heidegger	  warns	  his	  students	  in	  this	  course,	  just	  as	  he	  does	  in	  many	  others,	  that	  philosophy	  is	  apt	  to	  be	  a	  frustrating	  subject:	  it	  is	  of	  its	  essence	  to	  never	  to	  get	  to	  its	  content,	  but	  to	  remain	  always,	  in	  principle,	  only	  on	  the	  way	  to	  it.	  On	  this	  matter,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  he	  is	  uncompromising:	  “About	  what	  is	  proper	  to	  philosophy	  itself,	  I	  have	  nothing	  to	  say	  to	  you”	  (IPR	  60:5).	  Instead,	  “the	  only	  way	  of	  arriving	  at	  what	  is	  proper”	  consists	  in	  “exhausting	  and	  fulfilling	  what	  is	  improperly	  indicated,”	  i.e.,	  “following	  the	  indication”	  itself	  (PIA	  61:33).	  	   Now,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  difficulty	  endemic	  to	  philosophy	  is	  that	  its	  subject	  matter	  cannot	  be	  directly	  delineated	  in	  advance,	   for	  any	  definition	  that	  staked	  out	  a	  determinate	  region	  of	  questions,	   concepts,	  or	  phenomena	  as	   “the	  philosophical”	  would	  beg	   important	  philosophical	   questions.	   This	   is	   what	   the	   Lebensphilosophen	   grasped,	   even	   if	   inchoately,	  and	  it	  is	  why	  they	  were	  loath	  to	  pin	  down	  the	  reference	  of	  their	  basic	  concepts—if	  they	  can	  even	  be	  called	  “concepts”—in	  a	  logical	  manner.	  And	  it	  is	  why	  Dilthey	  insisted	  he	  could	  only	  “evoke”	  the	  experience	  of	  life,	  not	  explain	  it.	  But	  it	  must	  be	  insisted,	  Heidegger	  thinks,	  that	  such	  insight	  is	  by	  no	  means	  merely	  negative.	  In	  fact,	  it	  reveals	  an	  essential	  characteristic	  of	  philosophy,	  namely,	   that	   it	  must	   approach	   its	  ultimate	   subject	  matter	   in	   such	  a	  way	   that	  this	  matter	   is	   not	   determinately	   grasped	   in	   advance,	   but	  which	   nevertheless	   indicates	   a	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grounding	   direction	   for	   our	   inquiry—a	   how	   of	   the	   inquiry	   that	   waits	   on	   its	   actual	  performance	  by	  the	  thinker.	  Although	  in	  the	  early	  1920s	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  acknowledge—and,	  perhaps,	  does	  not	  even	  realize—as	  much,	   this	  position	  already	  gives	  his	   “phenomenological”	  research	  a	  very	  different	  inflection	  from	  that	  of	  Husserl.290	  The	  very	  titles	  of	  the	  their	  basic	  methods	  suggest	   as	   much:	   Heidegger’s	   Anzeige,	   standing	   against	   Husserl’s	   Intuition	   or	  
Anschauung.291	  For	  Husserl,	  we	  will	  recall,	  the	  appeal	  to	  intuition	  is	  meant	  at	  once	  to	  clear	  away	  all	  prejudicial	  theoretical	  constructions	  that	  might	  intrude	  upon	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  its	  pure	  givenness.292	  Heidegger’s	  public	  avowal	  of	  this	  thesis	  only	  thinly	  veils	  his	  suspicion	  of	  any	  method,	  phenomenological	  or	  otherwise,	  that	  purports	  to	  render	  a	  field	  of	  intuition	  directly	  available	  for	  description.	  In	  fact,	  we	  can	  go	  further:	  for	  Heidegger,	  the	  temptation	  to	  straightaway	  describe,	  in	  Husserl’s	  sense,	  a	  given	  phenomenon	  is	  precisely	  what	  must	  be	  resisted,	   and	   the	   method	   of	   indication	   is	   explicitly	   designed	   to	   hold	   intuition	   (again,	   in	  Husserl’s	  sense,	  at	   least)	  at	  bay.	  Alternately,	  we	  might	  say	  that	  the	  intuition	  which	   fulfills,	  for	  Husserl,	   is	   replaced	  by	   the	   intuition	  which	   is	   always	  only	   fulfilling,	  where	  by	   that	  we	  
                                                290	  Even	   if	   Heidegger	   realized	   the	   irreconcilable	   nature	   of	   the	   differences	   that	   were	   emerging	   between	  Husserl	  and	  himself,	  he	  may	  well	  have	  been	  reluctant	  to	  announce	   it	  openly,	   for	  alongside	  the	  Introduction	  course	   he	   was	   concurrently	   teaching	   a	   “phenomenological	   practicum	   for	   beginners,”	   graduates	   of	   which	  would	   be	   qualified	   to	   enroll	   in	   Husserl’s	   advanced	   seminar.	   Husserl	   and	   Heidegger	   would	   continue	   this	  arrangement	  until	  the	  latter	  left	  for	  Marburg	  in	  1923.	  See	  Kisiel	  (1993),	  462-­‐463,	  554-­‐555n11.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  Heidegger	  boasted	  to	  Löwith	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  course	  he	  had	  completely	  destroyed	  the	  foundations	  of	  Husserl’s	  phenomenology	  (Sheehan	  [1997],	  17).	  See	  also	  n.	  248.	  291	  See,	  e.g.,	  Holzhey	  (2010),	  30-­‐32.	  It	   is	  unwise,	  however,	  to	   insist	  too	  much	  on	  this	  contrast,	   for	  Heidegger	  had,	   after	   all,	   connected	   his	   methodology	   decisively	   to	   Husserlian	   intuition	   in	   the	   KNS	   class	   (and	   would	  continue	  to	  do	  so	  consistently	  throughout	  the	  1920s).	  So	  for	  Heidegger,	  at	  least,	  the	  contrast	  suggested	  here	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  a	  false	  one.	  292	  Granted,	   Husserl	   never	   thought	   that	   adopting	   the	   phenomenological	   attitude	   was	   merely	   a	   matter	   of	  course.	   Just	  as	  Descartes	  presents	  his	  doubting	   in	   the	  First	  Meditation	  as	  a	  path	   that	  requires	  patience	  and	  vigilance	  (it	  is	  presented,	  after	  all,	  as	  a	  meditation),	  so	  Husserl	  is	  far	  from	  asserting	  that	  the	  natural	  attitude	  can	  be	  casually	  tossed	  aside.	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understand	   that,	   so	   long	   as	   philosophy	   is	   philosophy,	   the	   process	   of	   Vollzug	   is	   never	  complete.293	  At	   no	   point,	   however,	   does	   this	   prevent	   Heidegger	   from	   drawing	   his	   theoretical	  apparatus	   from	   classical	   Husserlian	   sources.	   In	   particular,	   the	   Husserlian	   provenance	   of	  “form”	  is	  absolutely	  crucial	  for	  Heidegger’s	  thought	  here.	  In	  both	  the	  Logical	  Investigations	  and	   in	   Ideas	   I	   Husserl	   had	   distinguished	   between	   genus	   and	   form,	   a	   distinction	   which	  tracks	   that	   between	   material	   and	   formal	   essence.	   The	   highest	   (most	   general)	   material	  essences	  are	   those	   that	   furnish	   the	  basic	  concepts	  of	   the	  highest	  regional	  ontologies,	  e.g.,	  the	   essence	   any	   nature	   whatsoever.	   Regions,	   however,	   are	   always	   regions	   of	   (possible)	  empirical	  objects,	  and	   the	  regional	  ontology	   is	  always	  bound	   to	   the	  objects	  which	  can	  be	  given	  within	  that	  region.294	  This	  means	  that	  the	  ascension	  to	  the	  highest	  genus,	  the	  material	  essence	  of	  a	  region,	  remains	  constrained	  by	  the	  form	  of	  intuitive	  givenness	  specific	  to	  that	  region.	  In	  contrast	   to	  all	   regional	  ontologies	  stands	   formal	  ontology.295	  Essences	   in	   formal	  ontology	  are	  not	  constrained	  by	  the	  regionally	  specific	  form	  of	  givenness;	  in	  fact,	  because	  
                                                293	  Contrast	  this	  with	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  Logical	  Investigations.	  “Consciousness	  of	  fulfillment”	  is	  described	  as	  one	  in	  which	  “the	  act	  of	  pure	  meaning,	   like	  a	  goal-­‐seeking	  intention,	   finds	   its	   fulfillment	   in	  the	  act	  which	  renders	  the	  matter	   intuitive”	  (Husserl	   [1900-­‐1901],	   II:206	  [Sixth	   Inv.,	  §8;	  Hua	  19:566]).	  This	   is	   the	  basis	  of	  identity,	   which	   is	   “there	   from	   the	   start	   as	   unexpressed,	   unconceptualized	   experience.	   .	   .	   .	   A	   more	   or	   less	  complete	  identity	  is	  the	  objective	  datum	  which	  corresponds	  to	   the	  act	  of	   fulfillment,	  which	  ‘appears	  in	  it’”	  (Husserl	  [1900-­‐1901],	  II:207	  [Sixth	  Inv.,	  §8;	  Hua	  19:568]).	  Again:	  “In	  the	  unity	  of	  fulfillment,	  the	  fulfilling	  content	  coincides	  with	  the	  intending	  content,	  so	  that,	  in	  our	  experience	  of	  this	  unity	  of	  coincidence,	  the	  object,	  at	  once	   intended	  and	   ‘given,’	   stands	  before	  us,	  not	  as	   two	  objects,	  but	  as	  one	   alone”	   (Husserl	   [1900-­‐1901],	  I:200	   [First	   Inv.,	   §14;	   Hua	   19:57]).	   In	   this	   sense,	   at	   least,	   we	   could	   say	   that	   the	   object	   of	   philosophy,	   for	  Heidegger,	  never	  stands	  as	  “one	  alone”—something	  that	  forges	  a	  basic	  link	  between	  the	  thought	  of	  Heidegger	  and	  that	  of	  Derrida.	  294	  See	  Husserl	  (1913),	  18	  (§9).	  295	  Interestingly,	  this	  is	  a	  distinction	  Heidegger	  thinks	  Kant	  was	  unable	  to	  draw;	  in	  other	  words,	  Kant	  reduces	  the	   formal	   to	   the	   general	   (PIK	   25:63-­‐64).	   This	   is	   why	   Kant	   cannot	   ultimately	   reach	   the	   radicalness	   of	  Husserl’s	   phenomenology	   and	   why	   he	   is,	   indeed,	   up	   to	   a	   certain	   point,	   best	   understood	   (as	   the	   Marburg	  School	  would	  have	  understood	  him	  if	   they	  had	  conceived	  of	  his	  project	  ontologically)	  as	  offering	  a	  regional	  ontology	   of	   (mathematical)	   nature,	   not	   the	   formal	   ontology	   which,	   by	   Heidegger’s	   lights,	   would	   have	   to	  precede	  it	  (cf.	  PIK	  25:200-­‐206,	  425-­‐427).	  As	  Heidegger	  gives	  Kant	  more	  and	  more	  credit	  for	  his	  radicalness,	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they	  must	  fit	  all	  possible	  material	  essences,	  all	  formal	  essences	  must	  be	  completely	  empty	  of	  materiality.296	  Thus	  a	  formal	  “region,”	  though	  it	  may	  initially	  appear	  to	  be	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  higher	  (more	  generic)	  material	  region,	  is	  in	  fact	  not	  really	  a	  region	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  at	   all.	  As	  Husserl	   says,	   “The	   so-­‐called	   ‘formal	   region’	   is	   thus	  not	   something	   coordinated	  with	  the	  material	  regions	  (the	  regions	  simply);	  it	   is	  not	  genuinely	  a	  region	  but	   instead	  
the	  empty	  form	  of	  region	  in	  general.”297	  To	   take	   Husserl’s	   example	   (which	   is	   recited	   faithfully	   by	   Heidegger	   in	  WS	   1920-­‐1921),298	  “color”	   results	   from	   a	   generalization	   upon,	   e.g.,	   “black.”	   But	   the	   essences	   of	  “black”	   and	   “color”	   are	  material	   essences,	   and	   as	   such	   they	   only	   are	  what	   they	   are	  with	  reference	   to	   the	   look	   of	   the	   ink	   on	   this	   page.	   This	   look	   admits	   of	   a	   range	   of	   imaginative	  variation	  within	  a	  range	  of	  possibilities	  in	  which	  the	  same	  essence	  will	  still	  appear,299	  and	  yet	   “generalization	   is	   bound	   in	   its	   enactment	   to	   a	   determinate	  material	   domain”	   (IPR	  60:58;	   cf.	   60-­‐61).	   The	   formal	   attitude,	   by	   contrast,	   “is	   not	   bound	   to	   materiality	   (to	   the	  region	  of	  material	  things	  and	  such),	  but	  is	  materially	  free.	  It	  is	  also	  free	  from	  any	  order	  of	  stages:	  I	  don’t	  need	  to	  run	  through	  any	  lower	  generalities	  to	  ascend	  stepwise	  to	  the	  ‘highest	  generality’	  ‘object	  in	  general’”	  (IPR	  60:58).	  What,	  then,	  is	  the	  motivation	  for	  formal	  predication?	  In	  virtue	  of	  what	  is	  a	  stone,	  for	  instance,	  an	  example	  of	  an	   “object	   in	  general,”	  which	   is	  not	  merely	  a	   “highest	  generality”	  but	  instead	  a	  formal	  category?	  Once	  again,	  Heidegger	  turns	  to	  Husserl	  for	  guidance.	  In	  the	  
Logical	  Investigations	  Husserl	  had	  emphasized	  that	  the	  formal	  objective	  categories	  
                                                                                                                                                       however,	  he	  will	  decide	  that	  Kant	  was	  actually	  very	  close	  to	  drawing	  this	  distinction,	  after	  all.	  In	  fact,	  this	  is	  one	   way	   of	   determining	   the	   point	   at	   which	   Kant	   had	   to	   fall	   back	   on	   a	   more	   traditional	   understanding	   of	  metaphysics.	  296	  Husserl	  (1913),	  22	  (§10).	  297	  Husserl	  (1913),	  23	  (§10).	  298	  Heidegger	  specifically	  cites	  §13	  of	  Ideas	  I,	  which	  is	  where	  we	  find	  the	  example	  in	  Husserl	  (IPR	  60:57).	  299	  This,	  for	  Husserl,	  is	  the	  “eidetic	  scope”	  (Husserl	  [1913],	  28	  [§13]).	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are	   independent	  of	   the	  particularity	  of	  any	  material	  of	  knowledge.	   .	   .	   .	  They	  are	   therefore	   solely	   in	   relation	   to	   our	   varying	   thought-­‐functions:	   their	  concrete	  basis	  is	  solely	  to	  be	  found	  in	  possible	  acts	  of	  thought,	  as	  such,	  or	  in	  the	  correlates	  which	  can	  be	  grasped	  in	  these.300	  	  For	   Husserl,	   this	   means	   that	   we	   isolate	   that	   part	   of	   the	   motivation	   that	   directs	   our	  consciousness	   to	   objects	   in	   general	   which	   can	   be	   located	   purely	   in	   the	   subject	   and	   its	  thinking.	  As	  Heidegger	  takes	  up	  Husserl’s	  point,	  we	  must	  abstract	  from	  all	  “what-­‐content”	  of	  an	  object	  and	   focus	  only	  on	   the	   “how”	   in	  which	   the	  object	   is	   intended.	  The	  motivation	  which	  directs	  our	  consciousness	  to	  the	  object	  arises	  from	  the	  sense	  of	  attitudinal	  regard	  [Einstellungsbezugs]	  itself.	  I	  do	  not	   see	   the	   what-­‐determination	   [Wasbestimmtheit]	   from	   out	   of	   the	   object,	  but	   rather	   see	   its	   determination	   “onto”	   it	   [ich	   sehe	   ihm	   seine	   Bestimmtheit	  
gewissermaßen	  “an”],301	  as	   it	  were.	   I	  must	   look	  away	  from	  the	  what-­‐content	  [Wasgehalt]	  and	  see	  only	  that	  the	  object	  is	  a	  given,	  attitudinally	  grasped	  one.	  Thus	  the	  formalization	  arises	  out	  of	   the	  relational	  sense	  [Bezugssinn]	  of	   the	  pure	  attitudinal	   regard	   itself,	  not	  out	  of	   the	   “what-­‐content	   in	  general.”	   (IPR	  60:58-­‐59)	  	  On	  Heidegger’s	  interpretation	  of	  Husserl,302	  formalization	  can	  (and	  must)	  be	  accomplished	  without	   a	   progressive	   generalization	   because,	   instead	   of	   abstracting	   from	   the	   “what-­‐content”	   of	   the	   object,	   we	   retreat	   from	   the	   content	   altogether	   and	   attempt	   to	   grasp	   the	  mode	  of	  its	  intention,	  the	  relation	  we	  bear	  to	  the	  object.	  In	  other	  words,	  “The	  determination	  turns	  away	   from	   the	  materiality	   of	   the	   object	   and	   considers	   the	   object	   according	   to	   the	  
                                                300	  Husserl	  (1900-­‐1901),	  I:153	  (Prol.,	  §67;	  Hua	  18:245-­‐246).	  The	  precise	  source	  of	  Heidegger’s	  strategy	  is	  not	  as	   transparent	   here.	   He	   refers	   generally	   to	   the	   final	   chapter	   of	   volume	   I	   (the	   Prolegomena)	   of	   the	  Logical	  
Investigations	  (IPR	  60:57).	  But	  I	  suspect	  this	  is	  the	  passage	  he	  has	  in	  mind.	  301 	  More	   straightforwardly:	   I	   apply	   the	   object’s	   determination	   to	   it.	   But	   Heidegger	   is	   contrasting	  “Heraussehen”	   and	   “Ansehen”:	   instead	   of	   seeing	   the	   determination	   from	   out	   of	   the	   object,	   we	   see	   the	  determination	  in	  our	  application	  of	  it	  to,	  or	  upon,	  the	  object	  that	  receives	  it.	  302	  Husserl	   is	  not	   the	  only	  source	  of	  Heidegger’s	   interest	   in	   formalization.	  As	  Kisiel	  has	  shown,	  Lask,	  whose	  influence	  on	  Heidegger	  was	  at	   its	  peak	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  his	  untimely	  death	  in	  1915,	  makes	  many	  of	  the	  same	  points.	  In	  neither	  Husserl	  nor	  Lask,	  however,	  is	  the	  connection	  between	  form	  and	  life,	  which	  would	  come	  to	  constitute	  its	  chief	  interest	  for	  Heidegger,	  made	  explicit.	  As	  Kisiel	  describes	  Heidegger’s	  situation	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1919,	   “Phenomenology	  needs	  only	   to	   improve	  upon	   the	  schematization	  of	   formalization	  and	  expand	   it	   into	  the	  full	  intentional	  structure	  dictated	  by	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  life”	  (Kisiel	  [1995b],	  229).	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aspect	  in	  which	  it	  is	  given;	  it	  is	  determined	  as	  that	  which	   is	  grasped,	  as	  that	  upon	  which	  our	  cognitive	  regard	  falls”	  (IPR	  60:61).303	  	   Heidegger’s	   innovation	   lies	   not	   so	   much	   in	   a	   novel	   interpretation	   of	   Husserl’s	  doctrine	   of	   formalization,	   but	   in	   an	   application	   of	   it	   to	   metatheoretical	   questions	   in	  philosophy.	   This	   lends	   Husserl’s	   idea	   of	   formalization	   a	   somewhat	   surprising	   existential	  cast.	  The	  “content”	  of	  philosophy	  turns	  out	  to	  reside	  not	  in	  what	  we	  originally	  sought	  after	  as	  its	  content,	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  mode	  of	  intention	  that	  reveals	  itself	  in	  stepping	  back	  from	  what	  was	   intended	  as	  such.	   In	  a	  slogan,	   the	   “object”	  of	  philosophy	   is	  not	   its	  what,	  but	   its	  
how.	  Husserl’s	  attempt	  to	   isolate	  the	  formal	  from	  the	  material	   finds	  itself	  transposed	  into	  Heidegger’s	  attempt	  to	  isolate	  the	  Vollzug	  required	  in	  philosophy	  from	  the	  Gehalt	  in	  which	  it	  always	  risks	  losing	  itself.304	  Thus	  we	  can	  already	  see	  how	  Heidegger	  manages	  to	  keep	  his	  distance	  from	  Husserl	  despite	  their	  great	  proximity.	  The	  project	  of	  fundamental	  ontology,	  as	   it	   is	   pursued	   in	  Being	  and	  Time,	   bears	   a	   strong	   resemblance	   to	  Husserl’s	   desire	   for	   a	  phenomenological	   grounding	   for	   the	   regional	   sciences	   (see	   BT	   10-­‐11).	   But	   philosophy	  cannot	   be	   a	   foundation	   for	   the	   latter	   in	   quite	   the	  way	   that	  Husserl,	   following	  Descartes,	  imagined,	  for	  philosophy	  remains	  essentially	  a	  task	  to	  be	  accomplished,	  ever	  again	  anew.305	  It	   is	   a	   foundation	   for	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   sciences	   only	   in	   that	   it	   preserves	   for	   them	   their	  essential	  connection	  to	  the	  inner	  truthfulness	  (as	  he	  had	  put	  it	  already	  in	  1919)	  of	  life.	  
                                                303	  As	  Heidegger	  puts	  the	  point	  in	  WS	  1921-­‐1922,	  “The	  formal	  is	  not	  the	  ‘form,’	  and	  the	  indication	  its	  content;	  rather,	  the	  ‘formal’	  is	  always	  approaching	  the	  determination,	  approach-­‐character”	  (PIA	  61:34).	  304	  Ryan	   Streeter,	   who	   does	   not,	   however,	  make	   the	   essential	   reference	   to	   Husserl	   explicit,	   puts	   the	   point	  extremely	  well:	  “It	  is,	  therefore,	  the	  task	  of	  philosophy	  to	  do	  what	  other	  disciplines—preoccupied,	  as	  it	  were,	  with	   the	   ‘thingness’	   of	   the	   objects	   of	   their	   research—cannot	   do,	   namely	   to	   take	   up	   the	   object	   of	   its	  investigation	  by	  enacting	  it	  so	  as	  to	  come	  to	  comprehend	  it	  more	  fully”	  (Streeter	  [1997],	  418).	  305	  As	   Heidegger	   notes	   suggestively,	   “What	   is	   needed	   is	   a	   radical	   interpretation	   of	   the	   ‘formal’	   itself:	  existentiell	   sense	  of	   the	   formal”	   (PIA	  61:33).	  Note	   that	   this	   remark	   is	   almost	   certainly	   a	   later	   (1922-­‐1924)	  addition	  to	  the	  manuscript	  of	  the	  lecture	  course	  (see	  Kisiel	  [1993],	  232).	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Traditional	  philosophy	  comes	  up	  short	   in	   that	   it	  perpetually	   loses,	  or	   covers	  over,	  the	   enactment-­‐character	   of	   philosophy	   in	   a	   rush	   to	   determine	   its	   specific	   content.306	  For	  this	  reason	  “the	  formal	  indication	  is	  a	  defense,	  a	  prior	  securing,	  so	  that	  its	  character	  as	  an	  enactment	  still	  remains	  free”	  (IPR	  60:64).	  It	  is	  a	  method	  which	  indicates	  the	  proper	  “way”	  to	  philosophy	  only	  by	   insisting	  on	  the	  need	  to	  perpetually	  stay	  along	  that	  way	  and	  hence	  “free.”	   When	   Heidegger	   decided	   upon	   the	   motto	   for	   his	   Gesamtausgabe—“Ways,	   not	  works”—he	  was	  at	  least	  true	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  philosophy	  he	  had	  developed	  even	  in	  his	  earliest	  years.	  In	  a	  way,	  formal	  indication	  is	  primarily	  not	  a	  positive	  prescription	  for	  how	  to	  do	  philosophy,	  but	  a	  warning.	  Why	   is	   it	   called	   “formal”?	   The	   formal	   is	   something	   relational	  [Bezugsmäßiges].	   The	   indication	   should	   indicate	   beforehand	   the	   relation	   of	  the	   phenomenon—in	   the	   negative	   sense,	   though,	   as	   if	   to	   warn!	   A	  phenomenon	  must	  be	  pregiven	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  its	  relational	  sense	  is	  held	  in	  suspense.	  (IPR	  60:64)	  	  And	  yet	  this	  warning	  does	  not	  preclude,	  but	  first	  makes	  possible,	  a	  determinate,	  if	  free,	  path	  for	   philosophy.	   “The	   understanding	   that	   approaches	   genuinely	   is	   not	   in	   the	   full	   sense	   a	  grasp	   of	   the	   sense	   of	   being	   [of	   the	   phenomenon]	   but	   is	   precisely	   determined	   by	   the	  character	  of	  the	  approach—only	  by	  that	  but	  precisely	  by	  that”	  (PIA	  61:34).	  	   “Only	   by	   that	   but	   precisely	   by	   that”—that	   is	   the	   source	   of	   the	   distinctive	   rigor	   of	  Heidegger’s	  phenomenology	  in	  the	  1920s,	  and	  it	  is	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  he	  pinned	  his	  hopes	  on	  the	   possibility	   of	   a	   scientific	   philosophy307	  in	   which	   the	   “freedom”	   permitted	   by	   formal	  
                                                306	  This,	   too,	   is	   correctly	   emphasized	   by	   Streeter.	   As	   he	   puts	   the	   point,	   “This	   direction,	   following	   from	   the	  character	   of	   the	   method,	   is	   incomplete,	   wanting	   completion	   in	   a	   concrete	   context	   although	   there	   is	   not	  enough	  in	  this	  direction	  itself	  to	  satisfy	  this	  want.	  That	  want	  must	  be	  satisfied	  by	  those	  who	  appropriate	  the	  text	  in	  an	  existential	  way”	  (Streeter	  [1997],	  417;	  cf.	  Zahavi	  [2003],	  173n9).	  307	  Heidegger	  would	  gradually	  abandon	  the	  claim	  (which	  he	  advanced,	  at	  any	  rate,	  only	  periodically	  early	  in	  his	   career)	   to	   be	   proceeding	   “scientifically.”	   Although	   I	   cannot	   show	   it	   here,	   it	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   this	   is,	  however,	  not	  so	  much	  a	  substantive	  shift	  for	  Heidegger	  as	  it	  is	  a	  recognition	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  discourse	  of	  “science”—or	  at	  least	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  successful	  coopting	  of	  that	  term	  by	  the	  logical	  positivists	  in	  the	  1930s.	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indication	   does	   not	   dissolve	   into	   arbitrariness.	   But	   philosophy,	   even	   when	   pursued	  scientifically,	  will	  not	  look	  much	  like	  any	  of	  the	  positive	  sciences,	  nor	  will	  the	  standards	  of	  rigor	   for	   the	   latter	   carry	   over	   to	   the	   former	   (or	   vice	   versa).	   Whereas	   the	   discourse	   of	  positive	  science	  depends	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  strictly	  defined	  and	  shared	  terminology	  that	  is	  tethered	  tightly	  to	  a	  determinate	  region	  of	  objects,	  the	  basic	  concepts	  of	  philosophy,	  just	  like	  the	  concept	  of	  philosophy	  itself,	  must	  retain	  the	  flexibility	  to	  apply	  to	  phenomena	  that	  are	  more	  precisely	  uncovered	  only	  gradually	   through	   the	  very	  process	  of	  philosophizing.	  We	   might	   say	   that	   the	   task	   of	   philosophy	   is	   to	   restore	   to	   its	   basic	   concepts	   the	  questionability	   that	   scientific	   conceptualization,	   with	   good	   right	   (at	   least	   within	   certain	  methodological	   limits),	  attempts	  to	  cover	  over.	  Philosophical	  concepts	  cannot	  be	  clarified	  by	  affixing	  to	  them	  a	  formal	  definition	  that	  permanently	  fixes	  their	  reference;	  rather,	  to	  be	  
philosophically	   rigorous,	  such	  concepts	  must	  remain	  restrained	  from	  falling	   into	  any	  such	  fixed	  signification.	  As	  Heidegger	  puts	  it,	  It	  belongs,	  rather,	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  philosophical	  concepts	  themselves	  that	  they	  always	  remain	  uncertain.	  The	  possibility	  of	  access	  to	  philosophical	  concepts	  is	   entirely	  different	   than	   in	   the	   case	  of	   scientific	   concepts.	   Philosophy	  does	  not	   have	   at	   its	   disposal	   an	   objectively	   formed	  material	   context	   into	  which	  concepts	  can	  be	  integrated	  in	  order	  to	  be	  determined.	  There	  is	  a	  difference	  in	  principle	  between	  science	  and	  philosophy.	  (IPR	  60:3)	  	  Heidegger’s	  distance	  from	  Husserl	  here	  is	  real,	  but	  it	  is	  precisely	  measured.	  It	  is	  Husserl’s	  own	   view	   that	   “basic	   concepts	   in	   philosophy	   cannot	   be	   pinned	   down	   in	   definitions	   by	  means	  of	  fixed	  concepts	  capable	  of	  being	  identified	  each	  time	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  immediately	  accessible	   intuitions”;	   in	   fact,	   “as	   a	   rule	   it	   is	   necessary	   instead	   to	   undertake	   lengthy	  investigations	   before	   those	   concepts	   can	   be	   clarified	   in	   a	   definitive	   way	   and	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determined.”308	  Heidegger	  could	  agree	  with	  much	  of	   this,	  but	   the	   idea	   that	  such	  concepts	  could	   finally	   be	   determined309	  in	   this	  way	   (at	  which	   point	  we	   could	   commence	  with	   the	  positive	   work	   of	   philosophically	   grounding	   the	   sciences)	   is	   not	   one	   Heidegger	   can	  ultimately	   accept.	   Interestingly,	   Husserl	   concludes	   his	   introduction	   to	   Ideas	   I	   by	  acknowledging	  that	  “detailed	  critical	  comparisons	  with	  the	  philosophical	  tradition	   .	   .	   .	  are	  necessarily	  foregone	  if	  only	  on	  account	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  work.”310	  	   Much	   the	   same	   could	  be	   said	   about	  Being	  and	  Time.	   It,	   too,	   foregoes	   the	   “detailed	  critical	   comparisons	   with	   the	   philosophical	   tradition”—and,	   again,	   for	   reasons	   more	  accidental	   than	   essential:	   Heidegger	   needed	   to	   publish	   the	   torso	   of	   his	   great	  work	   if	   he	  were	  to	  have	  any	  hope	  of	  attaining	  the	  rank	  of	  Ordinarius.311	  He	  confessed	  to	  Jaspers	  that	  it	  was	  an	  “intermediate	  piece.”312	  At	  least	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  that	  it	  was	  essential	  for	   the	   historical	   part	   of	  Being	  and	  Time	   (which	   never	   appeared)	   to	   go	  well	   beyond	   the	  “critical	   comparisons”	   mentioned	   by	   Husserl.	   As	   we	   will	   see	   in	   the	   next	   chapter,	   the	  positive	  philosophical	  task	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  was	  intended	  to	  be	  absorbed	  entirely	  into	  a	  research	   program	   in	   the	   history	   of	   philosophy.	   Without	   such	   a	   research	   program,	   the	  method	  of	  formal	  indication	  he	  had	  developed	  in	  the	  1920s	  would	  indeed	  be	  consigned	  to	  arbitrariness,	   for	   the	   reference	   to	   life	   required—as	   he	   had	   realized	   even	   in	   his	   earliest	  lectures—historical	  research	  if	  it	  were	  to	  be	  rendered	  concrete.	  
                                                308	  Husserl	  (1913),	  7-­‐8	  (Int).	  309	  And	  Husserl	  does	  mean	  something	  strong	  by	  “determined”	  here.	  He	  says,	  “In	  the	  course	  of	  the	  reflections	  elaborating	   on	   them,	   each	   of	   the	   terminological	   expressions	   mentioned	   above”—he	   has	   in	   mind	   the	  expressions	  for	  the	  philosophical	  concepts	  idea	  and	  essence—“should	  acquire	  its	  fixed	  sense	  through	  specific	  expositions	  that	  are	  evident	  in	  themselves”	  (Husserl	  [1913],	  8	  [Int]).	  This	  is	  certainly	  going	  well	  beyond	  what	  Heidegger	  would	  be	  comfortable	  with.	  310	  Husserl	  (1913),	  8	  (Int).	  311	  The	  Marburg	  faculty	  wanted	  Heidegger	  to	  effectively	  replace	  Hartmann,	  who	  left	  for	  Cologne	  in	  1925.	  The	  ministry	   of	   culture	   returned	   Heidegger’s	   proofs	   to	   him,	   refusing	   to	   promote	   him	   until	   the	   work	   actually	  appeared	   in	   print,	  which	   it	   finally	   did	   in	   1927	   as	   an	   offprint	   of	   the	   journal	   edited	   by	  Husserl	   and	   Scheler	  (Safranski	  [1994],	  143).	  312	  Safranski	  (1994),	  144.	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Philosophy	  and	  Its	  History	  From	   the	   start,	   Heidegger	   had	   conceived	   his	   WS	   1921-­‐1922	   Introduction	   course	   as	   a	  preliminary	  engagement	  with	  Aristotle	  which	  could	  be	  deepened	   the	   following	  semester.	  Yet	  at	  a	  certain	  point	  Heidegger	  seems	  to	  have	  realized	  that	  the	  “introductory”	  matter	  had	  taken	  on	  a	  life	  of	  its	  own.313	  	  Well	  past	  the	  midway	  point	  of	  the	  semester,	  Heidegger—up	  to	  this	  point	  having	  cited	  only	  Plato	  among	   the	  Greeks314—suddenly	  sees	   fit	   to	  reassure	  his	  students315	  that	  this	  is,	  in	  fact,	  a	  class	  on	  Aristotle.316	  He	  does	  so	  not	  by	  tracing	  a	  connection	  between	  his	  methodological	  considerations	  and	  the	  main	  body	  of	  Aristotle’s	  work,	  but	  by	  explaining	  to	  his	  students	  that	  it	  is	  artificial	  to	  separate	  the	  “introductory”	  and	  “historical”	  aspects	  of	  phenomenological	  research	  anyway.	  It	  is	  not	  at	  all	  as	  if	  the	  present	  “introductory”	  matter	  were	  the	  proper,	  main	  issue	  [Hauptsache]	  and	  the	  interpretation	  of	  Aristotle	  an	  optional	  application,	  chosen	  according	  to	  taste	  and	  accidental	  expertise;	  or	  as	   if	   the	   introduction	  were	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   genuine	   issues	   and	   systematic	   problems	   [der	  
eigentlichen	   sachlich-­‐systematischen	   Probleme]	   and	   the	   rest	   a	   historical	  
                                                313	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  course,	  at	  least,	  it	  appears	  that	  both	  Heidegger	  and	  his	  students	  were	  expecting	  to	  grapple	   with	   the	   details	   of	   the	   Aristotelian	   corpus.	   Heidegger	   offers	   a	   brief	   historical	   overview	   of	   the	  reception	  of	  Aristotle	   in	   the	  middle	   ages	   and	  modernity	   and	   recommends	   the	   editions	   of	  Aristotle	   and	  his	  Greek	  commentators	  recently	  completed	  by	  the	  Berlin	  Academy	  of	  Sciences	  (PIA	  61:8).	  For	  those	  who	  were	  not	   enrolled	   in	   Heidegger’s	   SS	   1922	   course	   on	   Aristotle,	   we	   can	   only	   hope	   they	   found	   a	  way	   to	   put	   their	  Academy	  editions	  of	  Aristotle	  to	  good	  use.	  314	  In	  fact	  he	  will	  not	  actually	  cite	  a	  passage	  from	  Aristotle	  the	  entire	  semester.	  315	  In	   1921	   he	   confessed	   to	   Löwith	   that	   his	   “single	   task”—that	   of	   “critically	   destructuring	   the	   traditional	  complexity	   of	   western	   philosophy	   and	   theology”—was	   “completely	   unsuited	   to	   the	   classroom	   and	   to	  progress”	  (quoted	  in	  Bambach	  [1993],	  130n28).	  316	  Fresh	   in	   Heidegger’s	   mind	   was	   an	   incident	   from	   the	   year	   before	   in	   which	   several	   students	   in	   his	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Phenomenology	  of	  Religion	  course	  had	  complained	  to	  the	  dean	  of	  the	  faculty	  about	  its	  lack	  of	   religious	  content;	  apparently	  Heidegger	  had	  gone	  on	  about	   “introductory”	  matters	   long	  enough	   for	   their	  taste.	  Under	  pressure	  from	  the	  dean	  to	  get	  to	  the	  point	  already,	  Heidegger	  could	  hardly	  resist	  firing	  a	  parting	  shot	   before	   turning	   to	   Paul’s	   Letter	   to	   the	   Galatians.	   It	   deserves	   to	   be	   quoted	   in	   full:	   “Philosophy,	   as	   I	  understand	   it,	   is	   in	  a	  bind.	   In	  other	   lecture	  courses	   the	   listener	   is	  given	  an	  assurance	  at	   the	  beginning:	   in	  a	  lecture	  on	  art	  history	  he	  can	   look	  at	  pictures;	   in	  other	  courses	  he	  gets	  his	  money’s	  worth	   for	  his	  exams.	   In	  philosophy	  things	  are	  otherwise,	  and	  I	  can’t	  change	  that	  since	  I	  didn’t	   invent	   it.	  But	  even	  so	  I	  would	   like	  to	  rescue	  myself	  from	  this	  calamity,	  break	  off	  these	  highly	  abstract	  considerations,	  and	  lecture	  to	  you,	  starting	  with	   the	   next	   hour,	   about	   history.	   Indeed,	   I	   will	   do	   so	   without	   any	   further	   considerations	   regarding	  beginnings	  and	  methods.	  I	  will	  take	  as	  my	  point	  of	  departure	  a	  particular	  concrete	  phenomenon—mind	  you,	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  you	  will	  misunderstand	  the	  entire	  procedure	  from	  beginning	  to	  end”	  (IPR	  60:65).	  For	  the	  story,	  see	  Kisiel	  (1993),	  171-­‐172.	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illustration;	  or	  as	  if	  the	  introduction	  concerned	  us	  directly	  and	  the	  historical	  consideration	  were	  a	  matter	  of	  mere	  scholarly	  interest;	  or	  as	  if	  we	  all	  had	  a	  personal	   stake	   in	   the	   introductory	   matters	   whereas,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   the	  interpretation	  of	  Aristotle	  were	  nonbinding,	  something	  standing	  isolated,	  on	  its	  own,	  next	  to	  the	  systematic	  questions	  of	  the	  introduction,	  but	  without	  the	  urgency	  that	  might	  perhaps	  attach	  to	  the	  latter.	  (PIA	  61:110)	  	  In	   fact,	   this	   was	   just	   a	   reminder	   of	   the	   position	   Heidegger	   had	   staked	   out	   at	   the	   very	  beginning	  of	  the	  class:	  For	   any	   epoch,	   the	   history	   of	   philosophy	   comes	   into	   view	   as	   clearly,	   is	  understood	   as	   deeply,	   is	   appropriated	   as	   strongly,	   and	   on	   that	   basis	   is	  critiqued	  as	  decisively,	  as	  philosophy,	  for	  which	  and	  in	  which	  history	  is	  there	  and	  in	  which	  anyone	  is	  related	  to	  history	  in	  a	  living	  way,	  is	  philosophy,	  and	  that	   means	   (1)	   maintaining	   a	   questioning,	   and	   specifically	   a	   fundamental	  questioning,	  and	  (2)	  seeking	  concretely	  after	  answers:	  research.	  (PIA	  61:3)	  	  In	  brief,	   if	  Aristotle	   (or	  anyone	  else,	   for	   that	  matter)	   is	   to	  be	  understood	  philosophically,	  that	  means	  that	  we	  must	  be	  able	  to	  interpret	  the	  basic	  concepts	  of	  his	  thought	  within	  the	  formal-­‐indicative	   context	   of	   philosophical	   concept-­‐formation	   in	   general.	   This	  means	   that	  Aristotle’s	  concepts	  are	  philosophically	  significant	  just	  insofar	  as	  they	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  their	  concrete	  provenance	  in	  lived	  experience.	  In	  brief,	  Heidegger	  is	  after	  what	  is	   living	   in	  Aristotle’s	  thought—not,	  however,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  what	  we	  today	  may	  still	  find	  acceptable,	  but	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  way	  Aristotle’s	  concepts	  express	  something	  recognizable	  from	  out	  of	  life	  itself.	  	   As	  we	  have	  seen,	  however,	  the	  reference	  to	  “life	  itself”	  here,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  mean	  anything,	  cannot	  be	  captured	  by	  any	  particular	  content—certainly	  not	  by	  cordoning	  off	  a	   region	  of	  phenomena	   and	   labeling	   it	   “life”—but	   must	   rather	   be	   allowed	   to	   indicate	   a	   mode	   of	  directedness	   towards	   any	   content	   whatsoever.	   Indeed,	   our	   access	   to	   the	   phenomena	   of	  lived	  experience,	  presupposed	  by	  any	  phenomenological	  interpretation	  of	  Aristotle,	   is	  not	  immediate,	  for	  the	  basic	  method	  of	  phenomenology	  consists	  in	  holding	  at	  bay,	  as	  vigorously	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as	  possible,	  the	  tendency	  to	  overlay	  concepts	  onto	  the	  phenomena	  of	  life.	  What	  Heidegger	  now	  wants	  to	  insist	  upon,	  however,	  is	  that	  insofar	  as	  we	  can	  comport	  ourselves	  at	  all	  to	  life	  itself,	  we	  do	  so	   in	  a	  way	   that	   turns	  out	   to	  be	  conditioned	  by	   the	  way	   life	  has	  historically	  been	   interpreted,	   and	   that	  means—most	   fundamentally—as	   it	   has	   been	   taken	   up	   by	   the	  philosophical	   tradition.	   Concretely,	  when	  we	  work	   back	   from	   life	   itself,	  we	   find	   that	   the	  conceptual	  scaffolding	  that	  attached	  to	  it	  bears	  the	  precise	  yet	  intricate	  stamp	  of	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy.	  The	  conclusion	  is	  one	  that	  Natorp	  could	  certainly	  appreciate	  (and	  one	  that,	  given	  his	  praise	   for	   the	  Aristotle	  manuscript,	   he	   likely	  did):	   neither	   an	   investigation	   into	  lived	   experience	   nor	   an	   investigation	   into	   the	   history	   of	   philosophy	   is	   possible	   in	  abstraction	  from	  the	  other.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy,	  when	  uninformed	  by	  research	  into	  lived	  experience,	  is	  empty	  of	  genuinely	  philosophical	  content,	  while	  the	  latter	  sort	  of	  research,	  when	  pursued	  with	  historical	  naïveté,	  results	  in	  an	  ersatz	  phenomenology	  which	   uncritically	   reproduces	   the	   categories	   of	   the	   history	   of	   philosophy	   in	   its	   stubborn	  attempt	  to	  directly	  confront	  life	  itself.	  	   Indeed,	  Heidegger’s	  departure	   from	  Natorp	   is	  subtler	  still	   than	  his	  departure	   from	  Husserl.	  What	  is	  decisive	  is	  only	  that	  Heidegger’s	  phenomenology	  is	  construed	  through	  and	  through	   as	   a	   species	   of	   living—life’s	   “growing	   intensification	   of	   itself,”	   to	   which	   he	   had	  alluded	   in	   the	   KNS	   class317—not	   a	   cognition,	   philosophical	   or	   otherwise,	   that	   would	   be	  opposed	   to	   the	   former	   (and	   which	   would	   approach	   life	   only	   asymptotically).	   Whereas	  Husserl	   had	   always	   given	   the	   Umkehrung	   characteristic	   of	   phenomenology	   (that	   is,	   the	  reversal	  of	   the	  direction	  of	  regard	  that	   follows	  from	  our	  transposition	  of	  ourselves	  out	  of	  the	  natural	  and	  into	  the	  phenomenological	  attitude)	  an	  interpretation	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  a	  
                                                317	  See	  p.	  183	  above.	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higher	  order	  of	   thinking,	  Heidegger	   regards	   it	   as	   continuous	  with	   life	   itself.	   “Where	  does	  the	  phenomenological	  begin?”	  Heidegger	  asks	  in	  WS	  1920-­‐1921.	  Does	  the	  turn	  away	  from	  what	   is	   objectively	   historical	   to	   what	   is	   historical	   in	   its	   enactment	   yank	   the	  phenomenologist	   out	   of	   history	   or,	   conversely,	   insert	   her	   into	   history	   for	   the	   first	   time?	  “This	  objection	  is	  legitimate,”	  Heidegger	  concedes,	  “but	  it	  maintains	  as	  its	  background	  the	  conviction	   that	   the	  philosophical	   has	   a	   special	   dimension.	  That	   is	   the	  misunderstanding”	  (IPR	  60:90).	  	   At	   any	   rate,	   Heidegger	   presents	   his	  would-­‐be	   scholars	   of	   Aristotle	  with	   a	   notably	  stark	  conclusion.	  Although	  the	  “introductory”	  considerations	  have	  dominated	  the	  course	  up	  to	   this	  point	  and	  may	  well	  appear,	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  pursued	   first,	   as	   though	   they	  could	  stand	   on	   their	   own,	   in	   fact	   they	   have	   no	   significance	   whatsoever	   apart	   from	   the	  phenomenological	  research	  they	  have	  served	  to	  “introduce”:	  Accordingly,	  this	  introduction,	  if	  taken	  and	  used	  on	  its	  own	  (which	  would	  run	  counter	   to	   its	   proclaimed	   sense),	   is	   not	   just	   one	   half	   of	   a	   treatise	   standing	  alongside,	   as	   its	   other	   half,	   the	   concrete	   interpretation	   of	   Aristotle,	   but	   is	  nothing	  at	  all	  without	  the	   latter,	  at	  most	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	  philosophy.	  (PIA	  61:112)318	  	  As	   we	   will	   see	   in	   the	   next	   chapter,	   the	   introduction	   to	   Being	   and	   Time	   is	   basically	   a	  repetition	  of	  this	  fundamental	  phenomenological	  point.	  	   Reflecting,	  in	  1925,	  on	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  phenomenological	  movement	  (of	  which	  he	  still	   considered	   himself	   a	   part),	   Heidegger	   laid	   out,	   albeit	   programmatically,	   the	   task	   of	  integrating	   phenomenology	   with	   Dilthey’s	   insights	   into	   the	   historical	   character	   of	  
                                                318	  This	  claim	  just	  complements	  the	  one	  at	  IPR	  60:65	  (see	  n.	  316	  above).	  Taken	  together,	  it	  is	  clear:	  neither	  an	  introduction	   to	  philosophy	   (and	  philosophy	   is	  always	   introduction)	  nor	   the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  have	  any	  chance	  at	  being	  understood	  when	  abstracted	  from	  one	  another.	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existence.	  Phenomenology	  was	  at	  first	  defined	  by	  its	  simple,	  even	  self-­‐evident	  principle:	  To	  
the	  things	  themselves!	  By	  means	  of	  this	  principle	  phenomenology	  wanted	  not	   so	  much	   to	  position	   itself	  outside	  history	  as	   to	  remain	  unaffected	  by	  it.	  But	  this	  is	  impossible,	  for	  every	  discovery	  stands	  in	  a	  historical	   continuity	   and	   is	   co-­‐determined	   by	   history.	   Alive	   in	  phenomenology	   itself	   are	   historical	   motives	   that	   partially	   condition	   its	  traditional	   ways	   of	   raising	   questions	   and	   its	   approaches,	   concealing	   the	  proper	   access	   to	   the	   matters	   themselves	   [zu	   den	   Sachen].	   Phenomenology	  must	  first	  gradually	  ease	  its	  way	  into	  the	  possibility	  of	  extricating	  itself	  from	  the	   tradition	   in	   order	   to	   make	   past	   philosophy	   free	   for	   itself	   and	   for	   a	  genuine	  appropriation.	  (WDR	  159-­‐160;	  cf.	  WDR	  176)	  	  We	   must	   be	   careful	   here,	   however.	   It	   might	   be	   assumed	   that	   for	   phenomenology	   to	  gradually	   extricate	   itself	   from	   its	   own	   tradition	   would	   imply	   its	   final	   ascent	   to	   a	   space	  which	   is	  beyond	   the	  reach	  of	  historical	   conditions	  generally.	  Nothing,	  of	   course,	   could	  be	  further	   from	   Dilthey’s	   intentions.	   Heidegger’s	   complaint	   against	   traditional	  phenomenology	  is	  by	  no	  means	  merely	  a	  call	  for	  it	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  its	  own	  posing	  of	  questions	  bears	  the	  stamp	  of	  the	  philosophical	  tradition	  (although	  it	  is	  that,	  too).	  Instead,	   Heidegger’s	   ultimate	   goal—which	   he	   identifies	   with	   the	   general	   goal	   of	  phenomenology—is	   to	   make	   possible	   a	   “genuine	   appropriation”	   of	   the	   history	   of	  philosophy.	   This	   is	   the	   goal	   to	   which	   the	   slogan	   To	   the	   things	   themselves!	   was	   in	   fact	  pointing	  all	  along.	  	   It	  is	  not	  without	  a	  tinge	  of	  irony	  that	  the	  most	  vociferous	  critic	  of	  philosophers	  who	  philosophize	  from	  their	  colleagues’	  books	  would	  end	  up	  affirming	  that	  the	  positive	  content	  of	   the	   things	   themselves	   is,	   after	   all,	   present	   only	   in	   the	   great	   ideas	   of	   the	   Western	  philosophical	   tradition.	   To	   be	   sure,	   it	   was	   not	   as	   if	   Heidegger	   found	   himself	   reduced	   to	  mining	  Spranger’s	  work	  on	  adolescent	  psychology319	  for	  ersatz	  philosophical	  insight,	  and	  of	  
                                                319	  See	  n.	  218	  above.	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  Scheler,	  at	   least,	  was	  immediately	  convinced	  that	  in	  Being	  and	  Time	  Heidegger	  had	  finally	  said	  what	  Lebensphilosophie	   had	   been	   trying	   for	   so	   long	   to	   say.	  Writing	   in	   September	   of	  1927,	  Scheler,	  who	  is	  generally	  critical	  of	  the	  residual	  existential	  solipsism	  he	  diagnoses	  in	  Heidegger’s	   approach,	   nevertheless	   begins	   his	   appraisal	   of	   the	   book	   with	   a	   stark	  acknowledgement:	  “In	  his	  unusual	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  book,	  Being	  and	  Time,	  vol.	  I,	  Heidegger	  is	  the	  first	  person	  to	  get	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  matter.”320	  Now,	  whatever	  his	  own	  estimation	  of	  his	   book’s	   merits,	   Heidegger	   himself	   would	   never	   have	   dreamed	   of	   claiming	   such	   an	  accomplishment.	  And	   this	   is	  not	  because	  he	  would	  have	  wished	   to	   remain	  modest	   in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   book’s	   success;	   Heidegger	   was	   hardly	   possessed	   of	   any	   notable	   personal	  humility.	  It	  is	  simply	  because	  Being	  and	  Time	  never	  gets	  to	  the	  point.	  The	  explicit	  goal	  of	  the	  treatise,	   Heidegger	   tells	   us	   on	   the	   very	   first	   page,	   is	   “the	   concrete	   working-­‐out	   of	   the	  question	  of	   the	  meaning	  of	   ‘being’”	   (BT	  1).	  Not	  only	  does	   the	  published	  portion	  of	  Being	  
and	  Time	   break	   off	  well	   before	   this,	   but	   even	   the	   “provisional	   aim”	   of	   the	   treatise—“the	  interpretation	  of	   time	   as	   the	  possible	  horizon	   for	  any	  understanding	  of	  being	  at	   all”	   (BT	  1)—is	  not	  accomplished	  by	  the	  book’s	  end.	  So	  Being	  and	  Time	  actually	  treats	  neither	  being	  nor	   time	   in	   the	   manner	   which	   was	   supposed	   to	   justify	   the	   title	   of	   the	   treatise.	  
                                                320	  Scheler	  (1927),	  134.	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Predictably,321	  Heidegger	  finds	  himself	  bogged	  down	  by	  preliminary	  considerations	  which	  quickly	  assume	  unanticipated	  proportions.	  Of	   course,	   Scheler	   did	   not	   mean	   to	   commend	   Heidegger	   for	   having	   raised,	   once	  again,	  the	  most	  traditional	  of	  all	  philosophical	  questions;	  he	  wished	  to	  say	  that	  Heidegger	  had,	  despite	  his	  missteps,	  raised	  the	  question	  of	  human	  existence	  with	  acute	  urgency	  and	  philosophical	  acumen.	  Even	  if	  we	  grant	  Scheler	  his	  praise,	  however,	  one	  could	  be	  forgiven	  for	  wondering	  what	  any	  of	  this	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  tasks	  Heidegger	  apparently	  sets	  out	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  treatise.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  do	  focus	  our	  attention	  on	  Heidegger’s	  analysis	  of	  concrete	  human	  existence—much	  of	  which	  he	  had	  worked	  out,	  here	  and	  there,	  across	   his	   lecture	   courses	   of	   the	   1920s—we	   find	   it	   weighed	   down	   by	   a	   dauntingly	  elaborate	   and	   opaque	   theoretical	   edifice.	   At	   any	   rate,	   whether	   one’s	   interest	   is	   the	  experience	  of	  being	  human	  or	  Greek	  metaphysics,	   it	   is	  hard	  to	  see	  in	  either	  case	  just	  how	  
Being	   and	   Time	   is	   supposed	   to	   make	   any	   positive	   progress	   over	   the	   course	   of	   its	   four	  hundred	  pages.	  If	  Heidegger’s	  book	  appeared	   to	  be	  neither	   fish	  nor	   fowl	   for	   life	  philosophers	  and	  historians	  alike,	  there	  was	  at	  least	  a	  good	  explanation	  for	  this.	  To	  crudely	  borrow	  a	  Kantian	  idiom:	  appeals	  to	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  human	  beings	  that	  are	  not	  grounded	  in	  traditional	  philosophical	   concepts	   are	   blind,	  while	   discussion	   of	   the	   philosophical	   tradition	   that	   has	  become	   unmoored	   from	   its	   reference	   to	   lived	   human	   life	   is	   altogether	   empty.	   We	   have	  already	   seen	   why	   this	   should	   be	   so:	   the	   phenomenological	   demand	   to	   begin	   from	   the	  concrete,	  prior	  to	  all	  theoretical	  construction,	  is,	  by	  Heidegger’s	  lights,	  an	  entirely	  valid	  one,	  but	  the	  concrete	  domain	  of	  phenomena	  can	  by	  no	  means	  be	  accessed	  with	  transparency	  at	  
                                                321	  See	  p.	  202	  above.	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one	  fell	  swoop,	  for	  the	  historically	  conditioned	  interpretations	  (which	  we	  often	  fail	  to	  even	  recognize	  as	  such)	  which	  impose	  themselves	  on	  the	  phenomena	  can	  be	  held	  at	  bay	  only	  by	  means	  of	   a	   sustained	  effort	   to	   treat	   the	  phenomenological	   field	   according	   to	   its	  properly	  
formal	   aspects.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   “things	   themselves”	   of	   phenomenology	   must	   be	  indicated,	  but	  they	  must	  only	  be	  indicated,	  so	  that	  in	  our	  analysis	  we	  follow	  the	  indication	  itself,	  rather	  than	  any	  material	  content	  we	  might	  happen	  to	  indicate	  along	  the	  way.	  On	  the	  other	   hand,	   the	   historical	   theories	   that	   condition	   our	   understanding	   of	   lived	   experience,	  and	  against	  which	  the	  demand	  for	  formalization	  in	  phenomenology	  is	  supposed	  to	  guard,	  have	  their	  own	  significance	  only	  in	  the	  phenomena	  to	  which	  they	  are	  discursive	  responses.	  Thus	  their	  mode	  of	  conditioning	  the	  phenomena	  of	  lived	  experience	  cannot	  be	  understood	  or	  disarmed	  independently	  of	  going	  back	  to	  this	  very	  experience.	  Clearly,	  the	  challenge,	  for	  Heidegger,	  is	  to	  articulate	  a	  philosophical	  methodology	  that	  will	  lay	  out	  in	  detail	  how	  both	  sides	   of	   philosophy,	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   lived	   experience	   of	   being	   human	   and	   the	  reclamation	  of	  the	  phenomenal	  basis	  of	  all	  theory	  that	  conditions	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  former,	  are	  to	  be	  pursued	  simultaneously.	  The	  primary	  task	  of	  the	  introductory	  sections	  of	  
Being	  and	  Time	  is	  to	  show,	  at	  least	  in	  outline,	  how	  such	  a	  thing	  can	  be	  possible.	  Now,	   the	   Heidegger	   of	   Being	   and	   Time	   would	   accept	   hardly	   any	   of	   the	  characterizations	   of	   his	   project	   I	   have	   offered	   in	   the	   preceding	  paragraphs.	   In	   large	   part	  this	   is	   because	   by	   1927	   Heidegger	   has	   basically	   eliminated	   appeals	   to	   “life”	   or	   “lived	  experience”	  from	  his	  philosophy.	  In	  place	  of	  such	  appeals	  stands	  a	  series	  of	  emphatic	  and	  unrelenting	   appeals	   to	   existence. 322 	  Such	   a	   shift	   in	   terminology	   is	   not	   without	   its	  
                                                322	  Heidegger	  is	  still	  willing	  to	  cite	  the	  life	  philosophers	  sympathetically.	  See	  esp.	  the	  discussion	  of	  Dilthey	  and	  Yorck	   in	  §77.	  Heidegger	   closes	   the	   section	  by	   saying,	   “Thus	   it	  becomes	  plain	   in	  what	   sense	   the	  existential-­‐temporal	  analytic	  of	  Dasein	  is	  resolved	  to	  foster	  the	  spirit	  of	  Count	  Yorck	  in	  the	  service	  of	  Dilthey’s	  work”	  (BT	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importance,	   and	   below	   I	   will	   emphasize	   the	   increase	   in	   formal-­‐indicative	   power	   that	  Heidegger	   took	  his	   new	   terms—foremost	   among	   them	   “Dasein”	   and	   “Existenz”—to	  make	  available	   to	  him.	  At	   the	  same	   time,	   the	  significance	  of	   the	  shift	   should	  not	  be	  overblown.	  Theodore	  Kisiel	   has	   argued	   in	  detail	   that	  Heidegger’s	  breakthrough	   to	   the	   topic	  of	  Being	  
and	   Time	   was	   already	   accomplished	   in	   KNS	   1919,323 	  and	   although	   the	   methodology	  suggested	   there	   would	   require	   elaboration	   and	   clarification	   throughout	   the	   following	  decade,	  Kisiel’s	  claim	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  be	  basically	  correct.	  Heidegger	  would	  cycle	  through	  different	   formal-­‐indicative	   concepts324 	  to	   indicate	   the	   phenomenal	   basis	   to	   which	   all	  theory,	   in	   faithfulness	   to	  Husserl’s	  principle	  of	  principles,	   is	   to	  be	  ultimately	   responsible,	  but	  even	  in	  1927	  the	  underlying	  goal	  of	  the	  appeal	  to	  existence	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  that	  of	  his	  earlier	  appeal	   to	   life,	   and	   the	  basic	  methodology	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	   is	   in	  general	  very	  much	  continuous	  with	  that	  of	  his	  earlier	  work.	  As	  it	  would	  turn	  out,	  Heidegger’s	  appeal	  to	  existentialist	  terminology	  would	  prove	  even	  more	  fleeting	  than	  his	  appeal	  to	  the	  language	  of	  Lebensphilosophie	  (though	  the	  canonization	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  has	  tended	  to	  obscure	  this	  fact).	   At	   any	   rate,	   what	   is	   remarkable	   about	   Being	   and	   Time	   is	   not	   Heidegger’s	   sudden	  conversion	  to	  “existentialism,”	  whatever	  significance	  we	  wish	  to	  attach	  to	  that,	  but	  rather	  the	  subtlety	  with	  which	  he	  treats	  the	  methodological	  problems	  that	  had	  exercised	  him	  for	  the	  better	  part	  of	  a	  decade.	  
                                                                                                                                                       403-­‐404).	  Scheler	  (BT	  47-­‐48)	  and	  Simmel	  (BT	  249n)	  are	  referred	  to	  in	  a	  somewhat	  favorable	  light,	  although	  both	  are	  criticized	  for	  relying	  on	  an	  insufficiently	  critical	  conception	  of	  the	  human	  being	  in	  their	  research.	  323	  See	  esp.	  Kisiel	  (1993),	  21-­‐25.	  324	  Cf.	  Derrida’s	  “différance,”	  which	  he	  insists,	  quite	  correctly,	  in	  my	  view,	  can	  be	  neither	  a	  word	  nor	  a	  concept	  (Derrida	  [1968],	  7).	  Any	  word	  or	  concept	  which	  would	  succeed	  in	  pointing	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  it	  purports	  to	  indicate	  would,	  at	  that	  very	  moment,	  no	  longer	  point	  to	  it	  at	  all,	  but	  neither	  can	  it	  avoid	  pointing	  altogether.	  Thus	   Derrida	   speaks	   of	   a	   “chain	   in	   which	   différance	   lends	   itself	   to	   a	   certain	   number	   of	   nonsynonymous	  substitutions”	  (Derrida	  [1968],	  12).	  The	  same	  could	  be	  said,	  I	  think,	  in	  regard	  to	  Heidegger’s	  formal-­‐indicative	  concepts	  of	  the	  1920s:	  because	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  indicated	  is	  to	  resist	  its	  determinate	  indication,	  the	  criterion	  of	  success	  of	  a	  formally	  indicative	  term	  must	  immediately	  be	  the	  mark	  of	  its	  failure,	  as	  well.	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Being	  and	  Time	  and	  the	  Early	  Freiburg	  Years	  It	   would	   be	   foolish,	   of	   course,	   not	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   apparently	   dramatic	   differences	  between	  Being	  and	  Time	  and	  the	  lecture	  courses	  that	  preceded	  it.	  For	  those	  who	  take	  the	  blind	   alleys	   and	  Holzwege	   of	  Heidegger’s	   earliest	   and	   latest	   thought	   as	   exemplary,325	  the	  comparatively	   structured	   and	   scholastic	   Being	   and	   Time	   will	   always	   appear	   as	   a	   well-­‐meant,	   perhaps	   even	   brilliant,	   aberration.	   Many	   commentators	   regret	   the	   emergence	   in	  
Being	   and	   Time	   of	   a	   quasi-­‐technical	   conceptual	   matrix	   that	   tends	   to	   obscure	   the	  motivations	  teeming	  beneath	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  work.326	  To	  such	  judgment	  (and,	  to	  be	  clear,	  I	  do	  share	  some	  deep	  sympathies	  with	  it),	  the	  task	  of	  interpreting	  Being	  and	  Time	  is	  really	  the	  task	  of	  destroying	  it	  after	  the	  pattern	  of	  Heideggerian	  Destruktion:	  loosening	  up	  its	  own	  concepts	   so	   that	   the	   character	   of	   those	   concepts	   as	   primarily	   responses	   to	   phenomenal	  difficulties	   is	   rendered	   transparent.327	  To	   the	   extent	   that	   he	   appears	   to	   be	   laying	   static	  foundations	   for	  philosophy	  (and,	  by	  extension,	   for	   the	  regional	  sciences	   founded	   through	  it),	  Heidegger	  has	  relegated	  to	  his	  readers	  the	  more	  essential	  task	  of	  destroying	  those	  very	  foundations.	  	   Such	   complaints	   against	  Being	  and	  Time	   are	  not	  new;	   in	   fact,	   their	   genesis	   can	  be	  traced	  back	  even	  further	  than	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  book	  itself.	  Heidegger’s	  student	  Löwith	  had	   proofread	   its	   galleys	   in	   1926	   and	   made	   ample	   use	   of	   the	   manuscript	   in	   his	   own	  habilitation.328	  As	  Löwith	  saw	  it,	  Being	  and	  Time	  represented	  a	  perplexing	  (though	  perhaps	  
                                                325	  See,	  e.g.,	  van	  Buren	  (1994),	  5-­‐9.	  326	  Most	  significant	  among	  these	  critics	  are	  Kisiel	  and	  John	  van	  Buren.	  Both	  suggest	  the	  presence	  of	  essential	  continuities	   between	   Heidegger’s	   earliest	   work	   and	   what	   is	   characteristic	   of	   his	   later	   thought.	   See	   Kisiel	  (1993),	  458;	  van	  Buren	  (1994),	  365-­‐366.	  For	  both,	  it	  is	  dangerous	  to	  take	  Being	  and	  Time	  as	  paradigmatic	  of	  Heidegger’s	  thought,	  for	  the	  apparently	  static	  structure	  of	  the	  work	  stands	  in	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  the	  dynamic	  and	  self-­‐deconstructive	  work	  of	  his	  earlier	  and	  later	  periods.	  327	  See	  the	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  below,	  p.	  245.	  328	  See	  Kisiel	  and	  Sheehan’s	  editorial	  notes	  (Kisiel	  &	  Sheehan	  [2007],	  290).	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unintentional)	  abandonment	  of	  Heidegger’s	  Freiburg	  ambition	  of	  producing	  a	  philosophy	  which	  assumed	  the	  form	  of	  lived	  experience	  all	  the	  way	  down.	  In	  place	  of	  that,	  Heidegger’s	  own	   quasi-­‐transcendental	   analysis	   of	   the	   constitution	   of	   existence	   took	   on,	   if	   you	   will	  permit	  the	  expression,	  a	  life	  of	  its	  own—a	  life	  which	  was	  no	  longer	  identical,	  however,	  with	  the	  life	  which	  it	  purported	  to	  be	  the	  analysis	  of.	  To	  be	  clear,	  Löwith	  is	  not	  concerned	  that	  Heidegger	  has	  given	  up	  the	  language	  of	  Lebensphilosophie;	  he	  is	  perfectly	  comfortable	  with	  the	   shift	   to	   an	   existentialist	   register.	   But	   lost	   in	   the	   hurry	   to	   define	   the	   structures	   of	  existence	  is	  the	  lived	  experience	  (or	  whatever	  you	  want	  to	  call	  it)	  of	  existing	  itself.	  Löwith’s	  early	   objections	   to	   Heidegger	   (which	   he	   communicated	   to	   him	   in	   August	   of	   1927)	   are	  remarkable	  not	  just	  for	  their	  anticipation	  of	  so	  much	  twentieth-­‐century	  criticism;	  they	  bear	  a	  striking	  resemblance	  to	  Heidegger’s	  own	  criticisms	  of	  Natorp’s	  “panlogicism”329	  nearly	  a	  decade	  prior:	  The	  main	  objection	  that	  I	  have	  against	  the	  “principled”	  ontological	  analysis	  which	  is	  brought	  into	  play	  far	  too	  quickly	  (in	  accord	  with	  the	  claim	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  Dasein	  as	  such),	  is	  that	  the	  decisive	  ontic-­‐existentiell	  distinctions—the	  questions	  of	  accent—get	  lost	  in	  an	  “absolute	  indifference”	  (Hegel).	  But	  as	  crucial	  ontic-­‐existentiell	  distinctions,	  they	  are	  also	  crucial	  for	  the	  ontological	  formalization,	   an	   expression	   that	   you	   however	   will	   surely	   no	   longer	   grant	  and	  allow	  to	  be	  applied!330	  	  Here	   Löwith	   refers,	   of	   course,	   to	   the	   roots	   of	   Heidegger’s	   “fundamental	   ontology”	   in	  Husserl’s	  “formal	  ontology,”	  suggesting,	  however,	  that	  Heidegger	  himself	  would	  no	  longer	  accept	  his	  Husserlian	  heritage	  as	  governing	  his	  analysis	  in	  Being	  and	  Time.	  To	  understand	  his	   claim	   that	   “the	   decisive	   ontic-­‐existentiell	   distinctions”	   get	   lost	   in	   Heidegger’s	   work,	  however,	  a	  brief	  terminological	  digression	  is	  first	  necessary.	  
                                                329	  See	  p.	  181	  above.	  330	  Löwith	  (1927),	  293.	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In	   Being	   and	   Time	   Heidegger	   contrasts	   the	   “ontic”	   with	   the	   “ontological,”	   a	  distinction	  that	  maps	  roughly	  and	  imperfectly	  onto	  the	  traditional	  philosophical	  distinction	  between	   the	  a	  posteriori	   and	   the	  a	  priori.	  We	  say	   that	  a	  cognition	  of	   something,	  or,	  more	  generally,	  a	  comportment	  to	  it,	  is	  ontic	  if	  it	  refers	  to	  (particular)	  beings,	  while	  a	  cognition	  or	  comportment	   is	   ontological	   if	   it	   is	   a	   cognition	   or	   comportment	   which	   is	   already	  presupposed	   in	  any	  ontic	  cognition	  or	  comportment	  whatsoever.	   It	   is	  called	  “ontological”	  because	   it	   refers	   to	   the	   constitution	   of	   a	   being	   that	   is	   necessary	   for	   any	   comportment	  towards	  it	  as	  the	  particular	  being	  that	  it	   is.	  It	  provides	  the	  logic	  of	  its	  being,	   if	  you	  will;	   it	  sketches	  the	  outline	  of	  that	  which	  enables	  it	  to	  even	  be	  a	  being	  for	  us	  in	  the	  first	  place.331	  Nevertheless,	   the	   ontic-­‐ontological	   distinction	   maps	   imperfectly	   onto	   the	   a	   posteriori-­‐a	  
priori	  distinction,	  and	  this	  for	  several	  reasons.	  First,	  while	  the	  latter	  distinction	  is	  primarily	  epistemological,	   the	   former	   is	   not	   limited	   in	   advance	   to	   our	   cognitive	   comportment	   to	  beings.332	  If,	   for	  example	  (as	  Heidegger	  argues	   is	  actually	   the	  case),	   the	  cognitive	  mode	  of	  comportment	   to	  beings	   is	  derivative	  of	  a	  more	  practical	   form	  of	  existential	  comportment	  (what	  we	  might	  call	  “understanding,”	  in	  Heidegger’s	  sense	  of	  “knowing	  one’s	  way	  around”	  
                                                331	  A	  rough	  comparison	  with	  Kant	  could	  be	  drawn	  as	  follows.	  The	  “logic”	  of	  the	  being	  of	  beings,	  for	  Heidegger,	  would	  include	  both	  varieties	  of	  subjective	  conditions	  for	  the	  appearance	  of	  beings	  distinguished	  by	  Kant,	  the	  sensible	  and	  the	  intellectual.	  For	  Kant,	   the	  validity	  of	  the	  “logic”	  of	  beings	  extends	  beyond	  the	  conditions	  of	  appearance	  to	  those	  beings	  as	  they	  are	  in	  themselves,	  i.e.,	  as	  they	  are	  even	  beyond	  the	  boundaries	  of	  human	  sensibility.	   Heidegger,	   who	   is	   committed	   to	   rejecting	   this	   interpretation	   of	   logic	   (see	   n.	   286	   above;	   logic,	  Heidegger	   holds,	   is	   essentially	   semantic,	   or	   intentional:	   though	   the	   Greeks	   grasped	   this	   in	   a	   sense,	   their	  ontology,	   dominated	   as	   it	   was	   by	   presence,	   was	   inadequate	   to	   this	   insight	   [see	   BT	   165]),	   will	   naturally	  understand	   the	   latter	   to	   be	   the	   generic	   category	   of	   comportment	   to	   beings.	   For	   Heidegger,	   logic	   can	   be	  associated	   with	   reason	   only	   because	   the	   more	   basic	   signification	   of	   logos	   consists	   in	   “merely	   letting	  something	  be	  seen”	  (BT	  34).	  332	  Obviously	   the	   question	   of	   the	   provenance(s)	   of	   the	   family	   of	   modal	   distinctions	   (not	   just	   a	   priori-­‐a	  
posteriori,	   but	   necessary-­‐contingent	   and	   analytic-­‐synthetic,	   as	   well)	   is	   still	   very	   much	   a	   live	   issue	   in	  contemporary	  Anglophone	  philosophy.	  But	  I	  take	  it	  that	  the	  a	  priori-­‐a	  posteriori	  distinction	  is	  at	  least	  prima	  
facie	  an	  epistemological	  one.	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in	  the	  midst	  of	  beings),333	  the	  ontic-­‐ontological	  distinction	  will	  also	  ultimately	  derive	  from,	  and	   in	   the	   first	   instance	   be	   applicable	   to,	   this	   broader	  mode	   of	   comportment.	   Thus	   the	  ontological	   comportment	   in	   virtue	   of	   which	   ontic	   comportment	   is	   possible	   may	   not	   be	  cognitive	  in	  nature;	  at	  least,	  nothing	  inherent	  in	  the	  ontic-­‐ontological	  distinction	  rules	  this	  out.	  Second,	  unlike	  (Kantian,	  at	   least)	  a	  priori	  cognition,	  there	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  nothing	  “subjective”	  about	  ontological	  cognition.	  It	  is,	  of	  course,	  not	  ontic	  (about	  beings),	  so	  there	  is	  one	   important	   sense,	  at	   least,	   in	  which	   it	   is	  not	   “objective,”	  but	  what	  Heidegger	  wants	   to	  keep	  open	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  reconceiving	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  subject-­‐object	  relation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  form	  of	  ontological	  cognition—a	  possibility	  which	  is	  obviously	  foreclosed	  if	  the	  former	  is	  already	  conceived	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  latter.	  The	   existentiell-­‐existential	   (existenziell-­‐existenzial)	   distinction,	   in	   turn,	   maps	  imperfectly	   onto	   the	   ontic-­‐ontological	   distinction.	   I’ll	   have	   a	   lot	   more	   to	   say	   about	  “existence”	  more	  generally	  in	  a	  bit,	  but	  for	  now	  suffice	  it	  to	  say	  that	  existentiell	  possibilities	  (for	  action)	  are	  those	  which	  are	  directed	  to	  some	  particular	  possibility	  (say,	  hopping	  on	  the	  Greyhound	   bus	   headed	   to	   Toledo).	   Heidegger	   reserves	   the	   term	   “existential”	   for	   a	   use	  something	   like	   that	   of	   “ontological”:	   the	   “existential”	   refers	   to	   the	   structure	   in	   terms	   of	  which	  existentiell	  possibilities	  can	  even	  appear	  as	  possibilities	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Existential	  structures	  are	  structural	  in	  a	  way	  analogous	  to	  that	  of	  the	  Kantian	  categories,	  which	  is,	  of	  course,	  no	  accident,	  since	  “existentials”	  are	  related	  to	  existence	  (Dasein)	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	   Kant’s	   categories	   are	   related	   to	   the	   subject.334	  As	   Heidegger	   says,	   “The	   question	   of	  
                                                333	  In	  brief,	  to	  understand	  something	  is	  to	  be	  able	  to	  freely	  grab	  a	  hold	  of	  appropriate	  possibilities	  for	  acting	  within	  a	  particular	  situation,	  possibilities	  which	  only	  arise	  as	  possibilities	  for	  us	  in	  the	  context	  of	  projects	  in	  which	  we	  find	  ourselves	  already	  involved.	  See	  BT	  142-­‐148.	  334	  As	  early	  as	  SS	  1923	  Heidegger	  contrasts	  categories	  and	  existentials	  (see	  O	  63:31	  and,	   in	  this	  connection,	  Kisiel	  [1993],	  275),	  and	  by	  Being	  and	  Time	  he	  assigns	  existentials	  a	  special	  methodological	  role.	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[structure]	   aims	   at	   the	   explication	   of	   what	   constitutes	   existence	   [Existenz].	   We	   call	   the	  coherence	  of	  these	  structures	  existentiality”	  (BT	  12).	  Let’s	  return,	  now,	  to	  Löwith’s	  complaint.	  “The	  decisive	  ontic-­‐existentiell	  distinctions	  .	   .	   .	   get	   lost	   in	   an	   ‘absolute	   indifference’	   (Hegel).”	  The	   reference	   to	  Hegel	   here	   is	   actually	  helpful: Hegel	   speaks	  of	  how	   the	  negation	  of	  all	  determinacy	  gives	   rise	   to	  an	  absolutized	  indifference	  that	  forms	  a	  substrate	  for	  external	  determination.335	  That	  is,	  in	  trying	  to	  hold	  together	  our	  manifold	  determinate	  cognitions	  of	  a	  (single)	  object,	  we	  are	  inevitably	  driven	  to	   posit	   an	   indifferent	   substratum	   as	   their	   ground,	   in	  which	   the	   essence	   of	   the	   object	   is	  supposed	  to	  reside.	  Such	  an	  essence	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  even	  a	  single	  cognition,	  but	  because	  there	  is	  no	  account	  of	  why	  the	  essence	  should	  bind	  together	  just	  these	  and	  not	  other	  accidental	  determinations,	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  moment	  of	  essence	  to	  cognition	  is	  (initially,	  at	   least)	  merely	  negative,	  sweeping	  aside	  the	  determinations	  through	  which	  the	  object	  was	  cognizable	  at	  all	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  “absolute	  indifference”	  through	  which	  it	  would	  be	  cognized	  not	  merely	  as	  it	  (manifoldly)	  appears,	  but	  as	  it	  really	  is.336	  As	  applied	   to	   the	  case	  of	  Being	  and	  Time,	  Löwith’s	  objection	   is	  supposed	   to	  be	   the	  following:	  what	  is	  ontic	  and	  existentiell	  in	  our	  comportment	  to	  beings	  is	  entirely	  lost	  in	  the	  ontological	   and	  existential	   analysis	   that	  provides	   its	   conditions	  of	  possibility.	  That	   is,	  we	  gain	  access	  to	  how	  life	  “really	  is”	  only	  by	  invoking	  structural	  features	  which	  are	  indifferent	  to	  the	  manifold	  appearances	  of	  life	  itself.	  For	  someone	  who	  had	  always	  maintained	  that	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  our	  comportment	  to	  beings	  must	  be	  preserved	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  it	  (as	  Heidegger	  had	   firmly	   insisted	  against	  Natorp),	   such	  a	  result	  should	  have	  been	  manifestly	  
                                                335	  See	  Hegel	  (1812-­‐1816),	  375.	  336	  Cf.	  Kant’s	  criticism	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  cognizing	  an	  object	  as	  it	  would	  be	  in	  itself	  through	  its	  relational	  predicates	  (CPR	  B67).	  
 217	  
unacceptable.	   Heidegger	   certainly	   acknowledges	   in	   Being	   and	   Time	   that	   philosophical	  research	  has	   to	  be	   seized	  as	  an	  existentiell	  possibility	   (BT	  13),	  but	   if	  Löwith	   is	   right,	   the	  existentiell	   possibilities	   of	   existence	   which	   motivate	   ontological	   questioning	   do	   not	  “reappear”	  and	  are	  not	  otherwise	  recaptured	  in	  the	  conclusion	  to	  which	  the	  end	  of	  the	  book	  points.	   Instead,	   we	   find	   pronouncements	   to	   the	   effect	   that	   in	   time	   we	   find	   the	   being	   of	  existence	  against	  which	  the	  meaning	  of	  being	   in	  general	   is	   to	  be	  worked	  out	  (BT	  1,	  404). Löwith’s	  worry	   is	  that	  Heidegger’s	   fundamental	  ontology,	  shorn	  of	   its	  original	  existentiell	  motivation,	   risks	   degenerating	   into	   a	   possibility	   that	   I,	   you,	   or	   anyone	   can	   take	   up	   and	  maintain	   an	   external	   relation	   to,	   much	   as	   you	   might	   buy	   this	   or	   that	   toaster	   at	   K-­‐Mart	  without	   thereby	   investing	  yourself	  or	   the	   toaster	  with	  any	  essential	   connection.	   In	  short,	  
Being	  and	  Time	   looks	   suspiciously	  doctrinal,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	  way	  of	   life	  Heidegger	  had	  seemingly	  promised	  in	  his	  lecture	  courses.	  Löwith	  (correctly)	  pursues	  this	  connection	  between	  the	  “decisive	  ontic-­‐existentiell	  distinctions”	  drawn	   in	  Being	  and	  Time	   and	   the	  philosophical	  methodology	  Heidegger	  had	  earlier	  developed	  at	  Freiburg.	  The	  ontological	  analysis	  rests—or	  at	  least	  ought	  to	  rest—on	  a	   kind	   of	   “formalization.”	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   Heidegger’s	   recourse	   to	   (Husserl’s)	  formalization	  was	  originally	  designed	  to	  get	  at	  lived	  experience	  without	  conflating	  it	  with	  that	  which	   is	  an	  object	  of	  experience	   in	  and	  for	   life;	   formalization	  thus	  represents	  a	  pure	  indication	   of	   direction—towards	   the	   living	   of	   life,	   away	   from	   what	   is	   “lived”	   in	   it—for	  philosophical	  inquiry.	  Now,	  Löwith’s	  idea	  is	  that	  “ontic-­‐existentiell	  distinctions”	  should	  be	  “crucial	   for	   this	   formalization”	   insofar	   as	   they	   partake	   of	   the	   living	   immediacy	   of	   our	  everyday	   comportment	   towards	  beings.	  To	   say	   that	   such	  distinctions	   are	   finally	   “lost”	   in	  
Being	  and	  Time	  is	  basically	  to	  accuse	  Heidegger	  of	  neglecting	  existence	  itself	  in	  his	  attempt	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to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  its	  structure.	  In	  other	  words,	  Löwith	  takes	  Heidegger	  to	  be	  hesitating	  at	  precisely	  the	  most	  essential	  moment	  of	  his	  earlier	  methodology.	  Löwith	  continues,	  I	   believe	   that	   your	   most	   unique	   insight	   into	   the	   problematic	   of	   the	   ontic-­‐ontological	  circle	  .	  .	  .	  must	  lead	  to	  clinching	  this	  dialectical	  movement	  at	  one	  end	  and	  “founding”	  it:	  not	  however	  at	  the	  ontological	  a	  priori	  (although	  this	  is	   apparently	   the	   consequence	   of	   philosophizing),	   but	   rather	   at	   the	   ontic-­‐anthropological	  end.337	  	  Again,	   Löwith’s	   worry	   is	   that	   the	   fundamental	   ontology	   Heidegger	   is	   seeking	   is	  subsequently	  called	  upon,	  after	  the	  fact,	  at	   least	  (as	  “the	  consequence	  of	  philosophizing”),	  to	   “found”	   the	   “ontic-­‐existentiell	   distinctions”	   upon	   which	   the	   ground	   of	   fundamental	  ontology	  was	   laid	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   To	   Löwith’s	  mind,	   this	   stands	   the	   order	   of	   founding	  precisely	   on	   its	   head	   and	   represents—as	   comes	   nearly	   to	   the	   surface	   several	   times	   in	  Löwith’s	  complaint—a	  tacit	  betrayal	  of	  the	  methodology	  of	  formal	  indication.	  To	  clinch	  the	  “dialectical	   movement”	   Löwith	   speaks	   of	   at	   one	   end	   would	   require	   philosophy	   itself	   to	  move	  entirely	   in	  the	  orbit	  of	   its	  purported	  object	   from	  the	  getgo.	  This,	  of	  course,	  was	  the	  root	   of	   Heidegger’s	   Freiburg	   insistence	   that	   in	   order	   to	   be	   answerable	   to	   life,	  phenomenology	  must	   itself	   become,	   from	   its	   very	   beginnings,	   a	  way	   of	   life,	   clinching,	   in	  Löwith’s	   terms,	   the	   movement	   of	   phenomenology	   at	   the	   “ontic-­‐anthropological	   end.”	  Insofar	   as	   Being	   and	   Time	   fails	   to	   do	   so,	   Heidegger	   turns	   out	   to	   succumb	   to	   the	   very	  panlogicism	  he	  took	  himself	  to	  have	  diagnosed	  in	  Neokantianism.	  	   Heidegger’s	   reply,	   as	   he	   explains,	   was	   delayed	   several	   weeks	   by	   external	  circumstances.	  Husserl,	  with	  whom	  he	  was	  still	  close,	  had	   invited	  him	  to	  Freiburg	  during	  his	   summer	   vacation	   for	   a	  weeklong	   visit.338	  When	   he	  was	   finally	   able	   to	   respond	   to	   his	  
                                                337	  Löwith	  (1927),	  293.	  338	  This	   visit	   marked	   the	   beginning	   of	   Heidegger’s	   abortive	   involvement	   with	   the	   Encyclopædia	  Britannica	  entry	  on	  phenomenology.	  See	  Sheehan	  (1997a),	  41.	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student,	  however,	  his	  reply	  was	  clear:339	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  Löwith’s	  immediate	  assimilation	  of	   the	   “ontic”	   to	   the	   regional	   sciences—anthropology,	   psychology,	   and	   the	   like—was	  misguided.	   Philosophy	   cannot	   take	   up	   the	   regional	   sciences	   as	   they	   are;	   instead,	   its	  research	  into	  their	  inner	  logic	  must	  run	  ahead	  of	  them.340	  Thus	  the	  priority	  of	  the	  ontic	  and	  the	  existentiell	  (see	  esp.	  BT	  13)	  cannot	  signify	  the	  priority	  of	  anthropology	  or	  the	  like.	  Even	  philosophical	  anthropology	  (of	  the	  sort	  Heidegger	  took	  Löwith	  to	  be	  pursuing)	  was	  not	  of	  foundational	   methodological	   significance;	   it	   simply	   represented	   one	   way	   in	   which	   the	  existential	   analytic	   might	   be	   extended	   and	   filled	   in	   (BT	   45).	   So	   to	   call	   the	   roots	   of	   the	  ontological	  analysis	  “anthropological”	  is	  at	  best	  extremely	  misleading.	  Notwithstanding	   this,	   Löwith’s	   basic	   point	   may	   well	   still	   stand:	   does	   the	   ontic—assuming	   we	   understand	   this	   correctly	   now—get	   swallowed	   up	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   its	  subsequent	  ontological	  analysis?	  Heidegger	  is	  perfectly	  willing	  to	  accept	  Löwith’s	  challenge	  on	  this	  point,	  and	  he	  proceeds	  to	  defend	  the	  continuing	  relevance	  of	  his	  Freiburg	  methods	  with	  a	  notable	  vehemence:	  I	  too	  am	  of	  the	  conviction	  that	  ontology	  is	  to	  be	  founded	  only	  ontically,	  and	  I	  believe	  that	  nobody	  before	  me	  has	  explicitly	  seen	  this	  and	  said	  so.	  But	  ontic	  founding	  does	  not	  mean	  arbitrarily	   pointing	   to	   something	  ontic	   and	  going	  back	   to	   it.	  Rather,	   the	   ground	   for	   ontology	  will	   only	  be	   found	  by	  knowing	  what	   it	   itself	   is	   and	   then	   allowing	   it,	   as	   such,	   to	   destroy	   itself	   [sie	  dann	  als	  
solche	  sich	  zugrunderichten	  läßt].	  (LL	  36)	  
                                                339	  It	   was	   also	   peppered	   with	   condescension:	   “Veiled	   attacks	   and	   glancing	   blows,	   delivered	   with	   great	  seriousness,	   are	   part	   of	   the	  mood	   in	   which	   one’s	   first	   undertakings	   are	   brought	   out.	   After	   a	   decade	   such	  gestures	  settle	  down,	  provided	  that	  one	  can	  link	  all	  the	  passion	  that	  swells	  within	  the	  safety	  of	  a	  riverbed	  to	  a	  life’s	  work	  that	  will	  really	  stir	  the	  waters”	  (LL	  33).	  340	  See	   BT	   10-­‐11;	   also	   49-­‐52.	   Heidegger’s	   barely	   concealed	   target	   here	   is	   Neokantianism’s	   insistence	   on	  beginning	   with	   the	   fact	   of	   science.	   Though	   Marburg	   Neokantianism	   directed	   itself	   squarely	   against	  psychologism	  long	  before	  the	  polemics	  of	  Frege	  and	  Husserl,	  the	  school	  was	  unable	  to	  clarify	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  opposition	  on	  account	  of	  their	  hesitation	  over	  the	  role	  of	  psychology	  and	  anthropology	  in	  Kant’s	  philosophy	  (L	  21:51).	  In	  fact—although	  he	  always	  tried	  to	  treat	  the	  issue	  with	  some	  delicacy—Heidegger	  finally	  came	  to	  think	   that	   Husserl’s	   own	   attempt	   to	   reject	   psychologism	   failed,	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   genuineness	   of	   Husserl’s	  intentions.	   This	   is	   suggested	   in	   the	   WS	   1925-­‐1926	   course	   (see	   esp.	   L	   21:53-­‐62,	   89-­‐90),	   and	   he	   finally	  communicates	   his	   worries	   to	   Husserl	   himself	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   their	   attempted	   collaboration	   on	   the	  
Encyclopædia	  Britannica	  article	  (see	  Husserl	  &	  Heidegger	  [1927],	  138).	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  Heidegger	  obviously	  not	  only	  agrees	  with	  Löwith	  about	  the	  ontic	  foundations	  of	  ontology;	  he	   identifies	   this	   point	  with	   one	   of	   the	  most	   basic	   insights	   that	   sets	   him	   apart	   from	   the	  philosophical	   tradition.	   But,	   he	   says,	  we	   cannot	   simply	   “point	   to	   something	   ontic	   and	   go	  back	  to	  it.”	  Ontology	  itself	  implies	  a	  specific	  way	  of	  going	  to	  the	  ontic	  and	  the	  existentiell;	  without	  a	  guiding	   idea	  of	  ontology,	  by	  which	   the	  ontic	   is	  opened	  up	   for	  us	   in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  leads	  out	  onto	  the	  ontological	  analysis,	  the	  ontic	  foundations	  of	  ontology	  are	  as	  well	  as	  useless	  for	  the	  entire	  project.	  But	  how	  are	  we	  supposed	  to	  secure	  such	  a	  guiding	  idea	  of	  ontology?	  Although	  it	  may	  not	   be	   obvious—and	   this	   is	   evidenced	   by	   Löwith’s	   reaction—Heidegger	   insists	   that	   his	  strategy	  remains	  fundamentally	  unchanged	  from	  his	  earlier	  work.	  The	  goal	  is	  indeed	  to	  get	  back	  to	  the	  phenomenal	  comportment	  towards	  beings	  upon	  which	  all	  others	  are	  founded:	  the	  facticity341	  of	  immediate	  lived	  experience,	  or,	  if	  you	  prefer,	  existence.	  But	  precisely	  the	  problem	   of	   going	   back	   to	   this	   facticity	   demands	   that	   we	   employ	   a	   method	   which	   can	  indicate	   in	   a	   radical—and	   therefore	   formal—way	   the	   ontic-­‐existentiell	   basis	   of	   ontology,	  and	  this	  cannot	  simply	  mean,	  as	  Löwith	  had	  put	  it,	  “clinching	  this	  dialectical	  movement	  .	  .	  .	  at	   the	   ontic-­‐anthropological	   end.”	   Rather,	   the	   idea	   of	   ontology	   must	   itself	   become	   the	  directive	  back	  to	  its	  own,	  ever-­‐receding	  ontic	  foundation.	  This	  is	  why	  Heidegger	  protests	  so	  vehemently	  against	  Löwith’s	  suggestion	  that	  his	  refusal	  to	  start	  at	  the	  ontic-­‐anthropological	  end	  represents	  a	  betrayal	  of	  his	  earlier	  work.	  In	  fact,	  just	  the	  opposite	  is	  true:	  The	  problems	  of	   facticity	  persist	   for	  me	   in	   the	  same	  way	  as	   they	  did	   in	  my	  Freiburg	   beginnings—only	   much	   more	   radically,	   and	   now	   in	   the	  
                                                341	  As	  Heidegger	  explains	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  SS	  1923	  course:	  “‘Facticity’	  is	  the	  designation	  we	  will	  use	  for	  the	  character	  of	  the	  being	  of	  ‘our’	  ‘own’	  existence	  [Daseins]”	  (O	  63:7).	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perspectives	  that	  were	  leading	  me	  on	  even	  in	  Freiburg.342	  .	  .	  .	  I	  first	  had	  to	  go	  all	  out	  after	  the	  factic	  [auf	  das	  Faktische],	  pushing	  it	  to	  its	  extremity,	  in	  order	  to	   even	   arrive	   at	   facticity	   [die	   Faktizität]	   as	   a	   problem.	   Formal	   indication,	  critique	  of	  the	  customary	  doctrine	  of	  the	  a	  priori,	  formalization,	  and	  the	  like	  are	  all	  still	  there	  for	  me,	  even	  if	  I	  do	  not	  speak	  of	  them	  anymore.	  (LL	  36-­‐37)	  	  “Even	  if	  I	  do	  not	  speak	  of	  them	  anymore”:	  actually,	  Heidegger	  does	  manage	  to	  speak	  of	  all	  these	   in	  Being	  and	  Time,343	  although	   it	   is	   certainly	   true	   that	   he	   does	   not	   develop	   any	   of	  these	  themes	  in	  detail	  (as	  he	  had	  typically	  done	  in	  his	  lecture	  courses).	  The	  case	  of	  “formal	  indication”	   is	   especially	   instructive:	   he	   refers	   to	   it	   casually	   on	   numerous	   occasions—apparently	  assuming	  its	  meaning	  is	  obvious	  to	  the	  reader—but	  never	  actually	  explains	  the	  point	  of	  the	  concept.344	  Whatever	  the	  fate	  of	  his	  objections,	  Löwith	  was	  very	  much	  within	  his	   rights	   to	   find	   this	   state	   of	   affairs	   surprising	   and	   perplexing.	  Why	  would	   Heidegger’s	  application	  of	  his	  well-­‐worn	  methods	  have	  suddenly	  become	  so	  opaque?	  
Being	  and	  Time,	  as	  Published	  The	   very	   title	   of	   the	   book,	   it	  must	   be	   recognized—“Being	  and	  Time”—is	   ambiguous.	   The	  book	  bearing	  that	  title	  was	  originally	  published	  with	  the	  designation:	  “First	  Half.”345	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  even	  that	  subtitle	   is	  generous	  to	  the	  actual	  content	  of	  the	  book,	   for	  only	  the	  first	  third	   of	   the	   “treatise,”	   as	   Heidegger	   describes	   the	   project	   in	   §8,	   is	   contained	   within	   its	  
                                                342	  Heidegger’s	   point	   seems	   to	   be	   that	   he	   has	   now	   entered	   into	   the	  work	  which	   he	   could	   only	   project	   (or,	  assume	  a	  perspective	  upon)	  in	  his	  Freiburg	  days.	  343	  Heidegger	  at	  least	  hints	  at	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  a	  priori	  at	  BT	  50n,	  229;	  and	  esp.	  321.	  Formal	  indication—with	  which	  formalization	  is,	  of	  course,	  intimately	  bound	  up	  (see	  p.	  198	  above)—is	  alluded	  to	  on	  many	  occasions,	  notably,	  however,	  at	  BT	  116,	  231.	  344	  Most	   likely,	   this	   was	   a	   casualty	   of	   the	   frantic	   pace	   at	   which	   Being	   and	   Time	   was	   finished.	   “Formal	  indication”	  is	  a	  shorthand	  in	  Heidegger’s	  writing	  by	  now,	  and	  he	  probably	  worked	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  at	  some	  point	  he	  would	  include	  an	  explicit	  discussion	  of	  it	  in	  his	  book.	  It	  is	  simply	  impossible	  to	  say	  whether	  he	  simply	  to	  neglected	  to	  include	  such	  a	  discussion,	  or	  whether,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  he	  took	  its	  inclusion	  to	  be	   unnecessary,	   given	   the	   extensive	   methodological	   reflections	   in	   the	   second	   introduction	   (but	   never	   got	  around	   to	   excising	   the	   unexplained,	   though	   now	   superfluous,	   references	   to	   “formal	   indication”).	   In	   either	  event,	   it	   certainly	  appears	   (and	   the	   letter	   to	  Löwith	  only	  confirms	   this)	   that	   the	  basic	  method	  employed	   in	  
Being	  and	  Time	  is	  either	  identical	  to	  or	  a	  close	  relative	  of	  formal	  indication.	  345	  See	   n.	   311	   above	   for	   the	   professional	   pressures	   that	   led	   to	  Heidegger’s	   decision	   to	   bring	   out	  Being	  and	  
Time	  before	  it	  was	  anywhere	  near	  finished.	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covers.	  The	  final	  (third)	  division	  of	  Part	  One,	  along	  with	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  (three-­‐division)	  second	  part,	  would	  never	  appear.	  At	  least	  in	  1927,	  Heidegger	  typically	  uses	  the	  title	  “Being	  
and	  Time”	   to	  refer	  to	  the	  treatise	  as	  a	  whole,	   including	   its	  unfinished	  but	  projected	  parts.	  Only	   in	   the	   seventh	   edition	   of	   1953	   did	   Heidegger	   finally	   remove	   the	   designation	   “First	  Half”	   from	   the	   book’s	   title	   page.	   This	   is	   important	   because	   the	   content	   of	   the	   published	  book	  Being	  and	  Time	  can	  only	  be	  properly	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  original	  Being	  
and	  Time	  project	  as	  a	  whole.346	  As	  we	  will	  see,	  the	  published	  sections	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  are	  preliminary—not	  only	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  a	   first	  attempt	  to	  work	  out	  the	  question,	  but,	  most	  crucially,	  in	  that	  they	  were	  drawn	  up	  with	  the	  expectation	  that	  they	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  systematic	  reinterpretation	  in	  light	  of	  the	  projected,	  but	  never	  published,	  second	  part	  of	  the	  project.	  As	  it	  stands,	  and	  as	  noted	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  chapter,	  the	  title	  “Being	  and	  Time”	  is	  a	  very	  odd	  one	  for	  the	  book	  to	  bear.	  Most	  of	  the	  book	  contains	  an	  analysis	  of	  existence:	  Division	  One	  is	  the	  preparatory	  fundamental	  analysis	  of	  existence;	  Division	  Two	  deals	  with	  the	   connection	   between	   existence	   and	   temporality.	   Obviously	   the	   concept	   of	   existence	  (Dasein)	  is	  of	  overriding	  importance	  for	  the	  finished	  text.	  Its	  basic	  role,	  Heidegger	  tells	  us	  on	  several	  occasions,	   is	  to	  function	  as	  a	  formal	   indicator	  (see	  BT	  53,	  231,	  313),	  even	  if	  he	  never	  specifies	   just	  what	   that’s	  supposed	  to	  mean.	  For	  any	  student	  of	  Heidegger’s	  earlier	  work,	  of	  course,	  this	  poses	  no	  great	  mystery:	  truly	  philosophical	  concepts	  always	  have	  the	  form	   of	   formal	   indicators,	   for	   the	   “content”	   to	   which	   such	   concepts	   are	   supposed	   to	   be	  responsible	   recedes	   through	   the	   very	   act	   of	   indicating	   it.	   Thus	   “life	   itself,”	   to	   use	  
                                                346	  Cassirer,	   for	   one,	   understood	   this.	   In	   the	   third	   volume	  of	   his	  Philosophy	  of	  Symbolic	  Forms	   he	  puts	   off	   a	  “critical	  discussion”	  of	  Being	  and	  Time:	  “Such	  a	  discussion	  will	  be	  possible	  and	  fruitful	  only	  when	  Heidegger’s	  work	  is	  available	  as	  a	  whole”	  (Cassirer	  [1929],	  163n2).	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Heidegger’s	  old	  terminology,	  recedes	  from	  any	  attempt	  to	  grasp	  it	  conceptually.	  The	  proper	  form	   of	   the	   concept	   which	   is	   to	   “grasp”	   it,	   then,	   must	   in	   turn	   be	   determined	   by	   this	  movement.	  Formally	  indicative	  concepts	  point	  to	  the	  immediacy	  of	  lived	  experience	  and	  in	  this	  pointing	  draw	  us	  ourselves	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  what	  is	   lived,	  requiring	  us	  to	  complete	  the	  act	  only	  in	  and	  through	  the	  very	  act	  of	  living.	  In	   order	   for	   a	   concept	   to	   genuinely	   function	   as	   a	   formal	   indicator,	   then,	   it	   must	  actively	   prevent	   the	   reification	   of	   the	   object	   to	  which	   it	   points,	   and	   on	   this	   score	   not	   all	  terminology	   is	   created	   equal.	  We	   can	   see	  why	  Heidegger	  would	  have	  been	  drawn	   to	   the	  idea	  of	   life	   (as	   so	  many	  of	   the	  Lebensphilosophen,	   of	   course,	  were):	   the	  act	  of	   living	   itself	  presents	  an	  intuitively	  sharp	  contrast	  with	  any	  concepts	  of	  life	  that	  would	  try	  to	  capture	  its	  flow	  (and	  which	  inevitably	  still	  its	  stream,	  as	  Natorp	  said).	  Nevertheless,	  Heidegger	  began	  to	  be	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  life	  as	  the	  1920s	  wore	  on,	  and	  by	  1927	  Heidegger	  was	  convinced	  that	  only	  “existence”	  could	  do	   the	  conceptual	  work	   that	  was	  needed	  here.	   It	   is	  not	   immediately	   apparent	   why	   this	   should	   be	   the	   case,	   but	   some	   of	   the	   shortcomings	  Heidegger	   saw	   attaching	   to	   his	   earlier	   terminology	  may	   help	   clear	   the	   way	   here.	   “Life,”	  Heidegger	   now	   insists,	   says	   rather	   too	   much.	   To	   be	   sure,	   Heidegger	   is	   still	   willing	   to	  acknowledge	  that	  there	  may	  well	  be	  a	  sufficiently	  austere	  understanding	  of	  “life”	  according	  to	   which	   it	   does	   indeed	   form	   the	   subject	   matter	   of	   philosophy.	   “In	   the	   tendency	   of	   all	  serious	  and	  scientific	  ‘philosophy	  of	  life,’”	  Heidegger	  says—adding	  that	  such	  an	  expression	  “says	   about	   as	   much	   as	   the	   botany	   of	   plants”—“there	   lies	   an	   unexpressed	   tendency	  towards	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  being	  of	  existence	  [Dasein]”	  (BT	  46;	  cf.	  L	  21:216).	  But	  now	  Heidegger	  is	  skeptical	  that	  “life”	  can	  help	  bring	  this	  subject	  matter	  into	  focus	  at	  all,	  laden	  as	  it	  is	  with	  a	  disorganized	  panoply	  of	  traditional	  connotations,	  ranging	  from	  the	  subjectivist	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to	   the	   biological	   and	   positivist.	   As	   such,	   “life”	   inherits	   much	   the	   same	   problems	   as	   do	  “subject,”	  “spirit,”	  and	  “person”—all	  of	  which	  have	  been	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  what	  is	  supposed	  to	   lie	   on	   this	   side	   of	   objectivity.	   All	   these	   terms,	   Heidegger	   says,	   refer,	   perhaps	   despite	  themselves,	  to	  “determinate,	  ‘formable’	  [‘ausformbare’]	  phenomenal	  domains:	  but	  they	  are	  always	  used	  alongside	  a	  curious	   failure	   to	  see	   the	  need	   for	  asking	  about	   the	  being	  of	   the	  beings	  thus	  designated”	  (BT	  46).	  If	  this	  is	  true,	  then	  it	  follows	  that	  “life”	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  good	  candidate	   for	   a	   formal	   indicator:	   since	   it	   indicates	   an	   ausformbar	   domain,	   it	   cannot,	   in	  principle,	  reach	  the	  form-­‐giving	  basis	  (Heidegger	  is	  agreeing	  with	  both	  Husserl	  and	  Natorp	  here)	  which	  so	  many	  thinkers	  have	  desired	  to	  indicate	  with	  it.	  	   It	  is	  in	  Being	  and	  Time	  where	  Heidegger	  is	  willing	  to	  push	  his	  point	  about	  the	  formal	  the	   furthest,	   and	   we	  may	   well	   wonder	   whether	   he	   did	   not	   do	   so	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	  indicative	  power	  of	  his	  terminology.	  What	  is	  “existence”	  supposed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  accomplish	  that	   “life”	   was	   unable	   to?	   When	   Heidegger	   introduces	   the	   term	   “Dasein,”	   it	   has	   all	   the	  appearance	  of	  a	  completely	  technical	  term.	  He	  insists	  that	  Dasein	  not	  be	  conflated	  with	  the	  human	  being	  (Mensch),	   for	   the	  reference	  to	   the	  human,	   like	   the	  reference	  to	   life,	  ends	  up	  saying	   rather	  more	   than	  we	  had	  meant.	  Heidegger’s	   vigilance	   on	   this	   score,	   it	   should	   be	  noted,	  is	  rather	  short-­‐lived:	  by	  1929,	  Heidegger	  explicitly	  and	  emphatically	  makes	  sense	  of	  the	  analytic	  of	  existence	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  human	  being.347	  Of	  course,	  no	  formal	  indicator	  can	  ever	   assume	   a	   completely	   technical	   character,	   for	   its	   indicative	   power	   depends	   on	   its	  independent	   ability	   to	   point	   us	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   ultimate	   subject	   matter	   of	  
                                                347	  The	   first	   page	   of	  Kant	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics	   is	   actually	   quite	   striking	   on	   this	   score.	  Heidegger	  refers	  to	  the	  human	  being	  in	  almost	  every	  sentence.	  Part	  of	  the	  motivation	  here,	  of	  course,	  is	  to	  sow	  the	  seeds	  of	   his	   eventual	   attempt	   to	   show	   that	   he	   is	   the	   true	   inheritor	   of	   Kant’s	   fourth	   question,	  What	   is	   the	  human	  
being?	   In	   Heidegger’s	   words,	   “The	   idea	   of	   laying	   out	   a	   fundamental	   ontology	   means	   setting	   out	   the	  characteristic	  ontological	  analytic	  of	  existence	  as	  a	  necessary	  prerequisite	  and,	   through	   it,	  making	  clear	   for	  what	   purpose	   and	   in	   what	   way,	   within	   which	   boundaries	   and	   under	   which	   presuppositions,	   it	   poses	   the	  concrete	  question:	  What	  is	  the	  human	  being?”	  (KPM	  3:1).	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philosophy.348	  And	   yet	   it	   should	   do	   no	  more	   than	   such	   pointing,	   either.	   Whether	   or	   not	  Heidegger’s	  language	  of	  Dasein	  is	  ultimately	  well	  suited	  to	  such	  a	  task,	  we	  should	  begin	  by	  understanding	   it	   as	  his	   attempt	   to	   further	   formalize	   the	  demand	  at	   the	  heart	  of	  both	   life	  philosophy	  and	  phenomenology:	  the	  demand	  to	  root	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  beings	  to	  which	  we	  comport	   ourselves	   in	   our	   own	   immediate	   lived	   experience.	   The	   word	   “Dasein”	   can	   be	  thought	   of	   as	   a	  more	   formal	   indicator	   for	  Husserl’s	   phenomenologically	   reduced	   field	   of	  experience,	  a	  field	  which,	  for	  Heidegger,	  can	  initially	  only	  be	  indeterminately	  indicated,	  but	  to	  which	  the	  analysis	  is	  ultimately	  responsible	  all	  the	  same	  (see	  L	  21:33).	  	   It	   is	   no	   accident	   that	   Dasein,	   probably	   the	   most	   important	   concept	   in	   Being	   and	  
Time,	   is	   also	   the	   one	   that	   has	   caused	   the	  most	   trouble.	   For	   English-­‐speaking	   readers	   of	  Heidegger,	   the	   trouble	   is	   compounded	   by	   the	   difficulties	   that	   attend	   even	   the	   most	  thoughtful	  English	  translations	  of	  the	  German	  “Dasein”:	  it	  has	  been	  translated	  as	  everything	  from	   “human	   reality”349	  to	   “being	   here/there”	   or	   even	   “being-­‐t/here.”350	  More	   often	   than	  not,	   it	   has	   simply	   been	   left	   to	   stand	   untranslated.	   All	   these	   approaches	   lead	   to	   serious	  problems,	  and	  I	  am	  not	  aware	  of,	  nor	  am	  I	  about	  to	  suggest,	  any	  that	  do	  not.	  If	  we	  leave	  it	  untranslated,	   “Dasein”	   invariably	   takes	   on	   the	   character	   of	   a	   technical	   term	   in	   English	  contexts,	   and	   this	   is	   contrary	   both	   to	   Heidegger’s	   intention	   and	   to	   his	   aggressively	  nontechnical	  choice	  of	  words	  here.	  Many	  translations,	  especially	  “being-­‐t/here,”	  are	  really	  
                                                348	  Of	   course,	   nothing	   keeps	   us	   from	   defining	   a	   new	   term	   to	   play	   such	   a	   role,	   and	   this,	   unfortunately,	   is	  basically	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  English	  readers	  presented	  with	  the	  untranslated,	  quasi-­‐naturalized	  “Dasein”	  find	  themselves.	  But	   the	  point	   is	   that	   in	  such	  a	  case	  the	  real	   formal-­‐indicative	  power	  of	   the	  concept	  will	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  concepts	  through	  which	  the	  new	  word	  is	  understood,	  whatever	  these	  may	  happen	  to	  be	  (cf.	  Gadamer	   [1985],	   107).	   In	   any	   event,	   it	   is	   incorrect	   to	  oppose,	   as	   is	   often	  done,	   the	   “ordinary”	   sense	  of	   the	  German	   “Dasein”	   with,	   as	   one	   interpreter	   puts	   it,	   “Heidegger’s	   own	   utterly	   technical,	   specific,	   ontological	  sense	  of	  ‘here-­‐being’”	  (Hemming	  [2013],	  30-­‐31).	  349	  See	  Sartre	  (1943),	  49-­‐56;	  de	  Beauvoir	  (1949),	  7.	  350	  See	  Streeter	   (1997),	  415.	  Vallega-­‐Neu	  uses	   “being-­‐t/here”	   for	  Heidegger’s	  use	  of	   “Da-­‐sein”	   in	   the	  1930s,	  but	  distinguishes	  between	  this	  later	  usage	  and	  his	  usage	  in	  Being	  and	  Time.	  See	  Vallega-­‐Neu	  (2003),	  36n8.	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translations	  in	  name	  only,	  and	  they	  suffer	  from	  the	  same	  difficulty.	  “Human	  reality”	  and,	  as	  Thomas	  Sheehan	  has	  suggested,351	  “human	  existence”352	  fare	  better	  on	  this	  score,	  but	  they	  introduce	   a	   reference	   to	   the	   human	   that	   is	   at	   best	   implicit	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   the	   German	  “Dasein”	  and	  which,	  more	  importantly,	  Heidegger	  takes	  pains	  to	  exclude	  from	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  term	  on	  methodological	  grounds	  (see	  BT	  46).	  	   Sheehan’s	  other	  suggestion,	  simply	  “existence,”	  is,	  considered	  in	  itself,	  very	  probably	  the	  best	  translation	  of	  the	  genuine	  sense	  of	  “Dasein”	  in	  Being	  and	  Time.	  Unfortunately,	  the	  translator	   of	   that	   work	   must	   distinguish	   between	   “Dasein”	   and	   “Existenz,”	   and	   any	  translation	  of	  “Existenz”	  other	  than	  “existence”	  is	  plainly	  artificial	  and	  misleading.	  I	  am	  not	  at	  all	  sure	  what	  the	  optimal—or	  even	  an	  acceptable—solution	  is	  to	  this	  problem.	  Perhaps	  the	  translator	  really	  is	  best	  served	  by	  leaving	  the	  term	  in	  the	  original	  German.	  Thankfully,	  it	  is	  not	  my	  task	  here	  to	  provide	  principles	  for	  a	  translation	  of	  Being	  and	  Time,	  but	  to	  try	  to	  clarify	  just	  a	  few	  of	  its	  basic	  concepts.	  For	  these	  purposes	  I	  actually	  think	  it	  is	  probably	  best	  to	   use	   the	   English	   “existence”	   to	   translate	   both	   “Dasein”	   and	   “Existenz.”	   I	   will	   say	   more	  about	   this	   shortly.	   But	   obviously	   this	   will	   at	   times	   require	   me	   to	   indicate	   which	   of	  Heidegger’s	  (closely	  connected)	  concepts	  I	  have	  in	  mind.	  	   How	  does	   this	  matrix	  of	  existential	  concepts	  come	   into	  Being	  and	  Time	   in	   the	   first	  place?	  In	  historical	  perspective,	  of	  course,	  the	  motivation	  is	  clear:	  ever	  since	  the	  1919	  KNS	  class	  Heidegger	  had	  been	  trying	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  and	  defend	  the	  claim	  of	  phenomenology	  to	  be	  able	  to	  get	  back	  to	  the	  pretheoretical	  foundations	  of	  all	  theory.	  In	  “going	  all	  out	  after	  
                                                351	  See	  the	  foreword	  to	  his	  translation	  of	  Heidegger’s	  WS	  1925-­‐1926	  lectures	  on	  logic.	  He	  even	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  claim,	  elsewhere,	   that	   the	  human	  being	   is	  die	  Sache	  selbst	   for	  Heidegger	  (Sheehan	  [2001],	  193;	  also	  199-­‐200).	   Similarly,	   Kisiel	   holds	   that	   “the	   best	   English	   translation	   of	   Dasein	   itself	   is	   the	   ‘human	   situation,’	  provided	   that	  one	  at	  once	   retains	   the	   full	   temporally	  distributed	  particularity	  of	   the	   indexicals,	   ‘here,	  now,	  mine,’	  that	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  convey”	  (Kisiel	  [1993],	  423).	  352	  Sometimes	  Heidegger	  actually	  does	  speak	  of	  “menschliche	  Dasein”	  (e.g.,	  BPP	  24:21).	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the	  factic,”	  as	  he	  recounted	  it	  to	  Löwith,	  he	  had	  finally	  arrived	  at	  “facticity”	  as	  a	  problem	  (LL	   37;	   quoted	   above).	   Like	   Husserl,	   Heidegger	   wanted	   to	   provide	   new	   and	   firm	  foundations	  for	  the	  sciences,	  though	  it	  is	  unlikely	  the	  two	  ever	  understood	  this	  in	  anything	  like	   the	   same	   sense.	   For	   Heidegger,	   this	   project	   was	   always	   rooted	   in	   his	   campaign	   for	  university	   reform: 353 	  making	   transparent	   the	   grounding	   of	   even	   the	   most	   abstract	  speculations	  of	  modern	  science	  in	  the	  shared	  life	  of	  the	  national	  community.	  Heidegger	  was	  convinced	   that	   this	   regrounding	   of	   the	   sciences	   could	   be	   accomplished	   by	   Husserlian	  means,	  although,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  he	  found	  himself	  forced	  to	  stretch	  the	  letter	  of	  Husserl’s	  phenomenology	   to	   its	   limit.	   In	   particular,	   the	   field	   of	   phenomena	   which	   Husserl	   had	  (originally,	  at	   least)	  hoped	  to	  lay	  bare	  by	  the	  phenomenological	  reduction	  became	  itself	  a	  kind	   of	   problem	  which	   could	   only	   be	   indicated	   (the	   problem	   of	   facticity,	   in	   Heidegger’s	  terms).	  If	  the	  basic	  organizing	  principle	  behind	  the	  division	  of	  the	  regional	  sciences	  were	  to	  be	   clarified,	   if,	   that	   is,	   the	   meaning	   of	   being	   in	   general	   were	   to	   be	   investigated	  phenomenologically,	   this	   could	  only	  be	  accomplished	  by	   first	   confronting	   the	  problem	  of	  gaining	  access	  to	  facticity.	  	   In	  Being	  and	  Time,	  the	  problem	  of	  facticity	  is	  brought	  to	  the	  fore	  from	  the	  getgo,	  as	  something	   immediately	   demanded	   by	   the	   inquiry	   into	   the	   meaning	   of	   being.	   Being,	  Heidegger	  notes,	   is	  a	  peculiar	  thing	  to	  ask	  about,	  really,	   for	  it	  cannot	  be	  held	  in	  front	  of	  a	  cognitive	  gaze	  (as	  just	  another	  object	  inquired	  into)	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  particular	  beings.	  And	  yet	   an	   understanding	   of	   being,	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   questioner,	   is	   presupposed	   in	   any	  comportment	   to	   beings	   whatsoever.	   The	   question	   of	   being	   thus	   immediately	   directs	   us	  back	   to	  one	  particular	  being:	   the	  being	   for	  whom	  beings	  can	  even	  be	   in	   the	   first	  place,	   in	  
                                                353	  See	  p.	  160	  above.	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other	   words,	   the	   being	   who	   already	   has	   some	   sort	   of	   understanding	   of	   the	   meaning	   of	  being.	   As	   Heidegger	   puts	   it,	   it	   is	   not	   that	   we	   have	   rigorously	   demonstrated	   the	  methodological	   priority	   of	   this	   being,	   but	   rather	   that	   a	   certain	   priority	   has	   “announced	  itself”	  (BT	  8)	  in	  the	  very	  posing	  of	  the	  question.	  	   This	  being,	  of	  course,	  Heidegger	   indicates	  as	  Dasein,	  and	  we	  must	   leave	   its	  precise	  relation	   to	   other	   beings	   an	   open	   question	   for	   the	   moment.	   Above	   all,	   we	   must	   not	  presuppose	  that	  its	  sort	  of	  being	  can	  simply	  be	  read	  off	  from	  the	  sort	  of	  being	  attaching	  to	  those	  beings	  to	  which	  it	  comports	  itself,	  even	  though	  Dasein	  has	  a	  natural	  tendency	  to	  lapse	  into	  precisely	   this	  presupposition	   (see,	  e.g.,	  BT	  58,	  130).354	  Rather,	  we	  must	   try	   to	   follow	  whatever	   clues	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   attempt	   to	   indicate	   this	   being.	   And	   on	   this	   score	  we	  immediately	  notice	  something	  simple:	  this	  is	  a	  being	  for	  which	  “being	  is	  an	  issue”	  (BT	  12).	  This	  has	  two	  related	  senses.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  have	  the	  familiar	  point	  that	  Dasein	  is	  able	  to	   comport	   itself	   to	   other	   beings	   and	   thus	   already	   lives	   in	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	  beingness	  of	  these	  beings,	  even	  though	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  beingness	  remains	  inexplicit	  for	  it.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Dasein	  is,	  on	  its	  own	  part,	  and	  for	  its	  own	  sake,	  related	  to	  these	  beings—again,	   however,	   in	   a	   manner	   which	   is	   basically	   unclarified.	   That	   is,	   Dasein	   finds	   itself	  somehow	  amidst	  a	  world	  of	  things	  that	  simply	  are.	  Dasein,	  by	  contrast,	  does	  not	  just	  have,	  as	  an	  already	  acquired	  possession,	  its	  own	  being;	  instead,	  by	  being	  held	  out,	  as	  it	  were,	  into	  the	   realm	   of	   beings,	   it	   sustains	   an	   inherently	   problematic	   relationship	   to	   the	   totality	   of	  what	  just	  is.	  In	  simpler	  language,	  Dasein’s	  own	  being	  is	  not	  given	  to	  it,	  but	  presented	  to	  it	  as	  a	  task	  for	  it:	  for	  its	  part,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  the	  being	  that	  it	  is.	  
                                                354	  This	  has	  a	  double	  sense	  for	  Heidegger:	  the	  analyst	  of	  Dasein	  has	  a	  marked	  tendency	  to	  fall	  into	  this	  error	  (as	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy),	  but	  this	  tendency	  is	  derivative	  of	  a	  natural	  tendency	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
Dasein	  to	  take	  itself	  for	  something	  it	  is	  not.	  See,	  e.g.,	  BT	  19.	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   If	   we	   strip	   away	   the	   ethical	   and	   metaphysical	   scaffolding	   of	   Sartre’s	   notorious	  reading	   of	   this	   point,355	  Heideggerians	   should	   not	   be	   too	   proud	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   the	  core	  of	  his	  interpretation	  is	  absolutely	  on	  the	  right	  track:	  existence	  is	  not	  something	  that	  is	  simply	  given	  to	  us,	  but	  imposes	  onto	  us	  a	  task,	  however	  indeterminate	  a	  formula	  that	  may	  appear	   to	   be.	   To	   be	   sure,	   the	   (English)	   language	   of	   “existence”	   complicates	   matters	  somewhat,	  but	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  its	  formally	  indicative	  power	  is	  often	  undersold	  by	  those	  who	  would	  like	  to	  dissociate	  Heidegger’s	  work	  from	  the	  popular	  postwar	  existentialism	  it	  helped	  to	  inspire.	  Indeed,	  Heidegger	  indicates	  the	  distinctive	  task	  assigned	  to	  Dasein	  with	  the	   term	   “Existenz”:	   “That	   kind	   of	   being	   [Sein]	   towards	   which	   existence	   [Dasein]	   can	  comport	   itself	   in	   one	   way	   or	   another,	   and	   always	   somehow	   does,	   we	   call	   existence	  [Existenz]”	  (BT	  12).	  If	  that	  has	  something	  like	  the	  look	  of	  a	  tautology	  in	  English,	  it	  should.	  
Dasein	  is	  fundamentally	  the	  possibility	  of	  existing:	  Existenz	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  Dasein	  to	  be	  itself	  (since	  its	  being	  is	  never	  simply	  given	  to	  it	  as	  a	  fait	  accompli).	  Here	  the	  resonances	  of	  “Dasein”	  and	  “Existenz”	  are	  at	  least	  helpful:	  Dasein,	  as	  a	  living	  existence,	  is	  pulled	  to	  really	  “make	  something	  of	  itself,”	  as	  we	  say,	  i.e.,	  to	  actually	  exist.	  Thus	  “existence	  [Dasein]	  always	  understands	  itself	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  existence	  [Existenz],	  a	  possibility	  of	  itself	  to	  be	  itself	  or	  not	  be	  itself”	  (BT	  12).	  	   One	  might	  wonder,	  of	  course,	  how	  existence,	  or	  anything,	  for	  that	  matter,	  could	  not	  be	  itself.	  Isn’t	  everything	  what	  it	  is	  and	  not	  some	  other	  thing?	  Heidegger’s	  point	  is	  that	  the	  evidence	  for	  such	  a	  presupposition	  would	  have	  to	  be	  demonstrated	  from	  out	  of	  existence	  itself.	   But	   what	   we	   find	   there	   is	   that	   we	   are	   not	   simply	   given	   to	   ourselves	   wholly	   and	  completely:	  we	  encounter	  the	  need	  to	  decide	  what	  to	  be	   in	  advance	  of	  our	  actually	  being	  
                                                355	  See	  Sartre	  (1946),	  290-­‐292.	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that	  thing.	  For	  Dasein,	  then,	  the	  decision	  to	  be	  or	  not	  to	  be	  itself	  precedes	  its	  simply	  being	  itself.356	  There	  is	  a	  sense,	  I	  suppose,	   in	  which	  Heidegger	  will	  grant	  the	  objection,	  for	  if	  we	  try	   to	  understand	  existence	  as	   just	  another	  being—one	  being	  among	  others	   to	  which	  we	  might	   comport	   ourselves—then,	   indeed,	   we	   will	   not	   be	   able	   to	   render	   existence	   itself	  intelligible	  as	  existence.	  But	  this,	  of	  course,	  is	  precisely	  Heidegger’s	  point:	  we	  cannot	  hope	  to	  understand	  existence	  itself	  by	  drawing	  inferences	  from	  “everything,”	   i.e.,	   the	  totality	  of	  what	  simply	  has	  being.	  
Existence	  and	  the	  Meaning	  of	  Being	  Let	   us	   briefly	   review	   what	   we	   have	   found.	   Heidegger	   begins	   Being	   and	   Time	   by	  acknowledging	   that	   the	   question	   of	   the	   meaning	   of	   being	   does	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   a	  particularly	  pressing	  one	  at	  the	  moment—either	  on	  the	  current	  philosophical	  landscape	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  relevance	  to	  contemporary	  life.	  If	  anything,	  what	  arouses	  curiosity	  nowadays	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ancients	  apparently	  troubled	  themselves	  so	  much	  over	  such	  an	  obvious	  concept.	   As	   Heidegger	   puts	   it,	   what	   Plato	   and	   Aristotle	   “wrested	   with	   the	   utmost	  intellectual	  effort	  from	  the	  phenomena,	  fragmentary	  and	  incipient	  though	  it	  was,	  has	  long	  since	  become	  trivialized”	  (BT	  2).	  Nevertheless,	  Heidegger	  thinks	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  recognize	  that	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  being	  is	  presupposed	  in	  all	  our	  everyday	  dealings	  with	  beings.	  Manifestly,	   it	  would	  appear,	  we	  do	  have	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  one	  we	  are	  prepared	  to	  formulate	  explicitly.	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  question	  has	  a	  distinctive	   kind	   of	   priority:	   it	   is	   not	   just	   historically	   prior	   to	   other	   questioning	   in	  
                                                356	  By	  no	  means	  do	  I	  mean	  by	  this	  to	  assimilate	  Heidegger	  to	  Sartre’s	  radically	  ahistoricist	  position,	  which	  has	  little	   in	   common	  with	   Heidegger’s	   deeper	   project.	   Although	   I	   cannot	   trace	   Heidegger’s	   complex	   argument	  here,	  his	  view	  is	  that	  the	  possibilities	  for	  existing	  among	  which	  existence	  must	  choose	  are	  projected	  forward	  from	  out	  of	  its	  past—projected	  forward	  from	  projects	  into	  which	  existence	  ultimately	  finds	  itself	  thrown	  (see	  BT	   135).	   So	   when	   existence	   finally	   chooses	   to	   be	   itself,	   it	   does	   so	   by	   appropriating	   the	   heritage	  which	   is	  handed	  down	  to	  it,	  not	  by	  imagining	  a	  new	  future	  for	  itself	  from	  out	  of	  thin	  air	  (see	  BT	  382-­‐387).	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philosophy	  (although	  this	  is	  not	  entirely	  accidental,	  either),	  but	  it	  is	  the	  most	  basic	  category	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  we	  relate	  to	  other	  beings	  at	  all.	  For	  just	  this	  reason,	  we	  cannot	  hope	  to	  understand	  being	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  generalization	  from	  beings,	  for	  an	  understanding	  of	  being	  is	  precisely	  what	  is	  presupposed	  in	  any	  comportment	  to	  beings	  whatsoever.	  But	  how,	  then,	  is	  being	  to	  be	  understood,	  if	  not	  from	  the	  pattern	  of	  beings?	  	   Now,	  it	  would	  be	  convenient	  if	  we	  could	  simply	   look	  at	  what	  is	  preobjective	  in	  our	  experience—that	   in	   our	   experience	   which	   depends	   on	   no	   objective	   reference,	   or,	   no	  comportment	   to	   beings,	   at	   all.	   Then	   we	   could	   trace	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   beings	   become	  represented	   as	   beings	   for	   us;	   this,	   of	   course,	   is	   Husserl’s	   basic	   gambit,	   that	   of	   isolating	  preobjective,	   but	   object-­‐constituting,	   noematic	   structures	   by	   means	   of	   bracketing	   the	  positing	  of	   the	  existence	  of	   the	  natural	  world.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Heidegger	   is	  wary	  of	   this	  strategy	  of	  Husserl’s,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  he	  is	  unwilling	  to	  give	  up	  (what	  he	  perceives	  as)	  the	  core	  of	  Husserl’s	  phenomenology,	   turning	   throughout	   the	  decade	  of	   the	  1920s	   to	   the	  method	   of	   formal	   indication	   to	   indicate,	   but	   not	   exhibit	   straightaway,	   what	   Husserl	   had	  hoped	   to	   expose	   through	   his	   phenomenological	   reduction.	   In	  Being	   and	  Time	   Heidegger	  chooses	  the	  term	  “Dasein”	  to	  try	  to	  achieve	  this.	  	   A	   good	   formally	   indicative	   concept	   ought	   to	   help	   us	   resist	   the	   natural	   urge	   to	  understand	  what	  it	  indicates	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  object	  which	  could	  be	  given	  to	  us	  in	  the	  fullness	  of	  its	  content	  as	  an	  object	  of	  cognition.	  Dasein—not	  Leben,	  Bewußtsein,	  or	  Subjektivität—is	  the	  concept	   Heidegger	   now	   thinks	   is	   best	   able	   to	   aid	   us	   in	   this	   resistance.	   Whether	   we	  ultimately	  agree	  with	  him	  or	  not,	  it	  is	  easy,	  I	  think,	  to	  see	  some	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  he	  came	  around	   to	   this	  view.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  unlike	  several	  of	   the	  alternatives	   (especially	   those	  favored	   by	   the	   Neokantians),	   “Dasein”	   is	   relatively	   independent	   of	   the	   philosophical	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tradition.	  Its	  carrying	  less	  baggage	  with	  it	  gives	  it	  a	  greater	  inherent	  formality.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say,	  however,	  that	  “Dasein”	  is	  really	  in	  any	  way	  free	  from	  the	  tradition;	  one	  of	  Heidegger’s	  key	   methodological	   points	   (which	   we	   will	   shortly	   consider	   in	   more	   detail)	   is	   that	   the	  formal-­‐indicative	  power	  of	  any	  concept	   is	  exhausted	  by	   its	  ability	   to	  give	  direction	  to	  the	  historical	  inquiry	  through	  which	  we	  may	  recover	  the	  force	  of	  the	  tradition.	  All	  we	  can	  really	  say,	  at	   this	  point,	   is	   that	   “Dasein,”	  when	  compared	   to	   “Leben”	  and	  other	   terms,	   resists	   its	  objectification	   longer	   and	   thus	   helps	   sustain	   the	   questionability	   that	   our	   path	   of	  questioning	  requires.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  indicative	  force	  of	  “Dasein”	  should	  direct	  us	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  meditations	  on	  its	  “to-­‐be”	  character	  that	  we	  have	  already	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  trying	   to	   distinguish	   its	   meaning	   from	   that	   of	   “Existenz.” 357 	  And	   of	   course	   these	  considerations	   are	   closely	   interconnected:	   only	   because	   “Dasein”	   indicates	   the	   task	   of	  existence	   can	   it	   hold	   out	   against	   its	   collapse	   into	   a	   traditional	   determination	   of	   being	  (which	  has	  always	  been	  understood,	  we	  gradually	  come	  to	  see,	  in	  terms	  of	  presence).	  	   Although	  Heidegger	   claims,	   plausibly,	   I	   think,	   a	  phenomenological	   heritage	   for	  his	  method	  in	  Being	  and	  Time,	  he	  ends	  up	  occupying	  a	  position	  that	  is	  by	  no	  means	  as	  foreign	  to	   Neokantianism	   as	   is	   often	   imagined.	   This	   is	   hardly	   an	   accident,	   of	   course,	   since	   his	  earliest,	   formative	   methodological	   meditations	   were	   carried	   out	   in	   conversation	   with—even	   if	   in	   opposition	   to—Natorp’s	   methodological	   criticism	   of	   Husserl.	   In	   particular,	   it	  should	   be	   emphasized	   that	   the	   analysis	   of	   Dasein	   by	   no	   means	   provides	   us	   with	   an	  immediate,	  untrammelled	  access	  to	  that	  which	  it	  indicates.	  It	  indicates,	  of	  course,	  the	  being	  that	   I	   myself	   am	   (BT	   41),	   since	   I	   am	   the	   being	   for	   whom	   beings	   can	   be	   objects	   of	  comportment	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   But	   who,	   exactly,	   am	   I?	   What	   kind	   of	   being	   belongs	   to	  
                                                357	  See	  p.	  226	  above.	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existence?	  How	  am	  I	  proximately	  “given”	  to	  myself?	  Not,	  Heidegger	  says,	  as	  a	  “mere,	  formal,	  reflexive	  awareness”	  (BT	  115),	  as	  the	  Neokantians	  held.	  And	  yet	  the	  way	  in	  which	  I	  appear	  to	  be	  given	  to	  myself	  in	  the	  first	  place—in,	  as	  Heidegger	  says,	  “average	  everydayness”—is	  not	  as	  myself	  at	  all,	  but	  rather	  as	  das	  Man	  (BT	  129).358	  That	  is,	  I	  am	  initially	  given	  to	  myself	  as	  “just	  anyone,”	  if	  you	  will—simply	  a	  being	  among	  others	  who	  accordingly	  does	  not	  have	  to	  decide	  upon	  her	  existence	  but	  can	  simply	  be	  in	  the	  mode	  in	  which	  others	  already	  are.359	  	   If	  this	  were	  the	  only	  way	  in	  which	  we	  could	  be	  “given”	  to	  ourselves,	  Being	  and	  Time	  would	   be	   a	   short	   enough	   book,	   and	   its	   stated	   goal—raising	   once	   again	   the	   question	   of	  being—would	   in	   any	   case	   be	   foreclosed	   from	   the	   very	   start.	   Only	   because	   existence	  (Dasein)	   functions	  as	  a	  formally	   indicative	  concept	  can	  this	  outcome	  be	  avoided:	   it	  points	  beyond	  the	  “given”	  content	  of	  existence	  (according	  to	  which	  we	  find	  ourselves	  in	  average	  everydayness	  as	  das	  Man)	  to	  the	  form	  of	  that	  existence	  which	  cannot	  be	  immediately	  given	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Of	  course,	  as	  even	  Heidegger’s	  own	  reference	  shows,	  the	  Neokantians	  had	  wanted	  to	  emphasize	  the	  essentially	  formal	  nature	  of	  subjectivity.	  But	  we	  must	  be	  careful,	  Heidegger	  thinks,	  not	  to	  preemptively	  narrow	  the	  sense	  of	  “formal”	  that	  is	  operative	  here,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  trap	  into	  which	  Heidegger	  takes	  the	  Neokantians,	  with	  their	  emphasis	  on	  the	  form(s)	   of	   consciousness,	   to	   have	   fallen.	   Instead,	   we	   must	   follow	   more	   vigilantly	   the	  indication	   of	   the	   “form”	   of	   existence	   as	   a	   directedness	   away	   from	   all	   that	  which	  we	   are	  continually	  prone	  to	  mistake	  for	  its	  content,	  content	  smuggled	  in	  even	  by	  attempts	  to	  focus	  on	  subjectivity	  or	  consciousness.360	  To	  be	  sure,	  we	  can	  only	  extricate	  ourselves	  gradually	  
                                                358	  As	   Gadamer	   correctly	   notes,	   the	   reference	   to	   das	  Man	   is	   “not	   only	   to	   be	   understood	   polemically	   in	   the	  sense	  of	  a	  cultural	  criticism	  of	  the	  century	  of	  anonymous	  responsibility.	  Behind	  it	  was	  the	  critical	  motive	  that	  questioned	  the	  concept	  of	  consciousness	  itself”	  (Gadamer	  [1979],	  85).	  359	  Cf.	  Sartre’s	  diagnosis	  of	  bad	  faith.	  Sartre	  (1943),	  86-­‐116.	  360	  See	  the	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  formal	  indication	  in	  Ch.	  IV	  above.	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from	   the	   misunderstanding	   of	   ourselves	   from	   which	   we	   always	   start.	   There	   is	   no	  phenomenological	   reduction	   by	   which	   we	   could,	   at	   one	   stroke,	   transform	   our	   everyday	  understanding	   of	   ourselves	   into	   a	   field	   of	   the	   phenomenological	   a	   priori	   ripe	   for	  description.	  Natorp	  was	  right	  about	   that.	  But	  he	  was	  not	  willing	   to	   follow	  the	  clue	  of	   the	  “formal”	  all	  the	  way.	  	   Of	   course,	   the	   heart	   of	   Löwith’s	   objection	   is	   that,	   in	   Being	   and	   Time,	   at	   least,	  Heidegger	  was	  not	  willing	   to	  do	  so,	  either.	   In	  Being	  and	  Time	   the	  move	   from	  the	   initially	  misunderstood	  content	  to	  its	  indicated	  form	  is	  in	  the	  first	  place	  supposed	  to	  be	  achieved	  by	  means	  of	  an	  analysis	  of	  structuring	  conditions	  of	  possibility,	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  which	  in	  each	  case	  are	  brought	  to	  light	  under	  the	  guidance	  of	  the	  formal	  indication	  of	  existence.	  Through	   this	   process	   the	   structures	   of	   existence’s	   everydayness	   reveal	   themselves	   to	   be	  derivative	   modes	   of	   more	   basic	   ways	   of	   existing,	   ways	   which	   actually	   come	   closer	   to	  expressing	  what	  we	  had	  intended	  to	  indicate	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  inquiry.	  Heidegger	  calls	  his	  task	   here	   a	   “preparatory	   fundamental	   analysis	   of	   existence,”	   since	   only	   by	   referring	   to	  structuring	   conditions	   of	   possibility	  will	  we	   be	   able	   to	   bring	   to	   focus	   the	   significance	   of	  these	   structures	   that	   are	   incompletely	   understood	   in	   average	   everydayness:	   idle	   chatter,	  for	   example,	   is	   only	   intelligible	   as	   a	   derivative	  mode	   of	   authentic	   disclosive	   speech	   (BT	  167-­‐170).	  The	  more	  primordial	  existential	  structures	  we	  uncover	  will	  themselves,	  in	  turn,	  be	  unified	  by	   further	   structural	   levels.	  Thus	  at	   several	  points	   throughout	  Being	  and	  Time	  Heidegger’s	  methodology	  can	  appear	  to	  be	  straightforwardly	  transcendental,	   in	  the	  sense	  of	  beginning	  from	  given	  facts	  and	  ascending,	  step	  by	  step,	  to	  their	  conditions	  of	  possibility.	  	   There	   are	   reasons,	   however,	   to	   be	   cautious	   here,	   given	   the	   nature	   of	   Heidegger’s	  method	  of	  formal	  indication.	  First,	  the	  “fact”	  of	  human	  existence	  is	  not	  really	  given	  as	  such,	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but	   rather,	   at	   first	   and	   for	   the	   most	   part,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   existence’s	   natural	   tendency	   to	  misunderstand	   itself.	   Thus	   the	   existential	   structure	   we	   uncover	   gives	   us	   not	   just	   the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	  a	  given	  fact,	  but	  a	  new	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  fact	  itself.	  In	  fact,	  the	  “facts”	  of	  everyday	  life	  turn	  out	  not	  to	  have	  been	  what	  we	  originally	  took	  them	  as	  being:	  as	  Heidegger	  found	  out	  early	  on,	  existence	  does	  not	  wear	  its	  facticity	  on	  its	  sleeve.	  This	   means	   that	   uncovering	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   of	   existence’s	   facticity	   is	   an	  essential	  step	  in	  arriving	  at	  that	  very	  facticity.	  So	  although	  the	  existential	  structure	  is	  not	  the	  existence	  we	  had	  formally	  indicated,	  it	  represents	  a	  movement	  towards	  our	  goal.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  we	  must	  understand	  Heidegger’s	  claim	  that	  the	  existential	  analysis	   itself	  must	  prove	  to	  be	  an	  existentiell	  possibility	  of	  existence,	  made	  first	  in	  the	  introduction	  (BT	  13),	  but	  then	  reinforced	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  second	  division	  (BT	  234,	  267).	  Heidegger’s	  goal,	  we	  must	  remember,	  is	  not	  just	  to	  provide	  his	  readers	  with	  an	  abstract	  analysis	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  human	  existence,	  but	  to	  lead	  them	  to	  participate	  in	  it	  in	  a	  living	  manner.	  The	  existential	   interpretation	  of	  these	  structures	  is	  therefore	  always	  ultimately	  responsible	  to	  the	   moment,	   as	   it	   were,	   of	   lived	   immediacy	   which	   we	   had	   initially	   indicated	   so	  insufficiently.	  
Being	  and	  Time:	  Division	  Two	  Existence,	  we	  have	  seen,	  should	  most	  properly	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  task.	  How,	  then,	  do	  we	  carry	  it	  out?	  As	  Heidegger	  puts	  it,	  the	  question	  of	  existence,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  Dasein	  will	   be	  Existenz,	   or,	   just	   as	  much,	   the	  question	  of	  whether	   existence	  will	   be	   itself,	   “never	  gets	   straightened	   out	   except	   through	   existing	   itself.	   The	   understanding	   of	   oneself	  which	  leads	   along	   this	   way	   we	   call	   existentiell”	   (BT	   12).	   To	   choose	   this	   or	   that	   possibility,	  however,	   does	   not	   require	   us	   to	   represent	   these	   possibilities	   to	   ourselves,	   nor	   does	   it	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require	  us	  to	  understand	  explicitly	  the	  structure	  of	  existing	  at	  all.	  Far	  from	  it:	  the	  possibility	  of	   coming	   to	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   structure	   of	   existence	   is	   itself	   just	   one	   existentiell	  possibility	  among	  others.	  For	  this	  reason	  Heidegger	  insists	  that	  “the	  roots	  of	  the	  existential	  analysis,	  for	  their	  part,	  are	  ultimately	  existentiell”	  (BT	  13;	  cf.	  L	  21:248;	  PIK	  25:38).	  	   On	  its	  surface,	  this	  may	  simply	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  triviality:	  philosophy,	  as	  an	  activity	  of	  human	  beings,	  must	  be	  one	  possible	  way	  of	  life	  for	  them.	  But	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  a	  distinct	  echo	  of	  Heidegger’s	   commitment	   to	   philosophy	   as	   a	  way	   of	   life,	   not	   just	   an	   analysis	   of	   it,	   that	  dominates	  Heidegger’s	   thinking	   throughout	   the	  1920s.	  The	   result	   is	   that	  Being	  and	  Time,	  even	   if	  we	   restrict	   ourselves	   to	   the	   published	   portion	   of	   that	   project,	   harbors	   a	   peculiar	  methodology.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	   (preliminary)	   goal	   of	   the	   book	   is	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	  
existential	  structures	  of	  existentiell	  possibilities.	  But	  the	  analysis,	  in	  turn,	  must	  be	  shown	  to	  be	   itself	  capable	  of	  being	   lived	  (although	  the	   living	   itself,	   to	  be	  sure,	  remains	  a	  task	  to	  be	  always	   completed	   by	   the	   reader). 361 	  Thus	   there	   arises	   a	   distinctive	   conditioning	  relationship	  between	  the	  existentiell	  and	  the	  existential:	  although	  the	  existential	  analysis	  is	  supposed	   to	   lay	   out	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   of	   (existentiell)	   existence,	   the	   former	  depends,	   in	   turn,	  on	   the	   latter—so	  much	  so,	   in	   fact,	   that	  existential	  analysis	  will	  demand	  what	   Heidegger	   calls	   an	   existentiell	   “attestation.”	   This	   is	   just	   what	   it	   sounds	   like:	   one	  possibility	   among	   others	   in	  which	   the	   existential	   structure	   itself	   is	  made	   transparent,	   in	  other	  words,	  an	  existentiell	  possibility	  which	  vouches	  for	  the	  analysis.	  	   The	  basic	   task	  of	   the	   second	  division,	   as	  described	  by	  Heidegger	   in	   several	  places	  (see	  BT	  17,	  234),	  is	  apparently	  straightforward:	  we	  must	  repeat	  the	  preparatory	  analytic	  of	  Division	  One	  on	  an	  ontological	  basis.	  But	  to	  recover	  the	  “logic”	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  beings	  
                                                361	  See	  p.	  199	  above.	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(and	  thus	  provide	  the	  requisite	  “ontological	  basis”)	  we	  will	  need	  to	  have	  a	  manner	  of	  access	  to	  Dasein	   that	   is	  not	   completely	  determined	  by	   its	   interpretation	  of	   itself	   as	   just	   another	  being.	  Division	  One	  provided	  an	  analysis	  of	  average	  everydayness,	  and	  as	  such	  concerned	  itself	  exclusively	  with	  the	  structure	  of	  inauthentic	  existence	  (BT	  232).	  In	  the	  first	  instance,	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  existence	  is,	  as	  we	  know,	  precisely	  not	  itself.	  And	  yet	  the	  structural	  analysis	  of	  Division	  One,	  following,	  as	  it	  does,	  the	  formal	  indication	  of	  existence,	  has	  already	  prepared	   the	   ground	   for	   the	   ontological	   repetition	   of	   its	   analysis.	   The	   inauthenticity	   of	  existence	  has	  by	  no	  means	  been	  merely	  a	  negative	  foil	  to	  our	  inquiry:	  “This	  indifference	  of	  the	  everydayness	  of	  existence	   [Dasein]	   is	  not	   nothing,	   but	   rather	  a	  positive	  phenomenal	  characteristic	  of	  this	  being.	  All	  existing	  [Existieren]	  is	  how	  it	  is	  from	  out	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  being	  and	   back	   into	   it”	   (BT	   43).	   In	   a	   manner	   of	   speaking,	   the	   directedness	   back	   to	   the	  conditioning	  possibilities	  of	  existence	  already	  indicates,	  though	  incompletely,	  the	  ability	  of	  existence	   to	  be	   itself	   (i.e.,	   for	  Dasein	   to	   achieve	  Existenz).	  As	  Heidegger	   says,	   “Manifestly,	  existence	  [Dasein]	   itself	  must,	   in	   its	  being	  [Sein],	  profess	  the	  possibility	  and	  manner	  of	   its	  authentic	  existence”	  (BT	  234).	  	   This	   is	   the	   transitional	   point	   at	  which	  we	   find	   ourselves	   at	   the	   outset	   of	   Division	  Two.	  Despite	  all	  the	  groundwork	  laid	  in	  the	  first	  division,	  we	  are	  still	  having	  a	  distinctive	  kind	  of	  trouble	  getting	  existence	  as	  a	  whole	  into	  view.	  This	  is	  not	  just	  the	  result	  of	  a	  faulty	  analysis	  or	  an	  accidental	  shortcoming	  of	  Division	  One;	  there	  is	  something	  about	  existence	  itself,	   Heidegger	   now	   points	   out,	   that	   resists	   our	   attempt	   to	   grasp	   it	   as	   a	   unified	  phenomenon	  (BT	  233).	  Since	  the	  object	  of	  our	  analysis,	  existence,	  is	  the	  very	  being	  that	  in	  each	  case	  we	  ourselves	  are,	  a	  peculiar	  difficulty	  attaches	  to	  the	  task	  of	  grasping	  our	  object	  as	  a	  whole,	  or	  as	  a	  unity.	  Recall	  that	  it	  was	  troubles	  of	  just	  this	  sort	  that	  Natorp	  had	  been	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keen	  to	  insist	  upon	  (against	  Husserl)	  in	  Heidegger’s	  formative	  years.	  In	  Natorp’s	  language,	  because	   subjectivity	   essentially	   bestows	   form	   and	   unity	   upon	   its	   objective	   constructs,	  subjectivity	  in	  itself	  cannot	  straightaway	  become	  an	  object	  for	  itself.	  Since	  Heidegger’s	  reply	  to	  Natorp,	  as	  it	  developed	  throughout	  the	  1920s,	  turned	  on	  his	  invocation	  of	  the	  Husserlian	  technique	   of	   formalization,	  we	  would	   expect	   him	   to	  make	   a	   structurally	   similar	  move	   at	  this	  point	  in	  Being	  and	  Time.	  	   As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  I	  think	  we	  should	  be	  able	  to	  see	  that	  this	  is,	  in	  essence,	  just	  what	  he	   does.	   Granted,	   his	   appeal	   to	   his	   established	  methodology	   is	   not	   always	   obvious,	   and	  Heidegger	   takes	   this	   to	   have	   seriously	  misled	   even	   those	  who,	   like	   Löwith,	   should	   have	  been	  best	  prepared	  to	  understand	  it.	  To	  see	  what	  Heidegger	  is	  up	  to,	  however,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  try	  to	  bring	  to	  clarity	  the	  problem	  with	  which	  he	  begins	  Division	  Two:	  that	  of	  bringing	  the	  whole	  of	  existence	  into	  view.	  It	  is	  striking	  that	  when	  Heidegger	  introduces	  care	  as	  the	  being	  of	  existence	  in	  I.6,	  he	  has	  already	  referred	  to	  what	  appears—on	  the	  surface,	  at	  least—to	  be	  the	  very	  same	  whole:	  The	  being	  of	  existence	  [der	  Sein	  des	  Daseins],	  which	  sustains	  ontologically	  the	  structural	  whole	  as	  such,	  becomes	  accessible	  for	  us	  when	  we	  look	  all	  the	  way	  
through	  this	  whole	  at	  a	  single	  originally	  unified	  phenomenon	  already	  lying	  in	   this	   whole	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   it	   is	   the	   ontological	   basis	   for	   each	   of	   its	  structural	  moments	  in	  its	  structural	  possibility.	  (BT	  181)	  	  Care,	  we	  might	  say,	  is	  supposed	  to	  function	  as	  a	  point	  of	  analysis	  by	  which	  we	  can	  look	  at	  and	  keep	  sight	  of—all	  at	  once—the	  other	  moments	  of	   the	  existentiell	  analysis	  of	  Division	  One.	   One	   might	   reasonably	   wonder,	   then,	   why	   there	   apparently	   remains	   yet	   another	  problem	   concerning	   the	   whole	   of	   existence	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   Division	   Two.362	  To	   see	  what	   the	   new	   difficulty	   is	   supposed	   to	   be,	   the	   heritage	   of	   Heidegger’s	   engagement	  with	  
                                                362	  I	  thank	  Jessica	  Polish	  for	  forcing	  me	  to	  grapple	  with	  this	  question	  in	  conversation.	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Natorp	  and	  his	  subsequent	  development	  of	  the	  method	  of	  formal	  indication	  are	  essential.	  In	  1919	  his	   idea	  had	  been	  that	   life	   is	  self-­‐interpreting,	  that	  phenomenology	  merely	  presents	  life’s	  own	  intensification	  of	  itself.	  Now	  he	  uses	  this	  insight	  to	  enact—or,	  better,	  to	  indicate	  the	   indispensability	   of	   a	   further	   enactment	   (on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   reader)	   of—the	  transformation	  of	  an	  analysis	  of	  existence	  into	  the	  register	  of	  existence	  itself.	  	   As	  long	  as	  it	  is	  afforded	  a	  strictly	  limited	  significance,	  the	  result	  of	  Division	  One	  may	  be	  left	  to	  stand.	  Existence	  may,	  indeed,	  be	  characterized	  by	  care,	  but	  to	  “see”	  the	  structural	  whole	  in	  this	  way	  is	  not	  necessarily	  adequate	  to	  the	  formally	  indicated	  existence	  to	  which	  we	  pointed	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  our	  inquiry.	  What	  is	  needed,	  Heidegger	  now	  specifies,	  is	  to	  “see”	  the	  existential	  structure	  as	  a	  whole	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  it	  “fills	  up”	  a	  real	  possibility	  for	  being.	   It	  shouldn’t	  be	   in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  doctrine	  which	  we	  either	  produce	  or	  recite;	  rather,	  it’s	   supposed	   to	  be	   something	  we	  experience	  as	   an	  existentiell	   possibility	   (see,	   again,	  BT	  12-­‐13).	  The	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  we’re	  trying	  to	  give	  must	  themselves	  be	  full-­‐blooded	  existentiell	  possibilities	   in	   such	  a	  way	   that,	   if	  we	  pull	   it	  off,	   there	   should	  be	  no	   room	   left	  over	   for	   the	   objection	   that	   we’ve	   failed	   to	   analyze	   everyday	   life	   as	   really	   lived	   and	  experienced;	   it	   should	   be	   transparent	   that	   our	   analysis	   not	   only	   is	   responsive	   to	   that	  demand,	   but	   issues	   itself	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   it	   shows	   this	   through	   existence	   itself.	   And	  because	   existence	   is	   always	   characterized	   by	   its	   “to-­‐be”	   structure,	   this	   means	   that	   the	  endpoint	  of	  philosophy	  is	  not	  understanding—at	  least	  according	  to	  its	  traditional	  cognitive	  interpretation—but	  decision.	  Thus,	  again,	  the	  question	  of	  existence	  is	  only	  straightened	  out	  through	  existing	  (BT	  12).	  	   In	  Division	  Two	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	   this	  decision	   is	   laid	  out	   for	   the	   reader	   through	  Heidegger’s	   famous	   discussion	   of	   being-­‐towards-­‐death.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   appreciate	   the	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often-­‐overlooked	  methodological	   role	   these	   sections	   of	   the	   text	   are	   supposed	   to	   play.	   In	  particular,	  Heidegger	  here	  focuses	  on	  the	  way	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  death	  foregrounds	  the	  
formal	  aspect	  of	  existence	  in	  a	  more	  radical	  way	  than	  has	  been	  possible	  in	  the	  text	  of	  Being	  
and	  Time	  up	  to	  this	  point.	  To	  see	  this,	  first	  notice	  that	  every	  concrete	  existentiell	  possibility	  has	  in	  common	  a	  certain	  form,	  the	  form	  of	  possibility	  as	  such.	  Now,	  this	  form	  may	  not	  be	  thematically	   foregrounded	   in	   any	   particular	   living	   existentiell	   possibility.	   In	   fact,	   and	   for	  essential	  reasons,	  we	  tend	  to	  obscure	  or	  cover	  up	  the	  form	  of	  possibility	  as	  such:	  we	  tend	  to	  project	   forward	   possibilities	   as	   so	   many	   future	   states	   of	   affairs	   and	   take	   our	   decision-­‐making	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  calculative	  play	  with	  various	  possible	  objective	  scenarios.363	  But	  this	  is	  to	  effectively	  collapse	  possibilities	  into	  actualities,	  not	  to	  confront	  them	  as	  possibilities.	  In	  fact,	   Heidegger	   thinks,	   the	   only	  way	   to	   come	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  with	   a	   possibility	   as	   such	   is	   to	  drain	   the	   latter	   of	   all	   its	   possible	   objective	   content,	   i.e.,	   the	   representation	   of	   it	   through	  constellations	   of	   possible	   states	   of	   affairs	   that	   may	   be	   brought	   about.	   And	   in	   its	   purest	  form,	  this	  is	  just	  what	  the	  possibility	  of	  (our	  own)	  death	  really	  is.	  It	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  .	  .	  .,	  where	  that	  ellipsis	  cannot	  be	   filled	   in	  with	  any	  objective	  content	  without	  destroying	   it	  as	  the	  possibility	  that	  it	  is.	  Thus	  the	  possibility	  of	  dying	  expresses	  in	  the	  purest	  way	  the	  mere	  form	  of	  possibility	  and	  precludes	  our	  misunderstanding	  the	  existential	  nature	  of	  possibility	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  possibilities	  which	  are	  really	  just	  possible	  actualities.364 The	   key	   connection	   to	   see	   here	   is	   that	   between	   being-­‐towards-­‐death,	   the	   form	   of	  possibility,	   and	   authenticity,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   formal	   indication	   of	   existence	  
                                                363	  See	  Heidegger’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  “situation”	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  decision	  in	  §62.	  In	  deciding,	  existence	  can	  never	   rigidify	   its	  need	   to	  decide	   into	  an	  objective	   choice	  made	   “once	  and	   for	  all,”	   come	  what	  may.	   Instead,	  Dasein	  always	  reserves	  the	  possibility	  of	  “retrieving”	  itself	  for	  a	  deeper	  form	  of	  resolve	  (BT	  308).	  364	  As	  any	  reader	  of	  Heidegger	  will	   immediately	  recognize	  (and	  perhaps	  object!),	   I	  am	  in	  fact	  truncating	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  beginning	  of	  Division	  Two	  rather	  severely.	  The	  attestation	  is	  ultimately	  traced	  to	  existence’s	  wanting	   to	   have	   a	   conscience	   (BT	   287-­‐288).	   Suffice	   it	   to	   say	   that	   the	   structural	   point	   about	   possibility	  remains	  determinative	  throughout	  this	  movement.	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(Dasein),	  on	  the	  other.	  Because	  the	  phenomenal	  content	  formally	  indicated	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	   inquiry	   reveals	   itself	   (though	   not	   objectively!)	   as	   pure	   possibility,	   existence	   “finds	  itself”	  only	  constantly	  on	  its	  own	  way	  to	  itself	  (rather	  than	  simply	  being	  there	  as	  objectively	  present,	   the	  way	   you	   find	   a	   domino	   under	   the	   couch).	   In	  my	   relation	   to	  my	   own	   death,	  which	  Heidegger	  terms	  “anticipation,”	  my	  existence	  is	  brought	  back	  from	  its	  dispersal	  into	  
das	  Man—where	  I	  might	  as	  well	  be	  anyone—to	  myself,	  as	  such.	  In	  this	  context	  we	  should	  remember	  Heidgger’s	  earlier	  remark	  that	  “the	  being	  which	  is	  concerned	  in	  its	  being	  about	  its	  being	  is	  related	  to	   its	  being	  as	   its	  ownmost	  possibility”	  (BT	  42).	   In	  anticipatory	  being-­‐towards-­‐death	  existence	  is	  brought	  back	  to	  itself.365	  Is	  this	  something	  we	  can	  recognize	  as	  an	  existentiell	  possibility	  of	  existence?	  It	  had	  better	  be,	  if	  Heidegger’s	  analysis	  is	  really	  going	  to	  do	  justice	  to	  existence	  in	  the	  radical	  way	  his	  method	  requires.	  But	  what	  would	  it	  mean	  for	  existence	  to	  be	  brought	  back	  to	  itself?	  We	  can	  recall	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  one	  of	  getting	  existence	  as	  a	  whole	  into	  view	  here.	  But	  what	  kind	   of	   whole	   is	   appropriate	   to	   the	   form	   of	   existence?	   Existence	   is	   not,	   after	   all,	   an	  objectively	   present	   entity	   posited	   between	   two	   fixed	   nodes—authenticity	   and	  inauthenticity—which	   it	   might	   occupy,	   but	   is	   rather	   a	   possibility	   continually	   and	  indefinitely	  stretched	  between	  two	  projectable	  ways	  of	  being—to	  be	  itself	  or	  not.	  So	  even	  existence’s	  ownmost	  possibility,	  which	  would	  project	  its	  authentic	  being,	  cannot	  ultimately	  close	  off	  the	  openness	  of	  existence	  to	  its	  entanglement	  in	  inauthenticity	  (and	  the	  converse	  holds,	  too).	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  parallel	  methodological	  consequence:	  the	  existential	  analysis	  can	  never	   coincide	  objectively	  with	  an	  existentiell	  possibility,	   for	   the	   initial	   formal	   indication	  never	   objectively	   reaches	   the	   “material”	   we	   might	   suppose	   it	   had	   intended;	   rather,	   the	  
                                                365	  And	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  forced	  to	  reckon	  with	  itself	  as	  a	  nullity	  (BT	  284-­‐285).	  
 242	  
relevant	   unity	   being	   sought	   by	   Heidegger	   in	   an	   attestation	   is	   a	   unity	   bound	   together	  
projectively.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  unity	  we	  are	  looking	  for	  here—getting	  existence	  as	  a	  whole	  into	  view—must	  match	  the	  unity	  disclosed	  by	  the	  preliminary	  analysis	  itself.	  This	   is	   not	   the	   occasion	   to	   trace	   the	   development	   of	   Division	   Two	   any	   further.	   A	  general	  observation	  about	   the	  movement	  operative	   in	   it	  will	  have	  to	  suffice.	  The	  analysis	  there	   has	   to	   answer,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   to	   our	   ownmost,	   i.e.,	   most	   authentic,	   possibility,	  while	   being	   responsible	   at	   the	   same	   time	   to	   our	   average	   everydayness,	   and	   the	   tension	  inherent	   here	   cannot	   be	   relieved	   by	   simply	   showing	   an	   identity	   between	   the	   two.	   But	   it	  doesn’t	  follow	  from	  this	  that	  existence	  lacks	  a	  unified	  nature,	  only	  that	  the	  specific	  kind	  of	  unity	  appropriate	  to	  existence	  is	  the	  unity	  of	  a	  being	  whose	  being	  is	  essentially	  projective	  existing-­‐in-­‐possibility.	  The	  tension	  cannot	  be	  dissolved	  by	  way	  of	  a	  theoretical	  maneuver,	  but	  rather	  falls	  back	  upon	  each	  of	  us	  as	  a	  decision	  to	  be	  rendered.	  If	  Being	  and	  Time	  leads	  to	  clarity	  concerning	  existence,	  it	  does	  so	  not	  by	  laying	  it	  out	  theoretically	  as	  an	  object	  to	  be	  grasped,	  but	  by	  leaving	  us	  holding	  the	  bag	  with	  a	  pressing	  urgency:	  am	  I	  going	  to	  exist	  as	  the	   being	   which	   I	   am,	   or	   not?366	  Philosophy,	   Heidegger	   holds,	   is	   therefore	   the	   freest	  possibility	   of	   human	   existence,	   “when	   individual	   existence	   understands	   itself—but	   that	  means:	  when	  individual	  existence	  has	  decided	  to	  understand	  itself”	  (PIK	  25:39).	  
The	  Unkept	  Promise	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  The	  structure	  of	  Being	  and	  Time,	  as	  Heidegger	  had	  originally	  projected	  it,	  was	  not	  to	  be	  all	  that	   different	   from	   a	   typical	   structure	   he	   used	   in	   his	   lecture	   courses	   in	   the	   1920s.	   His	  courses	  often	  had	  a	  historical	   subject	  matter	   (even	   if	   that	  was	  not	  made	  explicit	   in	   their	  titles),	   which	   Heidegger	   would	   preface	   by	   way	   of	   a	   substantive,	   usually	   overlong	  
                                                366	  Thus	  Magda	  King	  writes	  that	  “the	  first	  time	  one	  truly	  understands	  Heidegger’s	  questions	  one	  knows	  it	  by	  a	  cold	  shiver	  running	  down	  one’s	  spine”	  (King	  [2001],	  3).	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introduction	   to	   the	   basic	   principles	   of	   phenomenological	   research.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,367	  Heidegger	  on	  one	  occasion	  even	  had	  to	  be	  rebuked	  by	  his	  own	  students	  to	  move	  from	  his	  preliminary	   considerations	   to	   the	   historical	   subject	   matter	   he	   had	   promised	   to	   treat.	  Without	  such	  external	  pressures	  bearing	  down	  on	  him,	  it	  should	  be	  no	  great	  surprise	  that	  he	  simply	  never	  got	  to	  the	  historical	  subject	  matter	  he	  had	  promised	  in	  Being	  and	  Time,	  or	  even	  to	  the	  third	  division	  of	  Part	  I,	  which	  of	  course	  was	  supposed	  (among	  other	  things)	  to	  lay	  the	  ground	  for	  the	  transition	  to	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy.	  Heidegger	  himself	  acknowledged,	   just	  a	   few	  months	  before	  retreating	  to	  his	  Todtnauberg	  cottage	  to	  try	  to	  write	  Being	  and	  Time,	  that	  “we	  always	  underestimate	  the	  necessity	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  positive	  preparation	  we	  have	  to	  make	  to	  avoid	  violating	  the	  past”	  (L	  21:72).	  	   What	  was	   the	   third	   division	   of	  Being	  and	  Time’s	   first	   part	   supposed	   to	   look	   like?	  According	   to	  Heidegger,	   this	   (never	   completed)	  division	  would	   enact	   the	   transition	   from	  the	  ontological	  analysis	  of	  existence	  to	  the	  temporal	  basis	  of	  existence’s	  understanding	  of	  being.	   To	   be	   sure,	   Division	   Two	   already	   takes	   several	   decisive	   steps	   in	   this	   direction.	  Temporality	   is	   shown	   to	   be	   the	   ontological	   significance	   of	   care.	   Yet	   even	   this	   does	   not	  suffice	   to	   show	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   understanding	   of	   temporality	   is	   the	   ground	   of	   the	  meaning	  of	  being	  in	  general.	  Heidegger	  brings	  the	  published	  portion	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  to	  a	  close	   by	   acknowledging	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   temporality	   at	   which	   we	   have	  provisionally	   arrived	   and	   by	   reemphasizing	   the	   signal	   importance	   of	   the	  method	   of	   the	  treatise	  as	  a	  whole:	  The	   source	   and	   possibility	   of	   the	   “idea”	   of	   being	   in	   general	   can	   never	   be	  investigated	  by	  means	  of	   the	   “abstractions”	  of	   formal	   logic,	   that	   is,	  without	  any	  secure	  horizon	  for	  question	  and	  answer.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  look	  for	  a	  way	  of	  clarifying	  the	  fundamental	  question	  of	  ontology	  and	  to	  go	  along	  this	  way.	  
                                                367	  See	  n.	  316	  above.	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Whether	  it	   is	  the	  only	  one	  or	  even	  the	  right	  one	  can	  be	  decided	  only	  after	  
one	  has	  first	  gone	  along	  it.	  (BT	  437)	  	  Even	  Division	  Three,	  had	  it	  been	  completed,	  would	  not	  have	  settled	  the	  final	  score	  with	  the	  meaning	   of	   being.	   In	   fact,	   what	   Division	   Three	   should	   have	   brought	   to	   light	   is	   the	  insufficiency	   of	   the	   attempt	   to	  work	   out	   the	   temporal	   basis	   of	   the	   constitution	   of	   beings	  without	   an	   attendant	   destruction	   of	   the	   history	   of	   philosophy.368	  Neither	   Husserl	   (in	   his	  lectures	   on	   the	   phenomenology	   of	   internal	   time	   consciousness)	   nor	   Kant	   (chiefly	   in	   the	  first-­‐edition	  Transcendental	  Deduction	  in	  the	  Critique),	  despite	  their	  genuine	  diligence	  on	  this	   score,	   could	   have	   succeeded	   in	   the	   description	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   time,	   for	   they	  were	  held	   in	   thrall	   to	   the	   traditional	  understanding	  of	  being	  as	  primarily	   and	  essentially	  
presence.	  Division	  Three	  of	  Being	  and	  Time,	  facing	  the	  same	  obstacle,	  can	  only	  overcome	  it	  by	  being	  embedded	  in	  the	  larger	  project	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  sketched	  in	  its	  introduction.	  It	  is	  to	  the	  Introduction	  to	  which	  we	  must	  now	  return	  if	  we	  hope	  to	  understand	  the	  significance	  Heidegger	  attached	  to	  Part	  II	  of	  Being	  and	  Time.	  On	  its	  surface,	  the	  transition	  from	  Part	  I	  to	  Part	  II	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	   looks	  like	  the	  transition	  from	  philosophy	  proper	  to	  its	  history.	  But	  even	  the	  apparently	  secure	  “results”	  of	  Part	   I	   inherit	   the	   formally	   indicative	   character	   of	   its	   guiding	   method.	   This	   means	   that	  temporality	   itself	  must	   now	   serve	   to	   formally	   indicate	   the	   theme	   of	   time	   as	   it	   has	   been	  worked	   out	   in	   the	   philosophical	   tradition.	   As	   Heidegger	   puts	   it,	   what	   is	   positive	   in	   the	  inquiry	   into	   the	  determination	   of	   being	  by	   time	   is	  entirely	  exhausted	   by	   its	   function	   as	   a	  “directive	   for	   concrete	  historical	   research”	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  history	   of	   philosophy	   (BT	  19).	  Thus	  what	  appeared	  initially	  as	  a	  properly	  “philosophical	  question”	  is	  resolved	  into	  an	  essentially	   historical	   inquiry,	   an	   inquiry	   which	   nonetheless	   remains	   tethered	   to	   and	  
                                                368	  See	  Schalow	  (2000),	  182.	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ultimately	   receives	   its	   guidance	   from	   the	  phenomenon	  of	   existential	   temporality	  worked	  out	  in	  Part	  I.369	  	   The	   process	   of	   coming	   to	   grips	   with	   the	   tradition	   in	   this	   way	   Heidegger	   calls	  destruction	   (Destruktion).	   Several	   alternative	   English	   translations	   have	   been	   proposed:	  “destructuring”	   and	   “deconstruction”	   foremost	   among	   them.370	  Whatever	   translation	   is	  preferred,	  the	  word	  should	  retain	  some	  measure	  of	  polemical	  edge,	  but	  it	  must	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  that	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  intend	  anything	  like	  a	  critical	  attack	  on	  the	  tradition	  (which	  would,	   perhaps,	   serve	  merely	   to	   justify	   our	   own	   ignorance	   of	   it),	   but	   rather	   a	   piece-­‐by-­‐piece,	  patient	   taking-­‐apart	  of	   its	   animating	  assumptions.	   Such	  assumptions,	  of	   course,	  do	  not	   generally	   begin	   as	   assumptions;	   rather,	   they	   gradually	   become	   such	   through	   the	  increasing	   difficulty	   of	   remembering	   the	   contexts	   of	   the	   problems	   to	   which	   these	  assumptions	  were	  originally	  supposed	  to	  be	  answers.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  begins	  its	  life	  as	  an	   answer	   to	   a	   pressing	   problem	   slowly	   turns	   into	   an	   obvious	   starting	   point	   for	   further	  inquiry.	  Such	  inquiry	  makes	  progress,	  however,	  only	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  covering	  over	  the	  force	  and	  urgency	  of	  the	  original	  questions	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  what	  now	  function	  only	  as	  obvious	  presuppositions.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  philosophical	  tradition,	  as	  it	  has	  been	  handed	  down	  to	  us,	  remains	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   difficulties	   the	   phenomena	   presented	   to	   the	   most	   ancient	  thinkers,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  reflection	  that	  has	  grown	  increasingly	  pale	  as	  philosophical	  thought	  has	  consolidated	  its	  “progress.”	  	   As	  the	  original	  difficulties	  recede	  further	  and	  further	  from	  view,	  it	  is	  increasingly	  the	  case	   that	   we	   take	   the	   reflection	   for	   the	   real	   thing—philosophy	   being	   more	   and	   more	  
                                                369	  Cf.	  Heidegger’s	  plan	  for	  his	  WS	  1921-­‐1922	  course,	  discussed	  above,	  p.	  202.	  370	  Van	  Buren	  defends	  understanding	  Destruktion	  as	  deconstruction	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  “Abbauen”).	  This	  seems	  to	   me	   to	   be	   basically	   right,	   although	   it	   is	   a	   little	   hard	   to	   know	   what	   the	   general	   sense	   of	   the	   English	  “deconstruction”	  is	  supposed	  to	  be.	  See	  van	  Buren	  (1994),	  30.	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alienated	   from	   what	   gave	   rise	   to	   it	   in	   the	   first	   place.371	  Here	   again	   we	   can	   see	   the	  continuing	  strength	  of	  Heidegger’s	  attachment	  to	  Husserl’s	  principle	  of	  principles:	  because	  the	   vital	   content	   of	   the	   philosophical	   tradition	   has	   been	   reduced	   over	   time	   to	   all-­‐too-­‐familiar—even	   apparently	   self-­‐evident—concepts	   and	   theories,	   we	   increasingly	   tend	   to	  take	   for	   granted	   that	   these	   concepts	   and	   theories	   speak	   to	   the	   genuine	   “problems	   of	  philosophy.”	  But	  we	  do	  so	  without	  taking	  the	  effort	  to	  demonstrate	  to	  ourselves	  just	  what	  these	  problems	  of	  philosophy	  really	  are.	  We	  proceed	  instead	  as	  if	  the	  gaps	  in	  the	  theories	  and	  the	  equivocations	  over	  concepts	  into	  which	  well-­‐meaning	  thinkers	  are	  led	  illustrate	  the	  philosophical	   problems	   bequeathed	   to	   us	   by	   the	   previous	   generation,372	  but	   in	   truth	  we	  cannot	  make	   these	  problems	  our	  own,	  and	  hence	  recognize	   them	  as	  genuine	  problems	   at	  all,	  except	  by	  exhibiting	  for	  ourselves	  their	  provenance	  in	  existence.	  	   But	   how	  do	  we	   do	   so?	  One	  might	   suppose	   that	   the	   principle	   of	   principles	   carries	  along	   with	   it	   an	   immediate,	   obvious	   answer:	   go	   back	   to	   the	   intuitive	   (or,	   adjusting	   for	  Heidegger’s	  broadening	  of	  Husserl’s	  notion	  of	  intuition:	  back	  to	  the	  existential)	  basis	  for	  all	  philosophical	  theories	  and	  trace	  their	  relevance	  systematically	  back	  to	  this	  lived	  basis.	  But	  this,	  as	  we	  have	  by	  now	  seen	  Heidegger	  insist	  time	  and	  time	  again,	  is	  simply	  not	  possible.	  We	  can,	  to	  be	  sure,	  indicate	  this	  phenomenal	  basis	  of	  all	  theory	  in	  general,	  but	  any	  content	  that	  we	  succeed	  in	  indicating	  is	  in	  every	  case	  already	  tradition-­‐laden.	  So	  in	  order	  to	  destroy	  the	  tradition,	  it	  is	  not	  as	  if	  we	  could	  just	  blow	  it	  up	  and	  then	  proceed	  to	  reconstruct	  it	  from	  the	  materials	  left	  over	  from	  the	  explosion;	  instead,	  we	  must	  work	  painstakingly	  backwards	  
                                                371	  Recall	  Heidegger’s	   complaints	   about	   philosophers	   philosophizing	   from	   the	   books	   of	   their	   colleagues	   (p.	  165	  above)!	  372	  Thus	   Heidegger	   consistently	   rejected	   the	   “history	   of	   problems”	   approach	   to	   philosophy	   which	   was	  associated	  with	  Windelband	   and,	  more	   loosely,	   Neokantianism	   as	   a	   whole.	   On	   this	   context	   of	   Heidegger’s	  thinking,	  see	  Gadamer	  (1981),	  434-­‐435.	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through	  the	  history	  of	  philosophical	  theory,	  unraveling	  it,	  as	  it	  were,	  by	  considering	  it	  in	  the	  reverse	   order	   of	   its	   historical	   consolidation.	   We	   can	   do	   so,	   of	   course,	   only	   under	   the	  condition	  that	  we	  have	  sufficiently	  indicated	  (and	  above	  all	  that	  means	  that	  the	  indication	  itself	  must	  be	  sufficiently	  formal)	  the	  living	  basis	  of	  the	  philosophical	  tradition	  and	  worked	  to	  clarify	  it—as	  preliminary	  as	  our	  results	  on	  that	  end	  must	  necessarily	  be—on	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  clue.	  Thus	  the	  function	  of	  Dasein,	  as	  a	  formally	  indicative	  concept	  for	  this	  lived	  basis	  of	  philosophy,	  is	  finally	  exhausted	  in	  its	  function	  as	  a	  clue	  to	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  history	  of	  ontology.	  	   On	  Heidegger’s	  view,	  then,	  the	  result	  is	  that	  the	  necessity	  of	  grappling	  with	  the	  most	  ancient,	  obscure,	  and	  foreign-­‐to-­‐us	  determinations	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  being	  presses	  in	  on	  us	  as	   the	  natural	   consequence	  of	  our	  original	   intention	  of	   indicating	   the	   lived	  experience	   to	  which	  philosophy	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  adequate	  in	  the	  first	  place.373	  Conversely,	  the	  obscure	  doctrines	  of	   the	  ancients	  “come	  alive”	   for	  us	  precisely	  because	  the	  meaningfulness	  of	  our	  interpretation	   is	   rooted	   in	   our	   coming	   to	   grips	  with	   the	   question	   of	   our	   own	   existence:	  without	  having	  done	  so,	  the	  animating	  questions	  of,	  say,	  Plato’s	  dialogues	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  our	   own.	  But	   there	   is	   no	   royal	   road	   to	   achieving	   an	  understanding	   of	   Plato,	  Aristotle,	   or	  Parmenides.	   History	   of	   philosophy	   essentially	   looks	   backwards:	   from	  where	  we	   are,	   the	  most	  ancient	  thought	  is	  the	  most	  foreign,	  and	  to	  recover	  the	  context	  of	  its	  questioning,	  it	  is	  
first	   necessary	   to	  work	  back	   through	   the	  more	  proximate	  history	  of	  philosophy	   in	  which	  the	  thought	  of	  the	  ancients	  has	  become	  sedimented.	  
                                                373	  This	   is	  why	  Heidegger	   can	   say	   that	   the	   existential	   analytic	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   indicating	   not	   just	   the	  beginning	  but	  also	   the	  goal	  of	  phenomenological	  ontology:	   the	  existential	  analytic	   “has	   fixed	   the	  end	  of	   the	  guiding	   thread	  of	  all	  philosophical	  questioning	  at	   the	  point	   from	  which	   it	  arises	   and	   into	  which	   it	  returns	  [wohin	  es	  zurückschlägt]”	  (BT	  38).	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   To	  destroy	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  in	  this	  way,	   it	   is	   first	  necessary	  to	  have	  some	  guideposts	   to	   mark	   off	   our	   way,	   and	   Heidegger	   indicates	   these	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  introductory	  material	  for	  Being	  and	  Time.	  Like	  Part	  I,	  Heidegger	  projects	  three	  divisions	  of	  Part	   II.	   Collectively,	   they	   will	   demonstrate	   the	   “basic	   features	   of	   a	   phenomenological	  destruction	  of	  the	  history	  of	  ontology	  according	  to	  the	  guiding	  thread	  of	  the	  problematic	  of	  temporality”	  (BT	  39).	  The	  three	  divisions,	  none	  of	  which	  would	  ever	  appear,	  were	  to	  be	  laid	  out	  as	  follows:	  1. Kant’s	   doctrine	   of	   schematism	   and	   time	   as	   a	   preliminary	   stage	   in	   a	  problematic	  of	  temporality	  2. The	   ontological	   foundations	   of	   Descartes’s	   “cogito	   sum”	   and	   the	   way	  medieval	  ontology	  is	  taken	  up	  into	  the	  problematic	  of	  the	  “res	  cogitans”	  3. Aristotle’s	   treatise	   on	   time	   as	   a	   way	   of	   discriminating	   the	   phenomenal	  basis	  and	  the	  limits	  of	  ancient	  ontology	  (BT	  40)	  	  Kant’s	   thought,	   then,	   occupies	   a	   position	   of	   considerable	   privilege	   in	   the	  Being	  and	  Time	  project—at	   least	   as	   the	   latter	   was	   originally	   conceived:	   it	   was	   Kant’s	   thought	   that	   was	  supposed	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  pivot	  to	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  with	  which	  
Being	  and	  Time	  was	  to	  have	  concluded.	  This	  is	  not	  all	  to	  the	  advantage	  of	  Kant,	  of	  course;	  it	  implies	  that	  in	  his	  thought	  the	  Western	  tradition	  is	  sedimented	  and	  compressed—and	  for	  those	  reasons	  opaque—to	  a	  degree	  greater	  than	  in	  the	  thought	  of	  Descartes	  and	  Aristotle.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   Kantian	   problematic	   still	   retains	   the	   power	   to	   speak	   to	   us	   in	   a	  relatively	  direct	  way—even	  though	  we	  are	  at	  first	   liable	  to	  misunderstand	  it.	  By	  contrast,	  coming	  to	  grips	  with	  Kant’s	  predecessors	  requires	   the	  preliminary	  working	  back	  through	  Kant.	  Only	  by	  following	  through	  on	  the	  clues	  that	  are	  proximally	  present	  to	  us	  in	  the	  form	  of	   Kant’s	   work	   can	   we	   begin	   to	   unravel	   the	   history	   of	   Western	   philosophy	   so	   that	   the	  question	   of	   being	   can	   truly	   be	   raised	   anew.	   The	   most	   basic	   questions	   in	   philosophy,	  Heidegger	  always	  maintained,	  were	  at	   the	  same	   time	   the	  simplest,	  and	  “they	  are	   ‘simple’	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not	   just	   because	   they	   are	   still	   clumsy	   questions	   and	   haven’t	   quite	   been	   understood,	   but	  ‘simple’	  because	  you	  don’t	  need	  elaborate	  contraptions	  to	  investigate	  them”	  (L	  21:125).	  It	  is	  getting	  rid	  of	  the	  elaborate	  contraptions,	  unfortunately,	  which	  is	  complicated,	  and	  if	  we	  are	  to	  have	  any	  hope	  of	  doing	  so	  we	  must	  begin	  with	  Kant.	  
Heidegger’s	  Self-­‐Understanding	  in	  Being	  and	  Time	  and	  the	  Question	  of	  Kant	  Why	   Kant?	   Why	   not,	   for	   instance,	   Hegel,	   to	   whom	   Heidegger	   devotes	   the	   penultimate	  section	  of	  Division	  Two	  of	  Being	  and	  Time?	  Indeed,	  despite	  Heidegger’s	  respect	  for	  Hegel’s	  work	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  time	  (see	  BT	  428),	  he	  always	  held	  that	  Hegel	  was,	   in	  the	  end,	  far	  too	   quick	   to	   assimilate	   the	   phenomena	   of	   temporality	   to	   the	   concepts	   demanded	   by	   his	  own	   philosophical	   system,	   leading	   him	   to	   entirely	   miss	   the	   point	   of	   Kant’s	   doctrine	   of	  schematism.374	  By	  contrast,	  Heidegger	  always	  reserves	  the	  highest	  praise	  for	  Kant’s	  ability	  to	  tarry	  with	  the	  phenomena	  and	  follow	  them	  wherever	  they	  lead,	  even	  if	  this	  tendency	  did	  not	  always	  prevail	  in	  his	  finished	  works	  (see	  PIK	  25:396;	  and	  emphatically	  at	  431).	  By	  no	  means	  does	  this	  mean	  that	  Kant	  was	  able,	  through	  sustained	  philosophical	  diligence	  alone,	  to	   directly	   access	   a	   field	   of	   given	   phenomena,	   while	   Hegel	   was	   stuck	   boxing	   with	   the	  shadows	  of	  the	  tradition;	  it	  merely	  means	  that	  when	  Kant	  does	  make	  a	  decision	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  tradition,	  we	  can	  trace	  this	  moment	  with	  more	  transparency	  in	  his	  work,	  which	  in	  turn	  allows	  the	  stakes	  of	  Kant’s	  basic	  problems	  to	  come	  to	  light	  with	  exceptional	  clarity.	  	   Kant’s	   unflinching	   devotion	   to	  what	   appeared	   to	   him	   as	   the	   relevant	   phenomena	  allowed	  him	  to	  grasp	  more	  deeply	  than	  anyone	  else	  in	  the	  modern	  period	  the	  significance	  of	  time	  for	  the	  question	  of	  being.	  In	  the	  first	  Critique,	  which	  is	  supposed	  to	  lay	  a	  new	  and	  
                                                374	  See,	   e.g.,	   L	   21:201-­‐202.	   Thinkers	   following	   Hegel,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   have	   not	   really	   posed	   the	   central	  question	   at	   all.	   Speaking	   of	   Bergson,	  Heidegger	   insists	   that	   “so	   far	   as	   contemporary	   analyses	   of	   time	   have	  attained	  anything	  at	  all	  essential	  beyond	  the	  work	  of	  Aristotle	  and	  Kant,	  it	  has	  more	  to	  do	  with	  our	  grasp	  of	  time	  and	  our	  ‘consciousness’	  of	  it”	  (BT	  433n).	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permanent	   ground	   for	   a	   critical	   science	   of	  metaphysics,	   Kant	   sees	   time	   as	   the	   universal,	  inner	   form	  of	   our	   sensibility	   and	   the	   primary	   sensible	   condition	   of	   objective	   experience.	  The	  general	  problem	  of	  the	  Schematism	  is	  to	  show	  how	  time-­‐determinations	  interact	  with	  the	   purely	   intellectual	   conditions	   of	   objective	   experience	   (i.e.,	   the	   pure	   categories	   of	   the	  understanding)	   to	   generate	   schemata	   for	   the	   representation	  of	  objects.	  Kant	  had	  already	  seen,	  therefore,	  the	  importance	  of	  time	  for	  the	  constitution	  of	  objectivity.	  Transposed	  into	  Heidegger’s	   language,	   this	   means	   that	   Kant	   had	   already	   seen	   the	   centrality	   of	   the	  phenomenon	  of	  temporality	  for	  ontological	  cognition.	  	   Of	   course,	   as	   Heidegger	   is	   well	   aware,	   Kant	   had	   not	   argued	   that	   temporality	  provides	  the	  general,	  but	  only	  the	  sensible,	  condition	  of	  our	  comportment	  to	  beings,	  and	  the	  basic	   thrust	   of	   Heidegger’s	   interpretation	   of	   Kant	   is	   to	   nudge	   Kant	   towards	   the	   former	  position.	   Thus	  Heidegger	   tries	   to	   show,	   unsuccessfully,	   I	   think,	   that	  Kant	  wants,	   at	   times	  despite	   himself,	   to	   understand	   even	   the	   intellectual	   conditions	   of	   objectivity	   in	   terms	   of	  temporality	   (although	  Heidegger	   is	  willing	   to	   grant	   that	   Kant	  was	   clearly	   uncomfortable	  with	  such	  a	  conclusion	  and	  distanced	  himself	  from	  anything	  like	  it	  in	  the	  second	  edition	  of	  the	  Critique).	  	   Be	  this	  as	  it	  may—and	  we	  will	  consider	  the	  question	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  chapter—Kant	   lacked	   the	   groundwork	   that	   would	   have	   enabled	   him	   to	   grasp	   the	  phenomenon	   of	   temporality	   in	   a	   more	   original	   manner	   (see	   L	   21:163).	   Along	   with	   the	  tradition,	   stemming	   from	   Aristotle’s	   remarks	   on	   time	   in	   the	   Physics	   (L	   21:249),	   Kant	  interprets	   temporality	   from	   out	   of	   an	   understanding	   of	   beings,	   not	   from	   out	   of	   an	  understanding	   of	   the	   being	   for	   whom	   beings	   are	   beings,	   i.e.,	   existence.	   Now,	   this	   may	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  outlandish	  claim:	  wasn’t	  it	  Kant,	  after	  all,	  who	  insisted	  most	  loudly	  on	  the	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subjective	  nature	  of	  space	  and	  time?	  But	  this,	  as	  Heidegger	  sees	  it,	  hardly	  decides	  the	  issue:	  what	   is	   important	   is	  whether	  Kant’s	  own	  understanding	  of	   the	   subject	   is	   suitably	   radical	  here	  to	  support	  such	  a	  purported	  insight.	  	   We	   can	   already	   guess	   what	   is	   meant	   by	   “radical”	   in	   this	   context:	   the	   question	   is	  whether	   Kant’s	   designation	   of	   existence	   as	   a	   subject	   is	   sufficiently	   formally	   indicative	   to	  prevent	  the	  premature	  interpretation	  of	  the	  “subject”	  along	  “objective”	  lines.	  And	  here	  we	  already	  know	  what	  Heidegger’s	  answer	  will	  be.	  Without	  a	  formally	  indicative	  methodology,	  Kant	   necessarily	   lacks	   the	   preliminary	   existential	   analytic	   of	   the	   human	   situation	   which	  would	  allow	  him	  to	   interpret	   the	   temporalizing	  of	   the	  categories	   in	   the	  schematism	  from	  the	   inside	   out,	   as	   it	  were	   (L	   21:378).	  Without	   the	   existential	   analytic,	   Kant	   is	   ultimately	  forced,	   despite	   himself,	   even,	   to	   fall	   back	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   time	   he	   inherits	   from	   the	  tradition.	  And	  what	  is	  decisive,	  of	  course,	  is	  not	  that	  his	  conception	  of	  time	  is	  “traditional”;	  that,	   Heidegger	   would	   concede,	   is	   at	   all	   events	   unavoidable.	   Rather,	   Kant	   lacks	   the	  destructive	   indication,	  which	  could	  only	  be	  provided	  to	  him	  by	  the	  preliminary	  results	  of	  the	   existential	   analytic,	  which	  would	   allow	  him	   to	   inherit	   the	   tradition	   in	   a	   positive	   and	  productive	  way—that	   is	   to	  say,	   in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  allow	  a	  decision	  about	   time	  to	  stand	  urgently	  before	  him	  and	  be	  recognized	  as	  such.	  Thus	  when	  Kant	  remarks,	  apparently	  quite	  casually,	   that	   the	   schematism	   is	   “an	   art	   hidden	   in	   the	   depths	   of	   the	   human	   soul,”375	  Heidegger	  is	  quick	  to	  interject.	  This	  obscurity,	  he	  notes,	  is	  no	  mere	  accident.	  Rather,	  Kant’s	  inheritance	  (from	  Descartes)	  of	  a	  traditional	  notion	  of	  the	  subject	  positively	  prevents	  him	  from	  conceiving	  the	  object-­‐constituting	  function	  of	  temporality	  in	  an	  adequate	  manner.	  The	  
                                                375	  CPR	  A141/B180;	  quoted	  by	  Heidegger	  at	  BT	  23.	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result	  is	  that	  “the	  decisive	  connection	  between	  time	  and	  the	  ‘I	  think’	  remained	  shrouded	  in	  complete	  obscurity”	  (BT	  24).	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   then,	   Kant	   is	   accorded	   a	   sort	   of	   dubious	   significance:	   given	   his	  reluctance	  to	  cover	  over	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  time	  with	  concepts	  simply	  borrowed	  from	  the	  tradition,	  Kant	  is	  notable	  for	  his	  close	  encounter,	  as	  it	  were,	  with	  the	  existential	  conception	  of	   time,	   even	   if	   the	   encounter	   was	   one	   from	   which	   Kant	   ultimately	   “shrank	   back,”	   as	  Heidegger	   famously	   puts	   it	   (BT	  23;	  KPM	  3:160).	   This	   can	  make	   it	   sound	   as	   though	  Kant	  were	  of	   significance	  primarily	  because	  he	   found	  himself	   just	   on	   the	  verge	  of	  Heidegger’s	  later	  insight	  into	  the	  nature	  of	  time,	  only	  to	  pull	  back	  from	  it	  and	  decide	  instead—as	  if	  in	  a	  moment	  of	  weakness—in	  favor	  of	  the	  tradition.	  Although	   there	   is,	   indeed,	   a	   genuine	   sense	   in	  which	  Heidegger	   took	  Kant	   to	   come	  very,	   very	   near	   to	   the	   necessity	   for	   an	   existential	   analytic,	   the	   basic	   thrust	   of	   this	  characterization	  of	  Heidegger’s	  relation	  to	  Kant	  must	  ultimately	  be	  rejected.	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  for	  this.	  First,	  we	  must	  keep	  in	  mind	  the	  destructive	  context	  of	  Heidegger’s	  reading	  of	  Kant.	  By	  Heidegger’s	  own	  lights,	  it	  is	  not,	  in	  the	  final	  analysis,	  Kant	  who	  must	  progress	  to	  Heidegger’s	  deeper	  standpoint,	  but	  Heidegger	  who	  must	  go	  back	  to	  Kant	  to	  understand	  the	  meaning	   of	   the	   phenomenon	   to	  which	   existential	   time	   at	   best	   points	   imperfectly.	   Recall,	  once	  again,	  that	  the	  positive	  results	  of	  Division	  One	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  were	  intended	  to	  be	  exhausted	   in	   the	   directive	   for	   historical	   phenomenological	   research	   which	   they	   were	  intended	  to	  provide.	  Granted,	  this	  means	  that	  we	  must	  trace	  Kant’s	  thought	  to	  the	  point	  at	  which	  the	  latter	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  need	  to	  render	  a	  decision	  about	  time	  (a	  decision	   Heidegger	   takes	   it	   is	   obscured	   in	   the	   second-­‐edition	   Deduction),	   and	   then	   ask,	  further,	  what	  his	  decision	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  tradition	  really	  signifies	  (which	  drives	  our	  analysis	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back	   to	  Descartes).	   But	   the	   goal	   in	   all	   this	   is	   not	   to	   correct	  Kant’s	   faulty	   analysis,	   but	   to	  open	  up	  positive	  possibilities	  within	  the	  philosophical	  tradition	  that	  no	  longer	  appear	  to	  us	  as	   such.	   The	   goal	   of	   carrying	   on	   the	   project	   of	  Being	  and	  Time	   is	   not	   to	   be	   achieved	   by	  confirming	  already	  secure	  results	   through	  critical	  observations	  on	  traditional	   figures,	  but	  rather	   by	   learning	   to	   see	   Kant’s	   decisions	   in	   the	   original	   contexts	   in	   which	   he	   was	  compelled	  to	  render	  them.	  To	  be	  sure,	  these	  contexts	  cannot	  be	  opened	  up	  if	  we	  have	  not	  at	  first	   secured	   a	   firm	   direction	   from	   our	   initial	   formal	   indication,	   but	   such	   firm	   direction	  must	  never	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  positive	  doctrine	  to	  which	  traditional	  theories	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  adequate.	   In	   fact,	   only	  by	   returning,	   first	   to	  Kant,	   and	   then	   finally	   to	   the	  Greeks,	  will	   the	  nature	  of	   the	   traditional	   sediment	   congealed	   in	   the	   apparent	   “results”	   of	  Being	  and	  Time	  itself	  be	  made	  transparent.	  This	   brings	   us	   to	   the	   second	   point.	   Especially	   in	   light	   of	   Heidegger’s	   quasi-­‐transcendental	   methodology	   in	   Being	   and	   Time	   and	   his	   attempt	   to	   uncover	   the	  “existentials”	   of	   human	   existence,	   which	   are	   closely	   modeled	   upon	   Kant’s	   categories,	  Heidegger’s	  work	   is	  often	  compared,	   favorably	  or	  unfavorably,	   to	  that	  of	  Kant.376	  I	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  validity	  or	  interest	  of	  such	  work,	  but	  I	  want	  to	  insist	  on	  a	  point	  in	  light	  of	  which	  all	  Heidegger-­‐Kant	  comparisons	  must	  ultimately	  be	  considered:	  the	  Kantian	  “flavor,”	  if	  you	  will,	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  is	  no	  accident.	  We	  must	  continually	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  Heidegger’s	  citation	  of	  Plato	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  book	  remains	  equally,	  perhaps	  more,	  appropriate	  at	  its	  conclusion:	  we,	  who	  used	  to	  think	  we	  understood	  the	  expression	  “being,”	  have	  now	  become	  perplexed	  (BT	  1).377	  For	  the	  results	  of	  Being	  and	  Time,	  and	  that	  includes	  
                                                376	  Most	  notably,	  perhaps,	  in	  Blattner	  (1999);	  more	  recently	  by	  Hebbeler	  (2013).	  377	  And	  it	  is	  not	  as	  if	  Heidegger	  forgets	  the	  structural	  aspects	  of	  his	  work	  as	  he	  pursues	  his	  project.	  In	  the	  final	  section	   of	  Being	  and	  Time,	   he	  writes,	   “The	   conflict	   regarding	   the	   interpretation	   of	   being	   cannot	   be	   settled	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its	  chief	  conclusion—that	  it	  is	  temporality	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  anything	  like	  being	  in	  general	  is	  to	  be	  understood—do	  not	  have	  interpretations	  that	  are	  independent	  of	  the	  philosophical	  tradition	  which	  remains	   to	  be	  destroyed.378	  Heidegger	  does	  not	  have	  a	   “view,”	  e.g.,	  of	   the	  ready-­‐to-­‐hand	  or	  the	  present-­‐at-­‐hand	  (to	  take	  some	  commonly	  cited	  themes);	  he	  does	  not	  even	  have	  a	  view	  of	  time	  as	  such.379	  It	  is	  by	  no	  means	  the	  case	  that	  the	  phenomenological	  criticism	  of	   the	   traditional	   understanding	   of	   time	   (and	   thus	   being)	   in	   terms	   of	   presence,	  with	   which	   Division	   Two	   is	   apparently	   so	   centrally	   consumed,	   has	   afforded	   us	   an	  independent	  position	  from	  which	  to	  criticize	  this	  tradition.	  The	  existential	  analytic	  should	  upset	   the	  obviousness	  of	   the	   traditional	   interpretation	  not	  by	  suggesting	   that	   it	  might	  be	  
false,	   but	   rather,	   and	   more	   precisely,	   by	   suggesting	   that	   we	   not	   have	   sufficiently	  understood	   that	  which	   is	  wrapped	  up	   in	   defining	   being	   in	   terms	   of	   presence	   in	   the	   first	  place.	  	   Instead,	  we	  must	  patiently	  unpack	  the	  thought	  of	  being	  as	  presence	  by	  returning	  to	  those	   whose	   work	   has	   established	   this	   result.	   And	   our	   proximate	   historical	   forebearer	  here—at	  least	  as	  Heidegger	  thought	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Being	  and	  Time—is	  Kant.	  And	  now	  here	  is	   the	  key	  point:	   it	  will	   be	  no	   surprise	   if	  Being	  and	  Time	   bears	   a	  Kantian	   structure,	   for	   if	  Heidegger	   is	   right,	   the	   very	   analysis	   developed	   there	   ought	   to	   be	   understandable—
                                                                                                                                                       
because	   it	  has	  not	  even	  been	   ignited	  yet.	  And	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  this	  isn’t	  the	  kind	  of	  fight	  that	  can	  be	  ‘picked’;	   rather,	   arousing	   this	   conflict	   already	   requires	   a	   preparation.	   Towards	   this	   alone	   the	   foregoing	  investigation	  is	  on	  the	  way”	  (BT	  437).	  378	  Frank	   Schalow	   puts	   the	   point	   well:	   “Because	   the	   Seinsfrage	   is	   inherently	   historical,	   [Heidegger]	   can	  ultimately	   reformulate	   it	   only	  by	   expanding	   the	   scope	  of	   his	   questioning	   to	   include	   a	  dialogue	  or	   a	   critical	  encounter	   (Auseinandersetzung)	   with	   those	   predecessors	   who	   first	   broached	   the	   topic	   of	   being”	   (Schalow	  [2000],	  181).	  379	  I	   am	   inclined	   to	  agree	  with	  van	  Buren’s	  verdict:	   “The	  phrase	   ‘Heidegger’s	  philosophy’	   is	   a	   square	  circle.	  ‘His’	   thought	   is	   not	   a	   finished	   product	   but	   a	   constant	   beginning	   anew,	   not	   an	   answer	   but	   a	   questionable	  question,	  not	  an	  object	  but	  a	  controversial	  topic,	  not	  actuality	  but	  possibility,	  not	  presence	  but	  absence”	  (van	  Buren	  [1994],	  44).	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historically,	  now—first	  and	  foremost	  in	  Kantian	  terms.380	  That	  is,	  the	  self-­‐understanding	  of	  the	  standpoint	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	   is	  ultimately	  implicated	  in	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy:	  not	  even	  Heidegger’s	  apparently	  programmatic	  and	  methodological	  remarks	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  treatise	  carry	  a	  meaning	  that	  would	  positively	  go	  “beyond”	  Kant	  and	  the	  tradition.	  Simply	  put,	  Heidegger’s	  project	  has	  to	  be	  understood,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  in	  terms	  of	   Kant.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   Kant	   provides	   the	   deepest	   clue	   to	   the	   significance	   of	  Heidegger’s	   phenomenology—Heidegger	   ultimately	   wants	   to	   be	   able	   to	   understand	   his	  thinking	  as	  the	  repetition	  of	  the	  ancient	  inquiry	  into	  the	  question	  of	  being—but	  Kant	  is	  the	  thinker	  we	  must	  first	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  to	  make	  the	  project	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  historically	  intelligible.	  	   An	  understanding	  of	  Kant,	  then,	  is	  not,	  in	  Heidegger’s	  view,	  simply	  a	  desideratum	  of	  historically	  informed	  philosophy;	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  phenomenological	  movement’s	  very	  comprehension	  of	   itself.	  For	  better	  or	  for	  worse,	  Kant	  stands	  in	  front	  of	  the	  door	  through	  which	  it	  must	  pass	  to	  understand	  its	  own	  deepest	  motivations.	  	  	   	  





	  In	   the	   first	   edition	   of	   1929,	   Heidegger	   wrote	   in	   the	   Preface	   to	  Kant	   and	   the	   Problem	   of	  
Metaphysics	   that	   he	  was	   offering	   the	   reader	   a	   “fitting	   supplement”	   of	   sorts	   to	  Being	  and	  
Time:	   In	  Part	  Two	  of	  Being	  and	  Time,	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  following	  investigation	  will	  be	  handled	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  more	  fraught	  way	  of	  posing	  the	  question	  [einer	  
weitergespannten	  Fragestellung].	  By	  contrast,	  a	  progressive	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason	  is	  foregone	  there.	  The	  present	  publication	  should	  supply	  it	  with	  an	  anticipatory	  addition.	  (KPM	  3:xvi)	  	  As	   we	   have	   seen,	   Heidegger	   had	   already	   designated	   Kant’s	   first	   Critique	   as	   the	   proper	  starting	   place	   for	   the	   second,	   destructive	   part	   of	   Being	   and	   Time	   in	   1927.	   The	   “more	  fraught”	  manner	  of	  questioning	  Heidegger	  alludes	   to	   in	  1929	   is	   surely	  a	   reference	   to	   the	  methodology	  at	  work	  in	  Being	  and	  Time,	  which	  was	  designed	  with	  an	  eye	  to	  working	  back	  through	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  to	  return	  a	  sense	  of	  urgency	  to	  the	  ancient	  question	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  being.	   In	  Kant	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics,	  however,	   the	  implication	  is	  apparently	  supposed	  to	  be	  that	  he	  will	  be	  pursuing	  the	  very	  reading	  of	  Kant	  he	  had	  rejected	  in	  Being	  and	  Time.	  The	  progressive	  reading	  he	  is	  about	  to	  offer	  will	  thus	  stand	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  destructive	  reading	  he	  had	  promised	  in	  the	  earlier	  text.381	  	   Just	  what	  is	  this	  contrast	  supposed	  to	  amount	  to?	  Heidegger	  immediately	  provides	  us	   with	   some	   guidance:	   “At	   the	   same	   time	   [this	   investigation]	   clarifies	   the	   problematic	  treated	   in	   the	   first	   half	   of	  Being	  and	  Time,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   providing	   it	  with	   a	   ‘historical’	  
                                                381	  I	  owe	  thanks	  to	  Johan	  de	  Jong	  for	  drawing	  my	  attention	  to	  this	  point	  and	  impressing	  it	  upon	  me.	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introduction”	  (KPM	  3:xvi).	  To	  the	  casual	  reader	  this	  claim	  may	  strike	  an	  odd	  chord:	  surely	  it	   is	   the	  Greek	  manner	  of	  questioning	  after	  being,	   and	  not	  Kant’s,	   that	  would	  provide	   the	  proper	   “historical	   background”	   which	   would	   make	   the	   path	   of	   questioning	   pursued	   in	  
Being	  and	  Time	   intelligible	  (BT	  1!).	  In	  fact,	  however,	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  why	  Heidegger	  might	  think	  that	  Kant’s	  philosophy,	  and	  his	  philosophy	  alone,	  would	  be	  suitable	  for	  such	  a	  role.	   Sometime	   around	   Christmas	   1925382	  Heidegger	   had	   come	   around	   to	   the	   view	   that	  Kant	   was	   his	   proximate	   historical	   forebearer.383	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   this	   means	   that,	   on	  account	   of	   Heidegger’s	   proximity—and	   not	   just	   Heidegger’s	   alone,	   but	   the	   proximity	   of	  contemporary	  Western	  philosophy	  as	  a	  whole—to	  Kant,	  the	  task	  of	  destruction	  could	  only	  begin	   from	  the	   latter’s	  way	  of	   thinking.	  But	   if	  we	  understand	  the	  positive	  methodological	  role	   of	   Destruktion,	   we	   will	   immediately	   recognize	   that	   this	   also	   means	   that	   the	   true	  meaning	   of	   the	   “results”	   of	   Part	  One	   of	  Being	  and	  Time	   (bearing	   in	  mind,	   of	   course,	   that	  even	   the	   preliminary	   results	   expected	   from	   this	   part	   never	   fully	   materialized)	   must	   be	  understood,	   initially,	  at	   least,	   in	  a	  Kantian	  manner.	  To	  approach	  their	  deeper	  significance,	  we	  will	  of	  course	  have	  to	  destroy	  this	  semblance.	  But	  this	  will	  not	  be	  to	  show	  what	  is	  really	  
                                                382	  See	  n.	  445	  below.	  383	  His	  relationship	  to	  Husserl	  was	  still	  a	  vexed	  one,	  however.	  Since	  he	  tended	  to	  see	  himself	  as	  continuing	  at	  least	   one	   important	   strain	   of	   Husserlian	   phenomenology,	   Heidegger	   never	   really	   classifies	   Husserl	   as	   a	  distinct	  historical	   interlocutor	  at	  all.	  Despite	  the	  reservations	  he	  at	   least	  privately	  harbored	  about	  Husserl’s	  project	  (see	  n.	  248	  above),	  he	  could	  claim	  that	  Husserl’s	  Ideas	  was	  “in	  its	  foundations	  essentially	  more	  radical	  than	  Kant	   could	   ever	  be”	   (L	  21:284).	   It	   could	  be	   argued,	   I	   suppose,	   that	  Part	  One	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	   really	  amounts	   to	   a	  destruction	  of	  Husserlian	  phenomenology,	   but	   I’m	  not	   aware	  of	   any	  evidence	   that	  Heidegger	  himself	   saw	   his	   project	   this	   way.	   Publicly,	   at	   least,	   he	   presented	   himself	   as	   part	   of	   a	   basically	   Husserlian	  project;	  thus	  Kant	  and	  Husserl	  are	  never	  really	  competitors	  in	  his	  mind.	  Chad	  Engelland	  claims,	  by	  contrast,	  that	  in	  1929	  Heidegger	  had	  come	  to	  see	  Kant	  as	  more	  of	  a	  predecessor	  than	  Husserl.	  I	  think	  the	  evidence	  for	  a	  change	  of	  mind	  on	  Heidegger’s	  part	  here	  is	  slim.	  Yes,	  Kant	  grows	  in	  importance	  for	  Heidegger,	  but	  there	  is	  not	  really	   any	   indication	   that	   it	   is	   at	   Husserl’s	   expense.	   Even	   after	   Being	   and	   Time,	   Heidegger	   reads	   Kant	   as	  
anticipating	   Husserl’s	   rediscovery	   of	   the	   centrality	   of	   intuition	   and	   as	   falling	  short	   of	  Husserl’s	   radicalness	  (PIK	  25:64,	  71).	  So	  at	  least	  in	  Heidegger’s	  mind	  it	  was	  consistent	  for	  him	  to	  regard	  himself	  as	  Kant’s	  heir	  and	  at	   the	   same	   time	   as	   a	   kind	   of	   Husserlian.	   If	   this	   has	   changed	   by	   1929,	   it	   likely	   has	   more	   to	   do	   with	   his	  reevaluation	  of	  his	  own	  role	  in	  the	  phenomenological	  movement	  than	  it	  does	  with	  his	  deepened	  appreciation	  for	  Kant.	  But	  see	  Engelland	  (2010),	  158.	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the	  true	  content	  of	  Being	  and	  Time,	  but	  to	  try	  to	  slowly	  clarify	  what	  it	  was	  trying	  to	  say	  but,	  for	  essential	  historical	  reasons,	  could	  not.	  	   This,	  I	  think,	  is	  what	  Heidegger	  is	  gesturing	  at	  when	  he	  indicates	  that	  the	  Kantbook	  is	  a	  “progressive”	  reading	  which	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  “historical	  introduction”	  for	  Being	  and	  Time.	  It	   is	   not	   progressive	   because	   it	  will	   advance	   philosophical	   questioning	   into	   exciting	   new	  horizons	   of	   research	   or	   contribute	   constructively	   to	   the	   existing	   historical	   literature	   on	  Kant.	   Indeed,	   at	   the	   very	   beginning	   of	   his	  WS	  1927-­‐1928	   course	   on	  Kant’s	   first	  Critique,	  Heidegger	  told	  his	  students,	  “Philosophy	  does	  not	  evolve	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  progress.	  Rather,	  philosophy	   is	   the	  endeavor	   to	  unravel	   and	  elucidate	   the	   same	   few	  problems”	   (PIK	  25:2).	  The	  Kantbook	   is	   “progressive”	  because	   it	   looks	   forward	   to	   the	  project	  of	  Being	  and	  Time,	  anticipating	   the	   structure	  of	   its	  basic	   concepts,	   concepts	  which	  are,	   of	   course,	   essentially	  and	  necessarily,	  albeit	  provisionally,	  Kantian.	  	   If	   this	   is	  right,	   then	  the	  “progressive”	  and	  “destructive”	  readings	  of	  Kant,	   to	   follow	  the	  distinction	  suggested	  by	  Heidegger’s	  remark	  in	  the	  first-­‐edition	  preface,	  are	  genuinely	  complementary,	   and	   could	   never	   really	   have	   been	   undertaken	   independently	   of	   one	  another.	  Indeed,	  if	  we	  turn	  to	  the	  main	  text	  of	  the	  Kantbook,	  we	  are	  struck	  at	  once	  by	  the	  immediate	   and	   manifold	   references	   to	   the	   project	   of	   Being	   and	   Time.	   “The	   following	  investigation,”	  Heidegger	  informs	  us,	  poses	   for	   itself	   the	   task	   of	   interpreting	   Kant’s	   Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason	   as	   a	  groundwork	   for	   metaphysics	   in	   order	   to	   thus	   place	   the	   problem	   of	  metaphysics	   before	   us	   as	   a	   fundamental	   ontology.	   Fundamental	   ontology	  means	  the	  ontological	  analytic	  of	  the	  finite	  essence	  of	  human	  beings	  which	  is	  to	  prepare	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  metaphysics	  which	  “belongs	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  human	  being.”	  (KPM	  3:1)	  	  It	   is	   thus	   clear	   that	   although	   the	   Kantbook	   is	   not	   quite	   the	   destructive	   text	   promised	   in	  
Being	  and	  Time,	   it	   is	  not	  conceptually	   independent	  of	   it,	   either.	   It	   can	  be	  an	   “anticipatory	  
 259	  
addition”	  to	  the	  second	  part	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  by	  tracing	  its	  same	  steps	  in	  reverse	  order:	  instead	  of	  waiting	  for	  the	  results	  of	  the	  existential	  analytic,	  Heidegger	  here	  runs	  ahead	  of	  it,	  as	  it	  were,	  and	  offers	  the	  historical	  background	  that	  conditions	  those	  results	  ahead	  of	  time.	  In	   either	   case,	   however,	   the	   historical	   and	   “properly”	   philosophical	   projects	   cannot	  ultimately	  be	  dissociated	  from	  one	  another.	  	   In	  terms	  of	  its	  immediate	  influence,	  the	  Kantbook	  must	  be	  reckoned	  a	  success.384	  It	  went	   through	   four	   editions	   in	  Heidegger’s	   lifetime.	   For	   each	   edition,	   he	   prepared	   a	   new	  preface	  or	  remark	  with	  which	  to	   introduce	  the	  text.	  Beginning	  already	   in	  1950,	  however,	  his	  prefaces	   took	  on	  an	  almost	  apologetic	  character.	   In	   the	  preface	   to	   the	  second	  edition,	  Heidegger	  begins	  by	  acknowledging	  the	  “constant	  offense”	  that	  readers	  have	  taken	  at	  the	  “violence	  [Gewaltsamkeit]	  of	  my	  interpretations.”	  Indeed,	  he	  admits,	  such	  allegations	  can	  be	  supported	   easily	   enough	   by	   reference	   to	   the	   Kantbook.385	  He	   goes	   on	   to	   distinguish,	  however,	   between	   the	   methods	   appropriate	   to	   “historical	   philology”	   and	   “thoughtful	  dialogue,”	  emphasizing	  that	  each	  sort	  of	  inquiry	  has	  a	  kind	  of	  rigor	  that	  is	  proper	  to	  it	  and	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  thoughtful	  dialogue	  are	  even	  “more	  easily	  violated”	  than	  those	  of	   historical	   philology.386	  Finally,	   however,	  Heidegger	   acknowledges	   that	   he	  has	   come	  up	  short	   in	   the	  attempt	   to	   respect	  not	   just	   the	   laws	  of	  philology,	  but,	  more	   importantly,	   the	  laws	  of	  dialogue,	  as	  well:	  The	  failures	  and	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  present	  endeavor	  have	  become	  so	  clear	  to	   me	   .	   .	   .	   that	   I	   will	   abstain	   from	  making	   this	   work	   into	   a	   patchwork	   by	  compensating	   with	   additions,	   appendices,	   and	   postscripts.	   Thinkers	   learn	  from	  their	  shortcomings	  to	  be	  more	  persevering.	  (KPM	  3:xvii)	  
                                                384	  “For	  more	  than	  a	  quarter	  of	  a	  century,”	  Dieter	  Henrich	  estimates,	  “it	  determined	  the	  method	  as	  well	  as	  the	  interpretive	  goal	  of	  almost	  all	  publications	  in	  the	  field”	  (Henrich	  [1955],	  17).	  385	  By	  contrast,	   in	  January	  1926	  he	  had	  announced	  his	  original	   interpretive	  intention	  as	  one	  of	  bringing	  out	  “the	  unity	  of	  the	  problematic	  of	  the	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason	  without	  doing	  violence	  to	  the	  work”	  (L	  21:272).	  386	  On	  “thoughtful	  dialogue,”	  see	  WCT	  8:182,	  delivered	  in	  SS	  1952.	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  Between	  1929	  and	  1950—and	   likely	  much	  closer	   to	   the	   former	  date	   than	   to	   the	   latter—Heidegger	  had	  come	  to	  realize	  that	  Kant	  was	  not	  the	  philosophical	  forebearer	  he	  had	  taken	  him	  to	  be.	  The	  story	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  usurpation	  of	  the	  place	  of	  Kant	  in	  Heidegger’s	  thought	  is	  crucial	   not	   just	   to	   understanding	   its	   own	   internal	   development;	   it	   is	   important	   for	  appreciating	   the	   genesis	   and	   limitations	   of	   the	   dominant	   narrative	   of	   the	   history	   of	  “Continental	  philosophy”	  even	  today.	  But	  it	  is	  a	  story	  that	  deserves	  its	  own	  treatment	  and	  will	  have	  to	  await	  another	  occasion.387	  In	   the	  preface	   to	   the	   fourth	  edition,	  written	   in	  1973,	   three	  years	  before	  his	  death,	  Heidegger	  reflected	  somewhat	  more	  wistfully	  on	   the	  nature	  and	  cause	  of	  his	   folly	  during	  his	  early	  years.	  As	  he	  eventually	  came	  to	  remember	  the	  events	  of	  this	  period,388	  by	  1929	  it	  was	  already	  becoming	  clear	  to	  him	  that	  the	  question	  of	  being	  he	  had	  tried	  to	  raise	  anew	  in	  
Being	  and	  Time	  remained	  almost	  universally	  misunderstood.389	  And	  this,	  he	  was	  coming	  to	  realize,	  was	  not	   just	  the	  result	  of	  the	  incompleteness	  of	  the	  latter	  book,	  but	  because	  even	  his	  preliminary	  reflections	  in	  it	  had	  failed	  to	  do	  the	  work	  he	  had	  hoped	  they	  would	  do.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  this	  disappointment,	  he	  turned	  to	  Kant	  and	  found	  in	  the	  first	  Critique	  a	  “refuge”	  with	  which	   to	   seek	  out	   “an	   advocate	   for	   the	  question	  of	   being	  which	   I	   had	  posed”	   (KPM	  3:xiv).	   And	   yet	   his	   results,	  Heidegger	   belatedly	   came	   to	   realize,	   reflected	   far	  more	   of	   his	  own	  frustration	  with	  the	  failure	  of	  Being	  and	  Time	  than	  they	  did	  the	  innermost	  necessities	  of	  Kant’s	  thought.	  Finally	  Heidegger	  is	  able	  to	  freely	  admit	  that	  “in	  truth	  .	  .	  .	  Kant’s	  question	  
                                                387	  This	   story	  would	   need	   to	   be	   prefaced	   by	   an	   account	   of	   Heidegger’s	   reevaluation	   of	   the	  merits	   of	   post-­‐Kantian	  German	  Idealism	  in	  the	  early	  1930s.	  On	  this	  topic,	  see	  Dahlstrom	  (2005).	  388	  It	  is	  important	  to	  take	  nearly	  all	  of	  Heidegger’s	  later	  recollections	  with	  a	  grain	  of	  salt.	  His	  political	  memory	  is	  notoriously	  self-­‐serving,	  and	  even	  his	  later	  reflections	  on	  his	  development	  as	  a	  thinker	  display	  a	  surprising	  amount	  of	  inaccuracy	  and	  even,	  perhaps,	  misrepresentation.	  See,	  in	  particular,	  van	  Buren	  (1994),	  5-­‐27.	  389	  This	  much,	  at	  least,	  does	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  Heidegger’s	  view	  even	  at	  the	  time.	  See	  Cassirer	  &	  Heidegger	  (1929),	  199.	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is	  foreign”	  to	  the	  “posing	  of	  the	  question	  in	  Being	  and	  Time”	  (KPM	  3:xiv).	  Nevertheless,	  he	  insists,	  the	  Kantbook	  can	  remain	  an	  introduction	  “to	  the	  further	  questionability	  which	  still	  persists	  concerning	  the	  question	  of	  being	  set	  forth	  in	  Being	  and	  Time”	  (KPM	  3:xv).	  In	  the	  end,	  then,	  Heidegger	  gave	  up	  the	  high	  hopes	  he	  had	  once	  harbored	  for	  Kant.	  But	  was	  his	  encounter	  with	  Kant,	  abortive	  as	  it	  may	  have	  been,	  at	  least	  a	  productive	  one	  for	  Heidegger?	  Some	  of	  his	  most	  careful	  interpreters	  have	  concluded	  emphatically	  that	  it	  was	  not.	   In	   fact,	   there	   is	   a	   widespread	   (though	   by	   no	   means	   universal)	   tendency	   in	   the	  literature	  to	  regard	  Kant	  as	  something	  that	  befell	  Heidegger’s	  work	  from	  without	  in	  the	  mid	  1920s.	   Kisiel,	   who	   has	   done	   more	   work	   than	   anyone	   in	   tracing	   the	   genesis	   and	  development	   of	   Heidegger’s	   main	   theme	   up	   to	   Being	   and	   Time,	   presents	   the	   most	  developed	  form	  of	  this	  picture:	  We	  find	  Heidegger	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1927	  thoroughly	  convinced	  of	  being	  within	  the	   reach	  of	   the	  goal	  of	  a	   scientific	  philosophy.	  The	  bold	  claims	   induced	  by	  the	  spell	  of	  the	  Kantian	  transcendental	  philosophy	  apparently	  lead	  Heidegger	  to	  believe	   that	   something	   like	   a	  Kantian	   schematism	  of	   human	  existence	   is	  capable	   of	   definitively	   articulating	   the	   evasive	   immediacy	   of	   the	   human	  situation,	  that	  is,	  of	  “saying	  the	  unsayable.”390	  	  And	   this,	   it	   goes	   without	   saying,	   is	   then	   taken	   as	   a	   dereliction	   of	   Heidegger’s	   basic	  philosophical	  stance.	  	   To	   be	   sure,	   there	   is	   something	   to	   be	   said	   for	   the	   view	   that	   Heidegger’s	   way	   of	  speaking	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1920s	  is	  uncharacteristic	  of	  his	  thought	  as	  a	  whole.	  Although	  his	  style	  remains	  recognizably	  his	  own,	   it	   is	  during	  this	  period	  that	  Heidegger	  takes	  his	  most	  meaningful,	   if	   still	   tentative,	   steps	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   a	   rapprochement	  with	  mainstream	  academic	   philosophy	   in	   Germany.	   This	   can	   make	   it	   look	   as	   though	   Heidegger	   slipped,	  
                                                390	  Kisiel	  (1993),	  457.	  Cf.	  van	  Buren’s	  general	  interpretation	  of	  the	  arc	  of	  Heidegger’s	  thought,	  n.	  326	  above.	  And	  compare	  both	  Kisiel	  and	  van	  Buren	  to	  Löwith’s	  original	  complaints	  communicated	  to	  Heidegger	  in	  1927,	  discussed	  above,	  p.	  212.	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slowly	   but	   surely—and	   for	   a	   “true	   Heideggerian,”	   regrettably—into	   a	   mode	   of	   thinking	  more	  appropriate	  to	  those	  of	  his	  contemporaries	  who	  saw	  philosophy	  as	  a	  doctrinal,	  even	  scientific,	  enterprise.	  Although	  nobody	  would	  mistake	  Being	  and	  Time,	  with	   its	  boundless	  proliferation	  of	   neologisms,	   for	   a	   rote	   exercise	   in	   school	   philosophy,	   it	   nevertheless	  may	  appear,	   especially	   in	   light	   of	   Heidegger’s	   attempts	   to	   appropriate	   Kant’s	   Schematism	   in	  1928	  and	  1929,	  to	  point	  to	  a	  doctrine	  of	  human	  existence	  which	  could	  stand	  on	  its	  own	  as	  a	  philosophical	   result.	   Thus	   it	   might	   be	   argued	   that	   Heidegger	   was,	   for	   a	   time,	   at	   least,	  bewitched	  by	  his	  own	  forays	  into	  transcendental	  philosophy,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  he	  lost	  sight	  of	  the	  urgency	  of	  the	  existential	  questions	  that	  had	  animated	  him	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  In	  1928	  he	   told	   his	   students	   that	   “the	   intention	   of	   this	   course	   is	   to	   achieve	   a	   philosophical	  understanding	   of	   Kant’s	   Critique	   of	   Pure	   Reason,	   and	   that	   means	   to	   learn	   how	   to	  philosophize”	   (PIK	  25:1).	  Heidegger	   learned	  how	   to	  philosophize	   from	  Kant,	   some	  of	   his	  most	  sympathetic	  readers	  argue,	  rather	  too	  well.	  	   Such	  a	  reading	  of	  Heidegger’s	  “lapses”	  in	  this	  period	  may	  be	  helpful	  in	  reminding	  us	  of	  the	  context	  in	  which	  his	  most	  systematic	  work	  must	  be	  read,	  but	  it	  cannot,	  I	  think,	  be	  the	  final	   word	   on	   the	   matter.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   Heidegger’s	   dalliance	   with	   a	   Kantian	  understanding	  of	  his	  own	  philosophy	  was	  no	  accident;	  his	  discovery	  of	  Kant	  at	  the	  end	  of	  1925	  was	  not	  something	  he	  merely	  blustered	  into.391	  In	  fact,	  the	  strongest	  evidence	  for	  this	  
                                                391	  Cf.	  Schalow’s	  criticism	  of	  Kisiel’s	  position	  (Schalow	  [2000],	  180-­‐182).	  Engelland	  also	  rejects	  what	  he	  calls	  the	   “aberration”	   thesis,	   although	   my	   account	   has	   more	   in	   common	   with	   Schalow’s	   than	   Engelland’s	   (see	  Engelland	  [2010],	  150-­‐151,	  165).	  That	  said,	  I	  think	  Schalow	  underplays	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  Kisiel	  succeeds	  in	  offering	  a	   compelling	  genesis	   story.	  Kisiel’s	   intention,	   as	   I	  understand	   it,	   at	   least,	   is	  not	   at	   all	   to	  reduce	   the	  questioning	   in	   Being	   and	   Time	   to	   that	   of	   his	   Freiburg	   lectures,	   but	   to	   show	   that	   one	   and	   the	   same	   topic	  undergoes	  a	   continuous	  development	   throughout.	  This	  much	   I	   can	  happily	  agree	  with.	  Of	   course,	  one	  does	  then	  wonder	  what	  exactly	  Kisiel’s	  claim	  about	  the	  incursion	  of	  Kantian	  transcendental	  discourse	  amounts	  to,	  and	   it	   seems	   to	  me	   that	  Schalow	   is	  on	   solid	  ground	   in	   resisting	   this	  move.	  More	  generally,	   this	  question	   is	  hard	  to	  separate	  from	  the	  current	  debate,	  prompted	  in	  part	  by	  Sheehan’s	  pointed	  plea	  for	  Heideggerians	  to	  abandon	   talk	   of	   the	   question	   of	   being	   altogether,	   over	   what	   the	   “real”	   topic	   of	   Heidegger’s	   thought	   was.	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is	   precisely	   that	   which	   is	   so	   often	   cited	   against	   it:	   the	   success	   Heidegger	   had	   in	  transforming	   his	   thinking	   into	   something	   uncannily	   Kantian.	   Heidegger’s	   Kant	   may	   be	  idiosyncratic,	   but	   in	   the	   course	   of	   his	   attempt	   at	   an	   interpretation	   we	   find	   Heidegger	  speaking	   from	   and	   for	   Kant’s	   own	   position	   more	   convincingly	   than	   in	   his	   sustained	  interpretations	  of	  Aristotle	   (in	   the	  early	  1920s)	   and	  Nietzsche	   (at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  1930s).	  The	  proof,	   I	   think,	   is	   in	   the	  pudding:	  no	   thinker	  before	  or	  after	  Kant	  was	  able	   to	  enthrall	  Heidegger	  so	  thoroughly.	  And	  for	  just	  this	  reason,	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  Kantian	  spell	  insinuating	  itself	   into	   Heidegger’s	   thought	   from	   without	   should	   be	   entertained	   only	   with	   deep	  suspicion.	  It	  is	  certainly	  not	  justifiable,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  to	  regard	  either	  Heidegger’s	  careful	  engagement	  with	  Kant	  or	   the	  Kantian	  reinterpretation	  of	  his	  own	   thought	  with	  which	  he	  experimented	  as	  mere	  waystations	  along	  Heidegger’s	   true	  path.	   Indeed,	   insofar	  as	   it	  was	  always	  essential	   to	  Heidegger	   to	  plant	  his	   thinking	   firmly—nearly	   seamlessly,	   in	   fact—in	  the	  tradition	  in	  which	  he	  stood,	  it	  could	  well	  be	  argued	  that	  precisely	  here,	  as	  nowhere	  else,	  did	  Heidegger	  most	  nearly	  attain	  what	  he	  had	  originally	  set	  out	  to	  do.	  
Taking	  Kant	  Back	  from	  the	  Neokantians	  As	  he	  does	  elsewhere,	  in	  Being	  and	  Time	  Heidegger	  reserves	  some	  of	  his	  highest	  praise	  for	  Kant,	  whom	  he	  describes	  as	  “the	  first	  and	  only	  person	  who	  has	  traveled	  any	  stretch	  of	  the	  investigative	  path	  that	  leads	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  dimension	  of	  temporality”	  (BT	  23).	  But	  what	  he	  gives	  to	  Kant	  with	  one	  hand	  he	  just	  as	  quickly	  takes	  back	  with	  the	  other,	  insisting	  
                                                                                                                                                       Heidegger	  himself	  put	  little	  stake	  in	  such	  questions	  and	  was	  happy	  to	  change	  the	  terminology	  surrounding	  his	  thought,	   sometimes	   systematically	   and	   on	   short	   notice,	   as	   Kisiel’s	   meticulous	   research	   into	   Heidegger’s	  development	  in	  the	  1920s	  has	  decisively	  demonstrated.	  Sheehan	  concludes,	  “In	  the	  current	  paradigm	  ‘being’	  has	   become	   a	   ridiculous	  metaphysical	   caricature,	   so	   freighted	  with	   confusion	   and	   absurdity	   that	   it	   cannot	  serve	   as	   a	  marker	   for	   Heidegger’s	   focal	   topic”	   (Sheehan	   [2001],	   189;	   cf.	   Sheehan	   [2011],	   42-­‐52).	   If	   this	   is	  correct,	  and	  I	  think	  it	  probably	  is,	  it	  certainly	  would	  suffice	  for	  Heidegger	  himself	  to	  move	  on.	  And	  in	  this	  case	  Kisiel’s	  recasting	  of	  the	  topic	  might	  not	  be	  a	  bad	  place	  to	  start	  reimagining	  what	  Heidegger’s	  questioning	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  all	  about.	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that	  despite	  his	  efforts	  “insight	  into	  the	  problematic	  of	  temporality	  had	  to	  remain	  denied	  to	  Kant”	  (BT	  24).	  Over	  the	  next	  several	  years,	  however,	  Heidegger	  continued	  to	  warm	  to	  Kant.	  How	  far	  he	  goes	  in	  this	  direction	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  some	  debate.	  Some	  have	  gone	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say	  that	  by	  1929	  Heidegger	  had	  retracted	  his	  chief	  criticisms	  of	  Kant	  from	  1927:	  that	  Kant	  neglected	  the	  question	  of	  being	  and	  failed	  to	  offer	  a	  preliminary	  existential	  analytic.392	  This,	  I	  think,	  is	  too	  much:	  we	  are	  talking	  here	  about	  a	  matter	  of	  degree.	  At	  any	  rate,	  Heidegger’s	  chief	  and	  most	  famous	  claim—that	  Kant	  “shrank	  back”	  in	  the	  face	  of	  his	  near-­‐discovery	  of	  the	  reliance	  of	  all	  being	  upon	  time—remains	  unchanged	  from	  1927	  to	  1929.393	  We	  can	  say	  only	   that	   the	   character	   of	   this	   “shrinking	   back”	   must	   have	   taken	   on	   an	   increasingly	  dramatic	  significance	  for	  Heidegger,	  for	  he	  found	  that	  Kant	  had	  approached	  even	  closer	  to	  the	  existential	  problematic	  than	  he	  had	  originally	  expected,	  and	  he	  came	  to	  find	  that	  Kant’s	  “mistakes”	  were	  considerably	  subtler	  than	  he	  had	  imagined	  in	  Being	  and	  Time.394	  	   Despite	   his	   growing	   appreciation	   for	   Kant,	   Heidegger’s	   interpretation	   of	   him	  was	  never	   carried	  out	  with	   the	  aim	  of	   achieving	  a	   scholastically	   correct	   exhibition	  of	  Kantian	  doctrine.	   Indeed,	   Heidegger	   insists	   that	   we	   strive	   to	   understand	   Kant	   “better	   than	   he	  understood	   himself,”	   a	   nod	   to	   Schleiermacher	   and	   the	   hermeneutic	   tradition.395	  This	   has	  nothing	   to	   do	   with	   Kant’s	   having	   been	   confused,	   or	   with	   the	   task	   of	   distinguishing	   and	  clarifying	  the	  different	  motives	  which	  were	  operative	  in	  his	  thought.	  Rather,	  it	  means	  that	  we	  must	  attempt	  to	  trace	  Kant’s	  questions	  back	  to	  the	  phenomena	  he	  was	  dealing	  with	  and	  on	   that	  basis	   retrieve	   the	  problematic	  with	  which	  he	   found	  himself	   faced.	  For	  Heidegger,	  
                                                392	  See	  Engelland	  (2010),	  157.	  Heidegger’s	  criticisms	  are	  from	  BT	  24.	  393	  BT	  23;	  KPM	  3:160.	  But	  see	  the	  precedents	  for	  this	  claim	  even	  in	  1926	  at	  L	  21:406.	  394	  That	  said,	  we	  should	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  the	  destructive	  project	  announced	  in	  Being	  and	  Time	  was	  already	  designed	  to	  lead	  to	  precisely	  this	  sort	  of	  result:	  a	  gradual	  convergence	  of	  the	  existential	  problematic	  and	  the	  Kantian	  one.	  395	  See	  Gadamer	  (1960),	  192-­‐197.	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we	  understand	  Kant	  not	  only	  when	  we	  grasp	  the	  tenets	  of	  his	  theory,	  but	  when	  we	  recover	  the	  basic	  questions	  to	  which	  his	  theories	  were	  supposed	  to	  provide	  answers.	  	   As	  we	  have	   seen,	   however,	  we	   can	  only	   approach	   the	  phenomenal	  basis	   of	  Kant’s	  problematic	   if	  we	  work	  within	  a	  guiding	   indication	  which	  will	  keep	  us	  on	  the	  path	  to	  the	  things	   themselves.	   Thus	   Heidegger’s	   hermeneutics	   is	   really	   a	   moment	   of	   his	   existential	  phenomenology,	  and	   it	   is	  why,	  even	   if	  Kant	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics	   is	  not,	  strictly	  speaking,	   a	   destructive	   text,	   it	   still	  must	   be	   read	  with	   an	   eye	   to	  Being	  and	  Time’s	   formal	  indication	   of	   existence.	   This	   is	  why	  Heidegger	   says	   that	   understanding	   Kant	   better	   than	  Kant	   did	   himself	   is	   equivalent	   to	   recognizing	   through	   the	   study	   of	   his	   thought	   a	   content	  into	   which	   we	   ourselves	   can	   grow	   (PIK	   25:4).	   We	   grow	   into	   Kant’s	   thought	   precisely	  because	  we	  recognize	  that	  even	  the	  attempt	  to	  indicate	  our	  own	  existence	  only	  implicates	  us	  in	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy,	  for	  which	  Kant	  is,	  for	  us,	  the	  key.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  apparently	  dry,	   scholastic	   question	   of	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   first	   Critique	   provides	   us	   with	   the	  proximate	  historical	  content	  with	  which	  we	  can	  first	  begin	  to	  come	  to	  grips	  with	  ourselves.	  As	   Heidegger	   says,	   “It	   is	   of	   no	   use	   to	   repeat	   [nachzusprechen]	   Kantian	   concepts	   and	  propositions	   or	   to	   paraphrase	   them	  with	   others.	  We	  must	   come	   to	   the	   point	   where	  we	  speak	   them	  with	   him	   [sie	  mit	   ihm	  zusprechen],	  within	   and	   out	   of	   the	   same	   perspective”	  (PIK	  25:5).	  To	  speak	  with	  Kant	  is	  not	  just	  to	  convince	  ourselves	  that,	  after	  all,	  he	  was	  right.	  It	  is	  to	  hear	  in	  Kant’s	  doctrines	  what	  we	  had	  wanted	  to	  say	  from	  the	  start,	  only	  now	  more	  clearly	  and	  decisively.	  	   In	  comparison	  with	  typical	  philological	  standards,	  then,	  Heidegger’s	  reading	  of	  Kant	  is	  freely	  and	  openly	  a	  revisionist	  one.	  Interestingly,	   it	  bears	  many	  similarities	  to	  the	  best-­‐known	  “revisionist”	   reading	  of	  Kant	   in	   twentieth-­‐century	  Anglophone	  philosophy:	   that	  of	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Henry	  Allison.396	  Both	  argue	  that	  Kant	  has	  been	  systematically	  misunderstood	  within	  their	  traditions,	  and	  both	   locate	   the	  source	  of	   that	  misunderstanding	   in	   the	  kind	  of	   separation	  Kant’s	  interpreters	  have	  claimed	  to	  find	  between	  appearances	  and	  things	  in	  themselves.	  In	  fact	   Heidegger	   actually	   anticipates	   Allison’s	   turn	   away	   from	   the	   “two-­‐object”	   view	   in	  several	   important	   respects,397	  although	   there	   has	   been	   some	   confusion	   about	   this	   in	   the	  literature.398	  This	   is	   all	   the	   more	   important	   to	   emphasize	   given	   that	   (1)	   Heidegger	   is	  generally	  known	  as	  an	  enemy	  of	  “epistemological”	  readings	  of	  Kant	  and	  (2)	  Allison’s	  view	  is	  the	   one	   view	   contemporary	   Kant	   scholars	   will	   be	   most	   likely	   to	   associate	   with	   such	   a	  moniker.	  	   For	  Heidegger,	   as	   for	  Allison,	   the	   expressions	   “appearance”399	  and	   “thing	   in	   itself”	  refer	  not	  to	  different	  classes	  of	  objects,	  but	  to	  one	  and	  the	  same	  object,	  considered	  under	  two	  different	  aspects.	  As	  Heidegger	  says,	  “The	  being	  ‘in	  the	  appearance’	  is	  the	  same	  being	  as	   the	   being	   in	   itself,	   indeed,	   precisely	   only	   this”	   (KPM	  3:31).	   As	  Heidegger	   understands	  this	   point,	   it	   is	   that	   beings	   can	   only	   stand	   against	   us	   as	   objects	   because	   our	   cognition	   is	  finite:	  as	  objects,	  or	  Gegenstände,	  beings	  press	  against	  us,	  as	   it	  were,	  with	  a	   force	  of	   their	  own.	  But	   the	  conditions	  of	  our	  receptivity	   to	   this	   force	  necessarily	  conceal	  aspects	  of	   the	  
                                                396	  Obviously,	  Allison’s	   reading	   is	   “revisionist”	   only	   in	   that	   it	   starts	  out	   from	  a	   totally	  different	   interpretive	  place	  than	  does	  the	  reading	  of	  Kant	  that	  had	  come	  to	  dominate	  twentieth-­‐century	  Anglophone	  philosophy.	  In	  any	   substantive	   notion	   of	   “revisionist,”	   however,	   it	   is	   clearly	   less	   so	   than	   the	   alternatives	   offered	   by	  Heidegger,	  on	  the	  one	  side,	  and	  the	  tradition	  following	  Strawson,	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  latter	  sort	  of	  revisionism	  is	  sharply	   defended	   by	   Jonathan	   Bennett:	   “I	   make	   no	   apology,”	   he	   says	   at	   the	   very	   outset	   of	   his	   work,	   “for	  fighting	  Kant	  tooth	  and	  nail”	  (Bennett	  [1966],	  viii;	  see	  also	  Bennett	  [1968],	  340).	  397	  This	  is	  noted	  in	  Han-­‐Pile	  (2005),	  85.	  398	  William	  Vallicella,	   for	   example,	   goes	   so	   far	   as	   to	  maintain	   that	   the	   phenomenological	   conception	   of	   the	  phenomenon	  has	  its	  closest	  counterpart	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  thing	  in	  itself	  as	  an	  ens	  rationis.	  This	  is	  to	  stand	  the	  debate	  between	  Heidegger	  and	  the	  Neokantians	  completely	  on	  its	  head.	  See	  Vallicella	  (1983),	  37-­‐39.	  399	  Heidegger	   recognizes,	   correctly,	   I	   think,	   two	   senses	   of	   “appearance”	   operative	   in	   the	   first	   Critique:	  appearance	  as	   the	  “undetermined	  object	  of	  an	  empirical	   intuition”	  (CPR	  A20/B34)	  and	  as	   the	  phenomenon	  which	  finite	  cognition	  renders	  apparent.	  See	  KPM	  3:31-­‐32;	  also	  n.	  57	  above.	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object,	   as	   well.	   Thus	   Heidegger	   offers	   the	   following	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Kantian	  expressions	  “behind	  the	  appearance”	  and	  “mere	  appearance”:	  This	   “behind”	   cannot	   mean	   that	   the	   thing	   in	   itself	   would	   still	   stand	   in	  opposition	  to	  finite	  cognition	  as	  such	  or,	  likewise,	  that	  it	  would	  not	  be	  “fully”	  grasped,	   its	   essence	   floating	   around,	   yet	   sometimes	   becoming	   visible	  indirectly.	  Rather,	  the	  expression	  “behind	  the	  appearance”	  expresses	  the	  fact	  that	  finite	  cognition,	  as	  finite,	  necessarily	  conceals	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  indeed,	  conceals	   in	   advance	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   the	   “thing	   in	   itself”	   is	   not	   only	  imperfectly	   accessible,	   but	   essentially,	   and	   as	   such,	   inaccessible	   to	  cognition.	  .	  .	  .	  Accordingly,	  the	  “mere”	  in	  the	  phrase	  “mere	  appearance”	  is	  not	  a	   restriction	   and	   diminishment	   of	   the	   actuality	   of	   the	   thing,	   but	   only	   the	  negation	   of	   the	   being	   being	   cognized	   infinitely	   in	   human	   cognition.	   (KPM	  3:33-­‐34)400	  	  Thus	  Kant’s	  recourse	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  thing	  in	  itself	  is	  no	  relic	  of	  traditional	  metaphysics,	  nor	  does	   it	   establish	   an	   unknowable	   shadow	   world	   behind	   the	   veil	   of	   appearances.	   “The	  Copernican	  turn	  dissolves	  real	  beings	  into	  subjective	  representations	  so	  little	  that	  it	  rather	  clears	  up,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  the	  possibility	  of	  access	  to	  objects	  themselves”	  (PIK	  25:56).	  It	  does	  not	  divide	  objects	   into	  two	  groups	  and	  deny	  that	  we	  can	  cognize	  those	  that	   fall	   into	  one	  of	  these;	  instead,	  “the	  difference	  between	  the	  thing	   in	   itself	  and	  appearance	  always	  refers	  to	  things	  themselves”	  (PIK	  25:98).401	  It	  is	  the	  thing	  itself	  that	  appears	  to	  us,	  and	  we	  cognize	  it	  precisely	  insofar	  as	  it	  does.	  	   Now,	  it	  does	  not	  much	  serve	  our	  purpose	  here	  to	  venture	  into	  a	  deeper	  comparison	  of	  Heidegger’s	   and	  Allison’s	   readings	   or	   to	   chart	   out	   their	  many	   differences.	   Instead,	  we	  must	   turn	   our	   attention	   to	   the	   “epistemological”	   reading	   of	   Kant	   which	   Heidegger	   does	  
                                                400	  Thus	  Heidegger	  agrees	  with	  Allison,	  pace	  Guyer,	  that	  Kant	  need	  not	  prove	  that	  we	  can	  have	  no	  cognition	  of	  things	  in	  themselves:	  “It	  is	  therefore	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  thing	  in	  itself	  if	  we	  believe	  we	  must	   prove	   the	   impossibility	   of	   a	   cognition	   of	   the	   thing	   in	   itself	   by	   means	   of	   positivistic	   critique.	   Such	  attempted	   proofs	   take	   the	   thing	   in	   itself	   to	   be	   something	  which	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   an	   object	   within	   finite	  cognition	  in	  general,	  but	  whose	  actual	  inaccessibility	  can	  and	  must	  be	  proven”	  (KPM	  3:34).	  401	  Above	   all,	   Heidegger	   says,	   we	   must	   constantly	   resist	   the	   inclination	   “to	   turn	   the	   transcendental	  
ontological	  distinction	  between	  thing	  in	  itself	  and	  appearance	  into	  an	  empirical	  ontic	  distinction”	  (PIK	  25:159).	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want	  to	  reject	  and	  try	  to	  understand	  what	  his	  own	  “metaphysical”	  reading	  then	  amounts	  to.	  Indeed,	   the	   epistemological	   reading	   rejected	   by	   Heidegger	   has	   nothing	   to	   do	   with	   the	  epistemological	   reading	   endorsed	   by	   Allison.	   “Erkenntnistheorie,”	   generally	   translated	   as	  “epistemology,”	   refers	   for	   Heidegger	   to	   the	   Neokantian	   program	   of	   the	   critique	   of	  cognition.	   To	   begin	   to	   get	   a	   sense	   of	   Heidegger’s	   stance	   towards	   Neokantian	  
Erkenntnistheorie,	  consider	  the	  following	  from	  the	  fall	  of	  1925:	  When	   I	   see	   this	   lamp,	   I	   do	   not	   apprehend	   sense-­‐impressions	   but	   the	   lamp	  itself	   and	   the	   light;	   even	   less	  do	   I	   apprehend	   sense-­‐impressions	  of	   red	   and	  gold.	  No,	  I	  apprehend	  the	  grey	  wall	  itself.	  Nor	  am	  I	  related	  to	  concepts.	  Even	  less	  do	  I	  see	  something	  like	  an	  image	  in	  my	  consciousness—an	  image	  of	  the	  wall,	  which	  I	  then	  relate	  to	  the	  wall	   itself	   in	  order	  thereby	  to	  slip	  out	  of	  my	  consciousness,	  in	  which	  I	  am	  allegedly	  imprisoned.	  No,	  it	  is	  the	  wall	  itself	  that	  my	  looking	  intends.	  This	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  particularly	  deep	  insight,	  and	  in	  fact	   it	   is	  not.	  But	  it	  becomes	  a	  crucial	   insight	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  erroneous	  constructions	  of	  epistemology.	  Epistemology	  snaps	  to	  the	  ready,	  armed	  with	  a	  theory,	  and	  though	  blind	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  cognition,	  goes	  ahead	  and	  explains	   cognition—instead	   of	   leaving	   its	   theory	   at	   home	   and	   for	   once	  starting	  by	  examining	  what	  underlies	  its	  “explanation.”	  (L	  21:100-­‐101)402	  	  We	  need	  not	  worry,	  for	  the	  moment,	  whether	  Heidegger’s	  indictment	  of	  Neokantianism—Heidegger	  names	  Rickert	  here,	  which	  helps	  to	  explain	  his	  general	  dismissiveness403—holds	  any	  water.	  The	  root	  error	  that	  he	  identifies	  is	  the	  general	  blindness	  of	  Erkenntnistheorie	  to	  the	  things	  themselves;	  it	  assumes	  it	  already	  knows	  what	  cognition	  is	  and	  works	  backwards	  from	  that	  assumption	  to	  its	  conditions	  of	  possibility,	  i.e.,	  to	  its	  “explanation”	  of	  cognition.	  	   But	  what,	  Heidegger	  wants	  to	  know,	   is	   this	  cognition	  which	  Rickert	  and	  others	  are	  apparently	   in	   such	   a	   hurry	   to	   explain?	   Kant’s	   virtue,	   Heidegger	   thinks,	   is	   precisely	   his	  willingness	   to	   make	   this	   cognition	   itself	   into	   a	   problem,	   a	   problem	   which	   Heidegger	  identifies	   simply	   as	   the	   problem	   of	   ontological	   cognition,	   or,	   better	   yet,	   the	   problem	   of	  
                                                402	  Sheehan	  follows	  Moser’s	  typescript	  in	  parts	  of	  the	  passage,	  so	  the	  correspondence	  to	  the	  Gesamtausgabe	  edition	  is	  not	  exact.	  403	  See	  n.	  235	  	  above.	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metaphysics—hence	   the	   title	   of	   the	   Kantbook.	   But	   the	   opposition	   between	  metaphysics	  and	  epistemology	   implied	  by	   the	   title	   is	  not	   the	  opposition	  which	   is	   familiar	   to	  us	   today.	  Instead,	  Heidegger	  means	  to	  indicate,	  rightly	  or	  wrongly,	  that	  Kant,	  unlike	  the	  Neokantians,	  is	   willing	   to	   question	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   problematizing	   cognition	   through	   a	  phenomenological	   encounter	   with	   it,	   rather	   than	   merely	   explaining	   it—externally,	   as	   it	  were,	  from	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  its	  existence.	  	   Heidegger’s	   concern	   is	   not	   just	   about	   Rickert	   here.	   In	   fact,	   the	  Marburg	   School	   is	  supposed	  to	  be	  implicated,	  as	  well.	  Here	  we	  approach	  a	  decisive	  array	  of	  historiographical	  questions:	   What,	   exactly,	   was	   Kant’s	   relationship	   to	   the	   tradition	   which	   he	   apparently	  transformed	   so	   radically	   through	   his	   “Copernican	   turn”?	   And	   to	   what	   degree	   does	   the	  Marburg	   School’s	   insistence,	   following	   Cohen,	   upon	   the	   “fact	   of	   science”	   represent	   an	  authentically	  “Kantian”	  development	   in	   idealist	   thought?	  In	   fact,	   the	  first	  question	  merely	  leads	  out	  onto	  the	  second.	  	   At	  the	  bottom	  of	  Heidegger’s	  disagreement	  with	  the	  Neokantians	  is	  the	  question	  of	  the	  extent	   to	  which	  we	  should	   see	  Kant	  as	  posing	  a	  basically	  new	  philosophical	  problem	  which	  would	  mark	  a	  decisive	  break	  with	  the	  metaphysical	  tradition.	  Certainly	  Kant’s	  talk	  of	  a	   “Copernican	   revolution”	   in	   philosophy	   encourages	   the	   view	   that	   he	   is	   posing	   a	   new	  question	   altogether,	   or	   at	   least	   posing	   an	   old	   one	   in	   a	   light	   which	   is	   new	   enough	   to	  transform	   it	   irrevocably.	   Windelband404	  and	   Rickert405	  certainly	   present	   the	   project	   and	  lesson	   of	   the	   Kantian	   philosophy	   as	   novel	   and	   revisionist,	   respectively.	   And	   at	   the	  
                                                404	  Cf.	  Windelband’s	  characterization	  of	  Kant’s	  significance	  within	  the	  context	  of	  Enlightenment	  thought:	  “The	  preeminent	   position	   of	   the	   Königsberg	   philosopher	   rests	   upon	   the	   fact	   that	   he	   took	   up	   into	   himself	   the	  various	  motives	  of	   thought	   in	   the	   literature	  of	   the	  Enlightenment,	   and	  by	   their	   reciprocal	   supplementation	  matured	   a	   completely	   new	   conception	   of	   the	   problem	   and	   procedure	   of	   philosophy.	   .	   .	   .	   But	   it	   was	   in	  connection	   with	   the	   difficulties	   of	   the	   problem	   of	   knowledge	   that	   he	   wrought	   out	   from	   all	   these	  foundational	  elements	  the	  work	  which	  gave	  him	  his	  peculiar	  significance”	  (Windelband	  [1892],	  532).	  405	  See	  p.	  190	  above.	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beginning	  of	  his	  review	  of	  the	  Kantbook,	  Cassirer,	  keenly	  sensing	  what	  is	  at	  stake,	  frames	  his	  review	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  “new	  orientation”	  at	  which	  Kant	  had	  arrived	  in	  his	  1772	  letter	  to	  Herz:	  “Now	  it	  was	  no	   longer	  a	  matter	  of	  adding	  a	   further	  system	  of	  metaphysics	  to	  those	  already	  on	  hand—to	  find,	  that	  is,	  a	  new	  answer	  to	  questions	  which	  had	  long	  existed.”	  The	  path	  of	  metaphysics	  now	  had	  to	  change	  because	  its	  goal	  had	  moved	  to	  another	  position—because	  the	  ‘object’	  which	  it	  wants	  to	  know	  and	  to	  which	  it	  accords	  had	  shifted.	   .	   .	   .	  The	  shift	  contained	  a	  new	  view,	  not	  only	  of	  what	  is	  known	  and	  what	  is	  knowable,	  but	  of	  the	  nature,	  task,	  and	  basic	  function	  of	  knowledge	  itself.406	  	  Heidegger,	  whose	  interest	  in	  Kant	  depends	  crucially,	  of	  course,	  on	  his	  occupying	  a	  definite	  place	  in	  the	  Western	  philosophical	  tradition,	  does	  not	  want	  to	  make	  this	  move.407	  Kant,	  he	  insists,	  occupies	  a	  central	  place	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  metaphysics	  stretching	  back	  to	  Plato	  and	  Aristotle	  (see	  KPM	  3:6-­‐8;	  PIK	  23:13-­‐15).	  He	  does	  not	  deny	  that	  Kant	  wants	  to	  problematize	  metaphysics,	  but	  he	  sees	  Kant	  as	  working	  through	  the	  positive	  possibilities	  inherent	  in	  that	  tradition	   (PIK	   25:101),	   rather	   than	   overthrowing	   it	   entirely	   and	   assuming	   a	   new	  standpoint.	   As	   Heidegger	   puts	   it,	   Kant	   shows	   that	   metaphysics	   as	   an	   ontic	   science	   is	  impossible	   (PIK	  25:61).	  Thus	  he	   consistently	   challenges	  what	  he	   takes	   to	  be	   the	  popular	  conception	  of	  the	  Copernican	  revolution	  to	  which	  Kant	  alludes,	  a	  conception	  encouraged	  by	  the	  Neokantians:	  shifting	   the	  question	  of	  philosophy	  away	   from	  real	  beings	  and	  onto	  our	  
                                                406	  Cassirer	  (1931),	  131-­‐132.	  He	  goes	  on	  to	  note	  that	  it	  is	  only	  at	  this	  point	  that	  “the	  battle	  of	  interpretations	  breaks	  out”;	  I	  suspect	  that	  Heidegger	  would	  already	  object	  to	  his	  framing	  of	  the	  problem,	  although	  he	  would	  not,	  of	  course,	  deny	  the	  importance	  of	  Kant’s	  having	  attained	  a	  new	  perspective	  from	  which	  he	  might	  address	  an	  old	  problem.	  407	  On	   this	  point,	  at	   least,	  Allison	  appears	   to	  stand	  closer	   to	   the	  Neokantians	   than	  he	  does	   to	  Heidegger.	  By	  casting	  Kant’s	   approach	   as	   an	   adoption	   of	   a	   new	  method,	   rather	   than	   as	   an	   (initially,	   at	   least)	   substantive	  attack	   on	   his	   predecessors,	   Allison	   seems	   to	   be	   encouraging	   the	   idea	   that	   Kant	   is	   posing	   a	   new	   kind	   of	  question	  altogether,	  rather	  than	  simply	  offering	  a	  new	  answer	  to	  an	  old	  one.	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cognition	  of	   them,	  as	   if	   the	   “appearances”	  were	  again	  beings	   to	  which	  we	  could	   comport	  ourselves	  ontically.408	  
Symbolic	  Form	  and	  the	  Fact	  of	  Science	  It	   is	  questionable,	  of	  course,	  whether	  Cassirer,	  or	  any	  of	  the	  Neokantians,	   for	  that	  matter,	  should	   be	   saddled	   with	   a	   bare	   acceptance	   of	   the	   fact	   of	   cognition.	   Cohen	   had	   already	  insisted,	   after	   all,	   that	   Erkenntnistheorie	   be	   understood	   in	   the	   first	   instance	   as	  
Erkenntniskritik.409	  From	  early	  on,	  the	  whole	  point	  of	  Marburg	  “epistemology”	  was	  to	  effect	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  modern	  science	  by	  tracing	  the	  transcendental	  conditions	  for	  its	  very	  existence.	  And	  nothing	  essential	   changed	  on	   that	   score	  as	   the	  project	  broadened	   its	  scope	   in	   the	   hands	   of	  Natorp	   and	   Cassirer.	   Nobody	   familiar	  with	   Cassirer’s	  monumental	  work	  on	  symbolic	  forms,	  drawing	  from	  an	  astonishing	  array	  of	  historical	  sources,410	  would	  dare	  assert	  that	  he	  simply	  took	  the	  existence	  of	  cognition	  for	  granted.	  	   Of	  course,	  Heidegger	  himself	  was	  deeply	  familiar	  with,	  and	  very	  much	  appreciative	  of,	   Cassirer’s	   work	   on	   cultural	   formation,	   having	   reviewed	   the	   second	   volume	   of	   the	  
Philosophy	   of	   Symbolic	   Forms	   in	   1928.411 	  In	   his	   review,	   Heidegger	   praises	   Cassirer’s	  functionalization	   of	   the	   basic	   concepts	   of	   mythology,	   going	   so	   far	   as	   to	   say	   that	   against	  naturalistic	   and	   sociological	   explanations	   of	   myth	   Cassirer’s	   critique	   is	   “thoroughly	  unambiguous	   and	   devastating”	   (RC	   3:264).	   But	   Heidegger	   remains	   unconvinced	   of	   the	  philosophical	   foundations	   of	   Cassirer’s	   approach:	   “The	   orientation	   to	   the	   Neokantian	  problem	   of	   consciousness	   is	   of	   such	   little	   help	   that	   it	   actually	   keeps	   us	   from	   gaining	   a	  
                                                408	  See	  Cassirer	  &	  Heidegger	  (1929),	  194.	  409	  Cohen	  (1883),	  6.	  410	  See	  n.	  425	  below.	  411	  This	  volume	   is	  also	   the	   subject	  of	   a	   footnote	   in	  Being	  and	  Time	   in	  which	  Heidegger	  attempts	   to	   register	  Cassirer’s	   acknowledgement—expressed,	   as	   Heidegger	   understood	   it,	   at	   least,	   at	   a	   1923	   lecture—of	   the	  necessity	   of	   an	   existential	   analytic	   (BT	   51n).	   At	   Davos	   Cassirer	  would	   deny	   this	   necessity	   in	   no	   uncertain	  terms	  (Cassirer	  &	  Heidegger	  [1929],	  205).	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foothold	   in	   the	   center	  of	   the	  problem”	   (RC	  3:266).	  Beginning	  with	   a	   chaos	  of	   sensations,	  and	   then	   showing	   how	   such	   sensations	   are	   given	   form	   through	   a	   basic	   mode	   of	  comportment	  to	  the	  world,	  is	  not	  sufficient	  unless	  the	  philosophical	  access	  to	  the	  starting	  point,	   i.e.,	   the	   sensations	   themselves,	   is	   itself	   placed	   at	   the	   center	   of	   the	   problematic	   of	  symbolic	  forms	  (see	  RC	  3:268).	  	   We	  must	  suppose	  neither	  that	  Cassirer,	  despite	  some	  of	  his	  formulations,	  descends	  into	   crude	   sensationalism,	   nor	   that	   this	   is	   the	   true	   basis	   of	   Heidegger’s	   dissatisfaction.	  Indeed,	   Cassirer	   freely	   speaks	   of	   “objectivization”	   as	   the	   process	   by	   which	   “mere	  impressions	   are	   reworked	   into	   specific,	   formed	   representations.”412	  But	  Cassirer’s	   talk	   of	  “impressions”	   or	   “sensations”	   is	   fully	   functionalized	   here:	   Cassirer	   is	   indicating	   the	  evanescent	   “given”	   which	   we	   symbolically	   transform	   just	   as	   soon	   as	   we	   would	   try	   to	  describe	   it.	   This	   is	   something	   Heidegger,	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   his	   engagement	   with	   Natorp,	  understood	  only	  all	  too	  well.	  In	  fact,	  Cassirer’s	  debt	  to	  Natorp	  is	  massive	  and	  meticulously	  acknowledged.	   In	   many	   ways	   the	   encounter	   between	   Heidegger	   and	   Cassirer	   at	   Davos	  would	  play	  out	  as	  a	  repetition	  of	  Heidegger’s	  encounter	  with	  Natorp	  a	  decade	  earlier,	  right	  down	   to	   the	   attempts	   by	   Natorp	   and	   Cassirer	   to	   pull	   phenomenology	   into	   the	   orbit	   of	  Neokantianism	   and	  Heidegger’s	   stubborn	   attempts,	   in	   each	   case,	   to	   resist	   them.	   But	   this	  time	   the	   stakes	   were	   historical	   right	   from	   the	   start:	   Who,	   the	   audience,	   would	   want	   to	  know,	  was	  the	  proper	  heir	  to	  Kant?	  Was	  it	  Cassirer,	  who	  had	  always	  worn	  his	  Kantianism	  on	  his	  sleeve,	  or	  Heidegger,	  who	  had	  only	  just	  lately	  staked	  out	  his	  claim	  here?	  	   Neither	   Cassirer	   nor	   Heidegger	   harbored	   any	   illusions	   about	   the	   revisions	   to	   the	  letter	  of	  the	  Kantian	  philosophy	  that	  their	  interpretations	  would	  require.	  For	  each	  of	  them	  
                                                412	  Cassirer	   (1925),	   29.	   Later	   on	   the	   same	   page,	   he	   speaks	   of	   “the	  ways	   in	  which	   the	   diversity	   of	   sensory	  impressions	  can	  be	  synthesized	  into	  spiritual	  unities.”	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the	   basic	   question	   concerned	   the	   animating	   drive	   behind	   Kant’s	   work	   as	   a	   whole.	   For	  Cassirer,	  Kant’s	  decisive	  contribution	  to	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  lay	  in	  his	  identification	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  unity	  with	  the	  side	  of	  thought	  and	  his	  consequent	  location	  of	  multiplicity	  on	  the	   side	   of	   matter:	   through	   the	   active	   formation	   of	   matter	   we	   come	   to	   regard	   it	   as	   an	  expression	   of	   spontaneous	   thought.	   Cassirer’s	   own	   philosophy	   of	   symbolic	   forms	   was	  designed	  to	  take	  this	  insight	  and	  apply	  it	  with	  a	  completely	  universal	  scope	  to	  the	  objective	  cultural	   world.	   To	   see	   the	   latter	   as	   a	   myriad	   collection	   of	   symbolic	   forms	   means	   to	  understand	  all	  the	  various	  aspects	  of	  reality	  as	  expressions	  of	  a	  unitary	  principle,	  but,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  to	  keep	  in	  view	  the	  peculiarity	  of	  each	  of	  these	  formations.	  This	  sounds	  Hegelian	  at	   first	   blush	   (and	   indeed	   it	   has	   been	   claimed	   that	   the	   Neokantians	   were	   every	   bit	   as	  indebted	  to	  Hegel	  as	  they	  were	  to	  Kant),	  but	  Cassirer	  sees	  no	  reason	  to	  admit	  the	  actuality	  of	   the	  synthetic	  universals	  (though	  such	  representations	  may	  be	  given	  problematically	   to	  us)	   which	   would	   make	   possible	   the	   simplicity	   of	   such	   cognition.413	  Unlike	   the	   Hegelian	  view,	  then,	  the	  “critical”	  view,	  i.e.,	  Cassirer’s	  own,	  “raises	  the	  problem	  of	  a	  unity	  which	  from	  the	  outset	  makes	  no	  claim	  to	  simplicity.”414	  	   The	   history	   of	   philosophy	   is	   in	   large	   part	   a	   dialectic	   between	   the	   opposed	  tendencies	   of	   the	   unitary	   principle	   of	   being,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   multiplicity	   of	  phenomena,	  on	  the	  other.415	  In	  other	  words,	  philosophy	  has	  always	  traced,	  throughout	  its	  development,	  the	  internal	  tension	  between	  the	  moments	  of	  form	  and	  matter	  of	  cognition.	  When	   Kant	   identified	   thought	  with	   form	   and	   intuition	  with	  matter,	   he	  was	   on	   the	   right	  
                                                413	  Very	  roughly:	  while	  Hegel	  remains	  faithful	  to	  the	  early	  modern	  ideal	  of	  completely	  intuitive	  cognition	  as	  governing	   us,	   Cassirer	   follows	   Kant	   in	   grounding	   human	   cognition	   as	   a	   whole	   in	   discursivity.	   See	   Poma	  (1988),	  77-­‐78	  on	  Cohen’s	  original	  rejection	  of	  Hegelian	  thought	  on	  basically	  this	  same	  basis.	  414	  Cassirer	  (1923),	  95.	  415	  See	  Cassirer	  (1929),	  1.	  
 274	  
track.	  But	  he	  himself	  was	  not	  able	   to	   see	   far	  enough	  here.	  By	   trying	   to	   isolate	   space	  and	  time	  as	  “forms	  of	  intuition”	  he	  tried	  to	  meet	  his	  own	  deepest	  insight	  halfway.	  To	  complete	  Kant’s	  revolution	  in	  philosophy,	  it	  remains	  only	  to	  thoroughly	  relativize	  the	  notions	  of	  form	  and	   matter	   in	   the	   case	   of	   cognition:	   what	   counts	   as	   form	   at	   one	   level	   can	   always	   be	  considered	  as	  matter	  at	  a	  higher	  one.416	  	   Cassirer’s	   point	   of	   departure	   is	   Natorp’s	   insight	   that	   the	   form-­‐matter	   continuum	  might	   be	   fruitfully	   employed	   in	   deconstructing	   the	   mind-­‐body	   problem	   that	   had	  preoccupied	  modern	  philosophy	  and	  which	  was	  positively	  torturing	  the	  emerging,	  still	  ill-­‐defined	   field	  of	  psychology.	  According	   to	  Natorp,	   the	   investigation	  of	  psychic	  phenomena	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  to	  be	  an	  inquiry	  into	  a	  region	  of	  phenomena	  separate	  but	  ontologically	  equal	   to	   that	  of	  material	  objects,	  but	   should	   rather	  be	   seen	  as	  giving	  an	   inquiry	   into	  one	  selfsame	   manifold	   of	   phenomena	   a	   different,	   indeed	   reversed,	   direction.417	  The	   basic	  question	  of	  psychology	  should	  be	  not	  What	  kinds	  of	  things	  are	  psychic	  processes?	  but	  rather	  
What	  is	  the	  principle	  of	  construction	  which	  constitutes	  objects	  in	  the	  world	  while	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  manifesting	  the	  basic	  principles	  of	   thought?	   Properly	   conceived,	   then,	   the	  mind-­‐body	  problem	  is	  not	  really	  about	  relating	  two	  separate	  entities,	  nor	  is	  it	  even	  about	  relating	  two	  distinct	   sets	   of	   phenomena	   which	   appear	   prima	   facie	   incommensurable;	   it	   is,	   rather,	  precisely	  the	  universal	  problem	  of	  the	  constitution	  of	  objectivity	  in	  general:	  what	  it	  is	  that	  allows	  objects	   to	  be	  objects	   for	  us.	  And	   this	  problem	  only	   attains	   its	   true	   form	  when	  we	  distinguish	  two	  possible	  directions	  of	  inquiry	  ranging	  over	  just	  a	  single	  set	  of	  constituting	  
                                                416	  Cassirer	  (1929),	  9-­‐10;	  cf.	  Cassirer	  (1923),	  98.	  The	  complete	  story	  here	  is	  considerably	  more	  complicated;	  to	  trace	  it	  out	  fully	  would	  effectively	  be	  to	  tell	  the	  story	  of	  Marburg	  Neokantianism.	  Suffice	  it	  for	  now	  to	  say	  that	  Cassirer	  is	  following	  Cohen	  and	  Natorp	  in	  considering	  the	  specific	  difference	  between	  forms	  of	  intuition	  and	  forms	  of	  thought	  to	  be	  inessential—in	  the	  final	  analysis,	  a	  precritical	  relic—for	  the	  deeper	  significance	  of	  the	  Kantian	  project.	  Heidegger,	  of	  course,	  will	  vehemently	  defend	  the	  prerogative	  of	   intuition	  to	  resist	  such	  relativization.	  417	  See	  n.	  268	  above.	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phenomena:	  forward,	  to	  the	  constituted	  objects;	  backward,	  to	  the	  psychic	  processes	  (which	  must	  not	  be	  conceived	  naturalistically,	  of	  course,	  in	  which	  case	  they	  would,	  once	  again,	  be	  constituted	  objects)	  by	  which	  they	  are	  constituted.	  	   Thus	  we	  can	  think	  of	  Natorp	  as	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  line	  running	  from	  the	  psychic	  to	  the	  objective	  can	  be	  traversed	  in	  both	  directions—and	  must	  be	  if	  the	  science	  of	  objective	  things	  is	  to	  be	  completed,	  or,	  better,	  complemented,	  by	  a	  scientific	  psychology.	  The	  line	  is	  infinite	   in	   both	   directions,	   however:	   the	   ultimate	   objective	   representation	   of	   reality	  remains	  a	  scientific	  ideal,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  while	  the	  basic	  principle	  of	  subjectivity	  remains	  forever	  unknown	  to	  us,	  on	  the	  other.	  Neither	  end	  of	  the	  line,	  despite	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  naturalists	  (who	  would	  take	  the	  objective	  as	  a	  simply	  given	  principle	  of	  explanation)	  and	  the	   phenomenologists	   (who	   claim	   an	   immediate	   access	   to	   subjectivity	   as	   such),	   can	  function	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  of	  inquiry.	  	   Cassirer’s	   gambit	   is	   to	   introduce	   a	   pluralist	   element	   into	   Natorp’s	   schema.	   If	  Natorp’s	  method	  can	  be	  represented	  by	  a	  single	  line	  extending	  infinitely	  in	  both	  directions,	  Cassirer’s	   can	   be	   represented	   by	   a	   series	   of	   lines	   which	   are	   dispersed	   in	   one	   direction	  through	  a	  potentially	  infinite	  refraction	  and	  which	  asymptotically	  converge	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	   towards	   an	   ever-­‐receding	   point	   of	   unification.	   The	   fatal	   flaw	   in	   Natorp’s	  method,418	  according	   to	   Cassirer,	   is	   that	   he	   takes	   just	   one	   avenue	   of	   cultural	   formation,	  namely,	   that	   of	   scientific	   cognition,	   to	   be	   the	   ultimate	   expression	   of	   the	   human	   spirit,	  instead	   of	   recognizing	   the	   irreducible	   “polydimensionality,”	   as	   Cassirer	   puts	   it,	   of	   the	  
                                                418	  This	   may	   be	   characterizing	   Cassirer’s	   attitude	   too	   strongly.	   As	   Cassirer	   describes	   it,	   Natorp’s	   own	  intellectual	  development	  was	  pushing	  him	   towards	   this	  very	   realization,	  and	  only	  his	  death	  prevented	  him	  from	  completing	  his	  project	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  a	  philosophy	  of	  symbolic	  forms	  (Cassirer	  [1929],	  54).	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latter.419	  The	   task	  of	   the	  philosophy	  of	   symbolic	   forms	   is	   to	  pursue	  each	   of	   these	   lines—again,	  following	  Natorp’s	  lead—in	  both	  directions,	  however	  far	  it	  is	  permitted	  us	  to	  be	  able	  to	   trace	   them.	   Philosophy	   must	   learn	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   irreducible	   complexity	   of	   the	  diversity	  of	  symbolic	  forms	  and	  restrain	  itself	  from	  the	  temptation	  to	  reduce	  this	  complex	  system	   to	   a	   single	   principle;420	  instead,	   it	   must	   present	   the	   various	   spheres	   of	   cultural	  formations	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  principles	  they	  immanently	  manifest.	  Hence	  it	  deals,	  in	  sober	  Kantian	  fashion,	  in	  analytic	  universals,	  even	  though	  these	  universals	  are	  finally	  understood	  to	  be	  diverse	  expressions	  of	  the	  one	  human	  spirit	  which	  forms	  itself	  in	  all	  of	  them.	  It	  is	  not	  given	  to	  us	  to	  be	  able	  to	  conceive	  with	  intuitive	  clarity	  the	  transition	  to	  the	  many	  from	  the	  one;	  rather,	  the	  many	  gives	  itself	  to	  us	  precisely	  as	  an	  inconceivably	  achieved	  unification	  of	  the	  human	  spirit	  in	  a	  cultural	  world.	  This	  is	  what	  remains,	  in	  Cassirer’s	  thought,	  of	  the	  “fact	  of	   science”	   of	   the	   Marburg	   School.	   “I	   start	   from	   the	   objectivity	   of	   the	   symbolic	   form,”	  Cassirer	  says,	  “because	  here	  the	  inconceivable	  has	  been	  done.”421	  	   The	   inconceivable	  achievement	  of	  culture,	   in	  all	   its	  panoramic	  grandeur,	   falls	  back	  on	  us	  as	  an	  infinite	  task	  which	  we	  must	  take	  up	  one	  stone	  at	  a	  time.	  It	  is	  demanded	  that	  we	  project	   the	   convergence	  of	   the	   refracted	   lines	  of	   culture	  at	   a	   common	  origin.	  To	  be	   sure,	  this	  point	  of	  origin	  always	  recedes	  from	  us	  and	  forever	  eludes	  the	  critical	  grasp.	  Invoking	  Kleist,	  Cassirer	  calls	  it	  the	  “paradise	  of	  immediacy,”422	  and	  indeed	  it	  is	  nowhere	  to	  be	  found	  in	  this	  world.	  But	  only	  by	  retaining	  the	  reference	  to	  a	  singular,	  though	  refracted,	  formative	  force	  do	  we	  render	  the	  diversity	  of	  cultural	  formations	  intelligible	  to	  us	  as	  a	  single	  world	  of	  
                                                419	  Cassirer	   (1929),	   54.	   This	   is	   the	   source	   of	   Cassirer’s	   incessant	   warnings	   about	   pursuing	   the	   Marburg	  project	   in	  too	  theoretical	  a	  manner;	  see	  Cassirer	  (1923),	  69,	  77-­‐78,	  82,	  111;	  Cassirer	  (1929),	  13,	  40,	  48,	  57.	  Still,	   he	  never	   gives	   up	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  mathematical	   natural	   sciences	   serve	   as	   a	   paradigm	   in	   this	   regard	  (Cassirer	  &	  Heidegger	  [1929],	  194).	  420	  Cassirer	  (1923),	  95.	  421	  Cassirer	  &	  Heidegger	  (1929),	  205.	  422	  See	  Cassirer	  (1923),	  113;	  Cassirer	  (1929),	  40;	  Cassirer	  (1930-­‐1931),	  857-­‐858.	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which	  we	  are	  a	  part.	  This	  guarantees	  that	  we	  are	  ultimately	  dealing	  with	  one	  constellation	  of	  problems	  in	  philosophy,	  rather	  than	  discrete	  regions	  of	  beings	  that	  would	  be	  best	  left	  to	  localized	  sciences.	  And	  this	  is	  not	  all.	  The	  principles	  of	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  world	  and	  of	  our	  participation	  in	  the	  world	  are	  in	  deep	  agreement,	  and	  indeed	  this	  is	  why	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  philosopher	  is	  itself,	  like	  any	  other	  part	  of	  culture,	  productive	  and	  reflective	  of	  a	  symbolic	  form.	   All	   cultural	   activity	   is	   determined	   by	   the	   need	   to	   appropriate	  what	   appears	   to	   be	  merely	  passively	  received	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  to	  stamp	  it	  with	  the	  seal	  of	  the	  human	  spirit.	  To	  be	  sure,	  we	  can	  only	  understand	  the	  “content”	  of	  our	  reference	  to	  a	  unified	  human	  spirit	  by	  
means	   of	   its	   actual	   manifestations,	   but	   this	   is	   precisely	   why	   the	   philosophy	   of	   symbolic	  forms	   is	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   this	   spiritual	   process:	   the	   critical	   cultural	   philosopher	   gives	  transparency	  to	  the	  human	  spirit	  in	  its	  cultural	  formations.	  Thus,	   with	   all	   their	   inner	   diversity,	   the	   various	   products	   of	   culture—language,	  scientific	  knowledge,	  myth,	  art,	  religion—become	  parts	  of	  a	  single	  great	  problem-­‐complex:	  they	  become	  multiple	  efforts,	  all	  directed	  toward	  the	  one	  goal	  of	   transforming	   the	  passive	  world	  of	  mere	   impressions,	   in	  which	  the	  spirit	  seems	  at	  first	  imprisoned,	  into	  a	  world	  that	  is	  pure	  expression	  of	  the	  human	  spirit.423	  	  Thus	  while	  the	  philosophy	  of	  symbolic	  forms	  can	  never	  reduce	  the	  rich	  panoply	  of	  culture	  to	  one	   spiritual	  principle,	  nor	  paint	   in	   a	   single	  picture	   the	  precise	   likeness	  of	   the	  human	  spirit	  made	  manifest	  on	  earth,	  its	  diverse	  analyses	  nevertheless	  gain	  their	  orientation	  from	  their	  infinitely	  distant	  grounding	  in	  the	  unity	  such	  a	  principle	  would	  provide.424	  
                                                423	  Cassirer	   (1923),	  80-­‐81.	  Cf.	  Cassirer	   (1923),	  91:	   “The	  achievement	  of	  each	   [function	  of	   the	  human	  spirit]	  must	   be	  measured	   by	   itself,	   and	   not	   by	   the	   standards	   and	   aims	   of	   any	   other—and	   only	   at	   the	   end	   of	   this	  examination	  can	  we	  ask	  whether	  and	  how	  all	   these	  forms	  of	  conceiving	  the	  world	  and	  the	  I	  are	  compatible	  with	  one	  another—whether,	   though	  they	  are	  not	  copies	  of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  self-­‐subsistent	   ‘thing,’	   they	  do	  not	  complement	  one	  another	  to	  form	  a	  single	  totality	  and	  a	  unified	  system.”	  424	  As	   Andrea	   Poma	   beautifully	   puts	   the	   point	   with	   respect	   to	   Cohen’s	   thought,	   the	   task	   of	   the	   critical	  philosophy	  consists	  in	  “the	  defense	  of	  the	  finite,	  loyalty	  towards	  it,	  but	  also	  tension	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  infinity,	  which	  is	  still	  considered	  a	  limit	  and	  task	  of	  the	  finite”	  (Poma	  [1988],	  53).	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   There	  are	  positive	  and	  negative	  conditions	  for	  succeeding	  in	  this	  project.	  Positively,	  we	  need	  both	   the	  access	   to	   the	  expressions	  of	   the	  human	  spirit,	   in	  all	   their	  diversity	  and	  richness,425	  as	  well	  as	  the	  intellectual	  and	  practical	  curiosity	  to	  seriously	  engage	  with	  them.	  Negatively,	   we	   must	   cultivate	   the	   restraint	   that	   is	   necessary	   to	   overcome	   the	   alluring	  prospect	  of	  cracking	  the	  secrets	  of	  the	  human	  spirit	  all	  at	  one	  blow.	  Our	  curiosity	  in	  the	  face	  of	   cultural	  diversity	  must	  be	  balanced	  by	   a	   sober	   respect	   for	   that	   very	  diversity,	   and	  we	  must	  constantly	  keep	  in	  mind	  the	  always	  still	  infinite	  distance	  that	  stands	  between	  us	  and	  Kleist’s	   inaccessible	   paradise.	   The	   desire	   to	   leap	   over	   this	   distance	   represents	   a	   genuine	  philosophical	   tendency,	  but	  giving	   into	   it	   is	   the	  supreme	  danger	   into	  which	  we	  could	   fall.	  We	  must	  content	  ourselves	  with	  less:	  True,	   the	  question	  of	  what,	  apart	   from	  these	  spiritual	   functions,	  constitutes	  absolute	   reality,	   the	   question	   of	   what	   the	   “thing	   in	   itself”	   may	   be	   in	   this	  sense,	   remains	   unanswered,	   except	   that	   more	   and	   more	   we	   learn	   to	  recognize	  it	  as	  a	  fallacy	  in	  formulation,	  an	  intellectual	  phantasm.426	  	  The	  mistake	  of	   life	  philosophy—and,	  by	  extension,	   the	  existentialism	  of	  Heidegger	  which	  represents	  its	  culmination—is	  precisely	  to	  press	  this	  question,	  to	  insist	  on	  recapturing	  this	  immediacy,	   where	   in	   fact	   there	   is	   nothing	   actually	   there	   to	   be	   recovered.	   The	   error	   of	  Bergson,	   Cassirer	   tells	   us,	   is	   to	   see	   cultural	   symbols	   as	   falsifications	   of	   the	   inner	   flux	  through	  which	   concrete	   life	   is	   constituted.427	  But	   this	   is	   precisely	   the	   problem	   of	   all	   life	  philosophy:	  cultural	   formation	  would	  only	  be	   falsification	   if	   there	  were	  another	  standard,	  immanent	  to	  life	  itself,	  by	  which	  culture	  could	  be	  measured.	  This,	  however,	  is	  a	  fantasy.	  No	  sooner	  is	  life	  lived	  than	  it	  forms	  itself,	  and,	  crucially,	  this	  is	  no	  less	  true	  when	  we	  attempt	  to	  
                                                425	  For	   Cassirer	   himself,	   this	   access	   was	   made	   possible	   by	   his	   association	   with	   the	   Warburg	   Library	   in	  Hamburg,	  whose	  vast	  collection	  provided	  much	  of	  the	  empirical	  impetus	  for	  his	  work	  in	  the	  early	  1920s.	  See	  Gordon	  (2010),	  19-­‐22.	  426	  Cassirer	  (1923),	  111.	  427	  Cassirer	  (1929),	  36-­‐37.	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meditatively	  direct	  our	  attention	  to	  life	  itself	  than	  it	  is	  when	  we	  casually	  give	  our	  attention	  entirely	   over	   to	   the	   objects	   of	   our	   experience.	   After	   all,	   “life	   cannot	   apprehend	   itself	   by	  
remaining	   absolutely	   within	   itself.	   It	   must	   give	   itself	   form;	   for	   it	   is	   precisely	   by	   this	  ‘otherness’	  of	  form	  that	  it	  gains	  its	  ‘visibility,’	  if	  not	  its	  reality.”428	  Rousseau’s	  nostalgia	  for	  a	  simple	   life	   to	   which	   we	   could	   return,	   prior	   to	   all	   culture,	   expresses	   the	   genuine	  inescapability	   of	   the	   reference	   to	   a	   unitary	   human	   spirit,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   provide	   a	   road	  upon	  which	  we	  could	  travel	  to	  learn	  the	  hidden	  truth	  of	  human	  existence.	  Hence	   [philosophy]	   has	   no	   other	   solution	   than	   to	   reverse	   the	  direction	   of	  inquiry.	  Instead	  of	  taking	  the	  road	  back,	  it	  must	  attempt	  to	  continue	  forward.	  If	  all	  culture	  is	  manifested	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  specific	  image-­‐worlds,	  of	  specific	  symbolic	  forms,	  the	  aim	  of	  philosophy	  is	  not	  to	  go	  behind	  all	  these	  creations,	  but	   rather	   to	  understand	  and	  elucidate	   their	  basic	   formative	  principle.	   It	   is	  solely	  through	  awareness	  of	  this	  principle	  that	  the	  content	  of	  life	  acquires	  its	  true	  form.429	  	  If	  the	  life	  philosophers	  want	  to	  approach	  the	  facticity	  of	  life,	  even	  they	  have	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  look	   for	   it	   in	   the	   cultural	   formations	   into	  which	   it	   has	   poured	   itself	   out.	  Pace	   Rousseau,	  culture	  is	  not	  man’s	  chains	  but	  the	  expression	  of	  his	  innermost	  freedom.	  
Davos	  The	  second	  Davos	  Hochschulekurse	  was	  held	  from	  mid	  March	  to	  early	  April	  1929.	  It	  was	  the	  second	  installment	  in	  an	  annual	  conference	  series	  designed	  to	  foster	  intellectual	  exchange	  across	   international	   borders—especially	   the	   borders	   separating	   the	   belligerents	   of	   the	  Great	  War	  from	  one	  another.	  The	  1928	  conference	  had	  included	  Tillich	  and	  Einstein	  among	  its	   speakers,	   and	   the	  hope	  was	   that	   a	   discussion	  between	  Cassirer	   and	  Heidegger	  would	  headline	   an	   equally	   successful	   conference	   in	   1929.430	  It	   certainly	   succeeded	   in	   attracting	  
                                                428	  Cassirer	  (1929),	  39.	  Again,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  decisive	  influence	  of	  Natorp.	  See	  p.	  184	  above.	  429	  Cassirer	  (1923),	  113.	  430	  Gordon	  (2010),	  91-­‐94.	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some	   of	   the	   brightest	   young	   philosophical	   minds	   of	   the	   time:	   Carnap,	   Fink,	   Bollnow,	  Lévinas,	  and	  Ritter	  were	  all	   in	  attendance.431	  The	  course	  would	  immediately	  bear	  fruit	  on	  Heidegger’s	   side:	   after	   returning	   from	  Davos,	  he	   reports	   that	   in	   three	   intensive	  weeks	  of	  work	  he	  had	  written	  out	  the	  manuscript	  that	  would	  become	  the	  Kantbook.432	  	   The	  discussion	  between	  Heidegger	  and	  Cassirer	  at	  Davos	  was	  recorded	  in	  summary	  fashion	  by	  Bollnow	  and	  Ritter.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  the	  discussion	  we	  find,	  as	  we	  would	  expect,	  anticipations	  of	  the	  main	  themes	  of	  the	  Kantbook	  and	  Cassirer’s	  review	  of	  it.	  We	  also	  find	  on	   display	   the	   characteristic	   charity	   and	   patience	   of	   Cassirer,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   equally	  characteristic	   stubbornness	   of	   Heidegger.	   For	   all	   that,	   the	   discussion	   itself	  was	   basically	  amiable,	  not	  combative;	  it	  was	  marked	  by	  Cassirer’s	  subtle	  and	  not-­‐so-­‐subtle433	  attempts	  to	  reconcile	  their	  positions,	  in	  opposition	  to	  Heidegger’s	  attempts	  to	  clarify	  their	  differences.	  To	  collapse	  these	  different	  strategies	  into	  the	  psychological	  idiosyncrasies	  of	  the	  respective	  thinkers	   would	   be	   to	   miss	   an	   important	   philosophical	   point:	   Cassirer	   was	   already	  committed	   to	   the	   view	   that	   both	   his	   own	   view	   and	   Heidegger’s	   could	   be	   understood	   as	  different	  nodes	  in	  the	  cultural	  constellation	  of	  symbolic	  forms.	  This	  does	  not	  mean,	  strictly	  speaking,	   that	   there	   is	  available	   to	  us	  a	  universal	   standpoint	  under	  which	  both	  would	  be	  subsumable,	   but	   it	   does	   at	   least	   require	   that	   we	   see	   them	   in	   light	   of	   the	   unity	   such	   a	  standpoint	  would	  provide	  as	  a	   focus	  imaginarius.	  For	  Heidegger,	  by	  contrast,	   the	  decision	  between	   his	  way	   of	   thinking	   and	   Cassirer’s	  must	   always	   come	   down	   to	   precisely	   that:	   a	  decision.	  In	  the	  clarification	  that	  leads	  up	  to	  the	  decisive	  moment,	  to	  be	  sure,	  we	  must	  see	  
                                                431	  See	   Gordon	   (2010),	   98-­‐109.	   Michael	   Friedman,	   of	   course,	   spends	   quite	   a	   bit	   of	   time	   analyzing	   the	  significance	  of	  Davos	  for	  the	  young	  Carnap	  in	  Friedman	  (2000).	  432	  See	  von	  Hermann	  (1990),	  220.	  Heidegger’s	  three	  lectures	  from	  Davos	  are	  themselves	  no	  longer	  extant,	  and	  his	  brief	  outline	  of	  them	  (DL	  3:271-­‐273)	  does	  little	  more	  than	  indicate	  the	  chief	  points	  familiar	  from	  his	  WS	  1925-­‐1926	  and	  WS	  1927-­‐1928	  lecture	  courses	  and	  the	  Kantbook.	  433	  Take,	   for	   example,	   Cassirer’s	   (likely	   jesting)	   claim	   that	   Heidegger	   was,	   despite	   himself,	   a	   Neokantian	  (Cassirer	  &	  Heidegger	  [1929],	  193).	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ourselves	   as	   being	   on	   the	   brink	   of	   saying	   the	   same	   thing.	   But	   the	   appropriation	   of	   the	  other’s	  viewpoint	  is	  always	  an	  existential	  one,	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  even	  in	  appropriating	  it	  we	  at	  the	  same	  time	  make	  it	  our	  own	  and	  assume	  responsibility	  for	  it.	  	   Looking	   back	   on	   Davos,	   most	   interpreters	   have	   read	   the	   apparently	   academic	  debate	   about	   the	   interpretation	   of	   Kant	   as	   the	   undercard	   for	   the	   deeper	   clash	   of	  worldviews	  between	  Heidegger	  and	  Cassirer.434	  Certainly,	   there	  is	  some	  truth	  to	  this,	  and	  throughout	   the	   disputation	   itself	   we	   find	   apparently	   scholastic	   concerns	   immediately	  overlaid	   with	   claims	   of	   broader	   methodological,	   philosophical,	   and	   even	   cultural	  significance,	  and	  undoubtedly	  this	   is	  how	  the	  audience	  experienced	  it	  at	  the	  time.	  But	  for	  the	  chief	  protagonists,	  the	  question	  of	  Kant	  himself	  was	  by	  no	  means	  subordinate	  to	  their	  other	  concerns.	  Obviously	  this	  was	  true	  for	  Cassirer,	  who,	  as	  a	  Neokantian,	  was	  fighting	  a	  losing	   battle	   against	   Europe’s	   waywardness	   from	   its	   Enlightenment	   heritage.	   If	   Kant	  himself	  were	  to	  abandon	  Cassirer	  in	  this	  time	  of	  need,	  there	  would	  be	  precious	  little	  ground	  left	   for	  him	   to	   stand	  on.	  And	   although	  Cassirer	  must	  have	   felt	   as	   though	  he	  were	  on	   the	  defense,	  in	  reality	  Heidegger’s	  situation	  was	  just	  as	  imperiled.	  After	  all,	  Heidegger’s	  entire	  project	   in	   Being	   and	   Time	   depended	   on	   his	   now	   being	   able	   to	   demonstrate	   its	   Kantian	  provenance.	  If	  he	  were	  to	  fail	  on	  this	  point,	  as	  apparently	  he	  would	  soon	  enough	  decide	  that	  he	  had,	  he	  would	  have	  to	  begin	  to	  countenance	  an	  entirely	  new	  set	  of	  possibilities	  for	  his	  philosophy	  in	  the	  decade	  to	  come.	  	   For	  all	  these	  reasons,	  it	  strikes	  me	  as	  inadvisable	  to	  allow	  the	  discussion	  of	  Davos	  to	  detach	  itself	  too	  quickly	  from	  the	  question	  of	  Kant.	  One	  tendency,	  which	  Peter	  Gordon	  has	  capably	   criticized,	   is	   to	   immediately	   transpose	   the	   intellectual	   debate	   into	   a	   clash	   of	  
                                                434	  See,	  e.g.,	  Luft	  &	  Capeillères	  (2010),	  61.	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cultures.435	  While	   the	  cultural	  and	  philosophical	  questions	  may	  well,	  of	  course,	   illuminate	  one	  another,	  Gordon	  is	  absolutely	  right	  to	  resist	  any	  facile	  reduction	  of	  the	  one	  to	  the	  other.	  Gordon’s	   own	   framework	   for	   understanding	   the	   debate,	   however,	   suffers	   from	   another	  kind	  of	  reduction.	  Encouraged,	  I	  think,	  by	  Cassirer	  himself,436	  Gordon	  extracts	  Kant	  himself	  from	   the	   main	   objective	   of	   the	   dispute.	   As	   he	   understands	   it,	   the	   encounter	   at	   Davos	  ultimately	   turns	  on	   the	  claims	  staked	   there	   to	   the	  human	  being’s	  spontaneity,	   on	   the	  one	  hand	   (Cassirer),	   and	   her	   thrownness,	   on	   the	   other	   (Heidegger).437	  This	   interpretation	  immediately	   runs	   into	   two	   problems.	   First,	   the	   opposition	   between	   spontaneity	   and	  thrownness	   does	   not	   really	   capture	   the	   contrast	   between	   Cassirer	   and	   Heidegger	  particularly	  well.	   It	   is	   true,	  of	  course,	   that	  Heidegger	  held	   that	   the	   freedom	  of	   the	  human	  being	   cannot	   consist	   in	   starting	   over	   from	   scratch,	   since	   she	   only	   comes	   into	   what	   is	  authentically	  her	  own	  by	  retrieving438	  the	  possibilities	  which	  have	  been	  handed	  down	  by	  the	  tradition	  in	  which	  she	  stands.439	  But	  the	  relation	  the	  human	  being	  has	  to	  this	  tradition	  is	  not	   that	  of	  being	  absorbed	  by	   it,	   the	  way	  Kierkegaard	   imagined	  the	  Hegelian	  professor	  dissolving	  himself	   into	  absolute	  knowing.440	  Rather,	  we	  must	  reach	  the	  point	  at	  which	  we	  
                                                435	  See	  Gordon	  (2010),	  3-­‐4.	  436	  I	   have	   in	  mind	  Cassirer’s	   retrospective	   indictment	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   thrownness	   (see	  Cassirer	   [1946],	   292-­‐293).	  437	  See	   Gordon	   (2010),	   86,	   214.	   Gordon	   concludes	   his	   work	   with	   the	   suggestion	   that	   the	   debate	   between	  Heidegger	  and	  Cassirer	  represents	  an	  irresolvable	  philosophical	  antinomy	  between	  ineradicable	  conceptions	  of	  the	  human	  being	  as	  receptive,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  spontaneous,	  on	  the	  other:	  “To	  force	  its	  resolution,”	  he	  says,	  “would	  be	  to	  deny	  what	  may	  very	  well	  be	  an	  essential	  tension	  of	  the	  human	  condition”	  (Gordon	  [2010],	  364).	  Taylor	  Carman,	  too,	  sees	  thrownness,	  at	  least,	  as	  the	  key:	  it	  was	  the	  one	  Heideggerian	  concept	  for	  which	  Heidegger	  himself	  sought	  in	  vain	  for	  a	  precedent	  in	  the	  Kantian	  philosophy	  (Carman	  [2010],	  139-­‐142).	  438	  The	  German	  word	  here	  is	  “Wiederholung,”	  “repeating”	  or	  “retrieving.”	  To	  repeat	  a	  possibility,	  however,	  has	  nothing	   to	   do	  with	   a	   “rote”	   repetition,	   any	  more	   than	   “destroying”	   the	   ontological	   tradition	   is	   at	   bottom	   a	  negative,	  critical	  enterprise.	  In	  fact,	  Destruktion	  and	  Wiederholung	  are	  closely	  linked	  in	  Heidegger’s	  thought.	  See	  Kisiel	  (1972),	  196.	  439	  Above	  all,	   this	  means	  that	  one	  does	  not	  confront	   the	   tradition	   in	  which	  one	  stands	  as	  an	  external	  object	  which	   confronts	   one,	   but	   rather	   as	   containing	   one’s	   own	   possibilities	   of	   existing.	   Gadamer	   constantly	  emphasizes	  this	  point.	  See	  Gadamer	  (1965),	  esp.	  237-­‐240;	  also	  Gadamer	  (1955),	  45;	  Gadamer	  (1971),	  288.	  440	  Heidegger	  himself	  privately	   joked	  with	   Jaspers	  about	  his	  Hegelian	  students.	  Having	   tried	   to	  express	   in	  a	  seminar	  just	  how	  paradoxical	  and	  question-­‐worthy	  the	  Hegelian	  thesis	  of	  the	  identity-­‐in-­‐difference	  of	  being	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can	   speak	   with	   the	   tradition,	   and	   this	   is	   only	   possible	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	   decision	   that	  invariably	   falls	   back	  upon	  us.	  The	  human	  being’s	   retrieval	   of	   the	   tradition	   is	   inseparable	  from	  her	  decision	  to	  be	  herself	  or	  not,441	  and	  nothing	  external	  to	  herself	  can	  compel	  her	  to	  answer	  one	  way	  or	  another.	  If	  it	  is	  at	  all	  acceptable	  to	  characterize	  Heidegger’s	  philosophy	  as	  one	  of	  “thrownness,”	   it	   is	  not	  at	  all	  a	  thrownness	  which	  is	  a	  simple	  counter-­‐concept	  to	  Neokantian	  “spontaneity.”	  	   Second,	  and	  relatedly,	  at	  Davos	  both	  Cassirer	  and	  Heidegger	  wanted	  to	  appropriate	  the	   tradition	   of	   the	   Enlightenment.	   In	   other	   words,	   it	   was	   a	   fight	   for	   Kant’s	   legacy.	  Neglecting	   or	   downplaying	   this	   leads	   to	   a	   seriously	   distorted	   view	   of	   the	   stakes	   of	   the	  debate.	   Consider	   Gordon’s	   description	   of	   Cassirer’s	   predicament	   at	   Davos:	   “The	   great	  disadvantage	   for	  Cassirer	  was	   that	  his	  philosophy	   remained	  steeped	   in	   the	   language	  and	  the	   values	   of	   the	   German	   Idealist	   tradition.	   But	   by	   the	  middle	   of	   the	   1920s	   the	   Idealist	  heritage	  was	   losing	   its	   power	   to	   inspire.”442	  But	   if	   this	  was	   an	   advantage	   on	  Heidegger’s	  side,	  it	  was	  not	  one	  that	  he	  ever	  turned	  to	  his	  favor,	  either	  at	  Davos	  or	  in	  the	  Kantbook.	  And	  the	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   simple:	   far	   from	   losing	   his	   relevancy,	   Kant	   was	   inspiring	   the	  phenomenological	   movement	   to	   a	   greater	   degree	   than	   ever	   before.	   In	   1925	   Husserl	  confirmed	   to	   Cassirer	   that	   he	   had	   come	   to	   see	   his	   own	   work	   as	   furthering	   Kant’s	   own	  deepest	   intentions,443	  and	   it	  was	   at	   the	   end	  of	   that	   same	  year,	   during	  his	  WS	  1925-­‐1926	  phenomenological	  practicum	  (for	  “beginners”!)	  on	  Kant’s	  first	  Critique,444	  that	  Heidegger’s	  rediscovery	   of	   Kant	   opened	   his	   eyes	   anew	   to	   the	   power	   of	   the	   idealist	   tradition	   (PIK	  
                                                                                                                                                       and	  nothing	  is,	  he	  reports	  his	  results	  with	  exasperation:	  “I	  have	  several	  Hegelians	  in	  the	  lessons	  from	  whom	  I	  unfortunately	  get	  no	  reaction.	  They	  are	  so	  Hegelianized	  that	  they	  don’t	  know	  themselves	  where	  their	  heads	  are	  at,	  because	  they	  are	  completely	  Hegelianized	  without	  substance”	  (HJC	  57).	  441	  See	  p.	  242	  above.	  442	  Gordon	  (2010),	  86.	  443	  Luft	  (2011),	  185-­‐186.	  444	  Kisiel	  (1993),	  409,	  473.	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25:431).445	  The	   Davos	   debate	   was	   about	   many	   things,	   and	   in	   retrospect—at	   least	   after	  1933—it	  appeared	  as	  though	  it	  were	  about	  everything	  that	  was	  about	  to	  befall	  Europe.	  But	  through	  all	  of	  this	  it	  was	  essentially	  about	  Kant.	  
Heidegger’s	  Foregrounding	  of	  the	  Transcendental	  Power	  of	  Imagination	  The	  centerpiece	  of	  the	  dispute	  about	  Kant,	  both	  at	  Davos	  and	  then	  in	  Heidegger’s	  Kantbook,	  is	   Heidegger’s	   placement	   of	   the	   transcendental	   power	   of	   imagination	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   his	  interpretation	   of	   the	   first	  Critique.	   Heidegger’s	   famous,	   and	   notorious,	   claim	   is	   that	  Kant	  nearly	   identifies	   the	   transcendental	  power	  of	   the	   imagination	  with	   the	   “common	  root”	  of	  sensibility	  and	  understanding	  of	  which	  he	  speaks	  in	  the	  Introduction	  to	  the	  Critique	  (CPR	  A15/B29).	  Nearly,	   however:	   for	   in	   Heidegger’s	   view	   Kant	   ultimately	   “shrank	   back”	   from	  what	  would	  have	  been	  his	  deepest	  and	  most	  radical	  insight	  (KPM	  3:160).	  Even	  Kant,	  who	  had	  such	  a	  keen	  sense	  for	  cutting	  through	  the	  theoretical	  mist	  to	  uncover	  and	  acknowledge	  the	  phenomena	  underlying	  it,	  was	  ultimately	  unable	  to	  sustain	  this	  phenomenological	  rigor	  indefinitely.	  After	  holding	  out	  as	   long	  as	  he	  could,	  Kant,	  exhausted,	   finally	  relapsed	  into	  a	  more	   traditional	   conception	   of	   reason	   than	   the	   one	   to	   which	   his	   initially	   unflinching	  analysis	  was	  leading	  him.	  In	  his	  work	  on	  the	  A	  Deduction	  and	  in	  the	  Schematism,	  Kant	  had	  seen,	  or	  almost	  seen,	  the	  dependency	  of	  human	  reason	  upon	  the	  imagination,	  the	  common	  root	   from	  which	   it	   originally	   springs	   along	  with	   intuition.	   But	   this	   never	   really	   becomes	  Kant’s	  “official”	  doctrine,	  and	  any	  doubt	  about	  this	  is	  laid	  to	  rest	  in	  the	  second	  edition	  of	  the	  
Critique,	  where	  Kant	  refers	  to	  the	  imagination	  as	  merely	  “an	  effect	  of	  the	  understanding	  on	  sensibility”	  (CPR	  B152).	  
                                                445	  He	  wrote	   to	   Jaspers	  on	  December	  10	   that	  he	  was	  “beginning	  to	   actually	   love	  Kant”	   (HJC	  57;	  quoted	   in	  Kisiel	  [1993],	  409).	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   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   is	   not	   just	   that	  Kant’s	   phenomenological	   stamina	   finally	   gave	  out,	   as	   it	   were.	   The	   dependence	   of	   reason	   on	   the	   imagination	   would	   have	   entailed	   an	  implication	  which	  Kant	  was	  simply	  unwilling	  to	  accept:	  pure	  reason	  itself	  would	  have	  been	  exposed	  as	  something	   inextricably	  entwined	  with	   the	  constitution	  of	  human	  beings	   in	  all	  their	   finitude.	  Kant’s	  determination	   to	  ground	  morality	   in	  reason	  alone	  and	  distinguish	   it	  sharply	   from	   any	   science	   with	   empirical	   content	   ended	   up	   turning	   him	   away	   from	   his	  deepest	   insight	   just	   as	  he	   stood	  on	   the	   cusp	  of	   it.	   Strictly	   speaking,	  Kant	  did	  not	  need	   to	  make	  this	  move	  to	  protect	  the	  purity	  of	  his	  moral	  philosophy,	   for	  the	   investigation	  of	   the	  
finitude	  of	  human	  beings	  has	  nothing	  whatsoever	  to	  do	  with	  empirical	  conditions	  of	  either	  willing	  or	  cognition.	  But	  Kant	  was	  not	  able	  to	  see	  this	  with	  complete	  clarity,	   in	   large	  part	  because	  he	  had	  failed	  to	  consistently	  distinguish	  between	  empirical	  anthropology	  and	  the	  “philosophical	  anthropology,”	  if	  we	  want	  to	  speak	  of	  such	  a	  thing,446	  which	  would	  deal	  with	  the	  question	  of	  the	  human	  being	  in	  a	  thoroughly	  nonempirical	  manner.447	  At	  any	  rate,	  with	  the	  retreat	  from	  his	  near-­‐insight	  into	  the	  role	  of	  the	  imagination,	  the	  damage	  to	  the	  critical	  philosophy	  was	  done,	  and	  when	  Kant	   sat	  down	   to	   rewrite	   the	  Transcendental	  Deduction	  for	   the	   second	   edition,	   it	   is	   no	   surprise	   that	   the	   imagination	   was	   assigned	   to	   the	  understanding	  as	  just	  one	  of	  its	  various	  functions.	  	   This	  leads	  Heidegger	  on	  his	  quest,	  in	  the	  Kantbook,	  to	  try	  to	  recover	  the	  radicalness	  of	   the	   first-­‐edition	   Deduction.	   Along	   with	   this,	   Heidegger’s	   attention	   is	   drawn	   to	   the	  Schematism,	  “the	  hinge	  upon	  which	  the	  entire	  Critique	  turns”	  (PIK	  25:168),	  where,	  even	  yet	  in	   the	   second	   edition,	   we	   find	   the	   power	   of	   imagination	   afforded	   its	   own	   distinctive	  
                                                446	  See	  below,	  p.	  296.	  447	  On	  the	  difficulty	  Kant	  had	  in	  articulating	  a	  nonempirical	  analytic	  of	  finite	  cognition	  that	  nevertheless	  does	  not	  collapse	  into	  logic,	  see	  KPM	  3:168-­‐169;	  PIK	  25:323-­‐324.	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analysis.448	  Finally,	   the	   imagination	   leads	  Heidegger	   to	   emphasize	   the	   significance	   of	   the	  fourth	   question	   that	   Kant	   added	   to	   his	   canonical	   list	   of	   three	   in	   the	   Jäsche	  Logic.449	  This	  question	   (What	   is	   the	   human	   being?),	   added	   late	   in	   Kant’s	   career,	   finally	   indicates	   the	  project	   that	  should	  have	  been	  placed	  at	   the	  very	  beginning	  of	  Kant’s	   inquiry,	  namely,	   the	  nonempirical,	   transcendental	   question	   of	   the	   identity	   and	   nature	   of	   the	   “us”	   in	   Kant’s	  locution	  “at	  least	  for	  us	  human	  beings”	  (CPR	  B33).	  In	  this	  one	  little	  phrase,	  Heidegger	  tells	  us,	   “Kant’s	   entire	   problematic	   is	   contained”	   (L	   21:116).	   This	   is	   the	   Archimedean	   point	  around	  which	  the	  misguided	  architectonic	  of	  Kant’s	  first	  Critique,	  which	  Heidegger	  regards	  as	   “unsuited	   to	   the	   originality	   of	   the	   insight	   at	   which	   Kant	   arrives	   in	   the	   most	   pivotal	  segment	  of	  the	  Critique”	  (PIK	  25:213),	  must	  now	  be	  reoriented.	  	   Heidegger’s	  focus	  on	  the	  imagination	  in	  the	  Transcendental	  Deduction,	  his	  attempt	  to	   install	   the	   Schematism	   as	   the	   centerpiece	   of	   the	   Critique,	   and	   his	   insistence	   on	   the	  priority	   of	  Kant’s	   fourth	   question	   are	   all	   aspects	   of	   one	   sustained	   interpretive	   endeavor.	  The	   pure	   concepts	   of	   the	   understanding	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   reflections	   of	   the	   activity	   of	   the	  imagination,	   and	   in	   the	   Schematism	   we	   find	   exhibited	   the	   dependence	   of	   the	  understanding,	  by	  way	  of	  the	  imagination,	  on	  the	  universal	  form	  of	  our	  inner	  sense,	  time.	  According	   to	   its	   category-­‐constituting	   function,	   time	   cannot	   be	   investigated	   objectively;	  rather,	   it	   leads	  us	  back	   to	   the	  question	  of	   the	   subjectivity	  of	   the	   subject	  who,	  as	   finite,	   is	  
                                                448 	  Friedman	   offers	   a	   perceptive	   account	   of	   the	   historical	   background	   for	   Heidegger’s	   focus	   on	   the	  Schematism.	  Having	  excised	  Kant’s	  pure	  forms	  of	  sensibility,	  Neokantianism	  was	  forced	  to	  proceed	  along	  two	  different	  routes:	   traveling	  along	   the	   first,	   the	  Marburg	  School	   thoroughly	  relativized	   the	   thought-­‐sensibility	  relation;	   traveling	  along	   the	  second,	   the	  Southwest	  School	  was	   left	  with	  an	  object	  of	   intuition	  shorn	  of	  any	  spatiotemporal	   form.	  On	  the	  first	  approach,	   the	  Schematism	  disappears	  as	  a	  unique	  moment	   in	  the	  Kantian	  system;	  it	  is	  absorbed	  into	  the	  entirely	  general	  problem	  of	  form	  and	  matter	  (although	  it	  remains	  exemplary	  in	  a	  certain	  respect).	  On	  the	  second	  approach,	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Schematism	  is	  markedly	  increased,	  even	  if	  its	   actual	   role	   becomes	   considerably	   murkier.	   Without	   forms	   of	   sensibility	   already	   given	   to	   the	  understanding,	  its	  schematism	  must	  now	  reach	  down	  to	  the	  deepest,	  unmediated	  recesses	  of	  our	  sensibility.	  Schematism	  loses,	  as	  it	  were,	  its	  guideposts,	  and	  the	  problem	  assumes	  a	  whole	  new,	  much	  more	  mysterious	  character.	  See	  Friedman	  (2000),	  35-­‐37.	  449	  See	  p.	  146	  above.	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reliant	  on	  the	  form	  of	   its	   intuition	  if	   it	   is	  to	  be	  related	  to	  beings	  at	  all.	  Kant	  himself	   is	  not	  able	   to	   see	   all	   the	   way	   through	   to	   the	   finite	   basis	   for	   the	   comportment	   to	   beings;	   his	  analysis	  of	  time	  remains	  indebted	  to	  the	  analysis	  appropriate	  for	  the	  temporality	  of	  objects	  of	  scientific	  cognition,	  even	  though	  he	  allows	  his	  own	  analysis	  to	  draw	  him	  somewhat	  away	  from	  this	  paradigm.	  Precisely	  at	  this	  moment	  of	  his	  thought,	  when	  Kant	  allows	  himself	  to	  be	  drawn	  back	   to	   the	  question	  of	   the	  subject,	   leaving	  behind	  every	  assumption	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  object	  (however	  generalized),	  Kant	  comes	  closest	  to	  posing	  the	  question	  of	  the	  human	  being	  in	  its	  full	  radicalness.	  The	  phenomenological	   interpretation	  of	  Kant	  is	  devoted	  to	  seeing	  Kant	  further	  along	  this	  path	  that	  his	  own	  thinking	  had	  already	  staked	  out.	  	   In	   each	   of	   Heidegger’s	   basic	  moves—the	   insistence	   upon	   the	   superiority	   of	   the	   A	  Deduction,	  the	  crowning	  of	  the	  Schematism	  as	  the	  decisive	  chapter,	  and	  the	  assertion	  of	  the	  priority	   of	   a	   question	   Kant	   did	   not	   even	   add	   to	   his	   thought	   until	   1793450—we	   can	   see	  Heidegger’s	  notorious	  “violence”	  on	  full	  display.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Heidegger	  is	  well	  aware	  of	   his	   unfaithfulness	   to	   the	   letter	   of	   the	   Kantian	   text	   here.	   Kant,	   he	   acknowledges,	  went	  down	   this	   path	   only	   reluctantly.	   Even	   though	   his	   intention	   was	   to	   emphasize	   the	  nonreductiveness	   of	   his	   account	   of	   cognition	   (in	   contrast	   to	   the	   accounts	   of	   Locke	   and	  Leibniz),	   he	   nevertheless	   found	   himself	   forced	   in	   this	   entirely	   new	  direction	   (PIK	   25:91-­‐92).	  And	  Kant’s	  willingness	  to	  follow	  the	  inner	  dynamic	  of	  his	  analysis,	  even	  when	  it	  began	  to	  run	  contrary	  to	  his	  original	  intention,	  deserves	  our	  respect.	  The	  mark	  of	  a	  truly	  radical	  philosopher	   is	   that	   precisely	   her	   greatest	   achievement	   is	   suffused	   throughout	   with	   her	  highest	  reluctance.	  
                                                450	  See	  n.	  204	  above.	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   The	  question,	  then,	  must	  concern	  whether	  Heidegger	  is	  really	  following	  an	  authentic	  Kantian	  tendency,	  or	  whether	  he	  is	  merely	  imposing	  the	  form	  of	  his	  own	  thought	  on	  Kant’s	  text.	  Without	  a	  doubt,	  Heidegger’s	  interpretation	  faces	  some	  steep	  obstacles	  on	  this	  front.	  With	  respect	   to	  his	  central	   claim	  about	   the	   transcendental	  power	  of	   imagination,	  we	  will	  want	  to	  insist,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  that	  Kant’s	  questioning	  is	  distorted	  beyond	  all	  manner	  of	  recognition	  if	  his	  dualism	  of	  the	  faculties	  (of	  cognition)	  is	  abandoned.	  And	  we	  might	  point	  out	   that	   such	   dualism	   is	   hardly	   a	   matter	   of	   Kant	   blandly	   accepting	   what	   the	   tradition	  offered	   him;	   on	   the	   contrary,	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   part	   of	   Kant’s	   achievement	   lies	   in	   his	  determination	  to	  resist	  the	  pronounced	  tendency	  of	  modern	  rationalism	  and	  empiricism	  to	  reduce	  the	  faculties	  of	  cognition	  to	  a	  single	  principle.	  In	  short,	  we	  could	  agree	  with	  Dieter	  Henrich	   that	   Heidegger’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	   “common	   root”	   passage	   is	   baldly	  anachronistic:	  Kant’s	  offhand	  conjecture	  about	  a	  common	  root	  does	  not	  anticipate	  Husserl	  or	  Heidegger,	  but	  refers	  us	  back	  to	  the	  eighteenth	  century.451	  If	  we	  wish	  to	  follow	  the	  path	  of	  the	  problem	  Kant	  himself	  alludes	  to	  here,	  we	  must	  follow	  Natorp,452	  and	  indeed	  follow	  Kant’s	  own	  instructions	  in	  the	  first	  Critique	  (CPR	  A648-­‐649/B676-­‐677),	  in	  taking	  the	  idea	  that	   there	  may	  be	  a	   common	  root	  of	   sensibility	  and	  understanding	  as	  an	  expression	  of	   a	  
demand,	  a	  demand	  to	  carry	  as	  far	  as	  possible	  the	  search	  for	  unity	  in	  matters	  subjective	  as	  well	  as	  objective.453	  	   We	  would	  then	  respond	  thus	  to	  Heidegger:	  you	  are	  presupposing	  here	  exactly	  what	  Kant	   himself	   wanted	   to	   put	   into	   question,	   namely,	   that	   with	   the	   demand	   for	   the	  unconditioned	   the	   totality	   of	   the	   series	   of	   conditions,	  which	  would	   include	   the	   common	  
                                                451	  Henrich	  (1955),	  21.	  Keep	  in	  mind,	  however,	   that	  Heidegger	  acknowledges	   just	  this	  point	  at	  PIK	  25:91	  (a	  text	  to	  which	  Henrich	  would	  not	  have	  had	  access	  at	  the	  time	  of	  his	  1955	  lecture).	  452	  Natorp	  (1917-­‐1918),	  238,	  241-­‐242.	  453	  Henrich	  (1955),	  27-­‐35.	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root	   of	   all	   the	   soul’s	   powers,	   is	   therewith	   given.	   What	   is	   given,	   rather,	   is	   precisely	   the	  demand,	  but	  only	  ever	  as	  a	  demand.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  Heidegger’s	  mistake,	  however	  novel	   its	  motivation,	  merely	   repeats	   the	   old	   error	   of	   transcendental	   realism:	   to	   take	   the	  satisfaction	   of	   the	   demands	   of	   reason	   as	   inevitably	   given	   along	   with	   the	   demands	  themselves.	   In	   fact,	   as	   Kant	   painstakingly	   explains,	   the	   honest	   acknowledgement	   of	   our	  inability	   to	   reduce	   the	   faculties	   of	   the	   soul	   to	   a	   single	   faculty,	   either	   by	   collapsing	  understanding	  and	  sensibility	  with	  respect	  to	  cognition,	  or	  by	  collapsing	  cognition,	  feeling,	  and	  desire	   into	  a	  single	   fundamental	   faculty,	   is	   the	  decisive	  recognition	  by	  which	  we	  can	  attain	  to—and,	  what	  is	  even	  more	  difficult,	  remain	  within—the	  critical	  standpoint.	  Even	  the	  most	  critical	  of	  philosophers	  must	  always	  vigilantly	  maintain	  her	  discipline	   in	   the	   face	  of	  the	   ineliminable	   illusion	   that	   the	  demand	   for	  a	  more	  deeply	  unified	  account	  of	  ourselves	  always	  holds	  out	  in	  front	  of	  us.	  	   Reading	  Heidegger	  this	  way	  is	  to	  place	  him	  squarely	  in	  the	  long	  tradition,	  beginning	  with	  Hamann,454	  of	  trying	  to	  overcome	  or	  mitigate	  the	  residual	  dualism	  in	  Kant’s	  thought.	  We	  will	   at	   least	  have	  good	  company	   if	  we	  choose	   to	  do	  so.	  Already	   in	  1931	  Cassirer	  had	  replied	  to	  Heidegger	  that	  “nowhere	  does	  Kant	  contend	  for	  such	  a	  monism	  of	  imagination.	  Rather,	   he	   insists	   upon	   a	   decided	   and	   radical	   dualism,	   the	   dualism	   of	   the	   sensuous	   and	  intelligible	   world.” 455 	  Plenty	   of	   recent	   interpreters	   have	   followed	   suit.	   Claude	   Piché	  concludes	   that,	   on	   both	   the	   role	   of	   the	   power	   of	   imagination	   and	   the	   significance	   of	   the	  schematism,	  “Heidegger’s	  approach	  is	  similar	  to	  Cohen’s,	  since	  both	  of	  them	  aim	  to	  surpass	  
                                                454	  See	  Hamann	  (1784),	  157-­‐158.	  455	  Cassirer	  (1931),	  148.	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Kantian	   dualism.”456	  And	  Manfred	   Kühn	   describes	  Heidegger’s	   approach	   in	   the	   following	  manner:	  It	  is	  not	  that	  Kant	  simply	  failed	  to	  bring	  to	  light,	  in	  an	  explicit	  way,	  the	  unity	  of	   the	   Transcendental	   Aesthetic	   and	   the	   Transcendental	   Logic.	   It	   is	   rather	  that	   Kant	   thought	   sensibility	   and	   understanding	   to	   be	   radically	   different	  faculties	  that	  cannot	  be	  brought	  together.	  While	  he	  had	  mused	  at	  one	  point	  that	  there	  may	  perhaps	  exist	  a	  “common	  root”	  of	  these	  faculties,	  Kant	  never	  thought	  that	  this	  could	  be	  made	  out	  by	  us.	  Heidegger	  claimed	  that	  he	  could	  make	  out	  this	  common	  root.457	  	  Now,	   if	   this	   really	   is	   the	   essence	   of	   Heidegger’s	   interpretive	   gambit,	   it	   must	   at	   least	   be	  acknowledged	   that	   it	   represents	   a	   somewhat	   surprising	  move	   on	   his	   part.	   After	   all,	   the	  implicit	   charge	   here	   is	   that	   Heidegger	   misunderstands	   Kant’s	   reference	   to	   the	   common	  root:	   what	   Kant	   took	   as	   a	   merely	   problematic	   point	   which	   could	   guide,	   but	   never	  determine,	   the	   content	   of	   our	   inquiry	   Heidegger	   now	   takes	   as	   an	   indication	   of	   a	   basic	  faculty	  which	  must	  in	  fact	  be	  operative.	  Now	  this,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize,	  is	  precisely	  the	  point	  which	  Natorp	  had	  pressed	  tirelessly	  against	  Husserl	  in	  his	  review	  of	  Ideas	  I	  and	  to	  which	  Husserl	  had	  drawn	  his	  young	  assistant’s	  attention	  back	  in	  1918:	  according	  to	  Natorp,	  Husserl	  persistently	  conflates	  the	  demand	  to	  exhibit	  subjectivity	  in	  its	  pure	  unity	  with	  the	  actual	  availability	  of	  the	  means	  by	  which	  alone	  such	  exhibition	  would	  be	  possible.458	  	   In	  fact,	  Heidegger’s	  strategy	  here	  actually	  amounts	  to	  something	  quite	  different.	  To	  understand	  the	  force	  and	  limitations	  of	  Heidegger’s	  argument,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  distinguish	  as	   clearly	   as	   possible	   between	   Heidegger’s	   approach	   and	   those	   premised	   on	   the	  
                                                456	  Piché	   (2000),	   201.	   Notice	   that	   since	   the	   Neokantians	   are	   themselves	   part	   of	   the	   tradition	   of	   trying	   to	  overcome	  the	  tension	  in	  Kantian	  dualism,	  such	  conclusions	  are	  just	  the	  natural	  result	  of	  lumping	  Heidegger	  in	  with	   this	   tradition.	   Doing	   so	   ultimately	   has	   the	   significance	   of	   blurring	  what,	   for	  Heidegger,	   at	   least,	  were	  some	  very	  clear	  lines	  separating	  their	  approaches.	  457	  Kühn	  (2010),	  127.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Henrich	  does	  not	  fall	  into	  this	  same	  trap—at	  least	  not	  in	  a	  naïve	  manner.	  He	  recognizes	  the	  peculiarity	  of	  Heidegger’s	  interpretive	  claim,	  even	  if	  (as	  I	  take	  to	  be	  the	  case)	  he	  lacks	  an	  adequate	  account	  of	  what	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  this	  claim	  consists	  in.	  See	  Henrich	  (1955),	  34.	  458	  See	  Natorp	  (1917-­‐1918),	  238,	  240-­‐242.	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overcoming	  of	  a	  Kantian	  dualism.	  Since	  Cassirer’s	  approach	  is	  actually	  closer	  to	  the	  latter	  than	   is	  Heidegger’s,	   the	   stakes	  of	   the	  Davos	  debate	   are	   completely	  obscured	   if	  we	   fail	   to	  make	  the	  distinctiveness	  of	  Heidegger’s	  position	  clear.	  	   In	   the	   first	   place,	   note	   that	   Heidegger	   criticizes	   Hegel	   quite	   severely	   on	   just	   this	  count.	  Hegel,	  following	  Hamann,	  Herder,	  and	  others,	  was	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  Schematism	  because	   in	   it	   we	   find	   Kant	   merely	   artificially	   linking	   up	   sensibility	   and	   understanding	  without	  really	  thinking	  the	  two	  thoughts	  together.	  As	  Hegel	  puts	  it,	  Kant	  ties	  them	  together	  “as	  a	  piece	  of	  wood	  and	  a	  leg	  might	  be	  tied	  together	  by	  a	  piece	  of	  rope.”459	  For	  Heidegger,	  however,	   this	   only	   confirms	   that	   “Hegel	   has	   absolutely	   no	   understanding	   of	   the	   real	  meaning,	  the	  central	  problematic,	  that	  Kant	  hit	  upon	  in	  the	  Schematism”	  (L	  21:202).	  What	  is	   essential	   is	   not	   to	  mediate,	   in	   a	   dialectical	   fashion,	   sensibility	   and	  understanding	  with	  one	  another,	  but	  to	  follow	  Kant’s	  inchoate	  indication	  of	  the	  common	  root	  from	  which	  they	  have	   sprung	   together.	   This,	   Heidegger	   claims,	   is	   a	   very	   different	   approach	   than	   the	   one	  taken	   by	   the	   idealists	   (KPM	   3:137n).	   To	   see	   Heidegger’s	   point,	   we	   must	   focus	   on	   the	  meaning	  which	   the	   reference	   to	   the	   common	   root	   as	   an	   “original	   unity”	   (see	  KPM	  3:36)	  necessarily	  assumes	  within	  an	  existential	  context.	  Indeed,	  the	  kind	  of	  unity	  that	  Heidegger	  sees	  Kant	  as	  on	  his	  way	  to	  here	  is	  a	  very	  different	  sort	  of	  unity	  than	  that	  which	  Hegel,	  for	  instance,	  had	  supposed	  Kant	  lacked.	  The	  missing	  link	  in	  Kant’s	  analysis	  cannot	  be	  filled	  in	  by	  identifying	  the	  synthetic	  universal	  from	  which	  sensibility	  and	  understanding	  would	  be	  differentiated	   as	   species—even	   if	  we	   then	   proceed	   to	   insist	  modestly	   that	   this	   universal	  remains	  unknown	  to	  us.	  Instead,	  as	  we	  might	  have	  expected,	  the	  original	  unity	  underlying	  sensibility	   and	   understanding	   can	   only	   be	   the	   subject	   of	   an	   indication.	   Kant’s	   question,	  
                                                459	  See	  Hegel	  (1840),	  441,	  cited	  by	  Heidegger	  at	  L	  21:202.	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rightly	  understood,	  will	   not	  benefit	   from	  a	   clarifying	  of	   the	  unknown	   root,	   but	  by	   letting	  this	   root	   stand	   forth	   in	   its	   full	   and	   unmitigated	   questionability.	   The	   reference	   to	   the	  imagination	   should	   indicate	   the	   problematic,	   but	   it	   should	   do	   so—to	   borrow	   an	   earlier	  phrase	  of	  Heidegger’s—“as	   if	   to	  warn”	   (IPR	  60:64;	   see	  p.	  199	  above).	   In	   this	  way,	  Kant’s	  “grounding”	   of	   metaphysics	   “leads	   not	   to	   the	   crystal	   clear,	   absolute	   evidence	   of	   a	   first	  maxim	  and	  principle,	  but	  rather	  goes	   into	  and	  points	  consciously	   towards	  the	  unknown.”	  This	   leads	   Heidegger	   to	   pay	   Kant	   the	   highest	   compliment	   he	   could	   possibly	   offer:	   his	  thought	  is	  “a	  philosophizing	  groundwork	  for	  philosophy”	  (KPM	  3:37;	  see	  also	  41).	  	   Whereas	   the	   idealists	   sought	   to	   provide	   an	   intelligible	   ground	   for	   the	   differences	  between	  sensibility	  and	  understanding,	  Heidegger’s	  goal	  is,	  rather,	  to	  indicate	  the	  limits	  of	  the	   intelligibility	   of	   this	   relation.	   Far	   from	   advocating	   a	   monism	   of	   the	   imagination,	  Heidegger	   is	   going	   out	   of	   his	   way	   to	   intensify	   the	   Kantian	   dualism.	   Thus	   Heidegger	  explicitly	   rejects	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   power	   of	   imagination	   could	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   a	   “basic	  power”	  underlying	  the	  others	   in	  the	  soul	  (KPM	  3:139).	  Here	   is	  Heidegger’s	  description	  of	  his	  positive	  alternative:	  The	   return	   to	   the	   transcendental	   power	   of	   the	   imagination	   as	   the	   root	   of	  sensibility	   and	   understanding	   just	   means	   to	   project	   anew,	   in	   light	   of	   the	  essential	   structure	   of	   the	   transcendental	   power	   of	   the	   imagination,	   which	  was	  achieved	  within	  the	  problematic	  of	  the	  groundwork,	  the	  constitution	  of	  transcendence	  upon	  the	  ground	  of	   its	  possibility.	  The	  return	  which	   lays	  the	  ground	   moves	   into	   the	   dimension	   of	   “possibilities,”	   of	   possible	   enablings	  [möglichen	  Ermöglichungen].	  (KPM	  3:140)	  	  The	   reference	   to	   “possibility”	   is	   telling	   here,	   and	   it	   may	   be	   helpful	   to	   briefly	   remind	  ourselves	  here	  of	  Heidegger’s	  procedure	  in	  Division	  Two	  of	  Being	  and	  Time.460	  In	  the	  latter	  work	   he	   had	   emphasized	   that	   the	   move	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   authentic	   existence	   requires	  
                                                460	  See	  p.	  239	  above.	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reference	  to	  a	  peculiar	  kind	  of	  unity,	  a	  form	  of	  unity	  which	  is	  isomorphic	  with	  the	  form	  of	  existence	   itself.	  Existence	   is	  not	   fundamentally	  a	   “thing”	   to	  be	  analyzed	  at	  all;	   instead,	   its	  proper	  analysis	  requires	  that	  we	  come	  to	  see	  it	  as	  pure	  possibility,	  a	  possibility	  into	  which	  we	  ourselves,	  as	   the	  erstwhile	   “external	  analysts,”	  are	  ultimately	   forced	   to	  step.	  Stepping	  into	  it,	  however,	  does	  not	  “give”	  this	  possibility	  as	  an	  objective	  possibility	  which	  might	  be	  realized;	  rather,	  it	  forces	  us	  to	  see	  it	  as	  a	  possibility	  which	  requires	  a	  decision	  on	  our	  part	  to	  actualize	   ourselves	   through	   it.	   In	   fact,	   as	   soon	   as	   the	   possibility	   is	   reduced	   to	   a	   kind	   of	  “content”	  offered	  up	   to	  us,461	  it	   no	   longer	   faces	  us	  as	   a	  possibility	   at	   all.	   So	   the	   “content”	  which	  at	  every	  moment	  appears	  to	  offer	  itself	  as	  the	  way	  to	  actualize	  ourselves—to	  really	  
be	   ourselves,	   for	   once—inevitably	   slips	   back,	   in	   the	   very	   moment	   of	   the	   decision,	   into	  oblivion.	  	   An	  analogous	  movement	   is	  governing	  Heidegger’s	  reading	  of	  Kant	  at	   this	   juncture.	  In	   fact,	   “the	   understanding	   of	   the	   possible,”	   he	   says,	   is	   that	   which	   “guides	   all	   retrieval”	  (KPM	  3:204).	   Thus	   if	  we	   are	   to	   retrieve	   the	   Kantian	   problematic,	  we	   need	   to	   be	   able	   to	  experience	  it	  as	  a	  possibility	  into	  which	  we	  ourselves	  can	  step.	  The	  transcendental	  power	  of	  imagination	  indicates	  to	  us	  the	  central	  place	  at	  which	  we	  can	  fruitfully	  apply	  pressure	  to	  Kant’s	   text,	   but	   it	   is	   not	   as	   though	   the	   complete	   and	   thoroughgoing	   elucidation	   of	   the	  imagination	  would	  make	  it	  possible	  once	  and	  for	  all	  to	  crack	  open	  the	  secret	  of	  the	  Kantian	  philosophy.	   In	   fact,	  Heidegger’s	  own	  goal	   is	   to	  pursue	   the	  problem	  along	   the	   lines	  of	   this	  indication	  precisely	  to	  the	  point	  at	  which	  such	  an	  indication	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  completely	  
                                                461	  Regrettably,	  this	  is	  precisely	  the	  image	  suggested	  by	  some	  of	  Macquarrie	  and	  Robinson’s	  editorial	  notes	  in	  their	  (generally	  quite	  good)	  translation	  of	  Being	  and	  Time.	  See	  esp.	  their	  note	  to	  p.	  438	  of	  the	  English	  edition	  (i.e.,	  to	  the	  crucial	  §74).	  This	  may	  be	  partly	  responsible	  for	  readings	  of	  Heidegger	  that	  would	  have	  authentic	  existence	   choosing	   freely	   from	   amongst	   an	   array	   of	   possibilities	   offered	   it	   by	   the	   tradition	   (e.g.,	   Friedman	  [2000],	  52n65,	  but	  my	  sense	   is	   that	  this	  reading	   is	  actually	  quite	  commonplace).	  This	   is	   to	  completely	  miss	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  problematic	  within	  which	  Heidegger	  is	  operating	  at	  this	  point	  in	  Being	  and	  Time.	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misleading	  as	  a	  way	  of	   stating	   the	  problem	  with	  which	  Kant	   found	  himself	   faced.	   “In	   the	  end,”	   Heidegger	   says,	   “what	   has	   hitherto	   been	   known	   as	   the	   transcendental	   power	   of	  imagination	   is	   dissolved	   into	  more	   original	   ‘possibilities’	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	   by	   itself	   the	  designation	   ‘power	   of	   imagination’	   becomes	   inadequate”	   (KPM	   3:140).	   In	   this	   way,	  Heidegger	   says,	   “the	   apparently	   secure	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   concerning	   the	   essential	  unity	   of	   ontological	   cognition	   is	   gradually	   dissolved,	   upon	   a	   closer	   determination	   of	   this	  unity,	  into	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  a	  unification”	  (KPM	  3:69).	  	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  consideration	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  imagination	  in	  the	  first	  Critique	  ought	  to	  lead	  us	  into	  an	  inquiry	  of	  an	  even	  more	  radical	  character.462	  This	  new	  inquiry,	  of	  course,	  would	  be	   the	  question	  of	  human	   finitude,	  and	   this	   is	  what	  Heidegger	   thinks	  Kant	  was	  on	  the	  way	  to	  grasping.	  Yet	  it	  was	  understandably	  unclear	  to	  Kant	  just	  what	  this	  new	  inquiry	   would	   look	   like	   or	   how	   it	   would	   fit	   into	   the	   critical	   system.	   In	   fact,	   Heidegger	  always	  recognized	   that	  Kant’s	  system	  was	  more	  or	   less	  closed	  to	   this	   line	  of	  questioning.	  “But	  into	  which	  transcendental	  discipline,	  then,”	  Heidegger	  asks,	  “does	  the	  consideration	  of	  the	   central	   problem	   of	   the	   possibility	   of	   ontology	   fall?	   This	   question	   remains	   foreign	   to	  Kant”	  (KPM	  3:66).	  	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  though,	  as	  is	  typical	  of	  Heidegger’s	  reading	  of	  Kant,	  he	  claims	  to	  find	  some	  tentative	  indications	  in	  this	  direction,	  as	  well,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  leads	  him	  to	  place	  an	   unusual	   amount	   of	   emphasis	   on	   Kant’s	   addition	   of	   his	   fourth	   question:	  What	   is	   the	  
human	  being?	   For	  Heidegger,	   this	   is	  an	   important	   indication	   that	  Kant	  at	   least	   intuitively	  recognized	  the	  need	  for	  some	  kind	  of	  treatment	  of	  the	  human	  being	  as	  such	  in	  his	  critical	  system.	  Once	  again,	  Heidegger	  stands	  in	  uncanny	  proximity	  to	  a	  venerable	  tradition	  of	  Kant	  
                                                462	  Recall	  that	  Heidegger	  called	  the	  Kantbook	  a	  kind	  of	  “historical	  introduction”	  to	  Being	  and	  Time	  (KPM	  3:xvi;	  see	  p.	  256	  above).	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criticism.	  Complaints	  that	  Kant	  had	  broken	  up	  his	  treatment	  of	  the	  human	  being	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  a	  synoptic	  view	  of	  the	  whole	  human	  being	  is	  of	  necessity	  denied	  to	  him	  are	  just	  as	  old	  as	  worries	  about	  Kant’s	  dualism.	  In	  many	  ways,	  Dilthey’s	  famous	  complaint	  about	  the	  lack	   of	   “real	   blood”463	  in	   Kant’s	   subject	   is	   a	   repetition	   and	   development	   of	   Hamann’s	  original	   worries.	   And	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   Spengler	   had	   recently	   popularized	   this	  criticism	   in	  his	  massively	   influential	  Decline	  of	  the	  West.	  Even	  more	  directly	   than	  Dilthey,	  Spengler	   attests	   to	   the	   immediacy	   of	   the	   connection	   between	  Kant’s	   failure	   to	   provide	   a	  foundation	   for	   historical	   cognition	   and	   his	   failure	   to	   treat	   the	   human	   being	   as	   a	   whole.	  According	  to	  Spengler,	  Kant	  “deals	  with	  the	  intuition-­‐forms	  and	  categories	  of	  reason,	  but	  he	  never	   thinks	   of	   the	   wholly	   different	   mechanism	   by	   which	   historical	   impressions	   are	  apprehended.”	  As	  Spengler	  puts	  it,	  Kant	  has	  failed	  to	  supplement	  the	  “logic	  of	  space”	  with	  a	  “logic	   of	   time”—i.e.,	   “an	   organic	   necessity	   in	   life,	   that	   of	   destiny.”464	  Obviously,	   there	   is	  much	  in	  this	  claim	  with	  which	  Heidegger	  can	  enthusiastically	  agree.	  As	  Heidegger	  sees	  it,	  Kant	  himself	  was	  not	  altogether	  clear	  about	  what	  his	  allusion	  to	  anthropology	  was	  really	  supposed	  to	  amount	  to.	  Kant’s	  anthropology	  is	  not	  altogether	  a	  pure	   one,	   although	   it	   does,	   to	   be	   sure,	   countenance—at	   least	   when	   pursued	  pragmatically—certain	  nonempirical	  investigations.	  So	  Kant’s	  question	  must	  really	  serve	  as	  a	   clue,	   rather	   than	  as	  a	   reference	   to	   some	  existing	  doctrine	  worked	  out	  elsewhere	   in	   the	  Kantian	   corpus.	   Kant	   himself,	   Heidegger	   says,	   “was	   never	   able	   to	   get	   clear	   on	   its	  singularity”	   (PIK	   25:70).	   So	   while	   Kant’s	   posing	   of	   the	   fourth	   question	   “unequivocally	  expresses	  the	  proper	  result	  of	  his	  groundwork	  of	  metaphysics”	  (KPM	  3:208),	  the	  question	  
                                                463	  See	  p.	  170	  above.	  464	  Spengler	  (1922),	  7.	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nevertheless	   points	   to	   an	   anthropological	   inquiry	   which	   is	   of	   a	   fundamentally	   different	  character	  than	  those	  on	  hand	  to	  Kant	  in	  his	  own	  time.	  Heidegger’s	   solution	   is	   not,	   however,	   to	   celebrate	   the	   fact	   that	   now,	   in	   the	   early	  twentieth	   century,	  we	  have	   finally	   attained	   to	   the	   sort	   of	   anthropology	   that	  would	  make	  Kantian	   critique	  possible.	  Although	  nowadays—partly	   owing	   to	   the	   inchoate	  demands	  of	  
Lebensphilosophie—seemingly	   everyone	   has	   a	   “philosophical	   anthropology”	   on	   offer,	   no	  extant	   anthropology,	   Heidegger	   thinks,	   can	   actually	   play	   the	   positive	   role	   called	   for	   by	  Kant’s	  clue.465	  Indeed,	  most	  such	  attempts	  merely	  borrow	  their	  methodological	  cues	  from	  the	  empirical	  sciences	  they	  would	  have	  to	  ground.	  Thus	  despite	  the	  explosion	  of	  research	  Heidegger	   concludes	   that	   “no	   time	  has	  known	   less	   about	  what	  man	   is	   than	   today”	   (KPM	  3:209).	  In	  fact,	  however,	  it	  is	  at	  precisely	  this	  moment	  that	  phenomenology	  finds	  itself	  in	  a	  position	  to	  clarify	  the	  stakes	  of	  such	  an	  inquiry.	  This	  is	  the	  basis	  for	  Heidegger’s	  apparently	  outlandish	  claim	  that	  Kant’s	  method,	  properly	  clarified,	   is	  phenomenological	   (PIK	  25:71).	  For	   the	   promise	   of	   phenomenology	   consists	   in	   its	   nonpsychological,	   nonanthropological	  investigation	   into	   the	   essence	   of	   human	   finitude,	   an	   investigation	  which—inquiring	   into	  human	   subjectivity	   with	   an	   eye	   towards	   freeing	   ourselves	   of	   all	   remaining	   assumptions	  about	  what	  subjectivity	  is—methodologically	  prevents	  itself	  from	  falling	  into	  the	  modes	  of	  assertion	  appropriate	  to	  any	  of	  the	  regional,	  or	  even	  general,	  sciences,	  and	  instead	  keeps	  to	  the	   strictest	   formal	   and	   indicative	  ways	   of	   posing	   and	   answering	   questions.	   Heidegger’s	  conclusion,	   of	   course,	   is	   that	   Kant’s	   question	   points	   towards	   precisely	   the	   analytic	   of	  existence	  that	  Heidegger	  had	  initiated	  in	  Being	  and	  Time.	  
                                                465	  Heidegger	   credits	   Scheler	   for	   at	   least	   finally	   appreciating	   the	   difficulties	   on	   this	   score	   and	   working	  diligently	  to	  overcome	  them.	  See	  KPM	  3:210;	  MFL	  26:63-­‐64.	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It	  is	  a	  classical	  move,	  of	  course,	  to	  claim	  that	  one’s	  own	  philosophy	  first	  clarifies	  the	  methods	  and	  solves	  the	  leftover	  questions	  bequeathed	  to	  us	  by	  the	  previous	  generation	  of	  philosophers.	  No	  one	  was	  more	  successful	  than	  Kant	  himself	  at	  reshaping	  the	  way	  we	  see	  the	  inner	  dialectic	  of	  philosophy	  that	  led	  up	  to	  his	  own	  thought.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting,	  however,	  that	  Heidegger’s	   interpretive	  move	  here	   is	  somewhat	  unique	   in	   this	  respect.	  Yes,	  he	  does	  think	   that,	   in	   an	   important	   sense,	   Kant’s	   attempt	   to	   lay	   the	   ground	   for	   his	   critical	  philosophy	   should	   lead	   us	   to	   an	   appreciation	   for	   the	   necessity	   of	   existential	  phenomenology.	  (Needless	  to	  say,	  this	  claim	  has	  had	  far	  less	  impact	  on	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  history	  of	  philosophy	  than	  did	  Kant’s	  contraposition	  of	  Locke	  and	  Leibniz.)	  But	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  Heidegger’s	  claim	  is	  not	  that	  his	  own	  work	  really	  clarifies	  Kant’s	  motives	  or	  results;	   if	   anything,	   Being	   and	   Time	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   introduce	   an	   even	   further	  questionability	   into	  Kant’s	  own	  questions.	  And	  we	  must	  keep	   in	  mind,	  of	  course,	   that	   the	  positive	   content	   of	   the	   existential	   analytic	   was	   finally	   designed	   to	   be	   exhausted	   in	   the	  directive	  for	  historical	  research	  which	  it	  would	  provide.	  Heidegger’s	  appropriation	  of	  Kant,	  we	  might	  say,	  was	  ultimately	  designed	  to	  make	  possible	  his	  subsequent	  reappropriation	  by	  Kant.	  
The	  Failure	  and	  Legacy	  of	  Heidegger’s	  Reading	  of	  Kant	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Heidegger	  himself	  would	  later	  announce	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Kantbook	  and	  the	  project	  it	  had	  promised.	  It	  must	  be	  admitted,	  I	  think,	  that	  the	  general	  thrust	  of	  his	  later	  self-­‐criticism	  is	  correct:	   in	  spite	  of	  all	   the	  effort	  he	  had	  put	   into	  Kant	  over	  the	  prior	  three	  years,	  he	  was	  unable	  to	  devise	  a	  convincing	  link	  between	  Kant’s	  thought	  and	  his	  own.	  The	  historical	  untenability	  of	  his	  major	  claims	  is	  really	  just	  the	  outward	  expression	  of	  this	  inner	  failure.	   I	   do	   not	   here	   want	   to	   insist	   on	   the	   details	   of	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   these	   claims.	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Indeed,	  Cassirer	  himself	  already	  presented	  the	  most	  essential	  points	  in	  his	  original	  review	  of	  the	  Kantbook.	  “The	  service	  that	  the	  understanding	  does	  for	  intuition,”	  he	  insists,	  “takes	  nothing	  away	  from	  the	  freedom	  and	  spontaneity	  of	  the	  understanding.	  The	  understanding	  is	   service	   for,	   not	   under,	   intuition.”466	  Indeed,	   the	   “change”	   in	   the	   second	   edition,	   so	  deplored	  by	  Heidegger,	  by	  which	  the	  imagination	  is	  assimilated	  to	  the	  understanding,	  is	  not	  an	  essential	  one	  at	  all.	   If,	   indeed,	   the	   schematizing	  of	   the	  understanding	  by	  means	  of	   the	  imagination	   is	   an	   art	   hidden	   in	   the	   depths	   of	   the	   human	   soul	   (CPR	   A141/B180),	   this	   is	  precisely	   because	   of	   the	   mutual	   independence	   of	   understanding	   and	   sensibility	   and	   the	  consequent	  absence	  of	  a	  faculty	  for	  comprehensively	  exhibiting	  their	  relationship.	  Thus	  the	  Schematism	   does	   not	   lead	   us	   down	   a	   rabbit	   hole	   in	  which	  we	   find	   a	   potentially	   infinite	  stock	  of	  food	  for	  thought;467	  instead,	  we	  know	  a	  priori	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  point	  at	  which	  the	   stock	   runs	   out.	   We	   are	   welcome	   to	   reject	   this	   if	   we	   find	   such	   a	   conclusion	  uncomfortable,	  but	  we	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  following	  in	  Kant’s	  footsteps	  if	  we	  do.	  	   Cassirer	   rightly	   presses	   Heidegger	   on	   the	   topic	   of	   practical	   reason,	   for	   here,	   he	  notes,	   Heidegger’s	   interpretation	   is	   stretched	   beyond	   its	   breaking	   point.	   Whatever	  semblance	  of	   plausibility	   the	   thesis	   of	   the	  dependency	  of	   understanding	  upon	   sensibility	  (via	   imagination)	  might	   retain	   in	   the	   theoretical	   realm,	   it	   completely	   vanishes	  when	  we	  turn	  our	  attention	  to	  Kant’s	  practical	  philosophy.468	  Here,	  Cassirer	  insists,	  the	  separation	  of	  the	  sensible	  and	  intelligible	  worlds	  means	  that	  all	   human	   existence	   and	   all	   human	   activities	   are	   to	   be	   measured	   by	   two	  completely	   different	   standards	   and	   are	   to	   be	   considered	   from	   two	  
                                                466	  Cassirer	  (1931),	  141.	  467	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Schematism	  exhausts	  what	  can	  be	  said	  about	  this	  matter.	  Cassirer	  rightly	  refers	  Heidegger	  to	  the	  Metaphysical	  Foundations	  of	  Natural	  Science	  where	  the	  project	  is	  carried	  further	  still.	  468	  Heidegger	   had	   devoted	   a	   section	   (§30)	   of	   the	   Kantbook,	   more	   suggestive	   than	   systematic,	   to	   practical	  reason,	  explaining,	  by	  way	  of	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  feeling	  of	  respect,	  that	  even	  the	  apparently	  purest	  spontaneity	  in	  Kant’s	  thought	  really	  amounts	  to	  an	  equally	  pure	  receptivity	  (KPM	  3:159-­‐160).	  
 299	  
standpoints	   that	   are	   in	   principle	   opposed	   to	   each	   other.	   .	   .	   .	   Here,	   in	   the	  domain	  of	  morality,	  there	  is	  in	  point	  of	  fact	  the	  miracle	  of	  a	  kind	  of	  creative	  knowledge.	  For	  here	  the	  ego	  is	  basically	  only	  what	  it	  makes	  itself.469	  	  Heidegger	   had	   tried	   to	   hold	   out	   on	   this	   point	   at	   Davos,	   insisting	   on	   the	   ineliminable	  reference	  to	  finitude	  in	  the	  casting	  of	  the	  moral	  law	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  imperative.470	  And	  of	  course	   he	   is	   justified,	   to	   a	   certain	   extent,	   in	   doing	   so.	   In	   fact,	   it	   may	   very	   well	   be	   that	  Cassirer’s	   Neokantian	   orientation	   towards	   spontaneity	   precludes	   him	   from	   painting	   a	  picture	  of	  moral	  action	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  tension	  between	  higher	  and	  lower	  incentives	  that	  Kant	  himself	  was	  committed	  to.	  Against	  Heidegger’s	  position,	  however,	  Cassirer’s	  critique	  is	   decisive.	   The	   basis	   of	   the	   problem	   is	   that	   Heidegger	   comes	   to	   the	   question	   of	   our	  desiderative	  faculty	  with	  resources	  carried	  over	  uncritically	  from	  the	  investigation	  into	  our	  cognitive	  faculty.	  This	  is	  precisely	  the	  assumption	  Kant	  wanted	  to	  call	  into	  question	  when	  he	  sought	  to	  insulate	  practical	  reason	  from	  the	  disrepute	  into	  which	  speculative	  reason	  had	  fallen.471	  To	  be	  sure,	  human	  finitude	  is	  an	  ineliminable	  part	  of	  the	  picture	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  Kant’s	   moral	   theory,	   but	   the	   manifestation	   of	   our	   finitude	   in	   the	   categorical	   imperative	  depends	  precisely	  on	   the	  disconnect	  between	   the	  principles	  governing	  our	   cognitive	  and	  desiderative	   faculties.	   In	   short,	   Heidegger	   would	   like	   to	   find	   the	   rabbit	   hole	   within	   the	  confines	  of	  Kant’s	  critique	  of	  cognition,	  but	  if	  there	  even	  were	  such	  a	  thing	  in	  Kant’s	  system,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  found	  here,	  but	  in	  the	  relation	  of	  the	  soul’s	  faculties	  to	  one	  another.	  	   Here	  it	  should	  be	  recognized,	  I	  think,	  that	  Heidegger’s	  impatience	  with	  the	  Kantian	  corpus	  has	  deprived	  him	  of	  his	  best	  opportunity	   for	   establishing	  a	  genuine	   link	  between	  Kant’s	  thought	  and	  his	  own.	  In	  fact,	  there	  are	  tantalizing	  hints	  that	  Heidegger	  was	  at	  least	  at	  
                                                469	  Cassirer	  (1931),	  145.	  470	  See	  the	  exchange	  on	  practical	  philosophy	  in	  Cassirer	  &	  Heidegger	  (1929),	  194-­‐197.	  	  471	  See	  p.	  20	  above.	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one	   point	   on	   the	   brink	   of	  widening	   the	   scope	   of	   his	   interpretation	   of	  Kant	   considerably.	  Among	  the	   loose	  notes	   that	  Heidegger	  had	  enclosed	   in	  his	  copy	  of	   the	  Kantbook,	  we	   find	  one	  labeled,	  “Critique	  of	  Judgment—Aesthetics”:	  “Only	  considered	  far	  enough	  to	  be	  able	  to	  see	  that	  it	  is	  not	  contradicted,”	  he	  writes.	  Then	  he	  adds,	  “But	  now	  the	  highest	  corroboration	  of	   the	   interpretation,”	  adding	  references	   to	  §59	  and	  §57	  of	   the	   third	  Critique	   (NK	  3:250).	  We	   can	   now	   only	   guess	   at	   what	   Heidegger	   thought	   he	   caught	   sight	   of:	   the	   references	  (which	   are	   given	   by	   page	   number)	   are	   to	   Kant’s	   distinction	   between	   symbolism	   and	  schematism472	  and	   his	   resolution	   of	   the	   antinomy	   of	   taste,	   respectively.	   Heidegger	   even	  recognized	   that	   for	  Kant	   the	  essential	  question	  would	  come	  down	   to	   that	  of	   the	  possible	  unity	  of	  the	  mind’s	  fundamental	  faculties	  (see	  KPM	  3:205).	  But	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  the	  third	   Critique	   in	   which	   this	   question	   is	   given	   its	   clearest	   development,	   Heidegger	   never	  devoted	  himself	  to	  a	  systematic	  treatment	  of	  it.	  	   Actually,	   it	  was	  Cassirer	  himself	  who	   first	  made	   the	   suggestion	   that	  Heidegger	  do	  so,473	  although	  he	  would	  not	  have	  expected	  Heidegger	  to	  find	  many	  positive	  resources	  for	  his	  project	  there.474	  Whatever	  Heidegger	  saw,	  or,	  maybe,	   just	  thought	  he	  saw,	  in	  the	  third	  
Critique,	   it	   is	   in	   fact	   the	   idea	  of	   the	  power	  of	   judgment	   that	  would	  have	   served	  him	  as	   a	  better	  clue	  for	  his	  understanding	  of	  Kant.	  After	  all,	   it	  is	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  critique	  of	  this	   faculty	   that	   Kant	   deals	   at	   last	   with	   the	   question	   of	   the	   unity	   of	   our	   fundamental	  faculties	  and	  is	  no	  longer	  willing	  or	  able	  to	  rest	  content	  with	  the	  dualism	  of	  practical	  and	  theoretical	  standpoints	  to	  which	  the	  results	  of	  the	  first	  two	  Critiques	  may	  seem	  to	  have	  led.	  
                                                472	  This	   focus,	   at	   least,	   was	   probably	   prompted	   by	   Cassirer’s	   remarks	   during	   their	   disputation	   at	   Davos	  (Cassirer	  &	  Heidegger	  [1929],	  195).	  473	  Cassirer	  (1931),	  149.	  474	  Cassirer	  claims	  that	  both	  the	  second	  and	  third	  Critiques	  consider	  man	  “under	  the	  idea	  of	  humanity”	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  “the	  ‘intelligible	  substratum	  of	  humanity’	  and	  not	  the	  existence	  of	  man	  is	  the	  goal	  essential	  to	  it”	  (Cassirer	   [1931],	  149).	  This,	   I	   think,	  circumscribes	  the	  goal	  of	   the	  third	  Critique	  much	  too	  tightly;	  see	  Ch.	   II	  above.	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Again,	   however,	   we	  must	   keep	   in	  mind	   that	   it	   was	   never	   Kant’s	   intention	   to	   abolish	   or	  sublate	   the	   differences	   between	   the	   sciences	   of	   theory	   and	   practice,	   but	   only	   to	   make	  possible	  a	  kind	  of	  transition	  between	  them.	  In	  any	  case,	  though,	  this	   is	  the	  point	  to	  which	  worries	  about	  Kant’s	  failure	  to	  treat	  the	  human	  being	  as	  a	  whole	  must	  finally	  be	  addressed.	  Heidegger’s	   error	   was	   that	   he	   wanted	   Kant	   to	   respond	   to	   Heidegger’s	   own	   demand—ultimately	  the	  demand	  of	  Lebensphilosophie—within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  critique	  of	  cognition,	  when	   the	   answer	   to	   such	  a	  demand	   cannot,	   as	  Heidegger	  himself	  would	  have	  agreed,	   be	  contained	  within	  such	  bounds.	  	   This	  is	  not	  simply	  to	  say	  that	  Heidegger’s	  reading	  of	  Kant	  would	  have	  succeeded,	  not	  failed,	   had	   he	   taken	   the	   power	   of	   judgment	   as	   his	   interpretive	   clue	   instead	   of	   the	  imagination.	   A	   certain	   sort	   of	   failure	   was	   probably	   inevitable	   anyway.	   Even	   if	   we	   took	  Heidegger	  up	  on	  his	  most	  radical	  suggestion	  and	  inflated	  the	  significance	  of	  Kant’s	  fourth	  question	  to	  the	  gigantic	  proportions	  Heidegger	  requires	  of	  it,	  the	  question	  would,	  after	  all,	  still	  be	  only	  the	  fourth.	  Whatever	  its	  importance,	  it	  is	  the	  question	  that	  Kant	  wanted	  to	  raise	  only	  after	  we	  have	  hazarded	  our	  answers	  to	  the	  first	  three.	  It	   is	  very	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  we	  could	   hope	   to	   dislodge	  Kant	   from	   this	   position,	   and	   yet	   dislodge	   him	   from	   it	  we	  must	   if	  Heidegger’s	   reading,	  which	  would	   require	  Kant	   to	   place	   the	  question	   first,	   is	   going	   to	   be	  able	  to	  find	  traction	  here.	  	   Heidegger	  does,	  at	   least,	  understand	  that	   this	   is	  exactly	  what	  his	  reading	  requires.	  “This	  characterization	  of	   the	  essential	  unity	  of	  ontological	   cognition,”	  he	  says,	   “cannot	  be	  the	   conclusion,	   but	   must	   instead	   be	   the	   rightful	   beginning	   of	   the	   groundwork	   of	  ontological	  cognition”	  (KPM	  3:65).	  But	  did	  Kant	  himself	  have	  any	  mind,	  even	  a	  little	  bit,	  to	  rearrange	  his	  system	  this	  way?	  It	  is	  important	  to	  see	  that	  in	  asking	  this	  question,	  we	  have	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in	  reality	  only	  returned	  to	  our	   first	  one.	   In	  doing	  so	  we	  take	  up	  the	  heart	  of	   the	  problem	  once	  again:	  was	  Kant	  an	  epistemologist?	  That	  is—as	  Heidegger	  understands	  the	  question—did	  Kant	  take	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  cognition	  for	  granted,	  and	  only	  subsequently	  attempt	  to	  place	   it	   within	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   manner	   of	   philosophical	   questioning,	   or	   did	   he	  investigate	  cognition	  first	  and	  foremost	  as	  a	  problem	  in	  its	  own	  right?	  Really	  what	  this	  asks	  is:	  could	  Kant	  have	  transposed	  his	  own	  questioning,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  findings	  in	  the	  first	  
Critique,	   from	   the	  question	  of	   the	  objectivity	  of	   theoretical	   objects	   to	   the	  question	  of	   the	  being	  of	  beings,	  where	  the	  latter	  is	  conceived	  formally	  enough	  that	  nothing	  of	  the	  subject-­‐object	   relationship	   is	   presupposed?	   This	   is	   what	   Heidegger’s	   claim	   of	   “shrinking	   back”	  finally	  amounts	  to:	  that	  Kant	  nearly	  moved	  from	  the	  first	  of	  these	  questions	  to	  the	  second,	  but	  did	  not.	  	   Heidegger	  thought	  that	  the	  power	  of	  imagination,	  not	  the	  power	  of	  judgment,	  would	  be	   flexible	   enough	   to	   permit	   the	   transformation	   of	   Kant’s	   questioning	   here.	   When	  Heidegger	  turns	  his	  attention	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  in	  the	  first	  Critique,	  he	  sees	  it	  as	  a	  fixation	  that	  Kant	  let	  get	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  radical	  phenomenological	  analysis	  to	  which	  his	  description	  of	  the	  imagination	  was	  leading	  him.	  Kant’s	  decision	  to	  reorient	  the	  Transcendental	   Deduction	   around	   the	   definition	   of	   judgment,	   which	   leads	   to	   his	  consequent	  assimilation	  of	  imagination	  to	  understanding,	  is,	  in	  Heidegger’s	  view,	  the	  most	  disastrous	   step	   Kant	   could	   have	   taken	   in	   his	   research.	   In	   this	   context,	   Kant’s	   appeal	   to	  judgment	  as	  another	  force	  binding	  together	  sensibility	  and	  understanding	  can	  only	  appear	  as	   a	   threat	   to	   the	   self-­‐transparency	   of	   Kant’s	   analysis,	   which	   depends	   on	   imagination	  serving	  as	  their	  common	  root.	  With	  its	  close	  connection	  to	  traditional	  logic,	  the	  activity	  of	  judging	   obscures	   this	   reliance	   of	   the	   understanding	   on	   the	   imagination	   and	   therefore	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disallows	  the	  most	  radical	  tendency	  of	  Kant’s	  analysis	  to	  come	  to	  fruition.	  It	  is	  no	  accident	  if,	  as	  Kant’s	  attachment	  to	  the	  tradition	  intruded	  itself	  into	  his	  thought	  in	  the	  years	  between	  1781	   and	   1787,	   the	   definition	   of	   judgment	   came	   to	   usurp	   the	   place	   afforded	   the	  imagination	  in	  the	  Transcendental	  Deduction.	  From	  Heidegger’s	  perspective,	  this	  can	  only	  be	  lamented	  as	  a	  lost	  opportunity.	  	   I	  am	  not	  about	  to	  speculate	  here	  on	  whether	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  could	  have	  been	  stretched,	  in	  Heidegger’s	  hands,	  to	  admit	  of	  an	  activity	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  simply	  cognitive.475	  This	   would	   certainly	   require	   no	   small	   measure	   of	   “violence”:	   judgment	   is	   an	   essentially	  cognitive	   faculty,	   on	   Kant’s	   view.	   I	   will	   note,	   however,	   that	   the	   dual	   role	   the	   power	   of	  judgment	  plays	  in	  Kant’s	  philosophy—first	  to	  ground	  the	  critique	  of	  cognition	  and	  then	  to	  provide	   the	   principle	   for	   the	   limited	   critical	   unification	   of	   theory	   and	   practice	   through	  feeling—would	  not	  have	  been	  without	  its	  usefulness	  for	  Heidegger’s	  interpretive	  gambit	  of	  placing	  the	  final	  Kantian	  question	  in	  the	  first	  position.476	  	   Now,	   given	   his	   place	   in	   the	   phenomenological	   tradition,	   Heidegger	   had	   plenty	   of	  reasons	   to	  want	   to	   privilege	   the	   power	   of	   the	   imagination	   over	   the	   power	   of	   judgment.	  Husserl,	   we	   will	   recall,	   had	   sought	   to	   entrench	   phenomenology	   as	   a	   science	   that	   could	  function	  within	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  natural	  attitude.	  Thus	  first	  philosophy,	  for	  Husserl	  as	  for	  Descartes,	   is	  possible	   (and	  only	  possible)	  prior	   to	   the	  kind	  of	  existential	   commitment	  that	  the	  employment	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  (taken	  in	  Kant’s	  sense)	  necessarily	  demands	  of	  us.	  Kant’s	  position,	  by	  contrast,	  is	  that	  the	  justification	  of	  rational	  norms	  is	  only	  possible	  
                                                475	  But	  Lask	  would	  certainly	  be	  the	  proximate	  resource	  for	  Heidegger	  to	  draw	  upon	  here.	  See	  Crowell	  (1992).	  476	  At	  Davos	  Heidegger	  asked,	  “Does	  it	  lie	  in	  the	  essence	  of	  philosophy	  itself	  that	  it	  has	  a	  terminus	  a	  quo	  which	  must	  be	  made	  into	  a	  problem	  and	  that	  it	  has	  a	  terminus	  ad	  quem	  which	  stands	  in	  a	  correlation	  to	  the	  terminus	  
a	  quo?”	  (Cassirer	  &	  Heidegger	  [1929],	  202).	  If	  anything	  could	  play	  such	  a	  role	  in	  Kant’s	  philosophy,	   it	  could	  only	  be	  the	  power	  of	  judgment.	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consequent	  to	  an	  act	  of	  judgment	  that	  binds	  one	  to	  the	  actually	  existing	  natural	  world.	  This	  marks	  a	  deep	  divide	  in	  their	  respective	  approaches,	  but	  what	  is	  important	  here	  is	  this:	  on	  Husserl’s	  view,	  it	  is	  only	  by	  suspending	  judgment,	  in	  Kant’s	  sense,	  that	  we	  can	  describe	  and	  justify	  the	  norms	  of	  rational	  discourse,	  and	  we	  do	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  phenomenological	  field	  of	  intuition	  that	  such	  suspension	  first	  reveals	  in	  its	  purity.	  Thus	  the	  genuinely	  intuitive	  basis	   of	   the	   structure	   of	   human	   reason	   only	   appears	   so	   long	   as	   the	   power	   of	   judgment	  remains	  idle.	  	   It	  may	   be	   Scheler,	   however,	  who	  puts	   the	   essential	   point	  most	   succinctly.	   Scheler	  separates	  judgment	  from	  intuition	  with	  exceptional	  clarity	  by	  distinguishing	  the	  sphere	  of	  mere	   “ethics”	   from	   the	  moral	   cognition	   through	  which	  willing	  must	   actually	   pass.477	  The	  role	  of	   judgment	   in	  taking	  us	  beyond	   the	  phenomenological	  given	  indicates	  to	  Scheler	  the	  need	   to	   suspend	   the	   activity	   of	   judgment	   in	   order	   to	   really	   reach	   the	   things	   themselves.	  According	  to	  him,	  In	   phenomenological	   experience	   nothing	   is	  meant	   that	   is	   not	   given,	   and	  nothing	   is	  given	  that	   is	  not	  meant.	   It	   is	  precisely	   in	   this	  coincidence	  of	   the	  “meant”	   and	   the	   “given”	   that	   the	   content	   of	   phenomenological	   experience	  alone	   becomes	  manifest.	   In	   this	   coincidence,	   in	   the	   very	  meeting	  point	   of	  fulfillment	  of	  what	  is	  meant	  and	  what	  is	  given,	  the	  phenomenon	  appears.478	  	  Whereas,	  for	  Kant,	  the	  activity	  of	  judging	  is	  that	  by	  which	  we	  reach	  out	  from	  the	  pure	  play	  of	  our	  concepts	  and	  latch	  onto	  what	  is	  actually	  given	  in	  our	  experience,	  for	  Scheler	  its	  role	  is	  precisely	  the	  opposite:	  to	  introduce	  an	  element	  into	  the	  phenomena	  which	  is	  foreign	  to	  them	  and	  hence	  to	  preclude	  our	  unmitigated	  access	  to	  the	  things	  themselves.	  
                                                477	  “Ethics	   is	   only	   the	   judgmental	   formulation	   of	   what	   is	   given	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	  moral	   cognition”	   (Scheler	  [1913-­‐1916],	  69).	  478	  Scheler	  (1913-­‐1916),	  51.	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   I	   suspect	   the	   phenomenological	   prejudice	   against	   a	   Kantian	   faculty	   of	   judgment	  encroached	  even	  into	  Heidegger’s	  thinking.	  It	  probably	  should	  not	  have:	  Heidegger,	  as	  we	  have	   seen,	   came	   to	   reject	   the	   classical	   phenomenological	   view,	   endorsed	   clearly	   here	   by	  Scheler,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  (at	  least	  the	  early)	  Husserl,	  of	  an	  untrammelled	  and	  immediate	  access	  to	  phenomena.	  For	  Heidegger,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  facticity	  was	  ultimately	  a	  problem,	   in	  fact,	  we	   could	   say,	   the	   problem	   of	   phenomenology.	   In	   theory,	   this	   could	   have	   left	   room	   for	  Heidegger	   to	   appreciate	   the	   distinctive	   role	   of	   judgment	   in	   the	   Kantian	   philosophy;	  moreover,	   it	   could	   have	   lent	   him	   the	   basis	   from	   which	   to	   interrogate	   this	   role	  phenomenologically.	   In	   practice,	   Heidegger	   was	   unable	   to	   see	   beyond	   his	  phenomenological	  predecessors	  here.	  	   This	  being	   so,	   it	   is	   inevitable	   that	   in	  Heidegger’s	   interpretation	  Kant’s	   recourse	   to	  the	   forms	   of	   judgment	   can	   express	   nothing	  more	   than	   a	   symptom	   of	   Kant’s	   inability	   to	  master	  the	  influence	  which	  traditional	  logic	  exerted	  on	  his	  ontology	  (see	  PIK	  25:213).	  He	  is	  thus	   forced	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   A68-­‐69/B93-­‐94	   passage,	   the	   passage	   in	   which	   Kant	  identifies	   the	   understanding	   as	   a	   faculty	   for	   judging,	   “evades	   the	   real	   problem	   of	   the	  transcendental	  origin	  of	  concepts”	  (PIK	  25:245).	  Thus	  Heidegger	  subtly—and	  ingeniously,	  in	  a	  way—reverses	  one	  of	  Kant’s	  central	  claims:	  that	  it	  is	  the	  unity	  of	  an	  action,	  identified,	  for	  Kant,	  with	  an	  act	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judgment,	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  comport	  ourselves	  to	  an	  object.	  Any	  such	  a	  reference	  to	  an	  act	  of	  judgment	  would	  link	  us	  immediately	  to	  the	  table	  of	  judgments—the	   forms	   of	   unity	   by	  which	   each	   act	   of	   judging	   is	   characterized—and	   thus	  direct	  us	  towards	  traditional	  logic	  and	  away	  from	  the	  intuitive	  basis	  for	  object-­‐relatedness	  for	   which	   phenomenology	   seeks	   and	   which	   throws	   cognition	   itself	   into	   question.	   The	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solution,	  for	  Heidegger,	  is	  to	  transpose	  the	  character	  of	  this	  act	  of	  judgment	  onto	  an	  act	  of	  imagination.	  The	   synthesis	   of	   the	   power	   of	   imagination	   has	   the	   function	   of	   the	   explicit	  bringing-­‐to	   of	   what	   is	   intuitive	   [des	   ausdrücklichen	   Zu-­‐bringens	   des	  
Anschaulichen].	  After	  what	  we	  have	   just	   said,	   however,	   this	  means	   that	   the	  
bringing-­‐to	   of	   the	   manifold	   is	   apparently	   the	   basic	   act	   which	   makes	   it	  possible	  for	  something—as	  that	  which	  is	  brought-­‐to	  [als	  Zu-­‐gebrachtes]—to	  stand	  opposed	  to	  me.	  (PIK	  25:335)	  	  With	  this	  maneuver,	  Heidegger’s	  own	  transposition	  of	  Kant’s	  questioning	  is	  completed;	  the	  possibility	  of	  appreciating	  the	  role	  of	  the	  power	  of	  judgment	  for	  Kant	  fades	  away	  and,	  with	  it,	  any	  chance	  for	  rigorously	  relating	  Kant’s	  first	  questions	  to	  his	  last.	  	   Again,	   however,	   this	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   Heidegger	   could	   have	   succeeded	   with	   an	  alternative	  approach.	  Kant	  is	  interested	  in	  the	  sort	  of	  unity	  underlying	  his	  various	  analyses,	  but	  this	  is	  a	  question	  he	  is	  content	  to	  take	  up	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  critical	  system,	  not	  place	  at	  its	   very	   beginning.	  No	   unmutilated	  Kantian	   system	   could	   put	   the	   question	   of	   the	   human	  being	   anywhere	   but	   in	   the	   final	   position.	   And	   Kant	   certainly	   thought	   that	   without	   the	  conceptual	   clarity	   first	   achievable	   by	   means	   of	   the	   first	   two	   Critiques,	   the	   transitional	  project	  of	  the	  third	  would	  scarcely	  be	  conceivable.	  Kant	  himself,	  we	  know,	  did	  not	  conceive	  it	  until	  he	  had	  worked	  the	  first	  two	  out.	  And	  so	  Heidegger’s	  elaborate	  attempt	  to	  save	  Kant	  from	  the	  epistemologists	  had	  to	  fail.	  For	  better	  or	  for	  worse,	  Kant	  did	  think	  he	  knew	  what	  cognition	  was,	  and	  he	  believed	  that	  no	  one	  can	  rigorously	  pose	  the	  question	  of	  the	  human	  being	  until	  after	  she	  has	  worked	  through	  the	  problem	  of	  cognition	  on	  its	  own	  terms.	  
Goethe’s	  Room	  Not	   all	   of	   Heidegger’s	   rejection	   of	   the	   epistemologists’	   reading	   of	   Kant	   was	   in	   vain,	  however.	  If	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  existential	  starting	  point	  for	  Kant’s	  system	  is	  absurd,	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  existential	  landing	  point	  for	  it	  is	  considerably	  less	  so.	  In	  any	  event,	  there	  is	  a	  case	  to	  be	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made	   that	   Heidegger’s	   characterization	   of	   Kant	   at	   Davos,	   whatever	   its	   essential	   defects,	  was	  in	  certain	  essential	  respects	  a	  truer	  likeness	  than	  Cassirer’s.	  On	  this	  score,	  at	  least,	  it	  is	  markedly	   less	   clear	   whether	   Cassirer	   succeeded	   in	   defending	   the	   purity	   of	   the	  Enlightenment	   against	   the	   incursions	   Heidegger	   tried	   to	   make	   into	   it	   through	   Kant’s	  thought.	  	   Recall	  that	  in	  Kant’s	  picture	  of	  human	  wisdom	  we	  find	  united	  two	  of	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  Enlightenment:	  the	  scholastic	  notion	  of	  philosophy	  as	  a	  scientific	  endeavor	  and	  the	  popular	  notion	  of	  philosophy,	   exemplified,	   for	  Kant,	   in	   the	   ideal	   of	   the	   “practical	  philosopher.”	   In	  this	   respect	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   human	   being’s	   return	   from	   her	   excursion	   into	   science	   is	  essential	   to	   the	   Kantian	   position.	   What	   is	   more,	   for	   Kant	   the	   Schulbegriff	   of	   philosophy	  depends	  on	  its	  Weltbegriff;	  the	  idea	  of	  philosophy	  is	  ultimately	  dependent	  upon	  and	  refers	  to	   the	   ideal	   of	   the	   philosopher.	   This	   means	   that	   Kant’s	   position	   can	   by	   no	   means	   be	   as	  separated	  from	  Rousseau’s	  as	  Cassirer’s	  Neokantianism	  might	  lead	  one	  to	  believe.	  The	  path	  to	  wisdom	  must	  travel	  through	  science,	  but	  wisdom	  itself	  can	  never	  be	  reduced,	  or,	  if	  you	  prefer,	   inflated,	   to	   science,	   for	   the	   fundamental	   Weltbegriff	   of	   philosophy	   always	  guarantees	   that	   even	   the	  most	   complete	   scientific	   treatment	  of	   the	  world	  only	   leads	  one	  back—more	  solidly	  than	  before,	  it	  is	  true—to	  one’s	  own	  self.	  Nothing	  could	  be	  further	  from	  Kant’s	  intentions	  than	  the	  setting-­‐free	  of	  the	  individual	  into	  the	  manifold	  constellations	  of	  culture	  where	  she	  is	  supposed	  to	  recognize	  her	  spontaneity	  in	  the	  achievements	  of	  modern	  science.	  Rousseau,	  we	  know,	  would	  have	  balked	  at	  such	  an	  idea.	  But	  so	  would	  have	  Kant.	  The	   difference	   between	   Rousseau	   and	   Kant	   is,	   as	   I	   have	   emphasized,	   very	   real.	  Wisdom	  cannot	  stay	  coiled	  up	  within	  itself	  and	  still	  be	  the	  “true	  philosophy”	  that	  Rousseau	  sought.	  For	  Kant,	  wisdom	  needs	  its	  scientific	  expression	  in	  order	  to	  come	  back	  to	  itself	  and	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now	   for	   the	   first	   time	   be	  what	   it	   is.	  Pace	   Rousseau,	   to	   really	   be	   true	   to	   oneself	   requires	  relinquishing	  one’s	  grip	  on	  the	  felt	  necessity	  to	  say	  always	  and	  only	  nothing	  more	  than	  the	  truth	  one	  feels	  firmly	  and	  losslessly	  inside	  oneself.	  Rousseau’s	  final	  wish	  was	  to	  spin	  from	  himself	  a	  portrait	  of	  his	  life	  “exactly	  according	  to	  nature	  and	  in	  all	  its	  truth.”479	  But	  to	  do	  so	  he	   would	   first	   have	   had	   to	   take	   a	   decisive	   step	   outside	   of	   himself,	   and	   this,	   as	   his	  
Confessions	  amply	  testify,	  is	  what	  he	  was	  never	  quite	  willing	  to	  do.	  One	   wonders	   whether	   Kant	   would	   have	   leveled	   a	   similar	   indictment	   against	   the	  phenomenological	   movement.	   Indeed,	   from	   a	   Kantian	   perspective	   one	   may	   very	   well	  diagnose	  Heidegger’s	  insistence	  on	  a	  philosophy	  of	  what	  precedes	  all	  objectivity	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  Rousseauian	  moment	  in	  his	  thought.	  For	  Kant,	  our	  cognitive	  faculty	  only	  comes	  into	  its	  own	  when	  an	  act	  of	  judgment—which	  always	  says	  more	  than	  what	  is	  clear	  and	  distinct	  for	  the	  subject	  herself—connects	  us	  up	  to	  an	  objective	  world.	  As	  Cassirer	  might	  put	   it,	   there	   is	  a	  kind	  of	  miracle	  here,	  something	  which,	  after	  the	  fact,	  we	  can	  only	  look	  back	  on	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  inconceivable	   accomplishment.480	  This	   is	   the	   kernel	   of	   truth	   in	   the	   Marburg	   School’s	  insistence	   on	   the	   fact	   of	   science.	  Whether	  we	   regard	   this	   fact	   as	   cognition	   or	   not	   is	   not	  really	  essential:	   it	   is	  that	   it	   lies	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  a	   judgment	  which,	  whatever	  its	   form,	  has	  taken	  us	  outside	  of	  ourselves	  and	  into	  the	  world	  of	  science.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   this	   thought	   is	  not	  nearly	  as	   foreign	   to	  Heidegger’s	   thought	  as	  Cassirer,	   for	   one,	   always	   assumed	   it	   had	   to	   be.	   That	   facticity	   is	   a	   problem	   means	   that	  existence	  is	  always	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  not	  itself;	  to	  be	  itself	  is	  only	  ever	  present	  to	  it	  in	  the	  
                                                479	  Rousseau	  (1782),	  3.	  480	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  his	  posthumous	  work	  The	  Myth	  of	  the	  State,	  Cassirer	  finally	  makes	  explicit	  a	  criticism	  of	  Heidegger	  deeper	  than	  those	  he	  had	  hitherto	  permitted	  himself.	  Precisely	  here,	  however,	  Cassirer	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  move	  closer	  to	  Heidegger	  than	  ever	  before,	  regarding	  scientific	  cognition	  no	  longer	  as	  a	  given	  fact,	  but	  as	   an	   achievement	   whose	   existence	   is	   guaranteed	   by	   nothing	   objective,	   but	   only	   by	   our	   own	   vigilance	   in	  securing	  it	  ever	  anew	  against	  the	  forces	  of	  myth	  that	  can	  never	  be	  simply	  defeated	  once	  and	  for	  all	  (Cassirer	  [1946],	  297-­‐298).	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form	   of	   a	   possibility,	   and	   indeed	   of	   a	   possibility	   purified	   of	   all	   actuality.	   To	   be	   sure,	  Heidegger	  hardly	  regards	  culture	  as	   the	  miracle	  of	   science;	   instead,	   it	   is	   the	   fallenness	  of	  existence.	  But	  it	  can	  hardly	  be	  said	  that	  existence	  has	  not	  judged	  and	  hence	  established	  its	  relationship	   to	   the	   scientific	   world.	  What	   is	   distinctive	   about	   Heidegger’s	   position,	   with	  respect	  to	  Cassirer’s,	  is	  that	  the	  scientific	  image	  in	  which	  existence	  beholds	  itself	  can	  never	  reflect	  its	  own	  spirit	  back	  to	  it.	  Or,	  better,	  it	  reflects	  it	  back	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  inadequacy:	  far	  from	  displaying	   to	   existence	   its	   own	   inner	   principle	   of	   activity	   in	   an	   ever	  more	   clarified	  fashion,	  the	  development	  of	  science	  only	  obscures	  it	  more	  and	  more	  exhaustively.	  And	  if	  we	  wish	   to	   turn	  a	  bit	  of	  Heidegger’s	  violence	  back	  upon	  him,	  we	  could	  even	  put	   it	   this	  way:	  Heidegger	   saw	   that,	   precisely	   on	   account	   of	   something	   like	   judgment,	   there	   is	   a	   true	  disconnect,	   a	   rupture,	   between	   the	   orders	   of	   science	   and	   wisdom,	   a	   rupture,	   moreover,	  which	  inescapably	  necessitates	  the	  return	  from	  the	  former	  to	  the	  latter.	  Cassirer,	  whose	  thinking	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  is	  as	  deep	  and	  clear	  as	  anyone’s,	   says	   in	   his	   review	  of	   the	  Kantbook	   that	   “Kant	  was	   and	   remained—in	   the	  most	  noble	   and	   beautiful	   sense	   of	   the	   word—a	   thinker	   of	   the	   Enlightenment.	   He	   strove	   for	  illumination	   even	   where	   he	   thought	   about	   the	   deepest	   and	   most	   hidden	   grounds	   of	  being.”481	  Just	  a	  bit	  further	  on,	  he	  relates	  that	  Goethe	  once	  told	  Schopenhauer	  that	  he	  felt,	  when	  he	  read	  Kant,	  as	  though	  he	  were	  entering	  a	  bright	  room.482	  It	   is	  precisely	  this	  drive	  for	  illumination,	  Cassirer	  implies,	  which	  Heidegger’s	  path	  of	  thinking	  imperils.	  To	  be	  sure,	  Heidegger’s	  desire	   for	   light	   is	  markedly	   less	  pure	   than	  Cassirer’s	  own.	  Compare	   Heidegger’s	   description	   of	   reading	   Kant	   to	   Goethe’s	   remark	   above:	   “In	   the	  struggle	  with	  Kant,”	  Heidegger	  tells	  his	  students,	  “it	  is	  important	  for	  us	  to	  strive	  to	  come	  to	  
                                                481	  Cassirer	  (1931),	  155.	  482	  The	  source	  of	  the	  anecdote	  is	  Schopenhauer	  (1818),	  144.	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terms	   with	   the	   things	   themselves—or	   at	   least	   to	   bring	   the	   problems	   that	   Kant	   has	  illuminated	   into	   a	  new	  darkness”	   (PIK	  25:75).	   Indeed,	  Kant’s	   great	   virtue,	   for	  Heidegger,	  was	   his	   willingness	   to	   drive	   even	   into	   those	   deepest	   recesses	   of	   the	   human	   soul	   where	  there	   is	   no	   light	   at	   hand	   and	   to	   which	   hardly	   any	   may	   be	   brought.	   But	   Heidegger’s	  relationship	  to	  Enlightenment	  thought	  by	  no	  means	  consists	  in	  the	  one-­‐sided	  rejection	  that	  is	  implicitly	  attributed	  to	  him	  by	  Cassirer	  and	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  he	  expels	  Heidegger	  to	  the	  tradition	  of	  Kierkegaard.483	  Heidegger’s	  insistence,	  rather,	  is	  just	  that	  the	  clarity	  striven	  for	  by	  the	  Enlightenment	  cannot	  be	  finally	  separated	  from	  that	  darkness	  from	  which	  it	  had	  sought	  to	  extricate	  itself.	  When	  the	  questions	  of	  philosophy	  devolve	  back	  upon	  us,	  as	  they	  inevitably	  must	  if	  they	  were	  at	  all	  rigorously	  posed,	  we	  can	  no	  longer	  rely	  wholesale	  on	  the	  light	   of	   science	   to	   guide	   us.	   Kant	   himself	   knew	   this	   from	   his	   picture	   of	   moral	   action:	  however	   clearly	   we	   are	   able	   to	   see	   the	   right	   path,	   we	   cannot	   simply	   legislate	   away	   the	  sensible	  incentives	  which	  distract	  us	  from	  it.	  But	  questions	  in	  philosophy	  are	  like	  this,	  too:	  they	   require	  us	   to	   take	  up	  what	  has	   come	   to	   light,	   and	   the	   content	  of	  philosophy	   cannot	  finally	   be	   dissociated	   from	   this	   taking-­‐up,	   for,	   as	   even	   Kant’s	   discussion	   of	   the	   worldly	  provenance	  of	  school	  philosophy	  goes	  to	  show,	  philosophy	  was	  always	  dependent	  upon	  it	  from	   the	   start.	   For	   all	   the	   illumination	   Kant	   succeeded	   in	   bringing	   about	   through	   his	  thought,	   his	   philosophy	  was	   never	   just	   about	  what	   happens	   in	   Goethe’s	   room;	   it	   is	   also	  about	   what	   happens	   when,	   if	   only	   for	   want	   of	   the	   sustained	   energy	   to	   continuously	  illuminate	   ourselves,	   we	   must	   inevitably	   retire	   from	   it.	   As	   Heidegger	   put	   it	   at	   Davos,	  
                                                483	  Cassirer	  (1931),	  156.	  See	  p.	  158	  above.	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philosophy,	  as	  philosophizing,	  is	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  “not	  a	  matter	  of	  learned	  discussion,”	  but	  only	  “setting	  free	  the	  existence	  [Dasein]	  in	  the	  human	  being.”484	  
Epilogue	  Heidegger	  would	  return	  to	  Kant	   later	  on,	  but	  his	  work	  would	  never	  assume	  anything	  like	  the	  urgency	  it	  had	  in	  1929.	  It	  had	  lost	  it	  on	  several	  counts:	  not	  only	  had	  Kant	  retreated	  from	  his	  privileged	  ancestral	  position	  with	   respect	   to	  Being	  and	  Time,	   but	   the	   latter	  work	  had	  altogether	  shed	  its	  foundational	  methodological	  significance	  for	  the	  path	  of	  his	  thinking.	  To	  what	  degree	  these	  events	  represent	  a	  substantive	  shift	  in	  Heidegger’s	  thought	  is	  a	  question	  which	  necessarily	  transcends	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  essay.	  Incontestably,	  however,	  the	  political	  developments	  of	  the	  1930s	  went	  on	  to	  cast	  all	  the	  events	  of	  the	  Davos	  days	  in	  a	  completely	  changed	  light,	  and	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  there	  was	  simply	  no	  question	  of	  plodding,	  once	  again,	  along	   the	  same	  old	  prewar	  pathways.	  The	  collapse	  of	  Neokantianism	  and	   the	  quick	   descent	   of	   the	   fortunes	   of	   Cassirer	   after	   an	   initial	   wave	   of	   American	   enthusiasm	  robbed	  Heidegger’s	  Kant	  interpretation	  of	  all	  of	  its	  force,	  and	  most	  of	  its	  point,	  by	  the	  time	  the	  work	  of	  Strawson	  and	  Rawls	  had	  begun	  to	  rehabilitate	  the	  historical	  consideration	  of	  Kant’s	   work	   in	   the	   Anglophone	   tradition.	   The	   relationship	   of	   the	   phenomenological	  movement	   to	   Kant,	   and	   to	   Enlightenment	   thought	   more	   generally,	   remains	   very	   much	  fraught	  and	  undecided,	  a	  state	  of	  affairs	  that	  is	  at	  least	  in	  part	  a	  relic	  of	  the	  abortive	  attempt	  to	  settle	  the	  question	  philosophically	  at	  and	  after	  Davos.	  	   Without	   a	   doubt,	   phenomenology	   remains	   indebted	   to	   Heidegger’s	   thought,	  although	  his	  sway	  over	  the	  tradition	  is	  perhaps	  something	  less	  than	  it	  once	  was.	  And	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  phenomenology,	  at	  least,	  the	  enduring	  question	  is	  not	  whether,	  in	  the	  
                                                484	  Cassirer	  &	  Heidegger	  (1929),	  200.	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final	  analysis,	  Heidegger	  got	  Kant	  wrong,	  but	  rather	  whether,	   in	  the	  midst	  of	  doing	  so,	  he	  got	  himself—and	  phenomenology—wrong,	  as	  well.	  Heidegger	  himself	  appeared	  to	  believe	  so.	  Gadamer	  recalls	  that	  sometime	  before	  1940	  he	  misplaced	  his	  copy	  of	  the	  Kantbook,	  and	  Heidegger	   was	   kind	   enough	   to	   send	   him	   a	   replacement.	   Upon	   opening	   it,	   he	   found,	  scribbled	   in	   its	   margins,	   Heidegger’s	   own	   self-­‐indictment:	   “relapsed	   totally	   into	   the	  standpoint	   of	   the	   transcendental	   question.”485	  As	   we	   have	   seen,	   many	   interpreters	   have	  seen	  fit	  to	  agree	  with	  Heidegger’s	  own	  retrospective	  assessment.	  The	  same	  thing,	  perhaps,	  might	   be	   said	   of	   the	   phenomenological	   movement	   as	   a	   whole,	   at	   least	   in	   its	   American	  setting:	   to	   go	   back	   to	   Kant	   immediately	   casts	   one	   under	   suspicion	   of	   falling	   into	   a	  particularly	   unfortunate	   sort	   of	   philosophical	   relapse.	   Perhaps	   the	   example	   of	  Heidegger	  has	  indicated	  the	  dangers	  one	  risks	  if	  one	  allows	  oneself	  to	  fly	  too	  near	  to	  Kant’s	  supreme	  illumination.	  	   No	  doubt,	   the	  cultural	  memory	  of	  Davos	  has	  by	  now	  far	  eclipsed	   the	  debates	  over	  Kant	  interpretation	  that	  took	  place	  there.	  In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  playful,	  if	  bizarre,	  episodes	  of	  the	  retreat,	  a	  young	  Lévinas	  portrayed	  Cassirer	  in	  a	  farcical	  skit	  the	  students	  had	  put	  on	  to	  commemorate,	   as	  well	   as	  mock,	   the	   somber	   intellectual	   events	   they	   had	   just	   witnessed.	  Lévinas,	  then	  an	  enthusiastic	  partisan	  of	  Heidegger’s,	  played	  his	  part	  with	  relish,	  whitening	  his	   hair	   with	   flour	   and	   animatedly	   insisting	   that,	   despite	   the	   volley	   of	   stubborn	  obfuscations	  emanating	  from	  faux-­‐Heidegger,	  the	  two	  of	  them	  did	  not	  really	  disagree.	  “I	  am	  a	   pacifist,”	   he	   repeated	   over	   and	   over	   again.	   The	   real	   Cassirer	   and	  Heidegger	   looked	   on	  
                                                485	  Gadamer	  (1979),	  87.	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from	   the	   audience.	   No	   one	   knows	   any	   longer	   whether	   they	   were	   bemused	   or	  embarrassed.486	  	   In	   just	   a	   few	   years,	   of	   course,	   all	   this	  would	   become	   almost	   unthinkable,	   and	   the	  remembrance	  of	  the	  Davos	  days	  took	  on	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  various	  parties	  a	  more	  sinister	  and	   foreboding	   cast:	   it	   was	   the	   last	   chance	   for	   the	   liberal	   humanism	   represented	   by	  Cassirer	   to	  make	  a	   stand	   in	   the	   face	  of	   the	   insidious	   forces	  of	   totalitarianism	  by	  which	   it	  would,	  in	  the	  end,	  be	  completely	  overrun.	  In	  a	  sense,	  it	  marked	  Germany’s	  final	  break	  from	  all	  that	  was	  brightest	  in	  its	  heritage	  and	  its	  surrender	  to	  the	  forces	  of	  darkness.	  	   This	   break,	   of	   course,	   proved	   impossible	   to	   simply	  mend	   up	   again	   after	   the	  war.	  Heidegger	   himself,	   forced	   to	   turn	   inward	   not	   only	   by	   his	   disillusionment	   with	   the	   Nazi	  movement	   for	  which	  he	  had	  held	  such	  high	  hopes,	  but	  also	  by	  the	   inner	   force	  of	  his	  own	  thinking,	  had	  no	  real	   interest	   in	  reforging	   the	  bonds	   that	  had	  been	  broken.	  Even	   today	   it	  seems	  scarcely	  imaginable	  that	  Heidegger	  had	  been,	  at	  Davos,	  right	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  giving	  his	   own	   thought	   the	   ultimate	   imprimatur	   of	   the	   Enlightenment:	   the	   title	   of	   a	   Kantian	  philosophy.	  “As	  I	  had	  not	  expected	  to	  find	  it	  in	  him,”	  Cassirer	  said	  at	  Davos,	  “I	  must	  confess	  that	   I	   have	   found	   a	  Neokantian	   here	   in	  Heidegger.”487	  But	   after	   Davos	  Heidegger	   shrank	  back	  from	  Kant,	  and	  he	  would	  never	  find	  another	  philosophical	  companion	  with	  whom	  he	  could	   travel	   quite	   so	   far.	   Heidegger’s	   interpretation	   of	   Kant	   may	   have	   failed,	   but	   in	   the	  course	   of	   pursuing	   it	   he	   came	   nearer	   than	   ever	   to	   speaking	   with	   and	   out	   of	   the	  philosophical	  tradition,	  evidenced	  now	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  so	  many	  take	  him	  to	  have	  strayed,	  during	   those	  years,	   from	   the	  path	   that	  was	  most	  properly	  his	  own.	   In	   fact,	  we	  still	   today	  cannot	  rule	  out	  the	  opposite	  possibility:	  that	  it	  was	  precisely	  at	  Davos	  that	  Heidegger	  came	  
                                                486	  Gordon	  (2010),	  326.	  487	  Cassirer	  &	  Heidegger	  (1929),	  193.	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as	  close	  as	  he	  ever	  would	  to	  understanding	  the	  contents	  of	  his	  own	  deepest	  philosophical	  insights.	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  Introduction	   to	   the	   Critique	   of	   Judgment.”	   West	   Lafayette,	   IN:	   Purdue	   University	  Press,	  2005.	  
Logik	   (JL	   1800).	   Ak	   9:1-­‐150.	   English:	   The	   Jäsche	   Logic.	   In	   Lectures	   on	   Logic:	   521-­‐640.	   J.	  Michael	  Young,	  trans.	  Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1992.	  
Logik	   Dohna-­‐Wundlacken	   (DWL	   early	   1790s).	   Ak	   24:687-­‐784.	   English:	   The	   Dohna-­‐
Wundlacken	  Logic.	  In	  Lectures	  on	  Logic:	  431-­‐516.	  
Logik	   Hechsel	   (HL	   c.	   1780).	   In	   Reinhard	   Brandt	   &	   Werner	   Stark,	   eds.	   Logik-­‐Vorlesung:	  
Unveroffentlichte	  Nachschriften	  II:	   269-­‐499.	   English:	  The	  Hechsel	  Logic	  (in	  part).	   In	  
Lectures	  on	  Logic:	  381-­‐423.	  
Metaphysiche	  Anfangsgründe	  der	  Naturwissenschaft	   (MFNS	   1786).	   Ak	   4:465-­‐565.	   English:	  
Metaphysical	  Foundations	  of	  Natural	  Science.	  Michael	  Friedman,	  trans.	  In	  Theoretical	  
Philosophy	  after	  1781:	  171-­‐270.	  Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002.	  
Metaphysik	  der	  Sitten	  (MM	  1797).	  Ak	  6:203-­‐493.	  English:	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals.	  Mary	  J.	  Gregor,	  trans.	  In	  Practical	  Philosophy:	  353-­‐603.	  
Metaphysik	  der	  Sitten	  Vigilantius	   (MoV	   1793-­‐1794).	   Ak	   27:479-­‐732.	   English:	  Kant	  on	   the	  
Metaphysics	   of	   Morals:	   Vigilantius’s	   Lecture	   Notes.	   In	   Lectures	   on	   Ethics:	   249-­‐452.	  Peter	  Heath,	  trans.	  Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1997.	  
Metaphysik	   Mrongovius	   (MMr	   1782-­‐1783).	   Ak	   29:747-­‐940.	   English:	   Metaphysik	  
Mrongovius.	   In	   Lectures	   on	  Metaphysics:	   109-­‐286.	   Karl	   Ameriks	   &	   Steve	   Naragon,	  trans.	  Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1997.	  
Metaphysik	  von	  Schön,	  Ontologie	  (MS	  late	  1780s)	  Ak	  28:	  461-­‐524.	  
Moralphilosophie	  Collins	  (MoC	  c.	  1780).	  Ak	  27:237-­‐473.	  English:	  Moral	  Philosophy:	  Collins’s	  
Lecture	  Notes.	  In	  Lectures	  on	  Ethics:	  37-­‐222.	  
Moralphilosophie	   Mrongovius	   II	   (MoMr2	   1784-­‐1785).	   Ak	   29:593-­‐642.	   English:	   Morality	  
According	   to	   Prof.	   Kant:	   Mrongovius’s	   Second	   Set	   of	   Lecture	   Notes	   (selections).	   In	  
Lectures	  on	  Ethics:	  223-­‐248.	  
Nachträge	  zur	  Kritik	  der	  reinen	  Vernunft	  (1.	  Auflage)	  (ACPR	  1781-­‐1787).	  Ak	  23:	  15-­‐50.	  
Prolegomena	   zu	   einer	   jeden	   künftigen	   Metaphysik,	   die	   als	   Wissenschaft	   wird	   auftreten	  
können	   (P	   1783).	   Ak	   4:253-­‐383.	   English:	   Prolegomena	   to	   Any	   Future	  Metaphysics	  
That	  Will	   Be	  Able	   to	   Come	  Forward	  as	   Science.	   Gary	   Hatfield,	   trans.	   In	  Theoretical	  
Philosophy	  after	  1781:	  29-­‐169.	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Recensionen	   von	   J.G.	   Herders	   Ideen	   zur	   Philosophie	   der	   Geschichte	   der	   Menschheit	   (RH	  1785).	   Ak	   8:43-­‐66.	   English:	   Review	   of	   J.G.	   Herder’s	   Ideas	   for	   the	  Philosophy	  of	   the	  
History	  of	  Humanity,	  Pts.	  1	  &	  2.	  Allen	  W.	  Wood,	   trans.	   In	  Anthropology,	  History,	  and	  
Education:	  121-­‐142.	  
Reflexionen	   (R).	   Ak	   14-­‐19.	   English:	   Selections	   in	   Notes	   and	   Fragments.	   Cambridge,	   UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2005.	  
Religion	   innerhalb	   der	   Grenzen	   der	   bloßen	   Vernunft	   (Rel	   1793).	   Ak	   6:1-­‐202.	   English:	  
Religion	  within	  the	  Boundaries	  of	  Mere	  Reason.	  George	  di	  Giovanni,	  trans.	  In	  Religion	  
and	  Rational	  Theology:	  39-­‐215.	  Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2001.	  
Träume	  eines	  Geistersehers,	  erläutert	  durch	  Träume	  der	  Metaphysik	   (DSS	  1766).	  Ak	  2:315-­‐373.	   English:	   Dreams	   of	   a	   Spirit-­‐Seer	   Elucidated	   by	   Dreams	   of	   Metaphysics.	   In	  
Theoretical	  Philosophy,	  1755-­‐1770:	  301-­‐359.	  
Über	  den	  Gebrauch	  teleologischer	  Principien	  in	  der	  Philosophie	   (UTP	   1788).	  Ak	  8:157-­‐184.	  English:	  On	  the	  Use	  of	  Teleological	  Principles	   in	  Philosophy.	   Günter	   Zöller,	   trans.	   In	  
Anthropology,	  History,	  and	  Education:	  192-­‐218.	  
Über	  den	  Gemeinspruch:	  Das	  mag	  in	  der	  Theorie	  richtig	  sein,	  taugt	  aber	  nicht	  für	  die	  Praxis	  (TP	   1793).	   Ak	   8:273-­‐313.	   English:	  On	  the	  Common	  Saying:	  That	  May	  Be	  Correct	   in	  
Theory,	  But	  It	  Is	  of	  No	  Use	  in	  Practice.	  Mary	  J.	  Gregor,	   trans.	   In	  Practical	  Philosophy:	  273-­‐309.	  
Von	  dem	  ersten	  Grunde	  des	  Unterschiedes	  der	  Gegenden	   in	  Raume	   (GDS	   1768).	   Ak	   2:375-­‐383.	   English:	  Concerning	   the	  Ultimate	  Ground	  of	   the	  Differentiation	  of	  Directions	   in	  
Space.	  In	  Theoretical	  Philosophy,	  1755-­‐1770:	  361-­‐372.	  
Was	  heißt:	  Sich	   im	  Denken	  orientieren?	   (OOT	   1786).	   Ak	  8:131-­‐147.	   English:	  What	  Does	   It	  
Mean	  to	  Orient	  Oneself	   in	  Thinking?	   Allen	  W.	  Wood,	   trans.	   In	  Religion	  and	  Rational	  
Theology:	  1-­‐18.	  
Wiener-­‐Logik	  (VL	  c.	  1780).	  Ak	  24:785-­‐940.	  English:	  The	  Vienna	  Logic.	  In	  Lectures	  on	  Logic:	  251-­‐377.	  
Zum	  ewigen	  Frieden	   (TPP	   1795).	  Ak	  8:341-­‐386.	  English:	  Toward	  Perpetual	  Peace.	  Mary	   J.	  Gregor,	  trans.	  In	  Practical	  Philoosphy:	  311-­‐351.	  
	  
Works	  by	  Heidegger	  	  The	  standard	  German	  edition	  of	  Heidegger’s	  works	  is	  the	  Martin	  Heidegger	  Gesamtausgabe	  (Frankfurt	  am	  Main:	  Vittorio	  Klostermann,	  1975-­‐	  ).	  The	  location	  of	  individual	  works	  within	  this	   edition	   is	   indicated	   by	   “GA	   [volume]:[pages]”	   in	   the	   following	   references.	   The	  abbreviation	   in	   parentheses	   refers	   to	   the	   abbreviation	  of	   the	  work	  used	   in	  parenthetical	  citations.	   Some	  works	   do	   not	   appear	   in	   this	   edition;	   in	   such	   cases,	   references	   are	   to	   the	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German	  edition	   listed	  here.	  Afterwards	  are	   listed	   the	  primary	  English	   translations	   I	  have	  consulted,	  supplemented	  in	  a	  few	  cases	  with	  alternatives	  from	  which	  I	  have	  also	  benefited.	  See	   also,	   in	   the	   “Other	   Works”	   listed	   below,	   Cassirer	   &	   Heidegger	   (1929);	   Husserl	   &	  Heidegger	  (1927).	  	  
700	  Jahre	  Meßkirch	  (Ansprache	  zum	  Heimatabend	  am	  22.	  Juli	  1961)	   (H	   1961).	  GA	  16:574-­‐582.	  English:	  “Home:	  The	  Seven-­‐Hundredth	  Anniversary	  of	  the	  Town	  of	  Messkirch.”	  Thomas	   Sheehan,	   trans.	   In	   Michael	   Pye,	   ed.	   Interactions	   with	   Japanese	   Buddhism:	  
Explorations	   and	   Viewpoints	   in	   Twentieth-­‐Century	   Kyōto:	   102-­‐108.	   Sheffield,	   UK:	  Equinox,	  2012.	  
Aufzeichnungen	  zum	  Kantbuch	   (NK	   1930s-­‐1940s).	   GA	   3:	   249-­‐254.	   English:	   “Notes	   on	   the	  Kantbook.”	   In	  Kant	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics,	   5th	   ed.:	   175-­‐179.	  Richard	  Taft,	  trans.	  Bloomington,	  IN:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1997.	  
Beiträge	   zur	   Philosophie	   (Vom	   Ereignis)	   (C	   1936-­‐1938).	   GA	   65.	   English:	   Contributions	   to	  
Philosophy	   (Of	   the	   Event).	   Richard	   Rojcewicz	   &	   Daniela	   Vallega-­‐Neu,	   trans.	  Bloomington,	   IN:	   Indiana	   University	   Press,	   2012.	   See	   also:	   Contributions	   to	  
Philosophy	  (From	  Enowning).	  Parvis	  Emad	  &	  Kenneth	  Maly,	  trans.	  Bloomington,	  IN:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1999.	  
Brief	  an	  Karl	  Löwith.	  20	  Aug	  1927	  (LL).	  In	  “Drei	  Briefe	  Martin	  Heideggers	  an	  Karl	  Löwith”:	  33-­‐38.	   In	   Dietrich	   Papenfuss	   &	   Otto	   Pöggeler,	   eds.	   Zur	   Philosophischen	   Aktualität	  
Heideggers,	   v.	   2:	   Im	   Gespräch	   der	   Zeit:	   27-­‐39.	   Frankfurt	   am	   Main:	   Vittorio	  Klostermann,	   1990.	   English:	   In	   “Letter	   Exchange	   with	   Karl	   Löwith	   on	   Being	   and	  
Time”:	  299-­‐303.	  Gary	  Steiner,	  trans.	  (Theodore	  Kisiel,	  rev.).	  In	  Becoming	  Heidegger:	  
On	   the	   Trail	   of	   His	   Early	   Occasional	   Writings,	   1910-­‐1927:	   289-­‐303.	   Evanston,	   IL:	  Northwestern	  University	  Press,	  2007.	  
Ernst	   Cassirer:	   Philosophie	   der	   symbolischen	   Formen,	   2.	   Teil:	   Das	   mythische	   Denken	   (RC	  1928).	   GA	   3:255-­‐270.	   English:	   Review	   of	   Ernst	   Cassirer,	   Philosophy	   of	   Symbolic	  
Forms,	  v.	  2:	  Mythical	  Thought.	   In	  Kant	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics,	  5th	  ed.:	  180-­‐190.	  
Die	  Grundprobleme	  der	  Phänomenologie	  (BPP	  1927).	  GA	  24.	  English:	  The	  Basic	  Problems	  of	  
Phenomenology,	   rev.	   ed.	   Albert	   Hofstadter,	   trans.	   Bloomington,	   IN:	   Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1982.	  
Die	   Idee	   der	   Philosophie	   und	   das	  Weltanschauungsproblem	   (KNS	   1919).	   GA	   56/57:1-­‐117.	  English:	   The	   Idea	   of	   Philosophy	   and	   the	   Problem	   of	   Worldview.	   In	   Towards	   the	  
Definition	  of	  Philosophy:	  1-­‐90.	  Ted	  Sadler,	  trans.	  London,	  UK:	  Continuum,	  2000.	  
Kant	  und	  das	  Problem	  der	  Metaphysik	  (KPM	  1929).	  GA	  3:xii-­‐xviii,	  1-­‐246.	  English:	  Kant	  and	  
the	  Problem	  of	  Metaphysics,	  5th	  ed.:	  xvii-­‐xxi,	  1-­‐173.	  Richard	  Taft,	  trans.	  Bloomington,	  IN:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1997.	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Logik:	  Die	  Frage	  nach	  der	  Wahrheit	   (L	   1925-­‐1926).	  GA	  21.	  English:	  Logic:	  The	  Question	  of	  
Truth.	  Thomas	  Sheehan,	  trans.	  Bloomington,	  IN:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  2010.	  
Martin	  Heidegger	  /	  Karl	  Jaspers	  Briefwechsel:	  1920-­‐1963	  (HJC).	  Frankfurt	  am	  Main:	  Vittorio	  Klostermann,	   1990.	   English:	   The	   Heidegger-­‐Jaspers	   Correspondence	   (1920-­‐1963).	  Gary	  E.	  Aylesworth,	  trans.	  Amherst,	  NY:	  Humanity	  Books,	  2003.	  
Metaphysische	   Anfangsgründe	   der	   Logik	   im	   Ausgang	   von	   Leibniz	   (MFL	   1928).	   GA	   26.	  English:	  The	  Metaphysical	  Foundations	  of	  Logic.	  Michael	  Heim,	   trans.	   Bloomington,	  IN:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1984.	  
Ontologie:	   Hermeneutik	   der	   Faktizität	   (O	   1923).	   GA	   63.	   English:	   Ontology—The	  
Hermeneutics	   of	   Facticity.	   John	   van	   Buren,	   trans.	   Bloomington,	   IN:	   Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1999.	  
Phänomenologische	   Interpretation	   von	  Kants	   Kritik	   der	   reinen	  Vernunft	   (PIK	   1927-­‐1928).	  GA	  25.	  English:	  Phenomenological	   Interpretation	  of	  Kant’s	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason.	  Parvis	   Emad	   &	   Kenneth	   Maly,	   trans.	   Bloomington,	   IN:	   Indiana	   University	   Press,	  1997.	  
Phänomenologische	   Interpretationen	   zu	   Aristotles:	   Einführung	   in	   die	   phänomenologische	  
Forschung	   (PIA	   1921-­‐1922).	   GA	   61.	   English:	   Phenomenological	   Interpretations	   of	  
Aristotle:	   Initiation	   into	   Phenomenological	   Research.	   Richard	   Rojcewicz,	   trans.	  Bloomington,	  IN:	  Indiana	  University	  Press,	  2001.	  
Prolegomena	   zur	   Geschichte	   des	   Zeitbegriffs	   (HCT	   1925).	   GA	   20.	   English:	   History	   of	   the	  
Concept	  of	  Time.	  Theodore	  Kisiel,	   trans.	  Bloomington,	   IN:	   Indiana	  University	  Press,	  1985.	  
Sein	   und	   Zeit	   (BT	   1927).	   GA	   2.	   English:	   Being	   and	   Time.	   John	   Macquarrie	   &	   Edward	  Robinson,	   trans.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Harper	  &	  Row,	   1962.	   See	   also:	  Being	  and	  Time:	  A	  
Translation	  of	  Sein	  und	  Zeit.	  Joan	  Stambaugh,	  trans.	  Albany,	  NY:	  SUNY	  Press,	  1996.	  
Die	   Selbstbehauptung	   der	   deutschen	   Universität	   (RA	   1933).	   Frankfurt	   am	   Main:	   Vittorio	  Klostermann,	  1983.	  English:	  “The	  Self-­‐Assertion	  of	  the	  German	  University.”	  William	  S.	  Lewis,	   trans.	   In	  Richard	  Wolin,	   ed.	  The	  Heidegger	  Controversy:	  A	  Critical	  Reader:	  29-­‐39.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1991.	  
Was	   heißt	   Denken?	   (WCT	   1951-­‐1952).	   GA	   8.	   English:	  What	   Is	   Called	   Thinking?	   Fred	   D.	  Wieck	  &	  J.	  Glenn	  Gray,	  trans.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Harper	  &	  Row,	  1968.	  
Was	   ist	   Metaphysik?	   (WM	   1929).	   GA	   9:103-­‐122.	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